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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Political and institutional leaders in the Pacific Northwest have struggled over 
how best to manage Columbia River Basin development and the implications of that 
development since the early 1900s.  Their efforts present a seeming paradox: whereas 
prominent political and institutional leaders believed some form of regional 
governance system was necessary, those same leaders refused to establish systems 
with the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the issues that led them to 
create the systems in the first place.  This study examines the historical record at the 
institutional level to determine why. 
This study found twenty-six governance systems proposed since 1933 of which 
eleven were enacted.  Prior to then, a private market oriented system dominated, 
assisted by supportive federal agencies with jurisdictional authority over individual 
resource domains.  Since 1934, the Basin has experienced an unbroken succession of 
one governance system or another, at times with multiple systems operating in 
parallel.  This study categorized each system under one of four governance models, 
distinguished by the locus of decision-making.     
Transitions from one system to another came about through evolutionary 
processes or the emergence of circumstances that allowed for dramatic shifts between 
models.  Evolutionary change within models resulted in collapse due to internal 
structural weaknesses or shifts to improved systems through mutual agreement.  
Dramatic change between models occurred when a “critical situation” appeared that 
called existing governance systems into question and allowed new systems to rise in 
ii 
their place.  Four such critical situations occurred between 1929 and 1999.  These 
were the onset of the Depression, the end of World War II, the hydro-thermal crisis of 
the mid 1970s, and the first ESA listings of salmon in 1991.   
This study concluded that the conflicting interests of powerful institutions only 
partially explain the Basin‟s governance paradox.  Differing worldviews and senses of 
institutional culture, identity, and values aggravated the conflict over competing 
interests by shaping the perspectives each party held over the goals and motivations of 
the others.  This study recommends further research to determine how institutional 
values translate into individual level decision-making.  It offers a theoretical 
framework under which such research might proceed. 
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PROLOGUE 
 
The Columbia River is international and interstate in geographic scope.  It is 
over 1200 miles long, drawing its water from two countries, five states, and the 
reservation lands of thirteen Native American tribes.  It drains a 258,000 square mile 
area encompassing parts of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and 
Canada.  It moves at an average stream flow of 265,000 cubic feet per second.  It 
drops 2,650 feet in elevation from its source to mouth.  The combination of elevation 
and flow provides the energy from which the hydropower system‟s electricity is drawn 
and constitutes a third of the nation‟s hydropower potential.  It serves as a major 
transportation corridor, moving timber and agricultural products for distribution to 
west coast and Pacific Rim markets.  Its water irrigates the farms of the arid areas 
between the Cascade and Rocky Mountain ranges (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; 
DeLuna, 1997; Brigham, 1998; Pope, 2008). 
Lang (1999) notes that two competing images of the Columbia River have 
existed since the first Euro Americans arrived.  The first is the view of “the river as a 
spiritual force,” the second as a “cornucopian provider of economic value” (p. 147).  
In more recent years, the conflicts between these two visions have been framed as a 
clash between regional icons: the Columbia Basin‟s sophisticated and technologically 
integrated system of multipurpose dams and its historic runs of wild salmon and 
steelhead.  Within this debate, each icon serves as a metaphorical representative of 
broader economic, moral, aesthetic, and, in some cases, spiritual values regarding the 
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social role of the river in particular and natural resources in general within the 
Northwest (White, 1995; Williams, 2006; Vogel, 2007).   
Disagreements over the river‟s use have existed since the river‟s development 
was first envisioned.  The United States side of the Columbia Basin spans multiple 
jurisdictions of federal, state, tribal, and local agencies.  No single entity (other than 
the courts) has ever had a scope of authority sufficient to resolve disputes spanning 
multiple jurisdictions.  The desire for a rational process to manage (if not resolve) 
differences over river use, planning, development, and operation led to the region‟s 
continuous experiments with various governance systems and structures.  The framing 
of those disagreements evolved over the years as circumstances changed and new 
institutional actors, often with competing values and worldviews, gained access to the 
debate through accumulation of financial resources and political power.   
The Pacific Northwest region of today generally corresponds to the area 
bounded by the Northwest Territory of 1848, shown in Figure P-1.  However, the 
Northwest has always had a tenuous relationship with the concept of itself as a unified 
region.  A single territorial government administered the region until 1853.  At that 
point, the increase in population in settlements north of the Columbia (especially in 
the Puget Sound area), their distance from the seat of government in the Willamette 
valley, and difficulties in communication led to a successful petition for establishment 
of what became the Washington Territory (Schafer, 1943/1918).   
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Figure P-1. 
Oregon Territory 1848
1
 
(Showing Current State Boundaries) 
 
 
 
 
Although Oregon achieved statehood in 1859 the communities of the new 
state, like those in the Washington Territory and the rest of the nation, consisted of 
relatively isolated “island communities” prior to the expansion of railroad and 
communications technology (Wiebe, 1967).  These technologies did not reach the 
inland areas of the Northwest until the latter 1800s.  Within the Northwest, disparate 
communities exploited resources of furs, fish, water, timber, minerals and crops for 
their own local interests and purposes in relative independence.  The idea of the region 
as a unified political, social, or economic entity did not begin to emerge until the 
1920s (Ogden, 1949; Vogel, 2007).     
The concept of the region as a potentially unified entity took shape as planners 
looked to develop the Columbia for purposes of irrigation, navigation, and – 
                                                 
1
 Map source: Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_Territory. 
 
2
 Map source: Northwest Region, National Marine Fisheries Service at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Salmon-
Hydropower/Columbia-Snake-Basin. 
3
 Vogel (2007) provides a great deal of information and insight regarding the establishment and 
 4 
 
eventually – hydropower (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Vogel, 2007).  White (1995) 
argues that the developed river gives the Northwest a unique unifying identity.  The 
Columbia‟s current developed state is a sophisticated blend of engineering skill and 
institutional organization.  The map provided in Figure P-2 displays the location of the 
Basin‟s multipurpose dams illustrating this “organic machine” (White, 1995).  These 
dams are managed and operated to serve as “the Northwest‟s primary power plant, 
central navigation channel, biggest irrigation ditch, and storage facility for flood 
waters” (Volkman, 1997, p. 10).  Other purposes include domestic, municipal, and 
industrial water supply, outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife restoration, and water 
quality.   
No single entity holds jurisdictional oversight over the entire system.  Instead, 
jurisdiction is fragmented among federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies 
with benefits accruing to a variety of public and private entities (Volkman, 1997).  
Although management of the Columbia as a system has been predominately a federal 
responsibility (Ogden, 1997; Williams, 2006), the interests and prerogatives of these 
other jurisdictional entities and their competing values and worldviews efforts often 
confounded governance efforts.  Consequently, since the 1920s Northwest leaders 
have struggled with how to come to a common vision regarding system planning, 
development, and operation of what was to become the Federal Columbia River Power 
System (FCRPS).   
 5 
 
There is an abundance of material addressing the historic settlement of the 
American Northwest in general (Schafer, 1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 
1967; Dodds, 1986; and Robbins, 1997 and 2004) and Columbia River development in 
Figure P-2. 
Columbia River Basin
2
 
(Showing Location of Major Dams) 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Map source: Northwest Region, National Marine Fisheries Service at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Salmon-
Hydropower/Columbia-Snake-Basin. 
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particular (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; DeLuna, 1997; Brigham, 
1998; Vogel, 2007; Pope, 2008).  Each illustrates or emphasizes different aspects of 
the region‟s settlement and development.  Although many mention the regional 
governance systems relevant to the story the authors wish to tell, only Roy Scheufele‟s 
(c. 1970) insightful analysis of the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee and 
Hemingway‟s (1983) discussion of the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation 
Council focused exclusively on Columbia Basin governance systems in the United 
States as the central subject.
3
  No one has yet written a history devoted to Basin 
governance. 
The intent of this paper is to do so.  The author was inspired to undertake this 
work based on his observations of and experience with the Columbia River Basin 
Forum (CRBF or the Forum), a short-lived governance effort initiated in 1997 that 
ended in 2000.  When first proposed the idea of a new governance effort enjoyed 
widespread support from regional governors, tribal leaders, and members of the 
region‟s congressional delegation.  Nevertheless, despite this support the resulting 
system collapsed after only a little over a year of operation.  The author undertook this 
research effort to understand why and to determine if the experience of the CRBF was 
unique or representative of past governance efforts.   
This study provides an institutional level analysis of the governance history in 
the United States portion of the Columbia River Basin., introduced through the CRBF 
                                                 
3
 Vogel (2007) provides a great deal of information and insight regarding the establishment and 
operation of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.  Her focus, however, is on the role 
of the Commission in creating the northwest‟s regional identity rather than the Commission itself.  
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experience.  Whereas this institutional approach established the events, circumstances, 
institutional actors, interests, and outcomes of regional debates over governance form, 
it could not reach the motivations within individuals that led them to their stated 
positions or drove their actions.  Differing worldviews and senses of institutional 
culture, identity, and values aggravated conflicts over interests by shaping the 
perspectives each participant held over the goals and motivations of the others.  
Determining how institutional values translated into individual level decision-making 
regarding governance choices requires further research.    
This research effort found that state and federal agency and political leaders 
debated twenty-six multi-jurisdictional governance systems between 1933 and 1999.  
Of these, they enacted eleven.  This study presents and analyzes the history of these 
twenty-six systems.  The goal was to use a framework inspired by the CRBF 
experience to understand why regional and national leaders adopted some types of 
systems and rejected others and determine lessons as may be applicable to future 
governance efforts.  Chapter 2 presents the methodology through which this 
framework was applied.  Chapters 3 through 7 provide the history, with the study‟s 
findings and conclusions presented in Chapter 8. 
This study report begins by documenting the rise and collapse of the Columbia 
River Basin Forum.  The richness of primary material regarding the CRBF‟s inception, 
operation, and demise offers a fairly complete introduction to the institutional actors, 
issues, and challenges that governance efforts faced in the recent past and will likely 
face in the future.  From it can be gleaned insights into the interests and positions of 
 8 
 
the entities involved, the types of issues institutional leaders expect such systems to 
address, and the types of challenges faced.  It also suggests a research framework by 
which a study of past systems can be undertaken.  The CRBF experience thus provides 
an informative case study introduction to this overall research report.  
 9 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO BASIN GOVERNANCE:  
THE RISE AND COLLAPSE OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FORUM 
 
 
A Paradox in Governance?   
The Columbia River Basin Forum (CRBF or the Forum) had its origins in a 
“Three Sovereigns” governance structure proposed by Oregon‟s then-governor John 
Kitzhaber in October 1997.  As the name implies, this process would be comprised of 
the region‟s three sovereign entities: federal, state, and tribal governments.  
Navigation, public power, and irrigation interests met this original proposal with 
aggressive resistance over concerns about the exclusivity of the new organization‟s 
decision-making processes.  States, tribes, and federal agencies expressed concerns 
regarding potential impacts on their jurisdictional prerogatives.  All became involved 
in the drafting of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) that would serve as a guiding 
charter.  Governmental representatives engaged directly while non-governmental 
actors participated either directly or indirectly through elected congressional 
representatives.  The result was the evolution of the original “Three Sovereigns” 
concept into the more inclusive “Columbia River Basin Forum.”  The non-government 
entity participation in the MOA‟s drafting ensured that any CRBF related meetings 
were to be open to non-governmental participants.  
An enormous amount of institutional energy and effort went into bringing the 
CRBF into being.  State, tribal, federal, and non-governmental representatives met 
over a sixteen-month period to craft an agreement under which they would operate.  
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State parties to the agreement were Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Montana.  There 
were thirteen tribal governmental parties.  Four were from the Lower Columbia River, 
collectively referred to as the lower river tribes.  These were the Confederated Tribes 
and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla 
Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, and the 
Nez Perce Tribe.  Six were from the Upper Columbia River, collectively referred to as 
the upper river tribes.  These were the Coeur D‟Alene Tribe, the Confederated Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, the Kalispel Indian Community, the 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, and the 
Spokane Tribe of Indians.  Three were from the Snake River basin, collectively 
referred to as the Snake River tribes.  These were the Burns Paiute Indian Tribe, the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, and the Shoshone-Paiute 
Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation.  Federal parties consisted of the four 
departments and ten agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities in the Columbia 
Basin.  These were the Department of Commerce (National Marine Fisheries Service), 
Department of the Army (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Department of the Interior 
(Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and 
Bureau of Indian Affairs), Department of Energy (Bonneville Power Administration), 
and Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service and Natural Resources 
Conservation Service) and the Environmental Protection Agency (MOA, 1999, p. 1).  
Each of these entities entered into the CRBF negotiations with their own set of 
interests and prerogatives.  Differing worldviews and senses of institutional culture, 
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identity, and values aggravated the conflict over competing interests and shaped the 
perspectives each party held over the goals and motivations of the others. 
Most of the parties signed the MOA in January 1999.  Others signed later and 
some not at all.  Regardless, the CRBF went ahead and held its first meeting the 
following March with high participant expectations.  However, in eleven meetings 
held over sixteen months
4
 members argued almost exclusively over issues of goals, 
procedure and format.  Frustration over lack of progress on substantive issues resulted 
in key participants either quitting or threatening to quit the process at several points.  
Despite the well-meaning efforts by CRBF proponents, participation trailed off amid 
an increasing sense of pointlessness.  The CRBF held its last meeting on April 28, 
2000.  
The experience of the CRBF presents a seeming paradox.  Whereas many 
prominent northwest political and institutional leaders strongly believed some form of 
regional
5
 governance system necessary, those same leaders failed to grant the CRBF 
the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the issues that lead them to think 
that such a system was needed in the first place.  Why? 
                                                 
4
 Meeting notes or references to meetings exist for each month from March through October 1999 and 
February through April 2000. 
 
5
 “Regional” in this context refers to the jurisdictional space between state and national levels of 
government.  Geographically, for the purposes of this study, it means the states affected by FCRPS 
related activities within Columbia River Basin: Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana and the 
Native American tribes residing therein.  Jurisdictionally, it means the state and federal agencies and 
tribal governments with operational, regulatory, and/or tribal trust and treaty responsibilities over these 
activities.  “FCRPS activities” refers to the purposes for which the FCRPS was developed (hydropower, 
irrigation, river-borne navigation, flood control, and water supply) and the impact those activities have 
on the Basin‟s natural resources in general and its salmon and steelhead runs in particular.   
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The remainder of this chapter chronicles the inception, operation, and ultimate 
disintegration of the CRBF.  It provides the institutional background from which the 
CRBF emerged.  It then presents the arguments made by political leaders in support of 
a new regional governance system as cited in conferences, publications, and the media.  
It chronicles the creation of the CRBF‟s guiding memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
and analyzes the structural weaknesses that contributed to the Forum‟s ultimate 
failure.  It then discusses the arc of the CRBF‟s existence from inception to eventual 
collapse.  It concludes with a summary of key points and an examination of the 
challenges to regional governance as illustrated by the CRBF experience, thus setting 
the stage for this study report‟s research questions and methodology.       
 
Institutional Background 
In his history of the Northwest salmon crisis, Taylor (1999) argued that 
“centrifugal forces of competing interests” (p. 247) constantly undermined solutions to 
challenges to policy and governance.  He criticized all major Northwest resource 
users, including the institutions and industries of timber harvest, logging, grazing, 
mining, fisheries, “urban environmentalists,” development, and dam building and 
public bureaucracies who all “artfully converted self-interest into principle” (p. 241).   
Although Taylor (1999) focused on the history of the regional salmon fishery, 
this study extends his argument to issues of Columbia River Basin governance.  This 
study organizes the “centrifugal forces” under three broad institutional categories.  
These are salmon harvesters, those dependent on the commercial benefits and 
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economic development provided by the multi-purpose dams, and environmental 
interests. 
The first two focused their attention on Pacific Northwest‟s two most enduring 
icons: the once massive runs of pacific salmon and the large multi-purpose dams 
located on the mainstems of the Columbia River and its major tributaries.  To 
commercial and sports fishery advocates the salmon harvest was symbolic of a critical 
regional economic and cultural resource and way of life that was rapidly collapsing.  
Tribal fishermen, while sharing a commercial interest in fish harvest, were equally if 
not more concerned with the depleted fish runs‟ impacts on their culture and the roles 
played by salmon in their sense of identity and way of life.  Although often bitterly 
opposed to the goals and objectives of each other (Taylor, 1999) and often litigation 
adversaries (Pevar, 2002), this three-way community of commercial, sport, and tribal 
fisheries were generally united in their claim that the dams were the primary reason 
for declining fish numbers (Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004).   
To those dependent on the commercial benefits provided by hydropower, 
irrigation, and navigation the dams were a symbol of the region‟s economic health as 
well as a guarantor of public safety through flood control.  The electricity produced by 
the dams provided inexpensive power to fuel the region‟s economy; the irrigation 
system supported the region‟s agricultural community; and waterborne navigation 
provided an inexpensive means to move timber and agricultural products to market 
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963).  To them, the moralistic arguments of the fishery 
community were a self-serving and disingenuous attempt to subsidize commercial and 
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sport fishing interests under pressure from natural changes in ocean conditions, rising 
global competition, and an inability to curb their own historic excesses.  There were 
deep disagreements among members of the community of dam proponents as there 
were within members of the fishery community.  Nevertheless, they shared a belief in 
the economic importance of the dams and related to them as symbolic indicators of the 
region‟s economic development and growth potential.  The constituent interests of the 
fishery and commercial development communities have been in conflict at least since 
the Army Corps of Engineers began its review in the early 1940s of the 1932 “308 
Report” (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Wilkinson, 
2005).   
The third category, American environmentalism, is more recent.  Concurrent 
with the Nation‟s rising environmental consciousness, strong support for the value of 
restoring sustainable populations of wild fish for their own sake emerged.  National 
and state environmental protection statutes in general and the Endangered Species Act 
in particular embody this value (Dunlap, 1992; Taylor, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005).   
The geographic breadth and socio-political complexity of this three-way 
conflict illustrated the inadequacy of the region‟s governance systems, as they existed 
in the mid to late 1990s.  One party or another filed multiple lawsuits looking to the 
courts to resolve the issues and, as Taylor (1999) argued, validate the legitimacy of 
their values and beliefs.   
The first listings of salmon and steelhead by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) in 1991 and 1992 and the establishment by NMFS of the federally led 
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Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum)
6
 in 1995 shifted the locus of 
governance away from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPPC or 
Council) to the federal agencies, especially NMFS.
7
  Other listings followed.  By 
1997, regional concerns over the listings and their potential impacts were coupled 
with: 
 Uncertainty over a pending new NMFS biological opinion (BiOp) regarding 
the effect of hydropower operations on listed salmon species,
8
 
 A related study by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the impact of the four 
lower Snake River dams on salmon survival and the study‟s potential to lead to 
the breaching of  those dams,  
                                                 
6
 The Regional Forum is not to be confused with the Columbia River Basin Forum.  The Regional 
Forum was established as a provision of a biological opinion issued by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service on the FCRPS in 1995.  It consisted of state, federal, and tribal institutional representatives.  
The Executive Committee was comprised of the state Governors or their designated representatives, 
tribal government leaders, and regional federal agency executives.   
 
7
 The Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council was created under the 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation of Act of 1980 to balance hydropower 
planning with fish and wildlife needs.  Chapter 6 discusses the origins of the Council in greater detail.  
The Council‟s name was officially changed to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council in 2003 
in order to emphasize the fish and wildlife aspects of its mission.  In the 1980 Power Act, the word 
“Conservation” in the Council‟s name specifically referred to energy conservation.  The name change 
was intended to convey the equal status of enhancing and protecting fish and wildlife resources affected 
by the dams with energy planning in the Council‟s programs (NPPC, 2007).  To minimize confusion, 
this report uses the Council‟s most recent name throughout. 
 
8
 If an agency proposes an action that will take place in an area in which listed species reside, then the 
Endangered Species Act requires the agency to consult with the regulatory authority over the species 
affected.  Jurisdiction over salmon resides with the National Marine Fisheries Service.  Upon reviewing 
the proposed action, the regulatory agency issues a written opinion (referred to as a “biological opinion” 
or “BiOp”) as to whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed species 
or result in the destruction or adverse modification to the listed species‟ critical habitat.  See ESA 
sections 7(a)2 and  7(a)3. 
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 Concern over the nationalization of the dam removal debate by fishery and 
environmental activists, 
 Uncertainty over the impacts of new policies regarding energy deregulation on 
the region‟s federally operated hydropower system,  
 The collapse of the Executive Committee of the Regional Forum, and 
 Frustration with the region‟s complex and often contradictory patchwork of 
treaties, statutes, regulations, policies, agency decisions and court 
determinations regarding salmon. 
Regional leaders presented three arguments in favor of a Columbia River Basin 
governance system.  First was the desire to better manage and organize the sheer 
complexity of Columbia Basin issues.  Regional leaders argued in favor of some form 
of system to eliminate duplication, confusion and conflict in regional decision-making 
then being carried out through multiple processes.  Second, and related to the first, was 
the desire for greater inclusiveness in the decision-making process.  Third was concern 
over periodic threats to the benefits derived from the Columbia – the most recent of 
which were outlined above - and the degree to which external forces could assume 
control over the system and divert those benefits out of region (Crampton, October 16, 
1998; Batt, Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998).   
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, released in June 2004, clearly 
portrays the complexity of Columbia River issues.  The states of Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, and Montana share a geographic and jurisdictional footprint with the thirteen 
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sovereign Indian tribes with rights within the Basin and ten federal agencies.
9
  The 
report characterized federal responsibilities as “a multilayered collection of laws, 
treaties, executive orders, and court decisions.”  It identified two Canadian and six 
Indian treaties; thirty-one nationwide statutes; six basin-specific statutes; fourteen 
mission-specific statutes applying to individual federal agencies; seven federal 
executive orders and memoranda applying to all agencies; and seventeen court 
decisions that defined and guided agency responsibilities for mission authority and 
operations, fish and wildlife mitigation, and tribal relationships.  These in turn 
spawned thirty-eight supporting plans and programs involving a varying array of 
federal, state, and tribal involvement (GAO, 2004).  This array of rules, regulations, 
and programs constitute a structure of regional governance absent the benefit of a 
unifying system to mediate their often-inconsistent goals and requirements.
10
 
As complicated as it made the situation out to be, this GAO report was in fact 
somewhat simplistic in that it only addressed federal activity.  It did not discuss 
additional layers of regulation and bureaucracy resulting from state, tribal, and local 
levels of responsibility.  These other levels of government hold jurisdiction over 
                                                 
9
 The agencies identified in the GAO report are the Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Marine Fisheries Service, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and U.S. Geological Survey.    
 
10
 This research report on Basin governance uses the terms “system” and “structure” in the sense offered 
by Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991).  Social systems are relationships between and practices of 
human agents patterned to the point where they form recognizable entities.  These entities manifest as 
organizations, institutions, or other social groupings.  Structures are the formal and normative rules and 
resources by which established systems operate.  To use the CRBF as an example, the organization of 
institutional participants into an arrangement called the Columbia River Basin Forum constitutes a 
system.  The CRBF‟s memorandum of agreement, facilitation and note-taking support, and internal 
operating procedures represents its structure.   
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nonfederal Basin policy domains such as water rights, permitting, fishery harvest 
levels, recreational facilities, and hunting and fishing regulation and add additional 
levels of complexity to issues of resource management.  No single entity has the 
authority to integrate areas of jurisdictional overlap or resolve disputes.   
Further compounding the issue were nongovernmental private interests active 
in the Basin and dependent on the missions and programs of federal and state agencies.  
To use the federal agencies as examples, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
traditionally draws its support from navigation interests; the Bureau of Reclamation 
from irrigation interests; the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) from public 
utility districts and direct service industries; the NMFS with commercial fishing 
interests; and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with sports fishermen, hunters, and 
state fish and game agencies (Clarke and McCool, 1996; Ogden, 1997).  Rightly or 
wrongly, these private interests were frequently perceived to bias agency decision-
making either through direct lobbying or by acting through their congressional 
representatives to ensure that agencies paid proper attention to their concerns. 
Such a dizzying array of requirements, activity, and competing interests all but 
guaranteed interpretative disagreement and jurisdictional dispute.  Writing to the 
CRBF following their June 24, 1999 meeting, attorney James Buchal argued for 
adoption of a clear salmon recovery goal.  In doing so, he underscored several of the 
arguments in favor of developing a coherent governance framework.  Buchal argued 
that unless the CRBF exercised leadership in “tempering and balancing them [fish and 
wildlife goals] with other relevant goals, the region‟s fishery managers will continue to 
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work at cross purposes.”  He noted that at several times during the meeting, members 
asserted the establishment in law of their relative positions to support their arguments.  
He argued that “the laws are vague and contradictory” and that “Columbia Basin 
salmon recovery is not progressing because of a lack of coordination among the 
relevant agencies to strike reasonable accommodations among these statutory goals.”  
“Only when some entity succeeds in taking charge of the recovery program, and 
giving meaningful guidance to those charged to implement it, can we obtain genuine 
progress” (emphasis added). 11 
The case for Northwest regional governance, based on the desire for greater 
efficiency, the desire for more inclusive decision making, the need to reconcile 
competing statutory and regulatory demands, and protection of regional benefits led 
many to conclude that existing governance systems were not adequate to the task.  For 
example, former Senator and Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield recommended that 
Congress expand the membership and authority of the Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council through legislative action (Collette, 1997).  Then-Governor John 
Kitzhaber stated that the Council “lacks the proper mission, proper representation, and 
the proper authority” to manage the Columbia River benefits (Crampton, October 16, 
1998) and eventually recommended replacement of the Council altogether (O‟Bryant, 
September 24, 1999).  Collectively, these issues convinced regional leaders that a new 
                                                 
11
 Quoted from a Murphy and Buchal, LLP, memorandum to Columbia Basin Forum Committee Members 
concerning Columbia Basin fish and wildlife goals.  The memorandum is dated June 29, 1999.  The original 
document is on file with Columbia River Basin Forum meeting notes held in the offices of the Northwest 
Power and Conservation Council and DS Consulting, Portland, Oregon.     
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system of decision-making was necessary to replace the Regional Forum‟s Executive 
Committee and to address weaknesses in the scope and authorities of the Council.    
  
Establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum 
Seeking to offset the growing federal role in Basin decision-making generated 
by the salmon listings with increased state and tribal input, Oregon Governor 
Kitzhaber hosted a regional conference in October 1997 at which he promoted creation 
of a “Three Sovereigns” process.  The stated goal was to manage Columbia River 
basin issues in a more integrated, accountable, and responsive manner.  This was to be 
done through establishment of a collaborative decision-making process that would 
develop consensus recommendations for regional decision-making authorities 
(Crampton, October 16, 1998).  Kitzhaber was successful in convincing his fellow 
governors that some such effort was worthwhile.  In a memo issued on July 15, 1998 
the four governors presented a statement of joint intent to bring the region together on 
a “common position” and not let the issues be “determined solely at the national level” 
(Batt, Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998). 
Governor Kitzhaber, supported by the regional governors, envisioned the Three 
Sovereigns operating through a “high-level policy forum” consisting of one 
representative each from the federal government, the four Northwest states, and the 
thirteen Columbia River Basin tribes.  The members of this forum would “address, 
collaborate on and coordinate basin-level policy, planning, decision-making, and 
implementation issues.”  A senior staff-level committee of four state, four federal, and 
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four tribal representatives would constitute this forum.  Recognizing the difficulty of 
reaching decisions on the Basin‟s conflicting issues through consensus, the governors 
suggested that, “a river governance framework may need to be legislated by the U.S. 
Congress…a process that could take several years.”  They then initiated a parallel 
initiative to determine whether a new statutory structure could be achieved (Batt, 
Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, July 15, 1998).   
The governors also proposed that a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
institutionalizing the Three Sovereigns Process be developed and signed by November 
1998.  However, not all felt that the “Three Sovereigns” process was the “right 
solution to the right problem.”  Upriver agricultural and timber interests dependent on 
the river‟s commercial uses of irrigation and navigation and hydropower users were 
deeply concerned over a body so heavily represented by tribal and downriver fishery 
and environmental advocates.  They questioned whether any form of regional 
governance would be part of a “sensible solution” (Tansey, March 17, 1998; Senate 
Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns, 1998).   
This group found a receptive audience among some members of the regional 
congressional delegation.  In a joint letter to Kitzhaber, Representatives Bob Smith (R-
OR), Doc Hastings (R-WA), Michael Crapo (R-ID), and Rick Hill (R-MT) expressed 
their concern over the “scope and intent” of the Three Sovereigns proposal and the 
suggested one-per-government voting scheme.  They called for a greater 
representation of non-governmental interests and more non-governmental participation 
(Congressmen Rap Three Sovereigns Process, 1998).  Senator Slade Gorton (R–WA) 
 22 
 
openly questioned whether the “problem” was a “lack of coordination or the inherent 
tension of federal agencies having to make decisions in the face of conflicting federal 
laws and the strong voices of diametrically opposed interests” and whether the Three 
Sovereigns was the proper response (Senate Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns 
Process, July 13, 1998).  Going a step further, Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) 
introduced Senate Bill S-214 that would require a non-governmental advisory group 
for whatever system eventually chosen (Three Sovereigns Develops New Twist, June 
9, 1998; Senate Hearing Focuses on Three Sovereigns Process, July 13, 1998; 
Espenson, August 28, 1998).
12
    
The governors‟ memorandum of July 15 offered four governance options in 
addition to the original Three Sovereigns proposal.
13
  A regional discussion ensued 
from which emerged a compromise.  The compromise called for more inclusive 
involvement by non-governmental parties and a renaming of the resultant governance 
system as the “Columbia River Basin Forum” in order to distance it from the 
governments-only connotation of the Three Sovereigns label.  Commercial interests 
thus received assurances that CRBF-related meetings would be open to non-
governmental participants.
14
   
                                                 
12
 The state legislatures also voiced concern that more stringent recovery efforts may have to be funded 
from state resources.  They created the Legislative Council on River Governance (LCRG) to stay 
abreast of developments in the Three Sovereigns process.   
 
13
 The governance alternatives offered in the July 15 memo are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
14
 Ironically, there is no indication in any of the CRBF records or meeting notes that any non-
governmental participant ever attended a formal CRBF meeting. When asked about this, a public power 
participant to the process replied that once the MOA was signed, his organization realized that the 
CRBF would be unable to make any significant changes to the system, and therefore posed no threat to 
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Some saw the CRBF as an interim solution that allowed time for trust and 
relationship building and greater coordination.  Concurrently the parties – particularly 
the states – could explore whether enough common ground existed for a more formal 
arrangement with true decision-making authority empowered by statute (Crampton, 
October 16, 1998; Espenson, October 23, 1998).  Others held great hope and faith in 
the CRBF‟s own intrinsic potential, although from different perspectives.  The federal 
agencies in general voiced support for a process that would bring the regional parties 
together and result in greater input to and support for federal decisions.  NMFS in 
particular sought regional input and ultimate buy-in to whatever decisions the 
biological opinion - due by the end of 1999 - would ultimately make.  Many of the 
tribes were eager to get on with substantive discussions as governing equals.  Spokane 
tribal representative Howard Funke captured tribal feeling when he argued that “the 
idea of governments sitting down and talking about fish, wildlife, and the habitat…and 
in their ecosystem…is the right thing to do” (Crampton, October 16, 1998; Espenson, 
February 5, 1999).   
The compromise did not satisfy everyone.  Although supportive of regional 
governance in the abstract, the governors of Idaho and Montana expressed concern 
over how potential outcomes would affect the agricultural and recreational interests of 
their respective states.  Idaho particularly was leery of even the appearance of ceding 
authority over water use to some regional authority made up of parties suspected of 
designs on Idaho water and supportive of the breaching of the four lower Snake River 
                                                                                                                                            
their interests.  Consequently, they stopped investing any time into its workings (Personal 
communication with participant.)   
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dams.  Both states threatened to withhold support for the CRBF unless these concerns 
were addressed (Montana, Idaho won‟t Sign on to Northwest Salmon Plan, 1999).   
The Nez Perce, distrustful of excessive state influence in the process, felt that 
their time would more be effectively spent in dealing directly with federal agencies 
through consultation and, when necessary, litigation.  They also, more than other basin 
tribes, believed that the CRBF was not an appropriate forum for their tribal leaders.  In 
their view, government-to-government negotiations between the Nez Perce and the 
federal government should not occur through federal agency heads but rather through 
direct involvement by the White House.  They staunchly opposed the notion of 
representative involvement, stating that they would not allow anyone other than tribal 
leaders to represent tribal interests and insisting on direct tribal participation at each 
level of the process (Espenson, Feb 5, 1999; Espenson, Mar 12, 1999).  The Nez Perce 
never signed the MOA.   
Divisions existed among the Umatilla board of directors.  Like the Nez Perce, 
they harbored deep distrust of state motives, especially Oregon.  Citing previous 
efforts by the state attorney general to limit tribal fishing rights, many board members 
did not believe that collaborating with a body historically hostile to fundamental tribal 
interests was possible.  Others on the board believed that the benefits of participation 
outweighed the risk.  It is not clear whether the Umatilla ultimately signed the MOA.
15
 
                                                 
15
 Frankly, it is not entirely clear which of the lower Columbia tribes did or did not eventually sign the 
MOA.  The original MOA signature sheet was not filed among the records reviewed for this study.  The 
information presented as to signatories is derived from media accounts and recollection of process 
participants.   
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After two postponements
16
 generated by concerns over state decision-making 
prerogatives, tribal concerns, funding, and extensive review by the federal agencies, a 
CRBF signing ceremony finally occurred on January 29, 1999.  Fourteen regional 
sovereign entities signed.  Six others were supportive and signed a short while later, 
including Montana.  Governor Kempthorne of Idaho signed the following March, 
although in doing so he made it clear that the state of Idaho would not support any 
recommendation that included either removal of the Snake River dams or additional 
water flows out of Idaho (Espenson, Feb 5 and Mar 12, 1999). 
The signing ceremony in January of 1999 culminated almost two years of 
debate and negotiations over roles, responsibilities, representation, and institutional 
authority.  The discussion identified both a general interest in addressing the issue of 
regional governance and the myriad differences among regional interests that made 
structuring a governance framework so difficult.  Thus, it underscored the paradox of 
the effort.  Almost all parties agreed that a regional governance system could allow for 
more efficient decision-making, be more inclusive, and help protect regional 
resources.  However, the discussion also revealed a deep unwillingness to concede to 
the CRBF the decision-making authority that could make it a successful resolver of 
disputes.  A large reservoir of skepticism remained among regional parties as to each 
other‟s intent and motives.  This skepticism and the lack of agreement over formal 
decision authority led several to believe that a statutorily constituted body would 
                                                 
16
 The draft MOA was released for regional comment in August 1998 and originally scheduled for 
signing in the following November.  The signing date was postponed until mid December and again 
until January 1999.    
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ultimately be needed.  Nevertheless, signatories agreed to allow participation by non-
signatory entities in the interest of moving forward and with the hope that those parties 
who had not yet signed would eventually come around.   
The document that emerged from this process reflects the concerns and 
interests of the debate that created it.  Its structure and language played a significant 
role in the ultimate operation of the CRBF.  It embodies the rules and procedures of 
the CRBF‟s establishment through negotiation by regional agents.  It is therefore 
useful at this point to review its key elements.   
 
The Memorandum of Agreement 
The fifteen pages comprising the MOA signed in January 1999 contain detailed 
language laying out the Forum‟s purposes, organization, processes, guidelines for 
public involvement, and rules for financial management.  An appendix outlined five 
substantive issues intended to receive immediate attention.   
Section II of the MOA (1999) identified the Forum‟s purpose.  Its overarching 
purpose was  “to provide a high-level policy forum in which federal, state and tribal 
governments, working with interested members of the public, will address, collaborate 
on and coordinate basin-level policy, planning, decision-making and implementation 
issues that effect [sic] the Columbia River Basin fish and wildlife and related habitat.  
The parties recognize the need to prioritize their efforts, focusing on the most pressing 
issues with the greatest opportunity to improve the effectiveness of regional efforts.” 
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Specific purposes included ensuring coordination among governmental parties 
and addressing all factors that affect anadromous fish in the Basin, such as 
hydropower operations, harvest, habitat, and hatcheries.  Other purposes were to 
“harmonize actions and shape initiatives,” “simplify current processes by eliminating 
duplicative efforts and consolidating or eliminating existing committees or bodies,” 
provide for dispute resolution; improve financial management; ensure effective and 
independent scientific and economic review mechanisms; and “ensure a structured 
process of public information and involvement” (MOA, 1999, pp. 3-4).   
For funding, the MOA (1999) called on the parties to “commit to investigate 
the full range of funding alternatives.”  The parties agreed that “funding obligations 
are to be shared among the parties on an equitable basis,” subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds.  The Committee identified an initial budget of $119,000 to 
$189,000 and appended this budget to the agreement (MOA, 1999, p. 6 and Appendix 
B.) 
The MOA (1999) defined a two-tiered organizational structure almost identical 
to that prescribed under Governor Kitzhaber‟s Three Sovereigns concept.  At the upper 
policy level was the Columbia River Basin Forum Board (the Board).  The Board 
consisted of the governors of Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Montana; the leaders of 
the thirteen Basin Indian tribes; and a “representative of the federal Administration.”  
The key functions of the Board were to provide policy guidance with regard to MOA 
implementation, review priorities and tasks, provide oversight for the Forum 
Committee.  The Board was also empowered to make determinations and 
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recommendations on matters upon which it reached consensus (MOA, 1999, pp. 4-5).  
There was no formal connection between the Board and the Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council or with the remnants of the NMFS‟ Regional Forum, both of 
which continued to function.   
The MOA delegated implementation to the Columbia River Basin Forum 
Committee (Forum Committee).  The Forum Committee consisted of twelve members.  
One each was to be appointed from the four Northwest states; four collectively 
representing the twelve tribes;
17
 and one each representing the federal Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, Interior, and Energy.  Committee members were to elect a chair 
to serve a one-year term.  Functions of the Committee included carrying out the 
purposes of the Forum; development of annual internal operating budgets; 
implementation of the MOA‟s public involvement and outreach provisions; 
monitoring implementation of agreed-upon actions; and preparing issues of such 
policy significance as would require referral to the Board (MOA, 1999, pp. 5-6).   
The MOA carefully defined the processes for getting an issue before the Forum 
Committee and for the Committee to issue a recommendation.  Although any 
Committee member could propose an issue for consideration, three separate voting 
processes were required before the Forum Committee could issue a formal 
recommendation.  First, the Committee put the issue to a vote to determine whether to 
                                                 
17
 Two represented the upriver tribes and two the lower river tribes.  The tribes could also designate up 
to four alternate representatives from those tribes whose programs were directly affected by an issue 
before the Forum Committee.  (As noted earlier, the Nez Perce did not delegate to anyone the right to 
represent Nez Perce tribal interests.) 
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consider it.  Nine (75%) of the twelve Committee members had to concur before an 
item could be taken up.  If an issue passed this step, it was designated a “Forum 
Issue.”  Forum Issues were eligible for further discussion, analysis, and the 
development of alternative resolutions.  Although not clear from the language of the 
MOA (1999), it appears that the Forum Committee could provide this level of analysis 
to relevant decision-makers without further action and without making a formal Forum 
Committee recommendation.  If, however, the Committee desired a formal 
recommendation or believed additional discussion needed then it would call for a 
second vote.  Putting a Forum Issue into the collaborative process required the 
consensus of the Forum Committee.  The Committee member with jurisdiction over 
the issue in discussion could limit or terminate the process at any time.  Once the 
collaborative process was completed, the Forum Committee could make its 
recommendation after a third consensus vote.  The MOA defined “consensus” as a 
recorded vote of all twelve Forum Committee members, with no votes in opposition.  
Members who did not register a vote within two weeks of an issue being called or who 
chose to abstain did not count against the consensus (MOA, 1999, pp. 6-7).   
In addition to spelling out what the Forum could do and how it would do it – 
and perhaps more importantly – the MOA (1999) included a list of twelve exclusions 
specifying what the Forum could not do.  Among these were prohibitions on limiting 
the otherwise lawful decision-making discretion of any of the parties; prohibitions on 
requiring parties to limit their use of Basin resources; prohibitions on addressing “local 
issues that do not have basin-wide effects;” prohibitions on any affect to private 
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property and water rights; and a prohibition on requiring any party to expend funds in 
support of the agreement (pp. 9-10). 
The language and procedures embodied in the MOA (1999) are reflective of 
both the hope and suspicion that underscored the debate and discussion leading up to 
its signing.  The hope was that the Basin‟s collective interests would outweigh more 
localized interests and render the restrictive provisions of the MOA unnecessary.  Yet 
this hope was undermined by the parties‟ deep seated (and, as this study report will 
show, long standing) opposition to centralized authority in any regional governance 
system.  The states, tribes, and federal agencies would not support a decision process 
that could challenge state or tribal sovereignty or federal agency prerogatives.  The 
MOA underscored this principle through the requirement for a super-majority to get 
issues even considered by the Committee; the requirement for consensus voting; the 
long list of exclusions; and the provision that allowed any party to terminate 
collaboration of any issue that fell under its jurisdiction.  These provisions are the 
heart of the paradox.
18
  The result was a document crafted on the optimism that 
consensus on substantive issues would emerge while denying the CRBF, as an 
institution, any mechanism for resolving issues for which consensus proved 
impossible.   
                                                 
18
 The predictable problems with this sort of arrangement caused some regional leaders to champion a 
permanent legislative solution to alter the institutional prerogatives that the MOA‟s provisions were 
designed to protect.  The CRBF debate illustrates how difficult it will ever be to get the political process 
to produce such legislation absent a regional crisis of such magnitude that it dwarfs parochial concerns.  
It is difficult to see how the MOA signers – all of whom represent sovereign entities that could have 
voluntarily surrendered some sovereignty to further region wide interests – would support creation of a 
statute leading to the same end.  As this study will show, they never have. 
 
 31 
 
 
The CRBF in Action 
The Forum Committee
19
 met thirteen times between March 1999 and April 
2000.  The first two meetings, both in March 1999, understandably focused on internal 
organizational issues.  The Forum Committee appointed two ad hoc subcommittees, 
one to address budget and funding and the other to develop an agenda and logistical 
arrangements for a proposed Forum Board meeting.  It unanimously elected Eric 
Bloch, an Oregon representative to the Council and Oregon‟s representative to the 
Forum Committee, as chair.  It agreed that discussions of substantive issues would 
take place within the Forum Committee as a whole rather than developing an overly 
bureaucratic system of multiple subcommittees.  The Committee agreed that each 
representative should produce credentials from their respective agency head or 
government formally appointing him or her as their parent body‟s official 
spokesperson.
20
  The Committee agreed to hire a coordinator to manage its internal 
business and assigned a subcommittee to develop a work plan for meeting its MOA 
responsibilities (Meeting Minutes, March 10 and March 30 1999).  In short, the first 
meetings were used to “sort out the membership and begin formulating a plan for 
                                                 
19
 The Forum‟s tribal representatives were John Platt, Chad Colter, Howard Funke, and Brian 
Lipscomb.  State representatives were Eric Bloch (Oregon) who also served as the Forum Committee 
Chair, Bob Nichols (Washington), Mike Field (Idaho), and Stan Grace (Montana).  Federal 
representatives were Doug Arndt (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for the Department of Defense), 
Karen Hunt (Bonneville Power Administration, for the Department of Energy), Anne Badgley (U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, for the Department of Interior), and Danny Constenstein (National Marine 
Fisheries Service, for the Department of Commerce). 
 
20
 By insisting on credentialing, the group hoped to avoid a problem that plagued the Regional Forum: 
different people claiming to represent the same governmental entity or non-government interest but 
advocating different policy positions (Meeting Minutes, March 10 1999). 
 32 
 
addressing the tasks outlined in the MOA” (Espenson, March 12, 1999).  Subsequent 
meetings resulted in development of a work plan and agreement on a guiding goal 
statement (Meeting Minutes, April 29 and September 7, 1999). 
The tone of discussions as recorded in meeting minutes and reported in press 
coverage of meeting proceedings is civil, respectful, and conveys the sense of 
importance that all participants attached to Forum Committee business.  However, 
over time, the meeting notes also document the growing frustration with the group‟s 
inability to come to grips with issues of substance.   
Federal agencies and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council had six 
major, interrelated processes underway in the Columbia Basin at the time of the 
CRBF‟s formation.  These were:  
 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers environmental impact statement (EIS) 
concerning juvenile fish passage through the Snake River dams.
 21
  The 
most controversial option under consideration in the EIS was potential 
removal of the earthen portion of four dams on the lower Snake River.  
Selection of this option would eliminate commercial navigation into Idaho 
and hydropower production.   
 The National Marine Fisheries Service biological opinion on the Federal 
Columbia Basin Power System (FCRPS).  This opinion and the Corps EIS 
                                                 
21
 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies integrate environmental 
values into their decision making processes.  To meet NEPA requirements, federal agencies must 
consult with any other federal agency holding jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to a 
potential environmental impact of a proposed action.  The agency then prepares a detailed statement 
known as an environmental impact statement.  See NEPA, 1970, section 102 (C).   
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comprised the core elements informing a much-anticipated decision 
expected by 1999 on the future of the FCRPS. 
 The Federal Caucus‟ Basinwide Salmon Recovery Strategy. 22  The federal 
agencies producing this document intended it to serve as a roadmap to 
salmon recovery.  It addressed all of the “Hs” believed to affect the salmon 
life cycle: habitat, harvest, hatcheries, and the hydropower system.
 23
 
 Then Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s “Multispecies 
Framework.”  The Council undertook this initiative to look holistically at 
opportunities to improve environmental conditions for all Basin fish 
species. 
 Bonneville Power Administration‟s (BPA) 2001 – 2006 rate case.  The 
Bonneville Project Act of 1937 requires the BPA administrator to sell 
electricity generated from federal hydropower projects in the Columbia 
River to preference customers at cost.  Cost includes the cost of energy 
acquisition, conservation, and transmission and includes routine operations 
and maintenance and the amortization of capital projects.  The rates at the 
time of the CRBF went into effect in 1996 for the five-year rate period from 
                                                 
22
 At this point, the Federal Caucus was a loose consortium of the federal agencies involved with 
NFMS‟ Regional Forum.  The Federal Caucus would meet to coordinate federal agency positions in 
preparation for discussions within the Regional Forum and CRBF.  The CRBF envisioned three such 
caucuses; the Federal Caucus, a state caucus, and a tribal caucus.  The Federal Caucus was formally 
codified under a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2000 (personal experience of author). 
 
23
 The Basinwide Salmon Recovery Strategy was initially referred to as the “4-H Paper.” This 
colloquialism was changed to the “All-H Paper” upon receipt of a letter of complaint sent by the 4-H 
Club organization (personal experience of author).  The original document can be found at 
http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/BiologicalOpinions/FCRPS/2000Biop/AllHStrategy.aspx. 
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October 1996 through September 2001 (BPA, 1996).  BPA was undergoing 
its rate setting process for rate period October 2001 through September 
2006.  The federal government was deregulating and restructuring the 
energy industry in order to improve competition and reduce prices.  
Deregulation was especially complex in the Pacific Northwest due to the 
dominant position in the energy market occupied by BPA, a federal agency 
under the U.S. Department of Energy.
 24
  The impact of deregulation on 
BPA in general and highly volatile swings in west coast energy prices 
during the summer of 2000 raised anxiety in the minds of many over the 
future of the region‟s cherished low energy prices (BPA, 2001). 
 The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of 
Land Management‟s Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management 
Project (ICBEMP).  Created through a 1993 directive from President 
Clinton, ICBEMP‟s purpose was to develop a “scientifically sound, 
ecosystem based strategy for management of 64 million acres of lands 
administered by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management 
within the Columbia River Basin, and portions of the Klamath and Great 
basins in Oregon.”  Concerns over forest and rangeland health, wildland 
fires, and threats to fish and wildlife species inspired this effort.  ICBEMP 
released a final environmental impact statement and proposed decision in 
December 2000 (ICBEMP, undated).  The release initiated a period of 
                                                 
24
 At the time, BPA provided on average about 40% of the electrical power sold in the region and 
controlled more than 50% of the region‟s transmission lines (BPA, 2001). 
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protest and recriminations as communities grounded in resource extraction 
industries such as timber, mining, and ranching reacted to perceived threats 
to their ways of life.   
These six processes were each addressing substantive and far-reaching issues.  
The resolution of those issues had the potential to disrupt the status quo of regional 
economic and commercial arrangements.  Each participant in the CRBF, as well as 
numerous non-governmental organizations and institutions, had a substantial stake in 
the outcome of these other processes and the potential impact of one process on the 
others.  Despite this, as pointed out by the facilitator during the October meeting, even 
after four or five sessions, the time still being spent on discussing process to the 
exclusion of substantive matters (Meeting Minutes, October 11, 1999).   
It was the importance of the potential policy outcomes of these parallel 
processes that led to the creation of the CRBF.  Ironically, that importance was equally 
the reason that regional agents ensured, through the MOA‟s provisions, that the CRBF 
was impotent to substantively resolve differences over the underlying issues.  The 
resulting sense of frustration led to members eventually losing confidence in the Forum 
Committee‟s ability to achieve anything significant.    
 
The Collapse 
The group grew increasingly frustrated over (1) the uncertain role of the CRBF 
in relation to other regional processes addressing many of the same issues, (2) 
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questions by some participants over the actual level of commitment to the CRBF by 
member governments, (3) funding, and (4) the requirement for consensus decisions.    
Recall that the overlapping nature of multiple complex processes and the lack 
of any comprehensive coordinating mechanism was one of the motivations behind 
creation of the CRBF.  However, the lack of clarity in the MOA (1999) as to precisely 
what the Forum Committee was expected to do carried into the Forum Committee 
discussions.  Recall also that the purpose written in the MOA (1999) called on the 
CRBF to serve as “a high-level policy forum in which federal, state and tribal 
governments… will address, collaborate on and coordinate basin-level policy, 
planning, decision-making and implementation issues that effect [sic] the Columbia 
River Basin fish and wildlife and related habitat” (p. 3-4).  The parties interpreted this 
differently.  The representatives from Washington, the upriver tribes, and the Corps of 
Engineers felt the Forum Committee should be developing a basin-wide strategic plan 
to guide the other ongoing processes.
25
  Others (Montana, Idaho, and lower tribal 
representatives)
 26
 felt that such an overarching plan would be redundant to the other 
processes and instead looked to the Forum Committee to resolve specific issues 
(Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, September 7, 1999).   
                                                 
25
 Interestingly, this planning function was similar to that performed by The Pacific Northwest Regional 
Planning Commission (1933-1943), the Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee (1946-1967), and the 
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967-1981).  Efforts at multi-domain, region wide 
planning essentially ended with the 1981 termination of the Pacific Northwest River Basins 
Commission.  These other governance systems will be discussed later in this report. 
 
26
 It is not exactly clear what Oregon‟s position was on the need for an overarching plan.  The July 
meeting minutes record the Oregon representative as stating that a desired goal of the group was a “plan 
that will lead to fish and wildlife recovery.”   In September, however, the meeting minutes state that he 
believed that, with other processes underway, it would not be appropriate for the Forum to develop 
another plan.       
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By July, group frustration over the lack of agreement over its role grew more 
pronounced.  Fundamental differences in policy objectives held by the parties 
exacerbated the situation.  For example, representatives from the Salish Kootenai and 
lower river tribal representatives argued for restoration of a “natural cycle” to the river, 
which could mean partial removal of the Snake River dams and/or additional flows out 
of the reservoirs in Montana and Idaho – actions that Montana, Idaho, and other upper 
river tribes vehemently opposed.  Other controversial issues included the role of 
hatcheries to supplement conservation objectives, the practice of barging of fish past 
the dams during the late summer, and a definition of the appropriate balance between 
“fish and people”.  Representatives from Idaho, Washington, and the upriver tribes 
were eager to move on with substantive discussions on these issues.  Meanwhile, 
Oregon and the representative from the lower river tribes believed the group needed to 
agree to specific objectives before such substantive discussions could be meaningful 
(Meeting Minutes, July 21 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999). 
Although the Committee adopted an overarching goal statement in September 
(Meeting Minutes, September 7, 1999), the group was never able to agree to objectives 
that were more specific or engage on substantive issues.  Governor Kitzhaber, 
concerned over the lack of progress, noted in September that the region was at “grave 
risk” of losing its two most prized assets: salmon and the “reliable low cost supply of 
power produced for the Northwest by the federal dams on the Columbia River.”  
Noting once again that neither the Columbia River Basin Forum nor the Northwest 
Power and Conservation Council could authoritatively address the region‟s issues, he 
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renewed the call for congressional legislative action to replace both.  Governor 
Kitzhaber likened the situation to the Balkans of Europe, noting that regional parties 
have “no requirement for coordinated action and no way to resolve conflicts between 
themselves” (O‟Bryant, September 24, 1999). 
The second general source of member frustration was deep suspicion over the 
level of genuine commitment the other participating governments had to the process.  
Both the state and tribal representatives questioned the degree to which federal 
agencies were willing to accept CRBF recommendations on pending NMFS‟ 
biological opinions, the Corps‟s environmental impact statement on the effects of the 
Snake River dams on salmon survival, and elements of the Federal Caucus‟ Basinwide 
Salmon Recovery Strategy.  The continuation of federal-only meetings on those 
subjects formed the basis of state and tribal skepticism.  The states also noted a 
decreased participation by federal agencies in the Council‟s Framework process.  
NMFS, responding for all the agencies, stated that while input from the region was 
welcome, the federal government alone was statutorily responsible and legally 
accountable for the responsibilities charged to it under the ESA (Meeting Minutes, 
March 10 and March 30, 1999).  It could not risk failing in these duties should the 
CRBF be unable to come up with useful recommendations.  Adding to the suspicion 
over federal intent was the fact that, although the federal government had filled its four 
positions on the Forum Committee, it never formally put a name to its one position on 
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the Forum Board (Meeting Minutes, May 27, June 24, and October 1999).
27
  Federal 
Forum Committee representatives contended that this was a function of bureaucratic 
inertia rather than lack of support for the Forum (Meeting Minutes, May 27 1999).  
The lack of an administration-level representative symbolically reinforced the sense 
among states and tribal representatives that the federal government was not as 
committed to the spirit of the CRBF as had been hoped. 
Tribal commitment was internally mixed and externally perplexing.  Tribal 
leaders were among the most critical of the NPPC
28
 and Regional Forum as 
governance systems due to the lack of tribal membership in those bodies.  Tribal 
leaders had long called for greater input into regional processes and the inclusion of 
tribal governments in regional decision-making was a central and important purpose of 
the Three Sovereign‟s process and CRBF (Crampton, December 5, 1997). 
The Snake River and upper Columbia tribes all signed the MOA, and their 
representative was among the most vocal urging the Forum Committee to begin work 
on substantive issues.  However, a history of court battles over fishing rights had made 
the four lower river tribes skeptical of state motives.
 29
  The lower river tribes 
                                                 
27
 From the beginning, the Forum Committee struggled to identify a meeting date for the Forum Board.  
Although the federal government never formally appointed a representative to the Board, the Chair of the 
President‟s Council on Environmental Quality agreed to attend the Board meeting should it ever be held.  It 
never was.   
 
28
 It should be noted that the Council‟s Multispecies Framework process had the active support and 
participation of the tribes, and that the 1980 Power Act specifically required consultation with tribal fish 
managers on the Council‟s fish and wildlife program.   
 
29
 These comments are based on the author‟s personal experience in listening to tribal elders and leaders 
concerns regarding regional governance systems.  See also Taylor (1999), Pevar (2002), and Dompier 
(2005). 
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consistently made the point that their treaties are with the federal government and are 
leery of any process that may open an opportunity for state interests to encroach on the 
rights ensconced in the treaties.  Additionally, the Forum Committee‟s representative 
structure ran counter to tribal political culture of direct democracy (as underscored by 
the Nez Perce position).
30
   
The lower river tribal governments that were unable to resolve the question of 
whether to sign the MOA presented a frustrating conundrum to the Forum Committee.  
These tribes justified their reluctance to sign as by arguing that it was not yet clear if 
the CRBF process would prove worth their time.  Yet, as the Forum Committee chair 
noted, their official input was essential in the design of what that process would turn 
out to be (Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1999).  In effect, the lower river tribes refused to 
engage in the process to design the structure that would make their formal 
participation worthwhile. 
Federal and state CRBF members were rankled by the lack of formal 
involvement and sometimes participation by all of the Basin‟s tribes.  The Idaho 
representative voiced this frustration when he noted that other participants had signed 
on to the CRBF process with the understanding that formal tribal participation (the 
lack of which was noted as a “huge void” in the Regional Forum process) would be 
forthcoming.  If their participation did not occur, he argued that the group should 
“reassess” what the Forum was doing (Meeting Minutes, June 24 1999).  Ultimately, a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
30
 It was a significant concession on the part of those tribal governments that did sign the MOA to have 
their interests represented by people not directly associated with their respective tribe.   
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substantial part of the lower river tribal commitment problem was one of the Forum 
Committee‟s own making.  By agreeing early on to allow non-signatories to 
participate in CRBF business, they removed a major incentive for those tribes who had 
not already done so to sign on to formal membership.   
State commitment to participation in the CRBF process was very strong, which 
is not surprising given that the CRBF was the product of an initiative by the four 
regional governors.  However, the amount of authority carried by each state‟s 
representative to truly collaborate and compromise on substantive issues was limited.  
The governor of Idaho delayed signing the MOA and made it clear when he did so that 
the issue of dam removal was not up for discussion, a position also maintained by the 
Washington representative.  Idaho and Montana also opposed additional flow 
augmentation or increases to spill (Meeting Minutes, June 24 1999).  What emerges 
from the meeting minutes is the sense that the states were willing to talk about a great 
number of things, but would not negotiate or compromise on any action or 
recommendation from the Forum Committee contrary to core state interests.  An 
unwillingness to compromise or negotiate on key issues led a Yakama tribal council 
member to chide the group as a whole for “competing and jockeying for position 
rather than joining forces to improve the resource” [referring to salmon] and noted that 
“each participating party is unbending in representing its own interests” (Espenson, 
July 30, 1999). 
The third source of frustration related to the second in that questions regarding 
participant commitment brought attention to participant funding.  The MOA (1999) 
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required each participating government share an “equitable” distribution of costs.  
Unfortunately, the MOA failed to define “equitable.”    
The initial budget called for $119,000 - $189,000 for federal fiscal year 1999.  
The delay in signing the MOA and establishing the Forum Committee meant that the 
Committee did not need entire amount.  A revised estimate put direct costs for 1999 at 
$70,000.  The Council agreed to provide about $28,000 of in-kind services.
31
  Funding 
was not secured until the following July, and then only for $50,000.  Of this, the 
Northwest Power and Planning Council provided $40,000 but agreed to pay no more 
than 1/3 of direct costs for subsequent years.
32
  The four states represented the Council 
contribution as their share.  BPA provided an additional $10,000.  Contributions from 
the other entities represented on the Forum Committee consisted of in-kind support 
provided by member participation (Meeting Minutes, April 29 1999; Fazio, July 2, 
1999). 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs initially agreed to fund $3,000 per tribe for travel 
(Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1999) although they had trouble actually coming up with 
all of the money.  Despite MOA language calling for “equitable” sharing of costs, 
neither the tribes nor states contributed any of their general fund moneys to the CRBF.  
Other than BIA and BPA, no federal agency provided cash contributions.  In effect, 
the Bonneville Power Administration financed the lion‟s share of the CRBF, either 
                                                 
31
 CRBF funding followed the federal fiscal year of October 1 through September 30.  The $70,000 
noted here would fund the Forum Committee through September 1999.  The budget for fiscal year 2000 
was estimated at $75,000.  BPA contributed $10,000 and NPPC $25,000 consistent with its previous 1/3 
commitment.  No other entity offered funds.  As it turned out, additional funds were not needed. 
 
32
 BPA provides all funding for The Northwest Power and Planning Council and its programs in 
accordance with the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980. 
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directly or through the Council‟s program (Meeting Minutes, April 29 and October 11, 
1999).   
The fourth area of frustration was the MOA‟s requirement for consensus 
decision-making.  Even the seemingly simplest decisions could become difficult.  For 
example, scheduling the first Forum Board meeting was a frequent subject of 
discussion.  The Forum Board never held its meeting, partly due to scheduling but 
mostly due to disagreement as to the meeting‟s purpose.  Oregon, the tribes, and the 
federal agencies felt that the first such meeting would be ceremonial in nature, 
representing a statement of commitment by each participating government.  
Washington, on the other hand, opposed a Forum Board meeting unless the Forum 
Committee provided substantive issues or accomplishments for Board member 
discussion.   
The Forum Committee chair summed up the problem of consensus based 
decision making at the October meeting.  He stated, “people think they can come and 
go, and any time they‟re not here, then they have a bye that month, and nothing that is 
accomplished or agreed to is in any way binding on them” (Meeting Minutes, October 
11, 1999).  The inability to schedule a meeting of the Board meant that the disputes 
within the Forum Committee could never be elevated, let alone resolved. 
The inability to come to agreement over the role of the Forum Committee; 
lingering suspicion over participants‟ true level of commitment; funding; and the 
inability to resolve the challenges of consensus decision making came to a head in 
January 2000.  The Montana representative stated he would no longer attend Forum 
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Committee meetings.  “I yet see little opportunity for this body to be effective in 
resolving solutions to the problems they address,” he said.  “Most of the issues are 
being debated in other forum arenas that we [Montana] have access to.  In those arenas 
the decision-making bodies have traction in bringing resolution to the issues and 
implementing those decisions.”  Also citing the lack of commitment and participation 
by other parties, he noted that Montana would reengage if the Forum Committee could 
agree to “changes and commitments” (O‟Bryant, January 14, 2000).   
Coupled with the withdrawal of Montana was the growing perception that the 
perceived threats enumerated by Governor Kitzhaber were not as severe as first 
thought.  For example, over time, regional utilities adapted to energy deregulation 
without major disruption to the region.  The Corps study of the Snake River Dams and 
the NMFS BiOp did not make the dramatic calls for dam removal that some feared.  
The collective sense of threat posed by the suite of issues facing the region dissipated 
as other venues worked through them.  In effect, the issues that caused so much 
concern in the beginning failed to rise to a level of criticality sufficient to justify the 
CRBF as an enduring governance system.     
The withdrawal of Montana signaled the end of the CRBF.  The Forum 
Committee held its last meeting on April 29, 2000 after which effectively dissolved.  
What could pass as its epitaph is captured in the last line of a document about the 
CRBF posted on the Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s website:  “The 
Forum conducted its deliberations for slightly more than one year before collapsing 
through diminished participation of the Forum membership” (NPPC, undated). 
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Challenges to Governance in the Columbia River Basin    
Why is it that, even with agreement on the common goals of better decision-
making, a more inclusive process, and preservation of common regional interests, the 
CRBF failed?  Is regional governance intrinsically paradoxical?  The circumstances 
surrounding the CRBF illustrate several inherent challenges to establishing workable 
governances systems.  These are the difficulty of resolving deep-seated conflicts over 
resource use among resource users, especially when exacerbated by differing values; 
and structural issues of common vision, commitment to the governance body‟s goals 
and objectives, funding, and processes for substantive decision-making.   
Competing interests, aspirations, and values. 
Inter-institutional conflict can occur over conflicting interests and/or when 
parties perceive that their aspirations are incompatible with the aspirations of others 
and when mutually satisfactory alternatives are not available (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  
For example, within the Columbia Basin, the interests and aspirations of those 
dependent on the commercial benefits of the dams were incompatible with those of 
advocates for dam removal in the interest of improved fish runs.  Another example is 
the incompatibility of the aspirations of those favoring market mechanisms for the 
pricing of electricity with those favoring cost-based rates.  Similar examples could be 
found of other perennially controversial issues in the region, such as flow 
augmentation (pitting aspirations of fish advocates against the aspirations of irrigation 
and recreation advocates) or levels of tribal harvest (pitting the aspirations of tribes 
against those of recreational and commercial fishermen).  No argument, however well 
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crafted, regarding dam removal, dam retention, or a significant modification to dam 
operations can ever completely satisfy all parties.    
What leads parties to become so intransigent in defending their aspirations and 
interests?  Pruitt and Kim (2004) identified four conditions that can cause   aspirations 
to become rigid to the point of precluding any opportunity for compromise.  These are 
(1) the importance of the underlying interests, (2) the degree to which strongly held 
principles are believed to be at stake, (3) the degree to which available options are 
perceived to be of the either-or variety, and (4) the degree to which parties see their 
aspirations as being legitimate or just (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  All four conditions are 
present in the Northwest.  A few examples: The preservation of inexpensive 
hydroelectric power is of vital economic interest to the region as a whole.  The low 
cost of waterborne navigation is of vital importance to agricultural and wood products 
businesses in Idaho, Montana, and eastern Oregon and Washington.  The salmon 
fishery is of fundamental cultural and economic importance to the tribes and the 
economic mainstay of communities in the lower Columbia River and along the coast.   
Then there is water.  Many of the farmers and ranchers in the region are 
descended from original settlers lured to the region by the promises of free land 
supported by irrigation water (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986; Pisani, 2002).  To them 
preserving their water rights is the central priority, even to the extent of discouraging 
neighbors from voluntarily trading or selling their water rights for environmental 
purposes.   
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The disputes among regional parties are often perceived as zero-sum options 
that leave little room for compromise.  All parties claim legitimacy grounded in either 
law or tradition (Taylor, 1999).  Examples include tribal rights to fish as protected by 
treaties and federal trust responsibilities; the defense of long-established water rights 
by inland farmers and ranchers; and commercial fishermen struggling to maintain a 
way of life began by their grandfathers and great-grandfathers.   
All of this creates an enormous challenge for regional leaders.  Their 
constituents perceive any predilection of an elected or politically appointed official to 
compromise for the sake of a greater good as a betrayal.  One cannot simply attribute 
this lack of a basis for compromise as a rational defense of tangible institutional 
interests.  Many Columbia Basin resource advocates genuinely and honestly believe in 
the moral righteousness of their respective positions.  These positions are thus 
reflective of deeply held values and beliefs.   
Structural issues: Shared vision, commitment, funding, and decision-making. 
In addition to conflict over values, four significant structural problems crippled 
the CRBF.  The first was a lack of a common vision over what the CRBF was intended 
to do, especially given that other processes were underway in the region addressing 
many of the issues the CRBF was established to address (Meeting Minutes, April 29, 
May 27, June 24, July 21, and September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).  
 The second was a perceived lack of commitment on the part of all participants.  
From the beginning, participants approached the CRBF with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm.  All voiced commitment to the process, but the lack of support to address 
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key issues, the failure for all parties to sign the MOA, and the failure to appoint 
individuals to all positions served to aggravate existing senses of distrust over other 
parties‟ motives (Espenson, Feb 5 and Mar 12, 1999; Meeting Minutes, May 27, June 
24, and October 1999).   
The third contributing factor to the demise of the CRBF was funding.  Whereas 
the MOA (1999) called for each participant to contribute an equitable amount of funds 
for CRBF operations, only the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and, to a 
lesser degree, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did so.  Holding participants to the 
funding terms of the MOA could have potentially accomplished several things.  It 
would have signaled the commitment of each participating government to the process, 
would contribute to the sense that the deliberations of the group were “real” to its 
participants, and would have likely sustained attention of the region‟s elected 
leadership.  None of these occurred since BPA managed ratepayer dollars 
predominantly funded the CRBF.  Consequently, none of the participants other than 
BPA had a financial stake in ensuring process efficiency (Meeting Minutes, April 29, 
July 21 and October 11, 1999; Fazio, July 2, 1999).   
Fourth and perhaps most importantly was the cumbersome and ineffectual 
decision-making process called for in the MOA.  The process required almost 
complete agreement before the Forum Committee could even discuss and issue, let 
alone resolve it.  The results of this decision-making process were not binding, even if 
strong majority agreement existed, in that anyone disagreeing with an outcome could 
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simply veto it (MOA, 1999; Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, July 21, and 
September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).   
  
Chapter Summary: 
Following are the key points drawn from the CRBF history:   
 Regional leaders sought to establish a new governance system that would 
provide a reasoned and rational basis to resolve regional differences.  
 Pending significant decisions on energy deregulation, dams, and salmon 
occurring within processes from which many felt excluded motivated 
regional leaders to explore a new decision process.  These issues held the 
potential to exert considerable impact on the regional economy, 
environment, and individual livelihoods. 
 The CRBF was comprised of institutional actors with long standing 
attachments to regional resources and established worldviews and values 
regarding those resources.  These actors included federal and state 
agencies, regional Indian tribes, commercial firms and trade associations, 
and non-governmental organizations.  Each institution had rights, 
authorities, interests, and/or prerogatives they wished to protect. 
 Regional institutional leaders established the CRBF to address critical 
regional issues while paradoxically refusing it the authority needed to do 
so. 
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 Some signatories to the Forum MOA made their signature contingent on 
precluding discussion of key issues.  As a result, the Forum was unable to 
address many of the issues for which it was formed. 
 Regional political leaders who recognized this potential weakness from the 
beginning believed a more effective and authoritative system should be 
established through federal legislation.  However, this legislative effort was 
either not seriously attempted or eventually abandoned.
33
   
 Refusal of all parties to sign the CRBF MOA (1999) exacerbated the 
MOA‟s structural problems.  The Forum Committee decision to allow non-
signatories to participate in its discussions and decisions added to the 
dysfunction.  Representatives of non-signatory parties were thus free to 
engage in extended debates without being bound by whatever agreements 
or decision the group as a whole eventually reached.     
 Despite the time spent in negotiating the MOA, serious disagreement 
remained among Forum Committee members over the Forum‟s purpose 
and authorized scope of activity.  The Forum Committee spent most of its 
time debating process as opposed to debating and resolving substantive 
issues. 
 Serious distrust existed as to the commitment and motivation of other 
Forum Committee members to meet the spirit of the MOA. 
                                                 
33
 The records reviewed for this study are not clear on this point. 
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 Frustration with the inability of the Forum Committee to address issues of 
substance led Montana to withdraw.  The Forum collapsed soon thereafter. 
 The CRBF faced challenges of constitutional structure, competing interests 
and values, and structural design.     
The Columbia River Basin Forum had set for itself the purpose of simplifying 
processes by, “eliminating duplicative efforts and consolidating or eliminating existing 
committees or bodies” (MOA, January 1999, p. 4).  By denying itself any capability 
for definitive decision-making and lacking commitment from a significant number of 
participants, the CRBF had no basis for replacing other ongoing processes at the time, 
almost all of which focused on some substantive goal, however limited that goal may 
be.  In limiting its role to only discussion of the issues, the Forum Committee ended up 
replicating debates taking place within these other processes.  With no real ability to 
influence outcomes, the CRBF ironically positioned itself to be another one of the 
“duplicative efforts” it had hoped to eliminate. 
In designing the CRBF MOA, institutional negotiators deliberately created a 
consensus-based process based on the hope that, if reasonable leaders from regional 
institutional stakeholders could meet to rationally discuss the issues at hand, 
reasonable compromises would be reached.  However, they hedged their bets by 
ensuring that every representative reserved veto authority over any collective position 
not in accord with the interests of their respective constituency.  As a result, parties to 
the CRBF gave themselves no ability to address substantive issues.   
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As observed by Russell Linden (2002) in his book on collaboration, “the forces 
that pull people apart are very strong, some of them wired into the very DNA of 
organizations, and it takes far more than good intentions and kind-hearted people to 
make collaboration work” (Linden, 2002, p. 36).  This study researched the historical 
record to determine why Linden‟s assertion seems so applicable to the Columbia.  It 
adopted the apparent paradox of the Columbia River Basin Forum as its research 
question.  The next chapter explains the method through which this question was 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
 
Research Question, Purpose, and Relevance 
The paradox suggested by the Columbia River Basin Forum experience 
presents a fundamental question.  Whereas many prominent northwest political and 
institutional leaders strongly believed some form of regional governance system was 
necessary, why did those same leaders fail to empower the system with the authority 
necessary to resolve the issues that led them to create it the first place?   
This study is the first step in a larger research project to address this question.  
It presents an institutional level case history of Basin governance that identifies the 
various governance systems proposed and enacted since 1934 and categorizes them 
into models according to their locus of decision-making as defined by their dominant 
institutional participants.  Its purpose is to analyze the Basin‟s multi-jurisdictional 
governance experience for trends both in the types of systems enacted and those 
rejected.  The goal, in effect, is to understand and explain how the region chose the 
governance systems it established.   
This study identified twenty-six governance systems proposed during the 
period of study of which eleven were established.  It presents the history of those 
systems using an analytical framework suggested by the circumstances surrounding 
the rise and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum.  Chapters are organized by 
the catalytic, critical situations whose occurrences allowed existing systems and 
structures to be challenged or overturned and new ones formed in their place – an 
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approach inspired by Bessey (1963) in his history of northwest regional planning.  
Other elements of the framework include each system‟s dominant participants, the 
other institutional actors involved, the social and political context from which each 
system emerged, and the salient issues that they were intended to address or influenced 
their establishment.   
Why does any of this matter? 
Giddens‟ (1976, 1979, and 1984) theory of structuration and Sztompka‟s 
(1991) theory of social becoming argue that no social system springs anew.  All social 
systems evolve from those that came before and serve to shape those that follow.  The 
findings of this study support those arguments.  Each governance system identified, 
whether merely proposed and debated or actually enacted, demonstrably had roots in 
earlier systems and structures.  Each new system either evolved noncontroversially or 
resulted from some catalytic event that allowed excluded parties to challenge existing 
system(s) as they vied for influence over regional resources and institutional 
prerogatives.  Each was either a modification or an outright replacement of an earlier 
system and in turn formed the basis for those that came after.   
This point is relevant because efforts to establish new Basinwide governance 
systems did not end with the Columbia River Basin Forum.  For example, in 2004 
staff from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council presented a proposal to 
reconfigure the National Marine Fisheries Service‟s Regional Implementation Forum 
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and establish a new Executive Committee under the auspices of the Council
34
 (Council 
to Look, May 7, 2004).  More recently, sovereign parties in litigation over the impacts 
of the FCRPS on salmonid species listed under the Endangered Species Act 
established a Regional Implementation Oversight Group to oversee the measures 
called for in the National Marine Fisheries‟ 2008 FCRPS biological opinion (personal 
experience of author).  Understanding the historical connections to past governance 
systems can inform these and future governance efforts.   
The author found no history centered on Columbia Basin governance systems 
as a whole in researching this report.  Of the materials reviewed for this study, only 
two (Scheufele, c.1970 and Hemmingway, 1983) wrote to objectively analyze a 
particular governance system.  Scheufele (c.1970) analyzed the Columbia Basin Inter-
Agency Committee and Hemmingway (1983) the Northwest Power Planning and 
Conservation Council.  All other accounts were written to either address other aspects 
of the region‟s history (for examples, see Ogden (1949), McKinley (1952), Bessey 
(1963), White, (1995), DeLuna (1997), Brigham (1998), Vogel (2007), Pope (2008) 
and others) or promote a particular system (see McKinley, 1952 and Ogden, 1997).  
Consequently, their discussion of any particular governance system was usually 
limited to those elements relevant to the story they wished to tell.   
                                                 
34
 This proposal is fully laid out in two NPCC staff memos.  The first, dated June 1, 2004 and authored 
by Doug Marker, is entitled Discussion of Implementation of Mainstem Amendment Measure 
Concerning Council Sponsorship of Federal Hydrosystem Decision Making Structure.  The second, 
authored by John Shurts, John Ogan and Doug Marker, subject: Proposal for revision to mainstem 
implementation forum consistent with fish and wildlife program amendments, is dated July 6, 2004.  
The July 6 memo is available at the Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s web site at 
http://www.nwppc.org/news/2004_08/ aug04_13.pdf.  A May 4 draft of the June 1 memo can be found 
at http://www.nwppc.org/news/2004_05/ fw2.pdf. 
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In addition to providing a history, this study offers diagnostic, predictive, and 
normative contributions to the general understanding of the Northwest‟s governance 
experience.  The study provides its diagnostic contribution through its exploration of 
the social and political contexts and issues from which various governance systems 
emerged.  As such, it provides an in-depth look at how Basin governance evolved with 
the region‟s history and in response to the motives and interests of institutional 
participants.  It thus helps explain why things are the way they are and provides a 
partial explanation as to why getting to accord over governance of the region‟s natural 
resource issues has often proven so difficult.    
The study provides predictive contribution through its identification of two 
sources of system change.  The first is noncontroversial evolutionary change from 
within existing systems.  The second is conflict-based change that involves a sequence 
of activities that appears to repeat itself each time certain conditions are present.  In 
essence, this conflict change pattern showed that regional governance arrangements 
maintained themselves in relative stability until faced with a critical situation 
(Giddens, 1984).
35
  These critical situations allowed existing arrangements to be called 
into question and opened the door for introduction of new governance systems by 
previously excluded parties.  The region then goes through a period of adjustment as 
these previously excluded entities attempt to gain influence while the included entities 
seek to retain and/or expand the influence they have.  Certain procedural events 
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 Giddens (1984) defines critical situations as those that result in changes to social systems and 
structure.  By this definition, if no change occurs then circumstances were not sufficiently “critical.”  
Consequently, the occurrence of such a situation can only be confirmed in hindsight. 
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follow, with regional institutional leaders calling for public meetings, engaging in 
negotiations, and eventually deciding to either reach agreement on new systems and 
structures or modify those already in place.  Assuming the situations that inspired the 
effort prove sufficiently critical, the region adopts new systems that eventually settle 
into a condition of stability pending arrival of the next critical situation.  What the next 
critical situation will be, or when it will arrive, cannot be predicted with any precision.  
What is predictable is that, once institutional leaders perceive such a situation to have 
arrived or be imminent, they will likely initiate the change pattern.  By understanding 
this dynamic, those seeking to change (or preserve) the status quo of governance 
arrangements can plan accordingly for the day when such circumstances appear. 
The study provides its normative contribution in part through its identification 
of the patterns of change noted above and through its proposal for additional research 
into the role of values in governance related decision-making.  The pattern of system 
development can lead to expectations over how things are supposed to be and how 
individual institutional members should behave when critical situations present 
(Schein, 1984; Giddens, 1984).  Consequently, such circumstances can serve to shape 
the behavior of individuals as similar conditions present themselves in the future.  The 
history reviewed for this study alone did not completely answer the paradox question.  
It did, however, suggest that a more complete answer might be found through 
additional research into the role that values associated with institutional worldviews, 
cultures, and identities play in individual decision-making during periods of 
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negotiation.  Such research may offer further prescriptions to increase the likelihood of 
success in future governance efforts. 
 
 Scope 
The geographic scope of this study is that portion of the Columbia River Basin 
lying within the United States Pacific Northwest, including its major tributaries, as 
illustrated in Figure P-2.  This corresponds to the geographic scope of the CRBF and 
most of the other multi-jurisdictional governance systems with which the region has 
experimented over time.
36
  The study focused only on governance systems involved 
with the planning, development, and/or operation of what became the Federal 
Columbia River Power System and the impact that FCRPS operations had on the 
commercial and sports fishery, natural regional salmon runs, Indian treaty rights, and 
the region‟s economic and social development.   
The study did not address international issues of governance, such as the 1964 
treaty with Canada that governs flood control and power benefit allocations between 
the two countries.  Nor did it examine other natural resource governance systems and 
structures involving other natural resources issues, such as the Regional Interagency 
Executive Committee organized under the Northwest Forest Plan or the Pacific 
Fishery Management Council established under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976.     
 
                                                 
36
 All systems identified in this study encompassed the Columbia River Basin.  Some, such as the 
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission encompassed the entire Northwest. 
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Methodology 
Whereas this study presents a case history, it does not follow a traditional case 
study methodology.  With the exception of the discussion of the Columbia River Basin 
Forum, it uses an historical method, relying on secondary sources to research 
governance systems at the institutional level.  This section describes this method.  It 
discusses the methodological sources upon which the study design relies, the 
methodological approach, and the study‟s potential limitations and weaknesses.  
Method. 
The methodological approach used generally followed those offered by 
Neustadt and May (1988) in Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision 
Makers and Ritchie and Spencer (2002) Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy 
Research.  Neustadt and May‟s (1988) Thinking in Time is based on the authors‟ Use 
of History course offered through the Kennedy School of Government.  The authors 
intended their book for senior policy makers as a manual for staff work regarding the 
use of history to inform decision-making.  Using a case study approach, the authors 
advocate a reflective and systemic process for analyzing history to inform policy 
choices.  They offer a seven-step process that focuses on storytelling to make the links 
between what is known to what the researcher wishes to find.  Ritchie and Spencer‟s 
(2002) Qualitative Data Analysis, although intended for use in analyzing original data, 
offers useful advice for the review of secondary sources as well.  Their framework 
involves a systematic process for sifting and sorting material according to key issues 
and themes.   
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This study‟s unit of analysis was the institutions involved in Basin governance 
systems.  These institutions included those Indian tribes, federal and state agencies, 
and private enterprises involved with land and water use, river infrastructure 
development, and the salmon fishery within the boundaries of the Columbia River 
Basin (Figure P-2).  This study emphasizes the federal agencies in the interest of space 
and since the operation of the Columbia River is essentially a federal responsibility 
(Ogden, 1997, Williams, 2006).   
Research proceeded through three steps.  The first step documented the history 
of events leading to the rise, activity, and collapse of the CRBF.  This step analyzed 
the issues and challenges faced by the CRBF as presented in Chapter 1.  This study 
used the results of that analysis to develop a framework around which to construct a 
history of Basin governance systems.  The components of that framework were: 
 The catalytic events or circumstances that created the opportunity for 
conflict-based change to existing systems and structures.  This study frames 
the narratives of Chapters 3 through 7 using these critical situation events. 
 The governance systems proposed or enacted in response to the perceived 
changes in circumstances. 
 The dominant institutions that would form or formed the locus of decision 
making for each governance system proposed or enacted.  This study used 
this criterion to define the six models subsequently identified.  
 The political and social context surrounding the points in time at which 
change occurred. 
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 The salient issues in the Pacific Northwest for which new governance 
systems were proposed or enacted to address. 
 The institutional participants and their interests. 
 The worldviews held by the institutional participants. 
 Additional information as available.  Such information included the 
duration of enacted systems, types of products produced, effectiveness, and 
any other material as may be relevant to the research question. 
The second step reviewed regional histories in the method recommended by 
Neustadt and May (1988) and Ritchie and Spencer (2002) and used the framework to 
develop an institution-oriented historical overview of past governance efforts.   
The third step inductively analyzed the historical record, identifying key 
themes and lessons as may explain the CRBF‟s institutional genealogy and provide 
insights that may inform future governance efforts.   
Potential problems and limitations. 
This study identified four categories of potential problems and limitations.  
These were source reliability, source completeness, the risk that the historical record 
alone would prove insufficient to fully explain the paradox of governance, and the 
author‟s proximity to the circumstances surrounding the CRBF.    
Source reliability 
This study used both primary and secondary sources.  The history of the 
Columbia River Basin Forum presented in Chapter 1 relied exclusively on primary 
source material.  These included press reports from print and electronic media, CRBF 
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meeting notes taken by a contracted note taker, and notes taken by the CRBF‟s 
contracted facilitator.  All of these materials represented firsthand accounts by 
witnesses to the events being recorded.  They are, however, potentially subject to the 
biases, misinterpretations, and/or lapses of attention of those who prepared them.   
This study partially mitigated this potential weakness by cross checking, where 
possible, the accounts of one against the accounts of the others for the same events.  
As an additional step, the author allowed several of the direct participants to the CRBF 
process to review early drafts of Chapter 1.  None offered substantive corrections.  As 
such, the author is confident that the events portrayed occurred essentially as 
presented.       
The history of governance presented in Chapters 3 through 7 relied 
predominantly on secondary sources.  This study pieces together fragmentary 
discussions of governance found in a wide array of historic accounts.  As such, there is 
some risk of misinterpretation regarding the details of each system‟s purpose, 
organization, and membership.  This author attempted to mitigate that risk by cross 
checking significant events and facts among multiple sources.  As a matter of protocol, 
this study notes disagreements either in the text or in an accompanying footnote.  If 
research found sufficient information to resolve the difference, the resolution was so 
explained.  
 The following example illustrates the risk and approach to mitigate possible 
misinterpretation.  Both McKinley (1952) and Bessey (1963) mention state 
participation in the Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee.  McKinley (1952) 
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claimed that the states participated only as observers, while Bessey (1963) reported 
that they participated as full voting members.  Scheufele (c.1970) resolved the 
difference.  The CBIAC existed from 1946 into 1967.  During that time, the nature of 
state participation fluctuated between passive observation and active participation.  
Thus, both McKinley (1952) and Bessey (1963) were accurate as of the time they 
wrote.  However, having relied only on one or the other would have resulted in a 
misrepresentation as to what actually occurred.  This study used a general approach of 
crosschecking multiple sources within each domain throughout to present as accurate a 
portrayal as possible.    
Source completeness 
Even if the primary and secondary sources used were completely accurate in 
the information they contained, there was still risk that they did not tell the complete 
story.  And there are, in fact, gaps in the narrative.  For example, as detailed as was the 
reporting on the events leading up to the signing of the CRBF memorandum of 
agreement (MOA), there were no records found by this author describing the specifics 
of the MOA negotiations.  Presumably, if they exist, they would be in the form of the 
personal notes kept by the negotiators.  The CRBF story would benefit from additional 
interviews to see if these additional sources exist in addition to exploring the 
motivations and institutional objectives as understood by the participants. 
This risk also applied to the history of governance as inferred from the 
secondary sources used.  In some cases, secondary source authors provided a great 
deal of information for some systems.  For example, there was a wealth of published 
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material regarding the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, the Regional 
Forum, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, and the Pacific Northwest 
Regional Planning Commission.  Alternatively, the sources reviewed contained only 
passing references to the Northwest States Development Association, the Committee 
on Fish Operations, and the Fish Operations Executive Council.  Consequently, the 
sources reviewed did not contain all of the information sought for each governance 
system identified.  However, they did provide sufficient information to warrant the 
findings and conclusions presented in Chapters 8.      
Risk of insufficient material in the historic record to resolve the paradox 
There was a risk that the historical record alone, including both primary and 
secondary sources, would not present sufficient information to answer the research 
questions or offer a satisfactory resolution to the paradox of regional governance.  
That proved to be the case.  Most accounts of the Columbia Basin‟s development 
spoke to events and the related economic and political interests and issues.  Examples 
included McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), DeLuna (1997), 
Brigham (1998), Pope (2008), and others.  It is a fundamental conclusion of this study 
that events, politics, economics and disagreements over tangible party interests offered 
only a partial answer to the question of the paradox.  Relatively few spoke to the social 
issues of worldview, institutional culture and identity, and values that drove 
individuals to so passionately believe in one position or viewpoint.  Examples of those 
that did were Hays (1957 and 1999/1959), Wiebe (1967) and Taylor (1999).  
Particularly good at describing the role that worldview (or conceptual framework) 
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plays in policy decisions and social structure are Lichatowich (1999), Dunlap (2004), 
and Williams (2006).  However, none directly linked how those values actually 
affected regional governance or policy choices.  The understanding of the CRBF‟s 
history in particular and the study of regional governance in general would be greatly 
improved by in-depth interviews with participants to better explore the role that 
worldview, social identity, and individual values played in negotiations over the MOA 
and the CRBF‟s operations.   
Author’s proximity to the events under study 
 Maxwell (2002) argues that good qualitative work must be transparent in its 
articulation of author background, potential biases, and selected methodology.  The 
author of this study was closely associated with the events that led to the Columbia 
River Basin Forum‟s creation.  He served as the Deputy Commander and Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Army Corp of Engineer‟s Northwestern Division, headquartered in 
Portland, Oregon.  He held that position from 1997 to 2001.  He held supervisory 
authority over and appointed the Corps‟s CRBF representative.  He exercised 
executive coordination with other federal agencies regarding the Corps‟s 
environmental impact statement on salmon survival through the lower Snake River 
dams, one of the major issues in which the CRBF members took interest.  He presided 
over four regional public meetings regarding that study and on several times testified 
to Congressional committees regarding the study and related biological opinions on 
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the operation of the Columbia Basin dams.
37
  Consequently, he was familiar with 
many of the issues and events discussed. 
To mitigate the effects of any bias, points supported only by the personal 
experience and observations of the author were kept to a minimum and offered only 
when no other source could be found or to amplify a point made by others.  To the 
maximum degree possible, this study presents information found in already published 
accounts, the public record, and other sources accessible to the public.   
The author is currently on contract as facilitator and program coordinator for 
the Columbia Basin Federal Caucus.  In that capacity, he is required to maintain a 
confidentiality agreement regarding information presented in meetings, discussions, or 
documents to which he is available.  The events discussed in this study predate this 
confidentiality agreement and concern events outside of the confidentiality 
agreement‟s scope.  There are no instances in which information was withheld due to 
constraints or conditions from the author‟s past or current professional duties. 
 
Sources 
Primary sources. 
Primary material for the rise and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum 
presented in Chapter 1 included meeting minutes, facilitator notes, and other CRBF 
related documents and committee reports.  The Northwest Power and Conservation 
                                                 
37
 A transcript of one such testimony as presented to the House Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water Works, can be found at 
http://bluefish.org/mogren.htm. 
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Council in Portland, Oregon, maintains one set of files of these documents.  The other 
set of files is located with DS Consulting, a firm also located in Portland.
 38
  To the 
author‟s knowledge, these are the only existing collections of CRBF records.  Both the 
Council and DS Consulting were very gracious in allowing the author full access to 
their files to research this paper.  This was fortunate in that some records were 
included in one file but not the other.  It may be that additional records exist in the 
private hands of CRBF participants.  However, the effort to contact those individuals 
was beyond the limit of this research project.  Consequently, the material reviewed 
bounded the CRBF history presented in Chapter 1.   
In addition to official CRBF related documents, the files contained notes 
prepared by two sources.  The Northwest Power and Conservation Council hired a 
contractor (Mr. Jeff Kuechle) to prepare CRBF meeting minutes.  Although not 
verbatim transcripts, these minutes provide a relatively detailed summary of meeting 
discussions.  Copies of minutes are on file in both the Council and DS Consulting 
collections for meetings conducted on March 10 and 30, April 29, May 27, June 24, 
July 21, September 7, and October 11 1999.  The files did not contain minutes for any 
of the meetings held in 2000.  Apparently, Mr. Kuechle was not replaced when his 
contract expired.  Chapter 1 cites information from Mr. Kuechle‟s notes as “meeting 
minutes.”   
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 DS Consulting specializes in public health, natural resource, organizational, and health care issues.  
Services include facilitation, mediation, conflict-needs assessment, systems design, negotiated 
rulemaking, collaborative problem solving, and consensus building.  Additional information is available 
from the company websites at http://www.mediate.com/dsconsulting/index.cfm and 
http://www.mediate.com/DS/index.cfm.  
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The second source of notes was DS Consulting, contracted to provide 
mediation and facilitation support for meetings beginning on May 27, 1999.  In 
addition to the meeting minutes recorded by Mr. Kuechle, Ms. Donna Silverberg, 
meeting facilitator, and/or members of her staff, took abbreviated outline notes.  These 
notes are on file with DS Consulting for the meetings held on July 21, 1999, and 
February 25, March 10, April 21, and April 28, 2000.  Chapter 1 cites information 
from these documents as “facilitator notes.”  An attendance sheet and references in 
media reports indicate a meeting also held on January 19, 2000 although the files 
contained no record of what transpired at that meeting.  Subcommittee memos, budget 
reports, meeting agendas, and the memorandum of agreement developed to guide 
CRBF activities provided additional information.       
In addition to the meeting notes and CRBF records, regional news outlets 
carried a running account of the CRBF‟s formation, operation, and collapse.  The 
author screened online websites of regional news sources for “Three Sovereigns” and 
CRBF related articles.  This study used almost every news article thus found; the few 
not used were rejected solely because they were superficially redundant of coverage 
found elsewhere.  The articles and editorials used appeared in the Oregonian and the 
online NW Fishletter and Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife News Bulletin.  Energy 
NewsData produces the Fishletter.  Founded in 1982, Energy NewsData provides 
reports of interest to the electric and utility industry.  The NW Fishletter is found 
online at http://www.newsdata.com/fishletter/index.html, with specific locations of the 
articles used identified in the list of references following Chapter 8.   
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Although the Oregonian and Fishletter articles were helpful, this study drew 
the preponderance of its news account related information from reporters Barry 
Espenson and Mike O'Bryant from the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife News 
Bulletin.  Intermountain Communications of Bend, Oregon publishes the Bulletin.  
The Northwest Power and Conservation Council‟s Fish and Wildlife Program funds 
the Bulletin, a program funded by the Bonneville Power Administration.  The Bulletin 
is found online at www.cbbulletin.com.  In addition to meticulously following the 
establishment of the CRBF, either Espenson or O‟Bryant attended and reported on 
each CRBF meeting.  Their reporting thus greatly supplements the CRBF meeting 
minutes and facilitator notes.  The list of references following Chapter 8 identifies the 
specific online location for each Bulletin article cited.   
Secondary sources. 
Secondary sources provided the preponderance of of information for the 
governance history discussed in Chapters 3 through 7.  There were several reasons for 
this.  First, delving into the archives for primary material on each of the twenty-six 
proposed systems identified in this study was time prohibitive.  Second, this study 
found the body of material in each literature domain to be substantial and well 
developed.  Third, although this account would undoubtedly benefit from additional 
analysis of primary documents, the published material reviewed provided sufficient 
information to support the findings and conclusions presented herein.     
This study constructed its historical narrative from references to governance 
systems and contextual trends in works generally intended to address other issues or 
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present other arguments.  The study reviewed published material selected from the 
following topical domains: 
 Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives, 
 Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest,  
 Columbia River Basin commercial development,  
 The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs, and  
 The American environmental movement. 
The discussion below reviews the material considered essential to this study‟s 
argument.  Appendix A presents an expanded review of this literature.  This study used 
additional sources to cross check information and to add or supplement details to 
specific incidents or issues.  The reference list that follows Chapter 8 identifies these 
other sources. 
  
Literature Review  
This section summarizes the literature used to write the history of Basin 
governance, organized by domain.  Works categorized under more than one domain are 
listed under each that applies.      
Domain: Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives. 
The research into regional Indian tribes (1800s through 2000) focused on a 
general background of Northwest tribes, their interactions with white settlers, the 
worldviews and perspectives around which tribal society was organized and how these 
views shaped later debates over Columbia Basin issues.   
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Trosper (1995), Pevar (2002), and Wilkinson (2005) provided information on 
tribal social values.  Trosper (1995) summarized Indian cultural precepts based on his 
study of native peoples.  Pevar (2002) focused on the legal and political evolution of 
tribal rights.  Wilkinson (2005) traced the history of the tribal sovereignty movement.  
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide additional tribal 
social context.  These works offered insights into the connection between worldview 
and tribal social organization and behavior.  They also provided a comparison of tribal 
worldviews and with those of early Euro-American explorers and settlers and discussed 
the impact of shift from one to the other on the region‟s natural resources.   
Three other books provided regional context oriented from the tribal 
perspective.  In two books, Ruby and Brown (1981 and 1992) provide an encyclopedia-
like overview of the tribes and bands of the Pacific Northwest.  Clark (1953) 
transcribed traditional Northwest Tribal stories that provided Indian interpretations of 
the creation and man‟s relationship with nature.  Collectively, this body of work 
provided a sufficient array of historical context, facts and circumstances relevant to the 
tribal role in the region.   
Domain: Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest. 
Research of regional exploration and settlement focused on the worldviews of 
the new arrivals, the impact of those worldviews and white expansion on native tribes, 
and the impact settlement had in setting the region‟s social trends.  This study reviewed 
material for facts, dates, and circumstances; the early roots of regional institutions; and 
the context from which later efforts at planning and governance emerged.  
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In their essay promoting a new conceptual framework to guide regional salmon 
management, Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams (2006) argued 
that conceptual foundations (or worldviews) have a profound effect on social 
organization and behavior.  Taylor (1999) and Lichatowich‟s (1999) critique of 
regional fishery management also argued the power of worldviews on social structure.  
They further argued that the replacement of the tribal foundation of unity with nature 
with the Euro-American concept of nature as a warehouse of marketable resource 
commodities directly resulted in the depletion of those resources – some, like salmon, 
almost to the point of extinction.   
Four authors captured the origins and nature of the worldviews brought by 
settlers to the Pacific Northwest.  These were Max Weber (2002/1920), Henry Nash 
Smith (1950), Jenks Cameron (1928 and 1929) and Dodds (1986).  That worldview 
believed in the moral rightness of the creation of personal wealth (Weber, 2002/1920).  
It embraced the right of property ownership, especially land, as a guarantor of 
individual liberty and republican virtue (Smith, 1950), a belief in the west as an 
Edenic garden of opportunity (Smith, 1950), a belief in the inexhaustibility of the 
resources the west offered (Cameron, 1928 and 1929).  It also carried a belief in the 
doctrine of Manifest Destiny.  The doctrine of Manifest Destiny held that some 
combination of God, nature, and/or fate ordained an American empire from coast to 
coast (Dodds, 1986).   
Dodds (1986) further argued that the institutions of the Northwest evolved 
under circumstances of relative complacency.  This was because white settlers the 
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region predominantly emigrated from the upper Midwest of the United States.  
Consequently, they already shared a common belief in American values and how those 
values were to be applied in social, political, and economic settings.  As the region 
filled with people all operating within the same conceptual framework, the institutions 
they chose to establish faced little crucial review or challenge (Dodds, 1986).    
   This study relied upon the following sources to document the Northwest 
settlement up to the early 1900s.  Robert Wiebe (1967) and Samuel Hays (1957) wrote 
from national perspectives, discussing broad trends that shaped American settlement 
and development in the 19
th
 century and thus provided context for the settlement of the 
Pacific Northwest.  Research into the history of Northwest exploration and settlement 
examined the work of Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen (1967), Schafer (1943/1918), 
Dodds (1986), and Robbins (1997 and 2004).  Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen (1967), 
and Dodds (1986) concentrated on key personalities and the region‟s economic, social, 
and political development.  Robbins (1997 and 2004) wrote from an environmental 
perspective, focusing on the impact of regional development on the regional ecology.  
All provided at least some additional insight into the worldview carried by the white 
settlers to the region and the influence of that worldview on Indian culture and 
development of the region‟s Anglo-American political and social institutions. 
 
Domain: Columbia River Basin commercial development. 
This study found that almost all references to Columbia Basin governance 
systems were contained in histories of the river‟s commercial development.  Johansen 
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(1967), White (1995), DeLuna (1997) and Brigham (1998) provided contextual 
background regarding the impact of Progressive and New Deal philosophies in general 
and the public-power debate in particular on Columbia River development.  Ogden‟s 
1949 doctoral dissertation traced the economic and social reasons behind the river‟s 
development and the political environment in which that development took place.  
White (1995) argued the social impact of converting the Columbia from a natural 
ecologic system into an “organic machine” producing multiple commercial benefits is 
what makes the Northwest a true region of common interest.  Vogel‟s 2007 doctoral 
dissertation took White‟s (1995) argument a step further.  She concluded that the 
concept of the Northwest as a unified region centered on the provision of inexpensive 
hydroelectricity and socially institutionalized through the Pacific Northwest Regional 
Planning Commission (PNWRPC).  Vogel (2007) based her argument on review of 
primary materials in PNWRPC archives.  Although not focused on the PNWRPC as a 
governance system per se, her work provided a great deal of insight into PNWRPC 
origins and operation.    
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), and Norwood (c.1981) 
provide firsthand accounts written by men with active roles in regional developmental 
policy and governance in the 1950s and „60s.  McKinley (1952) provided an overview 
of federal responsibilities in the region, analyzed the voluntary nature of interagency 
governance, and argued for establishment of a more authoritative Columbia Valley 
Authority to plan and manage Basin resources.  Bessey (1963) traced the region‟s 
efforts at regional planning.  Scheufele (c.1970) provided an insightful analysis of the 
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Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee and in so doing provided an applicable 
critique to collaborative governances systems in general.  Norwood (c.1981) traced the 
history of the policies of the Bonneville Power Administration.   
Histories of more recent events included Pope‟s (2008) account of the hydro-
thermal crisis of the 1970s; Blumm‟s (1982) discussion of the background of the 1980 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act; Hemmingway‟s 
(1983) analysis of the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council; and 
Crampton and Espenson‟s (2009) synopsis of salmon litigation between 1991 and 
2009.  This study effort researched these works with the goal of identifying the key 
issues facing the Pacific Northwest at the time, and the governance systems proposed 
or enacted in order to address those issues.  Also researched were the key arguments 
for or against the various governance systems and the positions of regional institutional 
actors as those debates played out.        
Domain: The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs.  
All Columbia Basin efforts at collaborative governance were initiated to guide 
planning and management of the Basin‟s resources and/or to provide a forum where 
differences among regional institutional actors could be resolved.  Many of the most 
dominant differences have involved conflicts among commercial, sport, and tribal 
fishery interests and the collective opposition of fishery interests to the construction 
and operation of mainstem dams.  This issue was central in the formation of the 
Columbia River Basin Forum and has been at least a component issue of every 
governance system proposed or enacted since the 1940s.  Its importance intensified 
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once NMFS began listing Columbia basin salmonid species as threatened or 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act in 1991.  Fish management and 
conservation will likely continue as a central governance issue into the future. 
Literature on the Northwest salmon situation proved a mix of objective analysis 
and issue advocacy.  Research focused on basic facts, dates, and circumstances; 
institutional context with regard to governance; insights into various advocates‟ 
interests and worldviews; and the role the issue played in governance choices.  The 
National Research Council (1996) provided an objective and comprehensive general 
overview of the salmon crisis and interrelated causes of salmon declines.  Cone and 
Ridlington (1996) provided excerpts from statutes, policy statements, Indian treaties, 
speeches, and technical reports considered central to policy decisions and editorial 
comments on each from regional salmon scientists and activists.  Lichatowich (1999), 
Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide holistic critiques of the causes of salmon 
decline and the impacts of cultural perspectives on salmon policy.   
This study researched advocacy books and articles for basic facts, dates, and 
circumstances and insights into how worldviews of the parties on whose behalf the 
authors were writing influenced perspectives on causes and solutions.  Buchal (1998), 
writing from the perspective of those dependent on the commercial benefits of the 
developed river, tends to dismiss the impact of dams and primarily attributes the 
salmon decline to overfishing, mismanaged hatchery practices, and ulterior political 
motives of federal regulatory agencies.  Alternatively, Blumm et al. (1998) placed 
primary blame on the existence and operation of Columbia and Snake River dams.  
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Lichatowich (1991) critically focused on hatchery policy, arguing that it was an 
application of industrial-scale fish production through hatcheries that created a 
misguided belief that the region could continue to have harvestable fish runs and 
commercial development – all of which came at the expense of natural salmon runs.        
Notwithstanding the enormous cultural importance of salmon to tribal culture, 
much of the salmon debate in the first half of the 20
th
 century consisted of a contest 
among competing economic interests framed within the market-capitalist worldview.  
In the 1960s and 70s a new worldview emerged that emphasized environmental values.  
Arguably, one of the underlying reasons that the salmon crisis seems so irreconcilable 
is the view by some parties of salmon as an economic commodity to be exploited and 
by others as an ecological treasure to be preserved.  The environmental worldview has 
gained significant traction in the Northwest with adherents insisting that resource 
managers consider ecological concerns.  Understanding that worldview is therefore 
important to understanding the Basin‟s more recent governance history.   
Domain: The American environmental movement. 
This study effort researched literature on the United States environmental 
movement primarily for its contextual roots and the role environmentalism played in 
recent American political life.   
Many environmental historians generally credit George Perkins Marsh as 
providing the intellectual foundation of the American environmental movement.  
Marsh (1965/1864) provided an intellectual framework for the conservation 
movement.  Marsh (1965/1864) promoted a responsible stewardship approach to 
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natural resource use grounded in the American capitalist and protestant traditions.  
Kline (2000) and Thomas Dunlap (2004), while giving Marsh his due, traced the 
historical trajectory of environmental philosophy from the Middle Ages up through the 
1990s.  Both are self-described environmentalists who provided critiques of the impact 
of the market-capitalist worldview on natural resources.   
Hays (1999/1959), Riley Dunlap and Mertig (1992a), and Rosenbaum (2005) 
collectively presented a history of the movement‟s political and institutional 
development.  Hays (1999/1959) argued that to most environmental historians, the 
significance of the progressive conservation movement lay in the substance of 
progressive policies concerning sustained yield forestry, multiple use river 
development, and efficient public land management.  He argued that the movement 
was much more than that.  It was nothing short of a major realignment of American 
political power away from private corporations and into the hands of government 
administrative agencies in the moral interest of promoting the public good.  Dunlap 
and Mertig (1992a) argued that despite predictions to the contrary, the American 
environmental movement has not had the short life span of most social movements 
and has embedded itself in American political life as a core value.  Rosenbaum (2005) 
offered an accounting of the nation‟s progress toward environmentalism, how much 
lost, and how much gained.  He chronicled changes in national policy due to changes 
in presidential administrations and congressional makeup.  He discussed the shift from 
single-issue policies for protection of individual elements of the environment such as 
water, air, and discrete species to more holistic concerns over ecological impacts.  He 
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addressed the uncertainty of science and the political difficulty of justifying costs for 
environmental consequences that fall to individual consumers whereas the benefits are 
spread over the population.   
Although no piece of the environmental literature reviewed directly addressed 
the Pacific Northwest, they provided a context for the environmental worldview that in 
recent years played an increasingly significant role in Northwest natural resource 
issues. 
  
Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
Findings. 
This study produced five primary findings, outlined here and discussed more 
fully in Chapter 8.  First is the sheer complexity of the governance task.  This 
complexity is due to several factors.  The first is the sheer scope of the operational 
issues to be addressed, especially in balancing the commercial purposes of the river‟s 
operation with mitigation for impacts on fish and wildlife.  The second is the legacy 
effects of localism, institutional power, and perspectives over resource use dating to 
the region‟s early settlement.  Third is the challenge of structure, or coming to 
agreement on a common vision of purpose and the internal rules and procedures to 
guide routine business and decision-making.  The complications of scope, institutional 
legacy, and structure are further exacerbated by the different worldviews institutional 
participants bring to debates over substantive issues.   
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The second general finding concerns the role of law and legal structure.  The 
U.S. constitutional framework and federal and state laws establish legal standing for 
state and federal agencies to carry out assigned tasks.  They also define relationships 
among institutional parties, delegate decision-making, and mandate tasks and 
objectives to be achieved.  Consequently, the legal structure both enables and 
constrains efforts at multi-jurisdictional governance. 
The third general finding is that, despite these complexities and legal 
framework, the Basin managed to employ some form of inter-jurisdictional 
governance system since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning 
Commission in 1934.  The Basin has not been without at least one governance system 
in place since.  Between 1934 and 2000, twenty-six different governance systems were 
proposed.  Eleven were established.  This study found that either each system 
identified was an evolutionary progression from an existing system or a new system 
specifically established to displace another.  This study categorized each identified 
system as either decision oriented or collaboration oriented.  As the names imply, 
decision oriented systems favored efficient, authoritative decisions regarding resource 
management and use at the expense of inclusiveness.  Conversely, collaborative 
systems favored broad inclusion at the expense of efficient decision-making.   
This study further subdivided these two broad characterizations into six 
governance models as determined by the dominant institutional actors in each system.  
The study identified three decision oriented and three collaboration oriented models.  
This study termed the decision-oriented models as the Market Model, the Iron 
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Triangle Model, and the Valley Authority Model.  Private enterprises led decision-
making under Market Model systems.  Three-way arrangements among federal 
agencies, their congressional oversight committees, and private interests controlled 
individual resource policy domains under the Iron Triangle Model.  In contrast to the 
decentralized decision-making nature of the Market and Iron Triangle Model, Valley 
Authority Model systems centralized federal decision-making under one 
administrative structure.   
This study categorized collaborative systems under models termed the Federal 
Cooperation Model, the State Cooperation Model, and the Three Sovereigns Model.  
Under the Federal Cooperation Model, federal agencies coordinated their discretionary 
decision-making and programs.  State Cooperation systems were led by state entities, 
usually representatives from the governors‟ offices.  Three Sovereigns systems 
envisioned federal, state, and tribal representatives working as co-equal management 
partners.  Chapter 8 discusses the models in more detail and identifies the systems 
assigned to each.   
The fourth general finding concerned patterns of system change.  Change came 
about either through evolutionary processes within models or the emergence of 
circumstances that allowed for dramatic shifts between models.  Evolutionary changes 
occurred through collapse due to internal structural weaknesses for which participants 
lacked a compelling reason to resolve or mutual agreement to improve and replace 
extant systems.  Conflict-based system change occurred through emergence of a 
critical situation that called existing governance systems into question and allowed a 
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new set of participants to achieve dominance.  This study found four such critical 
situations to have occurred between 1929 and 1999.  These were the onset of the Great 
Depression in 1929, events surrounding the end of World War II circa 1945, the 
issuance of a notice of insufficiency by the Bonneville Power Administration in 1976, 
and the first listings of regional salmon under the Endangered Species Act in 1991.  
Events and circumstances that precipitated the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee (the end of World War II), the Northwest Power Planning and 
Conservation Council (the BPA notice of insufficiency in 1976), and the Columbia 
River Basin Forum (potential threat of deregulation and loss of regional benefits from 
the FCRPS) suggest a patterned response to perceived pending critical situations.  
Chapter 8 explains this pattern and illustrates it in Figures 8-4 and 8-5.  The events that 
led to formulation of the CRBF did not rise to the level of criticality that would justify 
replacement of other extant forums and regimes.  This circumstance undermined any 
incentive for participants to invest in CRBF success, rendered it duplicative of these 
other forums, and thus contributed to its collapse.   
Fifth is the regional preference for collaboration-oriented governance systems.  
Between 1934 and 2000, the region repeatedly rejected decision-oriented models in 
favor of collaboration-oriented models.  All eleven systems enacted were collaboration 
oriented under one model or another; no decision-oriented system has yet been chosen.  
This is in spite of a mixed record of success.  Some collaborative systems, such as the 
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee, and the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council, existed for 
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decades and delivered substantive and credible programs, plans, products and services.  
Others, such as the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, 
Regional Forum Executive Committee, and Columbia River Basin Forum collapsed 
after a relatively short period, accomplishing little.  The systems that succeeded appear 
to have achieved a shared sense of purpose and identity among their members that 
transcended individual participant institutional interests.  Those that failed apparently 
did not.  
Conclusions. 
The study‟s findings led to the following six conclusions, introduced below 
and discussed more fully in Chapter 8.  First, regional leaders are likely to continue to 
support some form of multijurisdictional governance system.  The reason for that 
support is the continuing desire to establish a rational process for resolving (or 
precluding) problems of competition and disagreement over resource uses that 
transcend individual federal agency, state and tribal government jurisdiction.    
Second, the apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s 
consistent preference for collaboration-based governance systems.  The challenge of 
reaching consensus among multiple parties with deeply held interests, strong 
institutional cultures, and differing worldviews seems one the region is consistently 
willing to tackle.  This elusive – if not unattainable – goal seems an institutionalized 
characteristic of the Northwest‟s approach to natural resource management within the 
Columbia River Basin.  It is not likely to change.  The region derived value and 
benefit from collaboration-oriented systems established under the Federal 
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Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three Sovereign models.  Despite recurring 
frustration over the inability of such systems to solve the region‟s more intractable 
problems, regional leaders find that living with that frustration is preferable to the 
outcomes that may be produced by more decision-oriented alternatives.    
Third, statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system success.  This study 
found examples of successful collaborative systems that were not established through 
law and examples of not-so-successful systems that were.  The reason is that the 
effectiveness of the collaborative systems identified in this study was more dependent 
on the relationships among the institutional leaders involved than any external 
mandates. 
Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a sufficient 
condition for any decision-oriented system that the region may desire to establish.  The 
authorities and prerogatives of state, federal, and tribal governments and agencies and, 
to some degree, the relationships among them are all established in law.  Any system 
with the authority to direct agency priorities and prerogatives must therefore have 
statutory authority to do so.  The degree to which the relationships and decision 
hierarchy of participating entities are defined in some new authorizing statute will 
determine the degree to which effectiveness will depend on voluntary compliance with 
system decisions. 
Fourth, the region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decision-
oriented governance system.  Even if the region were able to overcome the 
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constitutional, statutory, and institutional challenges at the state and federal levels, 
institutional leaders have historically rejected such systems.  The regional preference 
for collaborative systems does not reflect an avoidance of tough choices.  Rather it 
reflects a strong desire to obtain as much agreement on choices made as possible – 
even though getting to those choices frequently involves a contentious mix of 
negotiation, legislation, and/or litigation.  It may be possible that, at some point in the 
future, a critical situation of such magnitude occurs that allows establishment of a 
more authoritative system.  However, the history shows that the Great Depression, the 
end of a World War, a major regional financial crisis represented by BPA‟s notice of 
insufficiency in 1976, and the listing of regional salmon under the Endangered Species 
Act were not of sufficient criticality to allow enactment of such a system.  At this 
point, it is difficult to imagine one that would. 
Fifth, regardless of the level of unity achieved within any one system, there 
will likely always be parties who believe that the system(s) in place do not properly 
serve their interests.  These parties will look for opportunities to challenge existing 
structures when presented with critical situations.  As was shown in the CRBF 
experience, the perception of a pending critical situation is not sufficient to 
institutionalize a new system or overturn existing ones.  When such situations do arise, 
the region‟s experience with past governance system changes suggests the behavioral 
model explained in Chapter 8 and illustrated in Figure 8-4 will likely be followed.    
The sixth and final conclusion concerns limitations to the institutional 
methodology as used in this study to fully explain the governance paradox.  The 
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history recounted provided only partial answers to the study‟s research question.  This 
study findings suggest that worldview belief patterns embedded in institutional 
identity and culture, (Tajfel and Turner, 1979/2004; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Hogg 
and Terry, 2001; Schein, 2004) inculcated in individual institutional members as the 
correct way to think, perceive, and feel (Schein, 2004) and manifest through individual 
decision making processes (Beach, 1998) condition the agents of those institutions as 
to what constitutes acceptable policies and systems.  The experience of the Columbia 
River Basin Forum offers an opportunity to investigate this question in greater depth.  
Appendix B presents a framework for such a study. 
  
Organization of Study 
This study used an organizing framework inspired by Bessey (1963) and drawn 
from Giddens‟ (1984) argument regarding critical situations.  According to Giddens 
(1984), when social systems become established, they remain in place until a significant 
event occurs that upsets the status quo and allows new or previously suppressed 
alternatives to become viable.  Giddens (1984) terms such occurrences “critical situations” 
and defines them as those situations where the “established modes of accustomed life are 
drastically undermined or shattered” and “circumstances of radical disjuncture of an 
unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten 
or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines” (Giddens, 1984, p. 60-61).  Writing 
in 1963, Roy Bessey presented changing economic factors alone as the primary catalysts 
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for this sort of dramatic change within the Columbia Basin.
39
   This study takes advantage 
of the additional context offered by the forty-plus years since Bessey published his work 
expands his argument to include the catalytic effect of events other than economic drivers 
of change.   
This study found major events that marked a turn in public interest for or against 
various regional governance systems from the 1920s to the present.  The first two are in 
accord with Bessey (1963): the onset of the Great Depression and the end of World War 
II.  The second two are the Columbia River power system‟s hydro-thermal crisis of the 
1970s and the first listing of Columbia basin salmon under the Endangered Species Act in 
1991.  These events frame Chapters 3 through 7.  
Chapter 3 summarizes the region‟s history up to the first of these critical 
situations, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.  It presents the region‟s early 
exploration and settlement by Euro-Americans and their impact on Native Indian 
people.  It explains the Indian and white settler worldviews and how those worldviews 
influenced their respective social organizations.  It identifies the key institutions that 
would come to be significant actors in regional governance debates.  It also 
summarizes the political and social context leading up to the Depression.  It concludes 
by explaining the market and agency-oriented governance systems that managed 
regional natural resources at the time.   
                                                 
39
 Giddens‟ (1984) theoretical construct and Bessey‟s (1963) empirical work reflect Gersick‟s (1991) 
theory of “punctuated equilibrium.”  Gersick argues that social activity tends to follow status quo 
behaviors until disrupted by a threat or changed condition that calls those routine behaviors into 
question and sets the conditions under which new policies and behaviors can be brought into being.   
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Chapter 4 focuses on the onset of the Depression in 1929 and the changes the 
policies enacted in response to the nation‟s economic crisis caused in regional 
governance systems.  The chapter outlines the national political and social context of 
the time, the salient regional issues that directly or indirectly affected Basin 
governance and the governance systems proposed in response.  Chapters 5, 6, and 7 do 
the same for the three other critical situations found in this study to have created the 
circumstances that led to Basin governance changes.  These are the end of World War 
II in 1945, the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis and resultant BPA notice of insufficiency 
(NOS) in 1976; and the first listings of regional salmon under the Endangered Species 
Act in 1991, respectively.   
Chapter 8 summarizes and analyzes the findings of Chapters 3 through 7 and 
presents the study conclusions.  It categorizes the twenty-six governance systems 
proposed or enacted under the six governance models introduced above.  It also 
presents a pattern of governance development that in which the region appears to 
engage each time a perceived critical situation presents.  A complete reference list 
follows Chapter 8.  Appendix A provides the detailed literature review; Appendix B a 
theoretical framework to guide future research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SETTING THE STAGE:  
THE COLUMBIA BASIN PRIOR TO 1929 
 
   
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the point of departure for the discussion of Columbia 
Basin governance systems in the chapters that follow.  It documents the legacy effects 
of regional settlement that would influence future governance debates.  It begins with 
a discussion of the worldview of the Native tribes in the region and a comparison of 
those views with those of the first European explorers.  The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the impact of the Great Depression in 1929, an event that dramatically 
altered the market-based, decentralized systems of regional governance in place up to 
that time. 
This chapter also introduces the major regional institutions that would come to 
shape future governance systems.  These institutions include the Indian tribes, federal 
and state agencies, and private enterprises that were established around the Columbia 
Basin‟s fisheries, land and water use (agriculture, grazing, and timber harvest), and 
river development (irrigation, navigation, flood control, and – eventually - 
hydropower).  Since the Columbia as currently developed is a primarily a federal 
responsibility, emphasis is placed on federal agencies with jurisdictional 
responsibilities over the Basin‟s land, water, fish, wildlife, and timber.    
The chapter is divided into the following eight sections: 
 The social structure and worldview of the region‟s Indian tribes.   
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 Early European exploration and Anglo-American settlement.   
 The region‟s economic development and its underlying worldview. 
 Regional institutional development, focusing on the institutions established 
around land use, western water law, early federal Columbia River 
development projects, the salmon fishery, and the rivers hydropower 
potential. 
 The earliest indications that the philosophies that guided initial settlement 
and development may carry serious consequences. 
 The Progressive conservation movement and the implications of that 
movement for the Northwest. 
 The governance systems by which the Basin‟s resources were being 
managed as of 1929.A short chapter summary. 
 
Native Social Structure and the Tribal Worldview 
The Columbia region‟s temperate climate, abundance of water, and plentiful 
food sources resulted in a large variety of early native tribal bands and cultures in the 
Pacific Northwest.  Ruby and Brown (1992) identified fifteen “language families” 
comprised of 115 native Indian tribes that lived in the present states of Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana by the early 1800s.  Of these, five language families 
dispersed among thirty-eight tribes lived in the Columbia and Snake River basins.
40
   
                                                 
40
 Information on the number of historic tribes and language families is taken from the maps in Ruby 
and Brown (1992), pages 116-124.  The authors note that this information is based on the best available 
information, but may not be complete.  They also do not identify the time periods over which the tribes 
 91 
 
Indian social systems were clan based.  Social mores varied.  Coastal peoples 
were highly individualistic, materialistic, and competitive with a limited concept of 
“tribe”” loyalties belonged to the family and village.  Inland people were less 
materialistic and more likely to identify with tribal allegiances (Johansen, 1967).  
Indian economies were dependent on the wildlife and plants of the surrounding 
countryside for food and materials for tools, weapons, and building materials.  Wealth 
accumulated at the clan level; Indians sought wealth for the power and security of the 
clan (as opposed to individuals) and depended on the clan to sustain them through 
hard times.  Marriage and trade brought wealth to the clan while gift giving circulated 
it within the clan.  In addition to the practical effect of distributing food and other 
items throughout the community, gift giving enhanced individual prestige and 
influence (Johansen, 1967; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, 
McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).    
Underlying all of the various tribes was a shared worldview grounded in 
cultural values of respect and commitment to the community, connectedness with the 
natural world, humility, and the need to consider the impact of one‟s actions today on 
those that will live seven generations hence (Trosper, 1995; Taylor, 1999; 
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).  This worldview led to 
complex social and ethical arrangements that prescribed how humans should interact 
with the world around them.  Tribal culture grounded natural resource use in a 
                                                                                                                                            
they identify existed, and the assertion that the number of tribes identified was as of the early 1800s is 
based on the authors‟ reference citations.  The authors note that many of the tribes they identify no 
longer exist and it is unknown how many others disappeared and whose histories are lost. 
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spiritual basis that recognized the “inexorable linkage between salmon, humans, and 
the world” (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006, p. 32).  
Tribal stories and legends in which landforms, fish, and animals routinely interact with 
Indian peoples and occasionally change from one form to another illustrate this 
“inexorable linkage” (Clark, 1953).  Within this general conceptual framework, each 
tribe prided itself on its own distinct traditions and orally passed them from generation 
to generation (Clark, 1953; Wilkinson, 2005). 
Central to Northwest tribal economies was the concept of reciprocal exchange as 
practiced through the potlatch – although its practice varied between coastal and inland 
tribes (Johansen, 1967).  The potlatch was a gift giving and barter event that distributed 
the clan‟s collective wealth among individuals.  It modeled what the Indians observed in 
the processes of nature: soil gave seeds the opportunity to produce plants; plants fed the 
animals; animals fed other animals; and, in death, the animals fed the soil.  It was a natural 
cycle in which no element was dominant, not even humans, and in which each element 
depended on the others.  The etiquette of reciprocal exchange called for a return in equal 
or greater measure for gifts received (Trosper, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999).       
None of this precluded the use of technology to manage nature‟s resources to 
improve tribal life.  Indians used fire throughout the Northwest to enhance root 
gathering and hunting and weirs, gillnets, seines, dip nets, and spears to enhance the 
harvest of fish (White, 1995; Robbins, 1997; Hays, 2000; Taylor, 1999).  Salmon was 
the “largest single source of protein” (Taylor, 1999, p. 13) for Northwest tribes and 
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preservation through drying, smoking, and pemmican-making allowed food to be 
stored for winter and transported over extended distances for trade or gift giving.   
These technologies, coupled with the stable and healthy populations of tribal 
people, posed potentially significant threats to fish runs.  Natural calamities caused 
periodic food shortages, but tribal tradition and custom provided normative restraints 
that prevented human over-use.  “Restraint flowed from the concepts and practices of 
Oregon country Indians, who filled their world with spirits that demanded respect.  
The way they understood this relationship resulted in a series of activities dedicated to 
propitiating salmon, and although conservation was not the stated purpose, moderation 
of harvests was the effective result” (Taylor, 1999, p. 27).  The result was a regime of 
natural resource management that sustained tribal society for centuries (Taylor, 1999; 
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006). 
Spanish explorers first arrived along the Northwest coast in the early 1540s.
41
  
They sought new sources of wealth to supplement the treasure taken from the Aztecs 
and Incas of Central America (Dodds, 1986).  Lyman (1963/1917) and Dodds (1986) 
argue that the Spanish maps of the Northwest coast, unlike those drawn of other parts 
of the North American coastline, were wildly inaccurate implying little or no inland 
exploration.  In an oft-repeated story,
42
 William Lyman (1963/1917) records a legend 
                                                 
41
 Dodds (1986) says the first Spanish ships arrived in 1542; Lyman (1963/1917) says 1543.  Schafer 
(1943/1918) and Johansen (1967) do not specify. 
 
42
 This story appears in Clark (1953), Indian Legends of the Pacific Northwest and Judson (1916), Early 
Days in Old Oregon.  Both cite Lyman (albeit from different editions of his book) and others.  Judson 
states that a Chinook version of the story was recorded in 1896.  Judson and Lyman also relate a story 
from a book by Gabriel Franchere, an early settler in Astoria.  Franchere tells of meeting an old man in 
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told him by an old Clatsop woman.  According to Clatsop tribal lore, two white sailors 
of unrecorded origin, perhaps shipwrecked or marooned, landed in a small sail boat 
about two miles south of the Columbia‟s mouth.  One or two local tribes, depending 
on the version, either adopted or enslaved them, again depending on the version.  One 
was apparently a blacksmith, providing the tribes a new and invaluable technology for 
tool making and jewelry.  Using this story, coupled with other circumstantial evidence 
and a healthy dose of speculation, Lyman (1963/1917) concludes that the landing of 
the two sailors could have occurred as early as 1725.
43
  Lyman also argued that this 
explains why, as recorded in the journals of Captain James Cook in 1778, the Indians 
showed no surprise at Cook‟s weapons or other iron implements.44  Later explorers 
engaged in trade with the tribes and, occasionally, violence (Lyman, 1963/1917; 
Schafer, 1943/1918; Johansen, 1967).  Thus, Northwest Indians may have had up to 
250 years of sporadic contact with whites before arrival of the Lewis and Clark 
expedition in 1805.   
Prior to 1828, the official policy of the American government toward the tribes 
was one of “agreements between equals” (Pevar, 2002, p. 6).  Congress passed laws 
                                                                                                                                            
1811 near the Cascades who claimed that his father, a Spaniard, had been wrecked at the river‟s mouth 
many years before.    
 
43
 Judson (1953) and Lyman relate a story from a book by Gabriel Franchere, an early settler in Astoria.  
Franchere tells of meeting an old man in 1811 near the Cascades who claimed that his father, a 
Spaniard, had been wrecked at the river‟s mouth many years before.  Lyman suggests that the father of 
the old man was one of the two found by the Clatsops and uses this in support of his 1725 date of the 
landing.    
 
44
 Presumably they could have been made aware of European metalwork through contact with earlier 
Spanish explorers as well. 
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restricting access by whites onto tribal lands, regulated white-Indian trade relations to 
ensure fairness to the tribes, and exempted tribes from state trade laws.  Although well 
intentioned, the states and settlers in general did not respect these laws and they 
proved virtually impossible to enforce.  Besides, they also stood in direct conflict with 
the growing nation‟s westward expansion (Pevar, 2002). 
Official policy changed with the election of President Andrew Jackson in 
1828.  Under Jackson‟s administration, continuing through 1887, removal and 
relocation to make way for white settlement became the dominant federal policy 
(Pevar, 2002).  The General Allotment Act, passed in 1887, further reduced tribal land 
holdings.  The Act was motivated both by well-meaning reformers who believed tribal 
interests were best served by turning Indians into farmers and by white developers and 
speculators who coveted Indian land.  The Act, applied to about three-fourths of the 
nation‟s tribes, provided every member of a reservation tribe a personal allotment of 
160 acres (80 acres on some reservations), with reservation land in excess of that 
amount declared “surplus” and put up for sale to non-Indians.  By the time Congress 
repealed the Act in 1934, federal policy had relegated Indians to a state of “coerced 
dependency” on the federal government (Pevar, 2002, p. 7).         
The beginning of settlement in the Northwest in the early 1800s held dire 
consequences for regional tribes.  Initially, white dependence on Indians to provide 
fish and furs for trade moderated consumption.  As the number of white settlers grew 
through the mid- to late-1800s, the demand for land and resources increased 
exponentially.  Concurrently, disease decimated tribal populations.  Taylor (1999) 
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cites estimates of Oregon Indian populations declining by 95% from 1840 to 1900 as 
non-Indians increased from less than 800 in 1840 to over 1.1 million in the same 
period.  Robbins (1997) relates similar numbers.        
Tribal society was under assault from Anglo-American influences other than 
disease.  Fur trappers introduced alcohol to Northwest tribes in the 1820s and 30s with 
devastating results.  Burgeoning pride in American nationhood, coupled with 
Protestant missionary zeal in the late 1700s, led to national Indian policies intended to 
“civilize” Indian tribes and assimilate their people into mainstream American society.  
For many, “‟civilize‟ quickly became a near synonym for “Christianize” (Pevar, 2002; 
Wilkinson, 2005, p. 33).  The goal of the missionaries, often with the best of intentions 
and believed in the best interest of the Indians, was in effect to eradicate the tribal 
cultural worldview and replace it with white values regarding private property, 
agriculture, and religion.  Less altruistic trappers and settlers simply took what they 
wanted.  Violence was sporadic until the Cayuse war of 1847.  Unable to effectively 
compete militarily with encroaching white settlement, Northwest tribes signed a series 
of treaties between 1854 and 1863.  These treaties relegated the tribes to designated 
reservations, most of which were beyond areas in which white settlers were initially 
interested.  War erupted again with the Modocs in 1873, the Nez Perce in 1877, and 
the Bannacks in 1878.  Organized tribal resistance ended by 1880.  From then on, the 
tribes had little choice but to accept life on the reservations (Lyman, 1963/1917; 
Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986; Ruby and Brown, 1981; Wilkinson, 2005). 
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Although the treaties and subsequent legislation resulted in the loss of most 
Indian lands and relocated the tribes to remote reservations, the Northwest tribes 
retained important rights to hunt and fish at their usual and accustomed locations 
(Wilkinson, 2005).  These treaty rights would come under repeated assault over the 
following years by whites seeking additional land and by fishery interests.  
Nevertheless, federal courts upheld the treaty promised rights.  These court cases 
would come to play a significant role in the governance debates in the decades to 
come.
 45
  But by 1929, and despite having been formally recognized as United States 
Citizens in 1924, the tribes lost virtually all influence over the management of 
Columbian Basin resources – influence they would not begin to regain until the 1970s 
(Ruby and Brown, 1981; Pevar, 2002).   
 
European Exploration and Anglo-American Settlement 
Whereas early Spanish interest in the Northwest centered on gold to replace 
that taken from South and Central America, it was the abundance of furs that sparked 
initial settlement (Lyman, 1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986).  The 
potential value of the Northwest fur trade was in effect discovered by accident.  
According to Schafer (1943/1918), the sailors of James Cook‟s 1778 voyage 
exchanged “baubles as the sailors cared to part with” with natives for sea otter and 
                                                 
45
 The treaty tribes have consistently prevailed in federal court in defending their treaty fishing rights, 
and the judicial history of the Pacific Northwest contains numerous milestones in the development of 
Indian law.  The National Research Council (2004) identifies United States v. Winan (198 U.S. 371), 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1905, as the foundational legal case regarding treaty reserved 
fishing rights.  Others are discussed later in this report.       
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other furs to supplement their clothing and bedding and improve shipboard comfort.  
Upon arrival in Canton, China, they were beset by merchants willing to pay “a 
hundred dollars” for “[s]kins that did not cost the purchaser sixpence sterling” 
(Schafer, 1943/1918, p. 15).  As word spread, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, 
Russia, Great Britain, and the United States all sought or claimed rights to the Pacific 
Northwest.  A growing demand for fur pelts in China and East India and long-standing 
interest in finding a northern waterway linking the North American east and west 
coasts fueled this international interest. 
  United States and Great Britain held the strongest claims; those of the others 
eventually fell away or were otherwise resolved (Schafer, 1943/1918; Lyman, 
1963/1917
46
).  The United States based its claim on Robert Gray‟s exploration of the 
mouth of the Columbia in 1792 (which gave the river its current name
47
) and the 
Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804-1806.  Great Britain rested its claim on the sea-
based discoveries of Francis Drake, James Cook and George Vancouver and 
Alexander Mackenzie‟s overland expedition in 1793.  A treaty in 1846, establishing 
the current border between the United States and Canada, settled British claim 
(Lyman, 1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986).     
 “Mountain Men” operating as independent trappers (mostly from Kentucky 
and Virginia) or as employees of large fur companies followed in the wake of the 
                                                 
46
 See Lyman, 163/1917, pp. 157-162 for discussion as to how these various claims were resolved. 
 
47
 Gray named the river after his ship, the Columbia Rediviva.  See Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman 
(1963/1917), Dodds (1986), and just about everyone else who has ever written about the Northwest.   
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Mackenzie and Lewis and Clark expeditions.  These companies included the British 
Hudson‟s Bay Company, first chartered in 1670; the Canadian Northwest Fur 
Company, established in 1783; and the American Pacific Fur Company founded by 
John J. Astor in 1810.  These companies did more than just pursue their business 
interests.  Their posts and forts established the first systems of white governance in the 
region, providing social organizations for defense, trade, food production, 
administration of justice, and other regulations over day-to-day life (Lyman, 
1963/1917; Schafer, 1943/1918; Dodds, 1986; Robbins, 1997).   
In the 1820s, the Hudson‟s Bay Company (the Company) merged with the 
Northwest Fur Company and bought out the American Pacific Fur Company.  The fact 
that the the Hudson‟s Bay Company almost derailed establishment of a provisional 
government in the Oregon Territory demonstrates the Company‟s regional political 
power.  The policy of the British as implemented through the Company was to “keep 
the country a wilderness, to maintain amicable relations with the Indians, and to 
depend mainly on the fur trade for the great profits of their enterprise” (Lyman, 
1963/1917, p. 162).  American interests, in contrast, lie in regional settlement and 
development.   
The Northwest established its first provisional territorial government in May 
1843 when local leaders called a meeting of American and French Canadian settlers to 
create a framework of laws and elect officers.  The Hudson‟s Bay Company ordered 
their employees, which accounted for about half of the delegates selected, to vote 
against any such plan.  Nevertheless, the proposal to form a provisional government 
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passed albeit by a narrow margin.  The new government laid the basis for American 
settlement and eventual establishment of the Oregon Territory in 1848 (Schafer, 
1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967).
48
    
The Oregon Territory of 1848 (see map at Figure P-1) consisted of the current 
states of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho and portions of Wyoming and Montana.  In 
1853 settlements north of the Columbia, located around Puget Sound and along the 
Cowlitz River, petitioned Congress to form a new Territory from within the 
boundaries of the Oregon Territory.  Noting that the current Oregon Territory was too 
large to form a single state and stating their frustration at the distance between their 
communities and the Territorial capital in Oregon City, proponents argued that 
division was inevitable anyway.  Presciently identifying the governance conflicts that 
were to follow, their petition stated that the residents north and south of the Columbia 
“would always rival each other in commercial advantages…”  The petitioners 
predicted the communities around Puget Sound and those within the Willamette 
Valley would always “as they are now and always have been, be actuated by a spirit of 
opposition” (Johansen, 1967, p. 248).  The bill creating the Washington Territory 
passed in 1853 with little opposition.  Similar arguments led to further dividing the 
Washington Territory to create the Idaho Territory in 1863, followed by the Montana 
Territory in 1864 and Wyoming Territory in 1868.  Statehood came for Oregon in 
                                                 
48
 See Lyman, 1963/1917, pp, 162-169 for a detailed and dramatic account of the proceedings leading 
up to this vote and description of the newly formed provisional government.  He claims the measure 
passed by two votes from over a hundred cast.  The veracity of his telling may be suspect, however, 
given that he mistakenly reports the year of the provisional government‟s formation as 1841 apparently 
confused it with a different meeting that occurred in that earlier year.  Johansen (1967) questions the 
closeness of the vote.     
 101 
 
1859, Washington and Montana in 1889, and Idaho in 1890 (Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 
1986).  With formal government structures in place and treaties signed with the 
Indians, migration to the Northwest began in earnest. 
 
Regional Economic Development and the Anglo-American Worldview 
White economic and social development flourished just as tribal societies 
disintegrated.  The economy of the Pacific Northwest developed along five lines of 
extractive industries between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries.  These 
were the fur trading, fishing, mining, forestry, and agriculture (to include farming and 
ranching) and their supporting social and institutional infrastructure (Norwood, 
c.1981; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999). 
Trapping died out as a major commercial enterprise by the 1840s.  Fueled by 
the trappers‟ stories, promises of free land, and discovery of gold in California in 1848 
and in Oregon in 1850, the population quickly grew.  The rapid influx of settlers and 
prospectors created demands for food, land, and timber.  The market for increased 
food supported development of an extensive salmon fishery in the lower Columbia 
River and farms and ranches throughout the region.  Canning technology provided the 
means to preserve food economically transport it over long distances supported the 
growth in food production.  Farm land in the water-rich area west of the Cascades, 
particularly in the fertile Willamette Valley, was developed first and was fully claimed 
by the 1850s.  Timber harvest from the forests of the Northwest and northern 
California, made efficient through the use of the steam engine, fed the need for 
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building material for mines, and towns (especially San Francisco) (Smith, 1950; 
Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).   
The railroads arrived in the 1870s, connecting the resources of the Northwest 
to growing demand from the nation in general and the meteoric growth and 
development in California in particular.  With the arrival of the railroads, the period 
1870 – 1914 saw an expansion of cattle and sheep ranching and the growth of dry land 
farming east of the Cascades in Oregon and Washington and in southern Idaho.  
A belief in market capitalism and divine support for the American political 
system grounded the general social values of the Euro-American settlers.  These 
values held nature as a warehouse of natural goods provided by Providence for human 
enrichment (Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 
2006).  These values epitomized the Judeo-Christian belief in human dominance over 
nature (Kline, 2000) and the accumulation of individual wealth as a divinely endorsed 
moral good (Weber, 2002/1920).  They were coupled with uniquely American 
concepts of private property in general and land ownership in particular as guarantors 
of social equity, individual wealth creation, and democratic government.  These 
concepts were combined with a belief that divine providence preordained an American 
empire from coast to coast (Smith, 1950).   
In addition, those arriving in the Pacific Northwest, having survived the 
arduous cross-country journey, brought with them an enormous sense of self-
confidence.  New settlers poured into the region, especially following the Indian 
treaties.  Most came from the Midwest, descended from British stock and already 
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American by several generations.  They were conservative, ambitious, and strongly 
believed in the west as a mythical garden awaiting the plow and settlement.  They saw 
the land of the West as an opportunity for a better life and for the growth of American 
republican virtue.  Thus, they added to an already American value of economic 
prosperity through capitalist enterprise and the belief that settlement of the west was 
part of God‟s divine plan (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986).    
These philosophical predispositions were coupled with the seemingly limitless 
natural resources of the North American continent.  Writing with regard to timber, 
Jenks Cameron (1928) argues that a “legend of inexhaustibility” evolved beginning 
with the earliest reports from European New World explorers.  The perception of 
inexhaustibility applied to fisheries (Weber, 2002; Cart, 2004) and game (Cameron, 
1929) as well.  Estimates of annual salmon and steelhead returns to the Columbia 
River Estuary are as high as 16 million (National Research Council, 2004).  With 
regard to game, Cameron (1929) wrote that the abundance of birds and wildlife 
…bred in the early American settler a fixed idea and a trait.  The fixed idea 
was a conviction that any such thing as the extermination of game was 
impossible.  The trait was a prodigal disregard for not merely game but 
wildlife of all sorts comparable to the solicitude which the boy with a stick in 
his hands feels for the weeds by the wayside.  And both the trait and the idea 
were transmitted to the early settler‟s children and to his children‟s children.  
And along with them were transmitted the fierce conviction that a free-born 
American had the right to bear arms, and to „gun‟ pretty much where, when, 
and how he pleased (Cameron, 1929, p. 5). 
 
The national belief in markets and individual liberty, an assumption of resource 
inexhaustibility, and dubious assumptions about water availability led to federal 
policies on western settlement, agriculture, mining, grazing, water, and timber 
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intended to encourage passage of western public lands into private hands with little 
regard for consequences (Wilkinson, 1992; Reisner, 1993).  As settlement progressed, 
the newcomers began to call for the institutional infrastructure needed support their 
ambitions.   
 
Regional Institutional Development 
America as a whole in the late 1800s was largely a country of “island 
communities” - small towns separated by miles of rural land.  Most people‟s concept 
of the nation was limited to their immediate and surrounding communities (Wiebe, 
1967).  Drawn by the region‟s abundance and the land and wealth promised by 
national policy, people and business enterprises established isolated, independent, and 
relatively self-contained communities built around mining, farming, ranching, fishing, 
and timber throughout the Northwest (Robbins, 1997, Vogel, 2007).  Seattle, 
Washington (timber); Bend, Oregon (timber); Astoria, Oregon (initially a fur-trading 
outpost; later fishing); Wenatchee, Washington (initially a fur-trading outpost; later 
agriculture) and Kellogg, Idaho (mining) provide examples of these early communities 
and the resources around which they were built.      
Isolation and independence also occurred in the administrative framework for 
oversight of federal and state statutes and policies.  Responsibility for policy oversight 
and implementation was assigned to specific government agencies, such as the Corps 
of Engineers for waterway navigation and flood control; the Bureau of Reclamation 
for irrigation; the U.S. Forest Service and General Land Office for timber harvest, 
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grazing, and mining on and/or distribution of public lands; the Department of 
Agriculture for farming; the state fish and wildlife agencies and federal Fish and 
Fisheries Commission (later the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine 
Fisheries Service) for fishery management (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; McKinley, 
1952, Steen, 1976; Shallat, 1994; Cart, 2004; Pisani, 2002; Rowley, 2006 ).     
Thus, local communities, private enterprises, and state and federal agencies 
evolved together around the region‟s fisheries, water resources, land, farms, ranches, 
and timber.  The approach and attitudes of the federal agencies were functions of their 
origins.  The earliest agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers (established 
1802), the General Land Office (established 1812), and the Department (later Bureau) 
of Indian Affairs (established 1824) had organizational roots and traditions dating 
back to the nation‟s colonial period.  Congress expected the Corps, GLO, and the 
Department of Agriculture (established 1868) to work with private interests to support 
and promote development of the nation‟s economy.  Later arrivals, such as the 
Reclamation Service (later Bureau of Reclamation) (established 1902) and U.S. Forest 
Service (established 1905), while grounded in Progressive values of scientific 
management, efficiency, and management of public resources for the greatest public 
good, were also development oriented albeit with the twin goal of sustainability over 
the long term.  Each developed close working relationships with the private 
constituencies that came to depend on them (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; Steen, 1976; 
Shallat, 1994; Pisani, 2002; Rowley, 2006).     
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The upshot was that by 1929 the Northwest economy and social system rested 
almost entirely upon extraction and development of the region‟s rich natural resources.  
Although frequently in conflict over markets and other tangible interests, regional 
institutions met with little challenge during their formative years (Dodds, 1986).  Later 
attempts to provide a more holistic management system, regardless of how well 
intentioned, would often be seen as threats to established ways-of-life, entrenched 
interests, and agency prerogatives and thus met with deep suspicion.  (Ogden, 1949; 
Smith, 1950; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992; White, 
1995; Robbins, 1997; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).      The remainder of this 
section introduces the major institutional actors that would come to play significant 
roles in future debates over the Basin‟s governance systems.  In addition to the 
already-discussed Indian tribes, these include the federal and state agencies and 
private enterprises developed around regional land development, water law, river 
development, fisheries, and hydroelectric power.    
Land use: farming, ranching, and timber.
49
 
Eighteenth and early 19
th
 century policies focused on the sale of public land to 
help fund the federal government (Conover, 1923).  By the mid 19
th
 century, federal 
policies offered both free land ownership to encourage an agricultural life style for 
average Americans and generous access for resource extraction to support settlement 
and economic development.  The Homestead Act of 1862 promised160 acres to 
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 Mining was also a major land use activity and a significant factor in regional settlement.  However, 
the research for this study revealed no involvement by mining interests in any of the proposed or 
enacted governance systems identified.  Consequently, discussion of mining is limited to its 
interconnection with other agencies and land uses.   
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anyone willing to claim and work the land; the Hardrock Mining Law of 1872 allowed 
free access to public land for extraction of minerals; and state grazing laws permitted 
private use of public land free of charge.  The stated goal of these policies was to build 
a society of small, “yeoman” farmers in the Jeffersonian tradition to avoid the 
European practice of an aristocracy of major landowners.  The west‟s abundance of 
natural resources could support regional settlement, enhance the national economy, 
assist in establishing the United States‟ place in international commerce, and offer a 
relief valve for potential crowding and social unrest in the east (Smith, 1950; 
Wilkinson, 1992; Cortner and Moote, 1999). 
The strategy for implementing settlement policy was simple and 
straightforward.  Adopting laissez faire policies at the state and federal levels, the 
government would essentially “open the gates to western public lands, step back, and 
allow American ingenuity to take over” (Wilkinson, 1992, p. 18).  Federal policy 
encouraged the exploitation of resources on public land; federal and state laws 
provided incentives for people to move west and codified the practices of those 
already there.  The two federal agencies charged with implementing these policies 
were the General Land Office (GLO) and, later, the Forest Service. 
Originally organized under the Department of the Treasury, GLO was moved 
to the newly created Department of the Interior in 1849.  In effect, GLO served as the 
nation‟s real estate agent (Conover, 1923).  GLO opened its first office in the Pacific 
Northwest in the Oregon Territorial capital, Oregon City, in 1855.  Field offices later 
opened in Olympia, Seattle, Walla Walla, Yakima, and Spokane in what is now 
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Washington and Burns, Lakeview, Roseburg, The Dalles, and Vale in the future state 
of Oregon.   
GLO‟s already large workload increased with the issuance of railroad grants 
between 1851 and 1872, the mission of managing public timber in 1855, the 
Homestead Act, and the Hardrock Mining Act.  These laws intended settlement to 
proceed in an orderly fashion guided by careful surveys.  The additional 
responsibilities imposed on GLO by these laws did not bring with them new staff, and 
the agency felt constantly besieged by more work than it could handle (Conover, 
1923).  Complaints over the slow processing of claim and requests by the agency 
mounted, and settlers, developers, and business interests often moved ahead with their 
development plans without formal approval.   
The agency compensated for its staff shortages by depending on grant 
applicants to provide their own surveys.  This often led to fraud, especially with regard 
to timber and minerals.  Reports to Congress requesting additional funds, larger staffs, 
better regulation, and greater authority went largely unheeded (Steen, 1976).
50
   
Much of the abuse on public land involved timber poaching.  Progressive 
reformers, motivated by the efforts of Franklin Hough, repeatedly tried to establish a 
professional forest service to combat the wasteful and damaging practices by timber 
companies on public land.  Congressman Mark Dunnell of Minnesota tried 
unsuccessfully to get such a bill through the Public Lands Committee in the mid 
1870s.  Private timber interests and their supporters on the committee opposed the bill.  
                                                 
50
 For an example, see the report to Congress from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
1888). 
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In frustration, Dunnell slipped a rider for a “forest study” under seed distribution 
provision in the Department of Agriculture appropriations bill.  Conducted by Hough, 
the report proved highly influential.  Congress appropriated funds for additional 
reports on a case-by-case basis until establishment of a formal Division of Forestry in 
Agriculture in 1881 with Hough as its chief.  Upon its establishment in 1905 under the 
leadership of Gifford Pinchot, the U.S. Forest Service assumed full responsibility for 
public forest management (Steen, 1976).  Six local district offices (later regions) were 
established the same year.  District (region) 6 was headquartered in Portland, Oregon. 
The federal government owns a large percentage of land within the Northwest, 
land now managed by the Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service.
 51
  The 
agencies developed close working relationships with local cattlemen‟s associations, 
farm bureaus, and timber companies interested in leasing access for grazing, farming, 
and timber harvest on lands under agency management (Conover, 1923; Steen, 1976).  
This close relationship with local interests coupled with the shear amount of land 
under their control destined both agencies to become significant actors in future 
governance activities.    
Western water law: the doctrine of prior appropriation. 
Prior to the early 1800‟s, east coast states based access to water on a doctrine 
of riparian rights and reasonable use.  Those holding streamside lands had a right to 
draw water for use as long as the use was “reasonable” in relation to other stream 
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 As of 2007, USFS and BLM owned land constituted 60% of Idaho, 46% of Oregon, 27% of Montana, 
and 23% of Washington.  Data obtained from http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2007/western-states-
data-public-land.htm. 
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users.  Although this began to change in the 1820‟s with industrialization in New 
England, in general private individuals could own the land along lakes and riverbanks 
while the water itself was considered a public resource (Steinberg, 1991; Wilkinson, 
1992).   
This concept of water use was carried west by the early settlers.  It began to 
change with the use of water in hydraulic gold mining in California in 1848.  The 
demands for water at mining sites located far from any water supply resulted in 
construction of elaborate systems of canals throughout western mining states.  
Predating written law and court decisions, miners developed their own water rules – 
which paralleled the rules they developed for mineral extraction.  The rule was simple: 
“first in time, first in right” or “prior appropriation.”  Influenced by the role of gold 
mining in the newly admitted state, the Supreme Court of California upheld this 
doctrine in 1855 (Wilkinson, 1992).   
Newly arriving ranchers and farmers adopted the doctrine of prior 
appropriation and incorporated it into state constitutions and statutes throughout the 
west.  Later developments clarified that, in order to maintain a water right, the user 
had to put the water to “beneficial use.”  The water had to be diverted from its natural 
bed and consumed for specified purposes such as mining, agriculture, municipal or 
domestic supply, livestock, or hydropower.  Not included were in-stream uses such as 
recreational boating, swimming, or fish and wildlife protection.  Although some states 
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eventually adopted exceptions,
52
 by 1929 prior appropriations doctrine governed 
almost all water use in the West (Wilkinson, 1992).   
Prior appropriation doctrine was embedded in the Reclamation Act of 1902, 
which – while claiming a water right for the federal government on water on public 
lands not already appropriated - prohibited the federal government from interfering 
with State and Territorial laws governing control, use, appropriation or distribution of 
water (Rowley, 2006).  Jurisdiction over water use and allocation was vested in the 
state, and not federal, governments.  The Northwest states would jealously guard their 
prerogatives over water in future governance debates.  Local parties quickly contested 
any hint of encroachment on local water by federal or other regional entities.    
State water law provides rules for water use.  Other than the provisions 
respecting the doctrine of prior appropriation found in the 1902 Reclamation Act, state 
law does not govern the development of water infrastructure.  That responsibility 
would ultimately fall to the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation.   
Early federal development of the Columbia River.  
Given the centrality of hydropower to the region‟s economy today, it is worth 
noting that electricity was not the first commercial purpose envisioned for the river.  
Irrigation water for farms and river transportation to move agricultural and timber 
products to market were more pressing needs for early settlers (Ogden, 1949, 
Norwood, c.1981).   
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 For example, Oregon exempted from appropriation several of its scenic waterfalls in 1915 
(Wilkinson, 1992). 
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Whereas farms in rain-rich areas west of the Cascades did well, most of the 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 century farming efforts east of the mountains failed due to limited 
rainfall.  The lack of rain, coupled with ever-increasing demand, prompted residents 
and political leaders to look to the region‟s major river systems as sources of large-
scale irrigation.  Additionally, monopolistic pricing practices by the railroads caused 
inland farmers, organized through the Grange, to promote development of the rivers as 
means of cheaper transportation (Ogden, 1949, Norwood, c.1981).   
The demand for irrigation and inland navigation were the two primary 
motivators for the series of dams and reservoirs that exist today.  Private investors or 
other local resources developed smaller tributaries and rivers, such as found in the 
Klamath and Umatilla basins.  However, major projects on the mainstem of the 
Columbia River were far too complex and expensive for local developers or the states 
(Robbins, 1997) and the cost of mainstem dam construction could not be economically 
justified based on irrigation and navigation benefits alone.  Eventually, projected 
revenue from hydroelectricity provided the economic justification for large-scale dams 
that irrigation and navigation improvements alone could not (Ogden, 1949; Norwood, 
c.1981).     
Early visionaries foresaw a system of dams providing efficient and inexpensive 
navigation and irrigation, the cost of which would be subsidized by the sale of 
hydroelectricity.  Consistent with the Progressive emphasis on the instrumental use 
and scientific management of natural resources, proponents of river development 
sought to harness the water being “wasted” by allowing it to run to the sea and transfer 
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it to equally “wasted” open land lying unused for want of moisture (Robbins, 1997).  
Their plan was to turn the unpredictable Columbia into a machine serving commercial 
and developmental purposes (White, 1995).   
Federal responsibility for irrigation and navigation rested with the U.S. 
Reclamation Service (later the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, respectively.  The Reclamation Act of 1902 established the Reclamation 
Service.  Whereas the older Corps of Engineers drew its members from the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point, the Reclamation Service was initially staffed from 
the U.S. Geological Survey, self taught engineers, and graduates of the many 
engineering colleges opening around the country.  Progressive values of competence 
and scientific management grounded the Reclamation Service.  It based career 
advancement on merit and demonstrated achievement.  By 1926, the government had 
authorized twenty-nine federal irrigation projects.  Northwest projects included 
Minidoka, Idaho (1904), Boise, Idaho (1905), Klamath and Umatilla, Oregon (1905), 
Okanogan and Yakima, Washington (1905), King Hill, Idaho (1917), and Owyhee and 
Vale, Oregon (1926) (Rowley, 2006).  Eventually, the Boise office would be 
designated the headquarters for the Service‟s Pacific Northwest Region.  Reclamation 
project offices established close working relationships with local Grange offices, 
irrigation districts, irrigation associations, and other agricultural interests and entities. 
The Minidoka project, located on the Snake River, was the first federally 
constructed hydroelectric facility built by the Reclamation Service.  The Minidoka 
project came on line in 1909 (Pisani, 2002; FCRPS, 2003).  The 1902 Reclamation 
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Act authorized dams to be outfitted with turbines to generate hydroelectricity in order 
to power the pumps that would move reservoir and groundwater to farms.  Later, the 
Town Sites and Power Development Act of 1906 authorized the Bureau to lease 
surplus power with a preference to municipal purposes (Bureau of Reclamation, 
2006).  Later Bureau irrigation-hydropower dams came on line in the Snake Basin at 
the Boise River Diversion project in 1912 and Black Canyon in 1925.  The Federal 
Columbia Basin Power System All would eventually come to encompass all of these 
projects (FCRPS, 2003).  
These first dams were single-purpose in that they were oriented primarily on 
irrigation; the hydropower plants provided the electricity needed to pump water from 
the projects‟ reservoirs to higher elevations.  Proposals for multi-purpose water 
development were beginning to be made in 1908 but did not gain widespread support 
until the broader push for development and promotion of hydroelectric power began 
around 1918.  The multi-purpose approach ultimately reinforced the notion that the 
federal government needed to take the lead on river development due to the 
complexity of the issues and the multiple jurisdictions that spanned major watersheds 
(Billington et al., 2005).   
Federal civil engineering expertise also resided in The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (the Corps).  Congress provided for the first American military engineers in 
1775 on the day before the Battle of Bunker Hill.  The Continental Army was heavily 
dependent on French trained engineers, as there were few technically trained 
Americans.  The Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802 formally established what 
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the Corps of Engineers.  This act also established a military academy focused on the 
teaching of civil engineering at West Point, New York (Holt, 1923; Shallat, 1994; U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).   
The Corps civil works mission dates to the River and Harbors Act of 1824.  
Supporters of the act hoped to create an interconnected series of improved waterways, 
canals, and roads to facilitate national defense and promote the commercial 
development of the interior.
53
  However, Congress never fully supported this nation-
wide vision, electing instead to fund projects on a piecemeal basis in keeping with 
local needs and interests (Holt, 1923; Shallat, 1994; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
1998).       
In the early 1900s, the Corps officially opposed multi-purpose river 
development.
54
  The Corps position was that development of waterways for navigation 
purposes, both to enhance national defense and to facilitate internal growth and 
development, was justified under the “general welfare” and “promotion of commerce” 
clauses in the Constitution.  The constitutional support for other proposed purposes 
was, in the Corps‟s view, suspect.  Hydropower – even if constitutionally supportable 
- was untested in the open market and investing in large dams risked a significant 
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 The United States had been invaded by Great Britain from Canada, the eastern seaboard (which 
resulted in the burning of Washington, DC), and the south at New Orleans during the War of 1812.  
Improving inland transportation infrastructure would improve the ability to move troops and military 
supplies within the country.  See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998, pp. 37-39. 
 
54
 The Corps‟s “official” position on any given issue at any particular point in time can be hard to 
determine.  The Corps traditionally operated in a decentralized decision making structure.  Thus, despite 
“official” positions being often declared by Corps or administration officials, actual practices in local 
district offices could be far different.  See Shallat (1994), Maas (1974/1951), and/or Ferejohn (1974) for 
further discussion.  
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waste of public funds should the expected demand never materialize.  Furthermore, 
river transportation was facing stiff competition from the railroads and diluting river 
purposes among other functions could weaken the effort to promote and enhance 
navigation.  Critics claimed that the Corps‟s arguments had more to do with protecting 
the agency‟s dominance over the nation‟s waterways than concern over broader 
national interests.  Regardless, the Corps found support in the members of their 
Congressional oversight committees who did not want their influence eroded or shared 
with other committees and agencies holding jurisdiction over other water purposes 
(Hays, 1999/1959; Billington et al., 2005; Rowley, 2006; Pope, 2008).   
The Corps would hold to its single-purpose perspective until forced to 
incorporate flood control due to a series of devastating floods in the early 1900s and 
the abject failure of its policy of relying on levees for protection during floods on the 
Lower Mississippi in 1927.  The final shift away from its single-use philosophy 
occurred when the 1925 and 1927 River and Harbors Acts called on the Corps to study 
opportunities for multiple uses, to include flood control and hydropower development, 
on the nation‟s major rivers (Billington, et al. 2006). 
The Corps‟s first improvements in the Columbia River began in 1868.  It 
opened an office in Portland (later the Portland District headquarters) in 1871 and 
another in Seattle in 1896.  These offices were organized under the North Pacific 
Division established in 1901, originally located in San Francisco.  The division 
headquarters office would alternate between San Francisco and Portland until finally 
settling in Portland in 1931 (Scheufele, 1969).    
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Like the General Land Office, Forest Service, and Bureau of Reclamation the 
Corps established close ties with the local business and trade associations built around 
their activities.  Steam ship companies and coastal fishing communities depended on 
navigation improvements in order to carry out their business.  Given their respective 
places in the regional economy and their jurisdictional responsibilities on the 
Columbia, both the Bureau of Reclamation and Corps would become major players in 
future governance debates.  Their projects would be at the center of the future 
controversy between river development and the region‟s salmon fishery.    
The Columbia River salmon and steelhead fisheries.   
The seemingly limitless bounty of Pacific Northwest fish attracted a robust 
fishing industry, especially with the advent of canning technology.  The tribes, of 
course, had fished the river and its tributaries for centuries.  Tribal fishers also 
provided all of the settlers‟ fish needs until a few white entrepreneurs began fishing 
commercially in 1850.  In 1861, the Territory of Washington granted two white men 
exclusive gill net fishing rights in the lower Columbia.  This seemingly simple act 
symbolized the beginning of conflict among tribal and state fishery managers and a 
profound transition from a fishery focused on regional subsistence to an integral part 
of a capitalism-driven market.  Industrial-scale fishing arrived in 1866 along with the 
first cannery.  By 1887, 39 canneries packed 42 million pounds of salmon per year 
(Taylor, 1999). 
The first hatchery was built in 1877 and was soon followed by others.  
However, hatchery production could not keep pace with the loss of habitat upriver due 
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to mining, timber, agriculture, and other development and ever-increasing harvest 
levels by an essentially unregulated fishery.  The fish also suffered severe natural 
setbacks between the early 1860s and late 1890s from periodic redds-scouring floods 
and stream-drying drought.  The combination of upriver habitat degradation, over 
harvest, and natural occurrences caused Columbia salmon runs to crash in the 1890s 
with some predicting imminent extinction.  The decline in the numbers of fish and 
subsequent consolidation of the market drove many commercial fishermen out of the 
market and closed a number of canneries.  Control of the market soon shifted from the 
Columbia to Alaska.  The Columbia market rebounded briefly with an increased 
military demand for food in the mid 1910s during World War I, largely met with 
increased hatchery production, but it declined again soon after the War‟s end.  It 
eventually stabilized, largely dependent on hatchery-produced fish.  An entire 
institution evolved around the science of artificial propagation of fish for the purposes 
of food production.  Despite the hatchery effort, the fishery never regained the size it 
enjoyed in its early heyday (Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).   
The formation of a federal fisheries service was almost single handedly 
accomplished by Spencer Fullerton Baird.  Baird sent a letter to Congress laying out 
his proposal for a federal fish commission.  He recommended, “…careful, scientific 
research be entered upon, for the purpose of determining what should really be done.”  
The federal fish commissioner‟s duties included conducting such investigations and 
“…perhaps, after conferences with the Fish Commissioners of the several states, 
advise what action, if any, should be taken by the General Government alone or in 
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conjunction with the states…”  (Baird, quoted in Cart, 2004, p. 4).  Congress 
forwarded a joint resolution establishing the U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission to 
President Ulysses Grant who signed it on February 9, 1871.  Grant appointed Baird as 
Commissioner.  The Fish Commission, located under the Department of Treasury, had 
three duties: 
 Research oriented to preserving the commercial fishery. 
 Research into fish culture and artificial propagation.   
 Compilation of statistics and evaluation of the efficacy of fishing 
methods. 
The goal of Fish Commission research was production of fish as a marketable 
commodity.  Consequently, close ties developed between Baird and his subordinates 
and promoters of hatcheries intended to increase sport and commercial harvest.  The 
stated goal of the fish culture research was to “make fish so abundant that they can be 
caught without restriction” (Cart, 2004, p. 6.).    
Although it opened investigations into the Alaska salmon fishery around 1890, 
the Fish Commission‟s presence in the Northwest was initially limited.  In 1903, the 
Fish Commission lost its status as an independent agency when it was transferred to 
the Department of Commerce and Labor and renamed the Bureau of Fisheries.  The 
Bureau opened a small office in Seattle in 1914 as the center for the Bureau of 
Fisheries Pacific operations.  In 1921, at the request of and in conjunction with the 
Oregon Fish Commission, it initiated a study on Columbia River salmon.  Although it 
would push for regulation when needed, particularly with regard to salmon 
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exploitation in Alaska, the Bureau of Fisheries in general cultivated close working 
relationships with state fishery and hatchery managers (Cart, 2004).  
 Already stressed by overfishing and habitat loss, the Columbia salmon runs 
now faced a new threat – the construction of dams in the Columbia mainstem. 
 Hydropower: the public – private power debate. 
No issue of the early 1900s arguably held greater implications for the future of 
the Columbia River than the debate over whether electrical generation and 
transmission should be a public or private enterprise.  Nationally, a backlash to the 
electricity monopoly exercised by major trust and holding companies grew along with 
the public‟s increasing concern over corporate power and other social inequities.   
Private utilities and holding companies viewed electricity as a commodity 
whose price and availability should be determined by the open market.  Critics 
contended that the electrical market was hardly “open.”  By 1912, ten holding 
companies owned 60% of the nation‟s hydropower with local monopolies setting rates 
with limited, if any, competition or regulation.  Private power interests dominated the 
policy arena in the 1920s, supported by Republican majorities in Congress and an 
administration generally hostile to public utility ownership and anti-monopoly 
policies.  As a result, there were few regulatory constraints and low permitting fees.  
As a result, private waterpower development boomed until passage of the Water 
Power Act in 1920 (Blumm, 1982). 
Electricity became a political issue due to the growing recognition of its 
potential to affect peoples‟ lives.  Despite arguments that large companies would 
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ensure low rates through economies of scale, greed and questionable business 
practices often resulted in the opposite.  Technology advances in communications and 
transportation at the turn of the 20
th
 century resulted in a nationwide transformation of 
American business from predominately small, locally owned enterprises to 
nationwide, multi-unit corporations.  The complicated ownership structure of holding 
companies that spanned multiple jurisdictions often rendered local regulation 
meaningless.  Frequently, company executives either bribed or ignored local 
regulators.  Monopoly power allowed companies to set prices without fear of 
competition and to avoid expanding electrical service to areas deemed unprofitable, 
such as rural communities (Ogden, 1949; Blumm, 1982; Brigham, 1998). 
Private power advocates argued it inappropriate for the the government to be 
involved in power production, transmission, or distribution.  They pointed out that the 
very existence of electrical power was the product of entrepreneurial experimentation 
and innovation by private inventors such as Thomas Edison.  In the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, private power supporters heralded such individual examples as classic 
success stories of American capitalism.  They viewed public ownership as 
“socialistic” and equated it to the confiscation of private property in order to place it 
under “political management” (Brigham, 1998, pp. 108-109).  Private power 
supporters defended the consolidation of locally owned utilities into large holding 
companies and interlocking corporations as an essential evolution necessary to ensure 
economies of scale and low rates.  As pressure for public ownership grew, privately 
owned businesses and utilities reluctantly agreed to support locally regulated 
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monopolies in order to protect investments and guarantee some level of return (Ogden, 
1949; Brigham, 1998).   
Conversely, Progressives and public power advocates viewed electricity as a 
powerful social force that could raise the standard of living for everyone if made 
affordable.  They did not, however, speak with one voice.  Those advocating outright 
government ownership and operation of energy facilities and those who sought a 
balance between the extremes of unconstrained markets and socialism split the 
movement.  Moderate Progressives argued less for government ownership and more 
for regulation of private utilities, the use of cost-based pricing as a “yardstick” against 
which to measure private rates, and “postage stamp” pricing that guaranteed customers 
of similar service would pay the same rate regardless of location (Ogden, 1949; 
McKinley, 1952; Brigham, 1998).   
Public power had numerous successes at the local level, with municipally 
owned utilities emerging in urban areas and energy cooperatives in rural areas, 
especially in Washington.  State measures were passed in California in 1913; Arizona, 
Nebraska, and Montana in 1915; and several other western states between 1927 and 
1930 (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Brigham, 1998).  However, success at the local 
and state levels did not translate into similar success at the federal level.  The Federal 
Water Power Act of 1920 affirmed federal jurisdiction over water power sites on 
navigable rivers, limited licenses of private facilities to 50 years, affirmed the right of 
the federal government to charge for private licenses, established public preference for 
the power generated from federal projects, and authorized federal construction of 
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hydroelectric projects as recommended by the Federal Power Commission.  But 
congressional support for federal licensing of hydropower projects was limited to 
concern that uncontrolled dam building would impede navigation, and did not equate 
to support for outright public project ownership (DeLuna, 1997).  Although the 1920 
Act established a uniform process for licensing private hydroelectric projects, it did 
not provide any funds for planning those projects (National Research Council, 1999).  
Furthermore, the small government and pro-market/pro-business administrations of 
Warren Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover 
(1929-1933) preferred that actual development be left in private hands.  In their view, 
the federal government role was to provide technical support and studies to inform 
private entity development (DeLuna, 1997; Blumm, 1982). 
The River and Harbor Act of 1925 directed the Corps of Engineers and Federal 
Power Commission to estimate the cost for a comprehensive survey to study multiple 
use development of the Nation‟s navigable streams, to include hydropower, flood 
control, navigation, and irrigation.  The Corps replied in 1926 with what became 
House Document No. 308.  The report identified 180 rivers for study, including the 
Columbia.  Congress responded with the River and Harbor Act of 1927, authorizing 
the Corps to undertake comprehensive surveys and formulate general plans for water 
resources development in the nation‟s major watersheds.  The Corps responded in turn 
with its 308 Report in March 1932.  The 308 Report represented the nation‟s first 
basin-wide development plan (Ogden, 1949 and 1997; Billington, et al., 2005; 
National Research Council, 1999).   
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The Hoover administration intended the 308 Report to guide private 
investment in water resource development.  It was not to turn out that way.  The onset 
of the Depression and the election of President Franklin Roosevelt shifted the public- 
private power debate decisively in favor of public power advocates.  The next chapter 
presents the impact of that shift for the Columbia. 
Section summary. 
By 1929, a large number of the institutional actors that would participate in 
future governance activities were well established in the Northwest.  These institutions 
include the federal and state agencies, private businesses and trade associations, and 
political supporters involved with land use, water use, river development, fisheries, 
and early hydropower production.  Each operated in a relatively autonomous manner 
within their respective jurisdictions and often competed with each other for federal 
funding, increased jurisdiction, and expanded missions (McKinley, 1952; Clarke and 
McCool, 1996).  Although their organizational roots originated in different eras of 
American history, they all shared a common worldview grounded in market 
capitalism.   
  
Early Signs of Stress on Northwest Resources 
By the late 1920s, the Pacific Northwest comprised about 9% of the United 
States land mass but held only 2.5% of its population.  Planners estimated it to hold 
40% of the nation‟s timber and 40% of its hydropower potential.  The region‟s mines 
were leading national producers of copper, silver, lead, and zinc (Bessey, 1963).  
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Fertile soil and plentiful water beckoned farmers to the Willamette Valley, and the 
promise of irrigation made agriculture and farming viable in the dry areas east of the 
Cascades (Bessey, 1963; Taylor, 1999).  Pre-development salmon runs have been 
estimated by some at between 6.2 and 12 million fish per year (Taylor, 1999; 
Williams, 2006) with some estimates as high as 16 million (National Research 
Council, 1996).  Commercial fishermen harvested 20 to 40 million pounds of salmon 
between 1875 and the 1920s (Taylor, 1999; Williams, 2006).  Given this “unlimited” 
bounty, it was extremely difficult to make a compelling case for restraint and 
regulation. 
Despite the relatively sparse population, negative impacts were beginning to be 
felt as early as the late 1800s.  The hard winter of 1886-1887 caused a massive die-off 
of cattle from starvation.  The overstocking of cattle, coupled with several subsequent 
years of drought, devastated public grasslands (Wilkinson, 1992).  The salmon 
fisheries, while strong, were beginning a serious decline due to over harvest and the 
destruction of habitat due to mining, timber practices, and the construction of dams in 
Columbia tributaries (Bessey, 1963; Taylor, 1999).  These declines caused Livingston 
Stone, an agent of the U.S. Fish Commission in the Northwest, to call for a national 
salmon park in 1892 to protect declining wild runs from the impacts of development 
(Cone and Ridlington, 1996, pp. 332-334).   
The effects of over grazing and fishery declines were the first indicators that 
the region‟s rapid and virtually unconstrained economic development could have 
significant long-term consequences.  New political and social forces were emerging 
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that would challenge the underlying premises upon which the region‟s institutional 
arrangements were based. 
 
The Progressive Conservation Movement 
Unlike the east, where the Progressive movement carried strong support from 
the population, Progressive reforms in the Northwest were more the work of 
legislatures, political parties, and party leaders.  More interested in visibility at the 
national level, regional leaders enacted reforms for which the population often seemed 
ambivalent, at best.  Progressive reformers constantly struggled against the more 
conservative strain of the Northwest population (Johansen, 1967). 
More relevant to the Northwest was the Progressive Movement‟s strong 
resource conservationist members.  There were motivated by disgust at over-harvest of 
timber, over-grazing of grassland, soil depletion through poor agricultural practices, 
degradation of public lands due to mining, and water pollution due to factory waste.  
For the public as a whole, the concern was less about environmental degradation than 
the unfair advantage and heavy-handed tactics exercised by large businesses (Wiebe, 
1967; Cortner & Moote 1999).   
Viewing natural resources as an interconnected ecosystem was in its earliest 
stages in the latter 1800s.  John Perkins Marsh, largely credited with being the first to 
record the impacts of development on natural processes, first published his 
observations in 1864 (Marsh, 1965/1864; Dunlap, 2004).  Two philosophical 
conservation perspectives emerged to challenge the prevailing view of nature as an 
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inexhaustible warehouse of marketable commodities, both of which had their origins 
in the observations of Marsh.  The “conservation” perspective was personified by 
Gifford Pinchot for public land, C. Hart Merriam for wildlife, and Spencer Fullerton 
Baird for marine fisheries.  “Conservation,” as used in the context of the time, called 
for management of natural resources in a way that ensured their long-term availability 
for utilization.  Under this view, failure to develop and use existing resources was 
considered as wasteful as depleting them to a point where they could not be recovered.   
A letter from James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, provided initial guidance 
to Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the just-established Forest Service, and concisely 
captured the Progressive conservation philosophy regarding natural resources.  
Although written specifically for the newly established Forest Service (and written by 
Pinchot for Wilson‟s signature55), the letter articulates the Progressive philosophy.  
Public land was to be “devoted to its most productive use” for “the permanent good of 
the whole people” as opposed to individuals or private companies.  Water, wood, and 
forage are to be “conserved and wisely used” to ensure “permanent and accessible 
supply” in support the “continued prosperity of agricultural, lumbering, mining, and 
livestock interests.”  The letter directed that the new agency professionally manage its 
assigned resources under “businesslike regulations” “under the eye of thoroughly 
trained and competent inspectors” (Wilson, 1905).     
As such, Progressive philosophy did not repudiate the concepts of private 
markets and commercial utilization of natural resources.  Instead, it introduced a new 
                                                 
55
 For detailed discussion of the origin, significance, and far-ranging influence of the “Pinchot Letter,” 
see Wilkinson (1992) pp. 127-130 and Steen (1976) p. 75. 
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role for government.  Professionally trained, apolitical civil servants would apply 
scientific management principles to regulate against the excesses of the market.  New 
federal agencies established in part to curb the power and excesses of corporations on 
public land through competent government stewardship (Wilson, February 1, 1905; 
Wiebe, 1967; Steen, 1976; Wilkinson, 1992; Billington, et al., 2005).         
The second perspective that emerged to challenge the market model placed an 
inherent aesthetic value on natural resources independent from their economic value.  
John Muir personified this “preservationist” perspective.  Muir argued that the 
wilderness had an intrinsic worth all its own that was worth preserving in its natural 
state.  Both the conservation and preservation movements established initial 
beachheads into corporate and private exploitation of public land due in no small part 
to the passion and energies of Pinchot, Merriam, Baird, and Muir and their support by 
President Theodore Roosevelt. 
The conservation perspective found expression through laws and policies 
governing the use of wildlife, fisheries, forests and water under federal jurisdiction 
and institutionalized through establishment of federal agencies such as the Bureau of 
Biological Survey, U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission, Forest Service, and Bureau of 
Reclamation.  Establishment of the state and national park systems, starting with 
Yosemite and Yellowstone, and creation of the National Park Service implemented the 
preservation perspective (Cameron, 1929; Steen, 1976; Cortner & Moote, 1992; 
Clarke and McCool, 1996; Cart, 2004; Dunlap, 2004).  All of these agencies or their 
successors would come to play dominant roles in future Basin governance systems.  
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Opposition to the Progressive conservation and preservation movements came 
mostly from westerners opposed to eastern-based interference with their prerogatives.  
They saw hypocrisy from those preaching conservation principles that were too late to 
implement in the already largely developed east (Steen, 1976) and a complete lack of 
understanding by easterners of the challenges and hardships of settling the often brutal 
conditions in the west (Wilkinson, 1992).  Corporate interests used to all but 
unrestricted access to the resources on public land were equally opposed to both 
movements (Hays, 1999/1959; Wilkinson, 1992).    
Despite the opposition from the west and large corporate interests,  the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive conservationists in 
government and in Congress successfully led and shaped the formal government 
conservation and preservation policies of the era.  The American public generally 
supported these efforts, but not because of any affinity for environmental protection.  
The direct experience of many nineteenth century Americans with nature presented 
personal challenges and outright threats, especially in the west.  Struggling against 
harsh weather, floods, drought, predators, insects, and rodents they carved an often-
precarious livelihood on small farms, ranches, mills, and homesteads (Cameron, 1929; 
Wiebe, 1967; Wilkinson, 1992; Robbins, 1997).  Often the actions and practices of 
legions of individual homesteaders, prospectors, and ranchers resulted in 
environmental consequences as severe as those of the industrialized giants (Hays, 
1999/1959).  Given the prevailing “legend of inexhaustibility,” many simply would 
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not have believed that any restrictions on the pursuit of personal economic 
advancement were necessary. 
Attitudes shaped by a strong protestant ethic of individual work and distrustful 
of the apparently unearned wealth, power, and corruption of large corporate entities 
underscored public support for the Progressive cause.  Values and lifestyles developed 
in isolated small-towns and centered on natural resource extraction, agriculture, and 
local factory working conditions left most Americans wary of monopolies, rising 
waves of immigration, land speculators, and wealthy land-grabbers (Wiebe, 1967).  
Progressive conservationism thus found public traction not because of any deep-seated 
public belief in environmental values, but because of deep-seated skepticism over the 
motives of moneyed interests (Cortner and Moote, 1992).  The result was a partial but 
significant shift in power from large corporate trusts and the market to the federal 
government as exercised through public agencies over public resources (Hays, 
1999/1959).    
   
Regional Governance Systems up to 1929: 
Regional natural resource governance up through the 1920s consisted of 
private enterprises working in concert with supportive and relatively autonomous 
federal agencies responsible for specific resource domains, constrained only by the 
authorities and funds provided by Congress.  Laissez faire policies left development to 
the market and individual ingenuity and many in the Northwest felt that minimum or 
no government equated to good governance.  In addition, many had little patience with 
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anyone, government or otherwise, interfering with their affairs or their rights to 
resources (Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992).  For example, Gifford Pinchot, then head 
of the U.S. Forest Service, imposed a modest grazing fee on ranchers in 1906 to 
attempt some control over the overstocking that led to the cattle disaster in the late 
1880s.  His effort outraged ranchers who had grown used to free grazing on public 
land with no government oversight or controls.  They pilloried him in the western 
press as a “dictator and carpet bagger” (Wilkinson, 1992).   
Progressives made some inroads in the laissez faire environment of the day by 
establishing federal agencies charged with the responsibility to better manage public 
resources.  These agencies included the Reclamation Service, the Forest Service, the 
National Parks Service, and the U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission (later the Bureau 
of Fisheries).  These new agencies joined those previously established, most notably 
for this study, the Corps of Engineers, the General Land Office, the Office of Indian 
Affairs, and the Department of Agriculture.  Legacy effects from the nation‟s earlier 
expansionist period and that era‟s policy emphasis on localism, support for 
commercial development, and the transfer of public lands into private hands 
established the traditions and cultures of the earlier agencies.  Some of these agencies, 
like the General Land Office and Office of Indian Affairs, had roots dating back to the 
nation‟s colonial period (Conover, 1923; Holt, 1923; McKinley, 1952; Shallat, 1994; 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998; Pisani, 2002).  Regardless of origin, all agencies 
developed close ties with regional interests dependent on their respective programs 
and services and for whom they had originally been largely established to support. 
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Authorizing statutes and assigned jurisdictional oversight of specific policy 
domains governed each agency.  Agencies exercised decision-making in keeping with 
their respective missions and authorizing statutes and regulations.  Just as American 
society was segmented into island communities at the end of the 19
th
 century (Wiebe, 
1967) so too were federal agencies segmented into island communities of policy and 
program jurisdiction.  Each agency was focused on a constituency that was dependent 
on the agency‟s authorities and expertise and supported by constituency-centered 
Congressional authorizing and appropriating committees.  Political scientists variously 
characterize these powerful triads of agency expertise, Congressional support, and 
local constituencies as “subgovernments,” “policy whirlpools,” or “iron triangles” due 
to their autonomy, strength, and resistance to reform (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; 
Heclo, 1978).  But a dramatic alternative to functional-management-by-individual-
agency was evolving in the East on the Tennessee River. 
Muscle Shoals is approximately the midpoint of the 600-mile long Tennessee 
River.  At this point, the river drops 134 feet over 37 miles creating a series of rapids 
and waterfalls that long impeded the use of the river for navigation.  The sharp drop in 
elevation offered the opportunity for hydropower development and attracted the 
attention of private corporations.  President Theodore Roosevelt vetoed a bill to allow 
the site to be privately developed in 1903.  The National Defense Act of 1916 
authorized the Corps to construct a dam, nitrate plant, and related temporary steam 
generating plant near the site to support the production of munitions for World War I 
and eliminate about 15 miles of rapids.  The War ended before construction was 
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completed, and project funding subsequently slowed.  The Corps ultimately completed 
the plant and Wilson Dam in 1925 (Norwood, c.1981; Conklin 1983).
56
   
To thwart further private interest in taking over the site, Progressives 
introduced a bill in 1922 to create a government corporation to run the nitrate plant 
(ultimately retrofitted to produce fertilizer) and to be responsible for future 
development.  The bill failed.  Although the public-private power debate was part of 
the Muscle Shoals controversy since 1897 (Conklin, 1983), the 1922 bill made Muscle 
Shoals a national focal point.  Both President Coolidge in 1928 and President Hoover 
in 1931 vetoed subsequent similar bills passed by Congress.  The election of President 
Franklin Roosevelt removed White House objections.  Roosevelt signed the Tennessee 
Valley Authority Act into law in 1933 (Norwood, c.1981; Conklin 1983).     
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was destined to provide an inspiring 
governance model for Northwest Progressives.  However, as of 1929, management of 
resources in the Columbia Basin meant governance through private corporations 
operating independently on private land or in concert with supportive federal and state 
agencies.  Private companies and individual federal and state agencies exercised 
decision-making in keeping with their individual objectives and priorities.  This 
combination of the laissez faire doctrine toward private businesses, weak government 
regulation, and public agencies exercising “iron triangle”-type functional jurisdiction 
over discreet policy domains characterized a market-oriented governance preference.  
All involved, whether in the private or public sectors, shared a common worldview 
                                                 
56
 Wheeler Dam was subsequently constructed to solve remaining Muscle Shoals navigation issues. 
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regarding natural resources.  There simply were no voices challenging the “rightness” 
of whether the various programs and projects underway or under consideration should 
be undertaken.   
The sharing of a common worldview did not automatically translate to 
cooperation.  The division of federal agencies among four cabinet level departments, 
the exercise of Congressional prerogatives by oversight committees, and strong 
support from agency constituencies often drove agencies to compete rather than 
cooperate (McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996).  As the government grew in 
size and complexity, a growing realization emerged among the major actors that better 
coordination and control arrangements were necessary.   
 
Chapter Summary 
The situation in the Pacific Northwest stood as follows by 1929: 
 The earliest regional governance structures consisted of clan-based tribal 
societies located on traditional tribal lands (Ruby and Brown, 1992).  The 
rules and regulations of large fur trading companies governed the earliest 
white communities in the late 1700s and early 1800s.  These in turn gave 
way to provisional governments, followed by establishment of the Oregon 
in 1848, later subdivided into the Territories of Oregon, Washington 
(1853), Idaho (1864), and Montana (1868).  County and municipal 
governments were first established under the Territorial governments.  The 
states of Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Idaho Montana were admitted 
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to the Union in 1859, 1889, 1889, and 1890 respectively (Schafer, 
1943/1918; Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).  
 The role of Native American tribes in the development of policy in the 
Northwest was dramatically mercurial.  The role began with dominance in 
the early 1800s but declined to a point of all-but-extinction from the mid 
1800s to the mid 1900s.  In essence, the tribes were simply not a relevant 
voice in the early 1900s (Taylor, 1999; Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).   
 The West experienced a major demographic shift with the decline of Indian 
populations and increase of Anglo-American settlers.  The territorial 
population was distributed among a few large cities and numerous small 
towns.  Isolated, “island” communities developed with economies centered 
on agriculture, ranching, or resource extraction (Lyman, 1963/1917; 
Wiebe, 1967; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 1992; Taylor, 1999). 
 National policy up to the 1860s was focused on helping fund the federal 
government through sale of public lands to private individuals or interests; 
thereafter the policy shifted to the transfer of public lands and resources to 
private control through sale, grants, or patents (Conover, 1923; Wilkinson, 
1992). 
 The Protestant-market-capitalism worldview dominated, modified in the 
Pacific Northwest by unique attitudes toward western land and a self-
confidence bred by surviving the move westward.  Disease, efforts to 
civilize their culture, and displacement to reservations all but erased the 
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tribal worldview (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986; 
Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Hays, 1999/1959; Kline, 2000; Weber, 
2002/1920; Wilkinson, 2005; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, 
and Williams, 2006).   
 The environmentalist worldview was in its infancy and expressed through 
the tenets of Progressive conservatism (Kline, 2000; Dunlap, 2004; 
Rosenbaum, 2005). 
 This dominant worldview held by policy makers and administrators 
fostered localized decision-making.  Communities, private businesses, and 
federal agencies exercised a great deal of autonomy in determining what 
they were going to do and how they were going to do it.  Corporate 
interests working alone or in partnership with federal agencies and 
appropriate congressional committees provided the governance framework 
for natural resource management (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Wilkinson, 
1992).   
 The Northwest was a region rich in natural resources, with a large potential 
for timber, agriculture, ranching, fisheries, mineral, irrigation, and 
hydropower development.  Exploitation of these resources was driven by a 
“legend of inexhaustibility,” the lack of effective regulation, and the 
opportunities for creation of private wealth.  Natural resource development 
was largely in the hands of large corporations and holding companies, such 
as timber, railroads, and mining interests, supported by federal agencies 
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(Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Lyman, 1963/1917; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 
1992; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, 
Stanford, and Williams, 2006). 
 Federal agencies developed as policy autonomous “island communities” 
with little cross-agency coordination or planning and frequent conflict over 
turf and congressional attention (Cameron, 1928; McKinley, 1952; Steen, 
1976; Shallat, 1994; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002).  
 Progressive era ideals of sustainable use and conservation-oriented public 
management of public resources for the public good were very much part 
of the political debate, but failed to overturn the prevailing belief in private 
markets and the laissez faire doctrine of minimum government 
involvement in private business activities.  The Progressive goal was a 
better life for average Americans through planning, scientific management 
of natural resources, and provision of electricity through public ownership 
or strict regulation of power production (Hays, 1957; Hays, 1990/1959; 
McKinley, 1952; Steen, 1976; Norwood, c.1981; Cortner and Moote 1999; 
Billington et al., 2005).  
 Commercial fishing on the Columbia began in 1850, growing to industrial 
scale in 1866.  The first hatchery was built in 1877.  By 1887 the river 
housed 39 canneries.  Overfishing, habitat degradation, and a series of 
naturally occurring floods and drought crashed salmon runs in the 1890s 
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(Cone and Ridlington, 1996; National Research Council, 1996; Taylor, 
1999).  
 Any debate over natural resource development was a debate over who 
should own, control, or operate natural resource exploitation.  There was 
no question among the relevant parties as to the rightness of such 
exploitation (Cortner and Moote 1999; Pisani, 2002; Billington et al., 2005; 
Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006). 
 The Corps, acceding to the demand for multiple use waterway 
development, was preparing its 308 Report on major rivers, a report that 
would assess the feasibility for hydropower, navigation, and irrigation on a 
scale not yet seen in the United States (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; 
Norwood, c.1981). 
Such was the situation as of 1929.  On October 29 of that year the stock market 
crashed and dramatically “punctuated the equilibrium” (Gersick, 1991) of private 
market dominance through laissez faire and symbolically marked the onset of the 
Great Depression.  The Depression proved “a major turning point in American history.  
It changed the Nation‟s economic beliefs and attitude toward business.  It revised 
American politics and the Government‟s role.  The laissez faire doctrine gave way to 
public demands for government action to battle the depression [sic], and the policies 
and special interests that contributed to its onset” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 34).     
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ONSET OF THE DEPRESSION (1929) 
  
Introduction 
The onset of the Great Depression presented the first critical situation that 
induced changes to prevailing Basin governance systems.  It created the conditions for 
a dramatic shift away from a model of governance based on private market enterprises 
working in concert with supportive federal agencies.  Rejecting calls for consolidation 
of federal agency missions under an authoritative valley authority, the region adopted 
a new model characterized by state-led centralized planning.  The onset of the 
Depression also resulted in the creation of a model for Basin operations that was 
characterized by cooperation among federal agencies.  
The catastrophic economic collapse of the Great Depression ushered in a 
decade of “persistent, continuing unemployment and unrelenting, grinding poverty” 
(Norwood, c.1981, p. 30).  Its wide effects significantly undercut the prevailing laissez 
faire attitude toward unconstrained free markets and challenged the relatively 
autonomous “iron triangle” arrangements among local interests, federal agencies, and 
their congressional supporters.  It created the conditions under which prevailing 
market and agency-centric governance systems could be changed as the public looked 
to government to restore the national economy.
 
 The changes in governance did not 
eliminate the market role in the economy or fundamentally alter federal agency 
missions.  What changed was the autonomy under which these long-standing 
institutions previously operated.  Private corporations were subject to greater 
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government regulation.  Federal agencies in the Columbia Basin were required to be 
more collaborative and inclusive in their discretionary decision-making. 
In addition to Progressives who believed in a more activist role for government 
was an influential group of advocates who embraced the concept of “regionalism.”  
Regionalists critically looked at state and federal government structures seeking 
criteria other than private markets or jurisdictional boundaries to suggest logical 
administrative arrangements.
57
  The Tennessee Valley Authority exemplified this 
thinking.  TVA admirers saw the watershed of the Tennessee River as a more efficient 
organizational concept than the political boundaries of the states, the market 
boundaries of privately incorporated businesses, or the jurisdictional boundaries of 
individual federal agencies (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007).    
The concept of multi-state regions presented, among other challenges, two 
fundamental questions.  The first was the structure under which long-range planning 
of regional resources was to take place.  Regionalists and Progressives believed 
planning to be the answer to the resource waste and inefficiency they saw as inherent 
in the fractured decision-making processes for land, soil, water, timber, fish, and 
timber development as practiced through unrestrained markets and uncoordinated 
agencies (Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1952).  The second question focused on 
operational issues.  The desires for rational region-scale planning to guide river 
development and other resource use meant determining how responsibilities for 
design, construction, and operations of resulting activities that crossed traditional 
                                                 
57
 Ogden (1949 and 1997), McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), and Norwood (c.1981) all wrote from a 
regionalist perspective. 
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agency jurisdictional boundaries were to be allocated (McKinley, 1952; White, 1995; 
DeLuna, 1997; Brigham, 1998).       
This chapter identifies the Northwest governance systems proposed and 
enacted to address these functional questions in the 1930s.  It documents the social and 
political context from which governance proposals emerged and the key issues in the 
Northwest that influenced those proposals.  The following four governance proposals 
emerged in this period of which two were enacted: 
 The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC or 
Commission), established in 1934 under the National Planning Board 
to perform the planning function. 
 Proposals in 1935 to assign full responsibility for all purposes of the 
dams, to include marketing and transmission of electricity, to either the 
Corps of Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation (not enacted). 
 Proposals made later in 1935 for a Columbia Valley Authority modeled 
after the Tennessee Valley Authority (not enacted). 
 Establishment of the five-agency Bonneville Advisory Board under the 
Bonneville Project Act of 1937. 
 
Social and Political Context 
Franklin Roosevelt achieved a landslide electoral victory in 1932, winning 472 
electoral votes to Hoover‟s 59.  Democratic majorities were swept into Congress.  
Democrats won 70% of seats in the House of Representatives and commanded a 22-
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seat majority in the Senate (Norwood, c.1981).  The Depression provided a catalytic 
opportunity for a more robust government role in the economy, marking “the final, 
inevitable collapse of an economy that had been beset for at least fifty years by 
overproduction and an excess of competition” (Kennedy, 2009, p. 261).  
 The Depression presented a critical situation that opened opportunities for 
change beyond regional governance systems.  It also enabled responses to other 
demands that had gained momentum in American society (Norwood, c.1981).  The 
1932 election was a clear public mandate to get the economy back on track.  It was 
also a mandate that was far more sensitive to Progressive ideals than its predecessor 
and far more activist in pushing for both regulation and, in some limited cases, direct 
government involvement in areas previously relegated to private markets (Norwood, 
c.1981; Kennedy, 2009).  Kennedy (2009) argued that the New Deal crowded more 
social and institutional change into American society than at any comparable period of 
time in its history, addressing issues such as social security for the elderly, the 
financial desperation of small farmers (especially in the Midwest), health, and 
housing.
58
  Although many of Roosevelt‟s specific organizational experiments did not 
last long, the New Deal succeeded in creating a set of institutional arrangements 
establishing unprecedented economic security for average citizens.   
                                                 
58
 One could argue that the periods of the Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction brought far greater 
change given the abolition of slavery, the economic destruction and eventual recovery of the South, the 
growth in power assumed by the federal government at the expense of the states, the emergence of 
transportation and communications technologies, and the beginnings of national industrialization, all of 
which presented major challenges to the traditional foundations of American society.  See Hays 1957; 
Wiebe, 1967; and Hays, 1999/1959.    
 143 
 
The New Deal brought dramatic reversals to private power interests.  Building 
on previous success at the state and local levels, public power advocates effectively 
swept the national policy field in the early 1930s.  With the support of President 
Roosevelt and the congressional Democratic majorities, they were able to enact 
legislation strongly regulating corporately owned activities and played a strong role in 
passage of the Bonneville Project Act in 1937 (Hays, 1959/1999; Bessey, 1963; 
Norwood, c.1981; Kennedy, 2009). 
The New Deal created the belief in the minds of the American public that the 
government had a major responsibility to ensure national economic health and citizen 
welfare.  This represented a major shift away from the laissez faire period that 
preceded it.  This shift notwithstanding, the New Deal did not challenge the 
fundamental tenant of capitalism – the private ownership of production – and left the 
nation‟s dominant market-capitalist worldview intact, if badly tarnished (Kennedy 
(2009).   
Kennedy additionally claimed that, excepting the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
“no significant state-owned enterprises emerged in New Deal America” (Kennedy, 
2009, p. 253).  Whereas this generalization may be true on the national scale, it 
overlooks the significant regional impacts that the New Deal had on the Northwest.  
These impacts include the conceptualization of the Northwest as an administrative 
entity oriented on the Columbia River (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007), establishment of 
the Bonneville Power Administration, and expansion of the roles that the Corps of 
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Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation were to play in the Columbia Basin following 
federal dam construction (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1980).   
 The period also opened opportunities for major changes within the federal 
bureaucracy.  New agencies were created, such as the Public Works Administration 
and its associated national planning committee,
59
 the Soil Erosion Service (later the 
Soil Conservation Service), and the U.S. Grazing Service.  Others were reorganized.  
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, pursuing his vision of consolidating all natural 
resource agencies into the Department of Interior, successfully acquired the Bureau of 
Biological Survey from the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries 
from the Department of Commerce in 1939.  These were subsequently combined to 
create the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940 (Clarke and McCool, 1996; Weber, 
2002).  Ickes also tried to acquire the U.S. Forest Service and the civil works function 
of the Corps of Engineers.  He failed in both due to those agencies‟ strong support 
from their respective Congressional oversight committees and local constituents 
(McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996) demonstrating that “iron triangle” type 
arrangements were still very much in play with some agencies.
60,61  
                                                 
59
 This “central planning committee” underwent several organizational changes between 1933 and 
1943.  It operated as the National Planning Board from 1933-1934; the National Resources Board from 
1934-1935; the National Resources Committee from 1935-1939, and the National Resources Planning 
Board from 1939-1943.  See Bessey, 1963, pp. 48-52.  This report uses the generic phrase “central 
planning committee” to minimize confusion. 
 
60
 Ickes frustration at being unable to overcome the bureaucratic and political power of the Corps and 
Forest Service resulted in frequent invective against both agencies, invectives that were subsequently 
cited in periodic calls for agency reform.  For the Corps, see Ickes‟ introduction to Arthur Maas 
(1974/1951) Muddy Waters, in which he describes the Corps as “lawless and irresponsible” and 
Reisner‟s subsequent reference to those comments in Cadillac Desert (1993).  For the Forest Service, 
see Fromes‟s The Forest Service (1971) where he quotes Ickes as characterizing the Service as a 
“bureaucracy run wild.” 
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Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest     
Two overriding policy issues influenced Pacific Northwest governance during 
this period.  The top national and regional priority, up until the United States‟ entry 
into World War II in 1941, was economic restoration.  New Deal programs addressed 
the economic challenge through tighter regulation of markets, central planning, and 
public works projects.  Complementing the belief in planning and public works were 
completion of the Corps 308 Report in 1932 and construction of the massive 
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams across the Columbia.  The emphasis on economic 
restoration provided the backdrop for the governance proposals put forth during this 
period.  Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the emphasis shifted to winning 
World War II, an emphasis that finally achieved the economic recovery sought under 
the New Deal.
62
  The need for electrical power to support the Northwest industries 
engaged in the production of war materials forced an unprecedented level of 
operational cooperation among the newly created Bonneville Power Administration, 
Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation and tested the collaborative 
governance arrangement between them called for in the 1937 Bonneville Project Act.       
Economic development through centralized planning. 
Bessey (1963) traces the roots of the Northwest‟s regional planning to the 
watershed management philosophy of John Wesley Powell in the late 19
th
 century and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
61
 See McKinley, 1952, pp. 411- 423.  
 
62
 Kennedy (2009) argued that it took the mobilization for World War II to create a context that 
permitted levels of deficit spending that finally restored the economy.  He further argued that such 
deficit levels were “intellectually inconceivable” and politically impossible in the 1930s despite the 
widespread unemployment and economic misery.   
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the progressive conservation philosophy of the Theodore Roosevelt administration in 
the early 20
th
 century.  Progressive goals were to be achieved through integrated 
planning on a watershed scale to optimize use of all natural resources, especially 
water.  Advocates called for nationally coordinated planning commissions to design a 
“rational distribution” of goods and services that would not be “hamstrung” by 
interstate differences (Mumford, 1939).  In the Northwest, the states of Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana were interested in finding ways to leverage federal 
dollars for river development projects too expensive for state funding alone (Vogel, 
2007).   
Prior to the Depression, critics of government led planning undercut public 
support by successfully associating it with rising totalitarian regimes in Japan, Italy, 
and Germany following the First World War and the centralized five-year plans of the 
communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).  
The onset of the Depression pushed those fears aside.  The public demand for 
economic relief engendered support for federal leadership and planning that, while 
stopping short of the scope of the regimes rising in Europe and Asia, were far more 
extensive than previously undertaken.  The National Industrial Recovery Act put forth 
a national blueprint for recovery in 1933.  The Act created the Public Works 
Administration (PWA), which in turn established its central planning committee.  
Private sector advisors dominated this committee, supported by federally funded staff.  
The central planning committee shared the belief that successful planning rested on 
local and state initiative and that effective planning at those levels was essential to the 
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national planning program.  Consequently, the committee established and supported 
state and local planning boards with technical assistance and funding.  Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana organized state planning boards between 1933 and 
1934.  County, area, and city planning boards were established as well (Bessey, 1963; 
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).     
In addition to the state-level boards, the committee identified a need for two 
interstate regional planning commissions, one in New England and the other in the 
Pacific Northwest.  The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC 
or Commission) was subsequently established in 1934.  The Commission would come 
to play a major role in shaping both the form and nature of future regional governance 
systems (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; Vogel, 2007).  It also 
solidified the concept of the Northwest as a unified region defined by the Columbia 
River (Vogel, 2007).    
The 308 Report.  
The Corps produced its long awaited 308 Report for the Columbia River and 
its tributaries in 1932.  Elwood Mead, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation 
and the Army‟s Chief of Engineers Major General Lytle Brown jointly endorsed the 
report.  In a letter of transmittal
63
 forwarding the report to the Secretary of War on 
March 29, Mead and Brown identified ten locations in the Columbia Basin 
                                                 
63
 The Corps provided the Bureau of Reclamation the opportunity to review and comment on the final 
report.  Commissioner Mead provided General Brown with a letter generally concurring with the report, 
the only exception being its treatment of irrigation as discussed below.  General Brown incorporated 
Commissioner Mead‟s letter into his own when forwarding the report to the Secretary of War.  
Consequently, the two letters are referenced here as one. 
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recommended by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors as the most 
promising for waterpower facilities and, more important, provided economic 
justification for their construction.  The report characterized the Columbia River and 
its tributaries as “susceptible of being developed into the greatest system for water 
power anywhere in the United States.”  The envisioned series of dams would provide 
an estimated eight million kilowatts of installed hydro electricity.  The report warned, 
however, that power development should be done “in such increments as not to outrun 
the demands of the market” and called for “close coordination of the entire power 
industry in the region” to guard against over production (Mead and Brown, 1932, 
March 29).  The Government Printing Office subsequently published the Columbia 
River portion of the report in 1934 under the title Columbia River and Minor 
Tributaries (Ogden, 1997). 
The report offered the opportunity for long sought after low-cost, high-volume 
barge navigation from Bonneville Dam to the mouth of the Snake River.  It claimed 
that the “potential navigation on the middle section is of such value” as to “warrant the 
assumption by the Federal Government of the entire cost of the necessary locks and 
channel enlargement” provided they be constructed as an integrated part of each 
hydropower project.  By integrating a series of locks at the hydroelectric dams, the 
report estimated a total of 600,000 tons of freight at a savings of over one million 
dollars per year (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29). 
The report noted the problem of flooding in the lower Columbia and stated that 
the projects may be able to provide some incidental flood protection.  Consistent with 
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the still-lingering attitude within the Corps that flood control was a local or state 
responsibility, the 308 Report identified this purpose as a “minor interest” best solved 
“by local interests whenever the economics of the situation justify the building of 
better levees”64 (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29; Ogden, 1949).    
The 308 Report‟s recommendations on irrigation were somewhat ambivalent.  
General Brown‟s portion of the transmittal letter noted that there were about two 
million acres along the United States‟ portion of the Columbia that were susceptible to 
irrigation.  But the Corps questioned the economic feasibility of irrigating this much 
farmland, citing cost and noting concerns by agricultural authorities that such 
additional farmland would compete with “other lands already under cultivation.”  The 
Corps concluded that irrigation was “not an economical proposition at this time and 
should await the future.”  In any case, the cost of irrigation could only be justified in 
conjunction with hydropower development.  The Bureau of Reclamation‟s 
Commissioner Mead concurred with the Corps that the cost of irrigation could only be 
justified if subsidized by the revenues from power and that there was no current 
demand for additional farms or crops.  But he recommended irrigation development 
begin anyway at Grand Coulee, arguing that the project would take at least ten years 
                                                 
64
 The Corps‟s position on flood protection methods varied over time.  It adopted a policy of protection 
through levees only in the 1860s, dismissing a visionary 1852 report recommending the use dams and 
reservoirs in tributaries to prevent or manage floods on the Mississippi.  Although dams for flood 
control in the Sacramento River were supported by the Corps and included in the 1917 Flood Control 
Act, in general the Corps opposed large federal investments in flood control.  This attitude gradually 
changed within the Corps in light of severe flood damage experienced in the lower Mississippi River in 
the late 1920s and the demonstrated inadequacy of flood protection dependent solely on levees.  Flood 
control was subsequently included as an authorized purpose for those dams capable of large scale water 
storage in the Columbia.  For discussions of early Corps flood control policies, see Shallat (1994), pp. 
174-176; Billington et al., (2005), pp. 314-315, and The Corps‟s official history (1998) pp. 47-51. 
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for construction and another ten or fifteen after that for the region to absorb the 
resulting electrical power.  By then, Mead believed, projected population increases 
would provide the needed market (Mead and Brown, 1932, March 29; White, 1995; 
Rowley, 2006; Pisani, 2002).  
The Columbia River portion of the 308 Report thus provided a comprehensive 
plan for a series of multipurpose dams on the Columbia.  It was, by design, purely a 
technical product, leaving open the questions of who should build, own, and operate 
the completed projects (although Brown recommended in the transmittal letter that 
hydropower development that local government or private investment should take on 
the responsibility for hydropower development).
65
  Although expressly calling for 
coordination with the power industry for hydroelectric development, it did not offer 
any suggestions as to how or if the completed projects were to be managed in a 
systematic way.  In short, it was a blueprint for turning the naturally flowing Columbia 
into a mechanism for commercial purposes.  It did not – nor was it asked to – address 
the complex social network inherently created with the system‟s completion, a 
network of interests bound by common dependence on the Columbia‟s water and the 
products and services that the use of that water would ultimately produce (White, 
1995). 
 
 
                                                 
65
 For their part, private power companies balked at the capital investments needed for provision of 
electricity to rural areas, especially if forced to sell the subsequent power at flat rates, and were 
skeptical that a market demand for power from large projects would ever materialize (Pope, 2008).   
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Construction of the first Columbia River mainstem dams. 
On a campaign stop in Portland Oregon in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt had 
promised to build the next large dam on the Columbia.  To New Dealers such as 
Roosevelt dam construction represented much more than just job relief.  It was a 
visible statement of the government‟s commitment to equitable distribution of national 
resource wealth to the public as a whole and to improving the quality of life and 
standards of living for millions of Americans.  Central planning would ensure 
efficiency and provide the maximum benefit to the people of the region (Ogden, 1949; 
Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).   
True to Roosevelt‟s campaign promise, the government initiated construction 
on Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams in 1933 (FCRPS, 2003).  The Bureau of 
Reclamation held authority for construction of Grand Coulee due to the project‟s 
irrigation purposes and the fact that the dam would not have a navigation function.  
Conversely, the Corps of Engineers designed and constructed Bonneville due to the 
primacy of its navigation purpose.  Both would provide hydropower, with Grand 
Coulee also offering storage for flood control purposes (Billington, et al., 2006).
66
  
Bonneville Dam was ready for power generation in 1938, with its first electricity 
flowing over federal transmission lines to Cascade Locks and Portland in 1939.  Grand 
Coulee began generating power in 1942 (FCRPS, 2003).  
 
                                                 
66
 Bonneville Dam, like most of the dams built on the mainstem Columbia and Lower Snake Rivers, 
was designed as a “run of the river” project.  This means that water flowing into the reservoir flows out 
through the dam‟s turbines or over its spillway.       
 152 
 
World War II in the Pacific Northwest. 
The mobilization for the Second World War had a major impact on FCRPS 
development with effects that extended into the post-war years.  The war‟s production 
effort would depend heavily on energy.  Ships, planes, and land vehicles needed oil for 
fuel.  Defense industries needed electricity for war production (Norwood, c.1981). 
The strategic role of electricity in modern war production first became 
apparent during World War I.  German submarine warfare had cut the supply of 
nitrates from Chile upon which the United States depended for ammunition 
production.  This prompted the 1916 National Defense Act that authorized federal 
construction of a nitrate plant and supporting electricity generation facilities at Muscle 
Shoals on the Tennessee River.  Military planners recognized the national energy 
shortage with regard to munitions production and the implication of that shortage for a 
sustained war effort.  World War I ended before their fears could be realized, but they 
captured the issue in a report presented in 1921 (Norwood, c.1981). 
Norwood (c.1981) suggested that Franklin Roosevelt‟s support for public 
power in the 1930s might have in part been due to the strategic near miss in the First 
World War and a premonition of pending war due to rising tensions in Europe, 
although he acknowledges that there is no evidence to support this.
67
  Regardless of 
Roosevelt‟s level of foresight, his support of public power in the early 1930s proved 
fortuitous.  He used his successes in the public power debates to help build American 
                                                 
67
 See Norwood, (c.1981), p. 120 for further discussion. 
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production capacity as Japan‟s aggression in Asia and Germany and Italy‟s aggression 
in Europe increased between 1936 and 1938 (Norwood, c.1981). 
In the Northwest, the expansion of industrial capacity in the late 1930s 
translated into demand for expansion of federal hydropower capability.  The 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), established under the 1937 Bonneville 
Project Act to market the power produced at federal dams, often functioned, in effect, 
as a “regional chamber of commerce” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 125) conducting industrial 
site and economic surveys.  This pre-war promotion resulted in new war-related 
electrometal and electrochemical plants being quickly located in the region.  The 
electrical needs of mobilization “telescoped more than 10 years of normal growth into 
a brief 5 years” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 123) in the Northwest.  The federal transmission 
system grew from zero to 2500 circuit miles between 1939 and 1944, with generation 
capacity increasing from less than 100,000 kilowatts to over 1.3 million in the same 
period.  This growth in capability provided inexpensive electricity to the Pacific 
Northwest‟s military installations, defense production industries, and, beginning in 
1943, to the highly classified plutonium production facility at Hanford, Washington.  
About 92% of federally produced hydropower went to support war production 
industrial loads, of which up to 80% (prior to the Hanford project) went to aluminum 
production in support of aircraft manufacturing (Norwood, c.1981; FCRPS, 2003).  
Ogden (1949) argues that low electrical rates enabled by federal hydropower so 
lowered the cost of aluminum production that the federal government saved the “entire 
cost of the two dams in reduced aluminum prices alone” compared to what it would 
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have spent had the aluminum industry been forced to purchase power from private 
utilities (Ogden, 1949, p. 422).
68
 
The Corps accelerated its schedule for generator installation at Bonneville 
Dam, ensuring that by war‟s end all ten planned generators were on line (McKinley, 
1952).  The Bureau of Reclamation made similar efforts at Grand Coulee.  BPA 
constructed a transmission line between Grand Coulee and Bonneville between 1938 
and 1940.  This transmission line provided the infrastructure to move power to where 
it was needed as well as enabling the expansion of the federal system that was to come 
later.  An executive order directed BPA to begin marketing Grand Coulee power upon 
the transmission line‟s completion (Norwood, c.1981). 69 
Although the war would not end until 1945, Allied victory was apparent by 
1944.  The Allies won in significant part through the United States superior production 
capacity.  This capacity remained intact even as war in Europe and the Pacific 
destroyed the production capacities of the Axis nations and seriously damaged those 
of America‟s European and Asian Allies.  Planning ahead, BPA began promoting 
Northwest hydropower resources as key to regional post-war development.  The 
agency published a prospectus report entitled Pacific Northwest Opportunities that 
outlined the industries needed in the Northwest and how they could benefit from the 
region‟s low cost power (Norwood, c.1981). 
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 Ogden cites the U.S. Congress, House, Interior Department Appropriations bill for 1948, p. 354, in 
making this claim. 
 
69
 Executive Order 8526, dated August 26
th
, 1940. 
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Resulting Governance Systems 
The Roosevelt Administration used the 308 Report to justify federal 
construction of the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams (Ogden, 1997).  However, 
construction of the two dams was well underway before any sort of system-wide 
operational arrangement had been decided.  With the pending completion of both 
projects, the management issue had to be addressed.   
Progressives and public power advocates envisioned and promoted a Columbia 
Valley Authority (CVA) to plan and operate the system along the lines of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (Conklin, 1983; Lowitt, 1983).  Others still believed in 
free markets as the best arbiter of where, how, and by whom natural resources should 
be developed.  However, the jolt of the Depression and the political landslide enjoyed 
by Roosevelt and his supporters swept aside the former dominance of private market 
advocates in the policy arena (Kennedy, 2009).   
The influence of individual agencies over their respective resource 
jurisdictions, however, was relatively unaffected by the nation‟s economic situation 
and proved far more resistant to reform.  Consequently, the debate over Basin 
governance centered on whether hydroelectric generation, transmission, and marketing 
should be divided among existing agencies or assigned to new ones.    
There was little debate that the planning function would be carried out by the 
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC).  The management 
issue was far more contentious.  The two alternatives under early consideration were 
the marketing of power by the existing dam-operating agencies (The Army‟s Corps of 
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Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation) or establishment of a valley authority into 
which some or all individual agency functions would be absorbed or at least 
supervised.  The PNWRPC produced a report offering several other governance 
alternatives intended to resolve this debate.  Given the urgency of coming to at least a 
temporary solution before the two dams came on line, the parties to the debated agreed 
to a compromise solution modeled after the PNWRPC recommendation.  The 
Commission, although favoring the valley authority idea, realized the political 
impossibility of getting such a structure established in time.  Instead, the Commission 
recommended retention of project operation by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
Reclamation and establishment of a new agency to market power.  The compromise 
also resulted in the region‟s first experiment with a governance system based on 
federal agency collaboration, the Bonneville Advisory Board.   
The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.  
Echoing White‟s (1995) later assertion that it was the FCRPS that united the 
Northwest as a region, Bessey (1963) argued that “the Columbia River System [not 
yet established, but envisioned in the 1932 308 Report] made for a strong interstate 
community of interest in development” (p. 46).70  The PNWRPC provided the 
institutional infrastructure to coordinate the efforts of that “community of interest.”  
                                                 
70
 McKinley also refers to this “community of interest” in his introductory chapter (McKinley, 1952, p. 
2).  Although not defined as such by either Bessey (1963) or McKinley (1952), their context is clearly a 
community of economic and development interests as neither tribal nor fishery interests were 
substantially addressed.  Fishery proponent protests against dam construction beginning in the 1940s 
demonstrated that this community of interests had its limits.  Bessey and McKinley did not address 
environmental interests either, understandable since both were writing before the environmental 
movement had gained much traction in the public mind. 
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The immediate need was to provide relief for unemployment and adjustments to 
agricultural policy in order to address the acute economic distress in urban and rural 
communities (McKinley, 1952).
71
  Bessey (1963) reports McKinley as believing that 
“lasting success…would depend upon the degree to which interagency coordination in 
this work can be secured” (Bessey, 1963, p. 49, emphasis added).  The Commission 
would conduct its planning effort based on the Corps‟s 308 Report (Ogden, 1949; 
Bessey, 1963). 
The PNWRPC was, by design, state-centric.  Its membership consisted of the 
chairs from each of the four state planning boards, a full-time executive director, and 
staff (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Vogel, 2007).  The part-time district chairman 
of the national planning committee (like all national planning committee members, a 
private citizen) served as Commission chair.  Federal agencies were not Commission 
members, although they supported the Commission and state board‟s technical teams 
with staff and information (McKinley, 1952).  The Commission‟s purpose was “to 
advise and assist…in the development of comprehensive plans for public works, as 
contemplated by the Recovery Act, for the regional area” (Bessey, 1963, p. 21).  Its 
functions were investigational and advisory, not operational.  The Corps of Engineers, 
Bureau of Reclamation, and other agencies retained operational decision authority for 
their respective programs.  Consistent with its Progressive roots, the Commission 
made clear that its intent was to improve the regional economy through the best use of 
                                                 
71
 McKinley (1952) also states that the Commission chair believed in participation by “private civic 
groups” in addition to state, regional, and local entities.  Nongovernmental participation is not 
mentioned by Bessey.  See McKinley, 1952, p. 460.  
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resources (Bessey, 1963).  In effect, this arrangement relegated federal agencies to the 
role of technical advisors and the executors of plans and priorities as established by 
others.   
Vesting supervision of the national planning effort under Secretary of Interior 
Harold Ickes caused interagency cooperation at the departmental level to suffer.  
Agencies not under the Department of Interior cooperated reluctantly at best.  Disputes 
were most prominent in Washington, DC but were reflected in the actions of regional 
agency offices as well.  The non-Interior departments and agencies were simply not 
inclined to support the efforts of someone they considered a rival who had previously 
campaigned to take over their programs.  This problem was eventually resolved by 
moving the planning function under the executive office of the President (McKinley, 
1952). 
Proposals for management by existing agencies. 
While the Commission was getting its planning function organized, others 
were calling the question as to how hydroelectricity from the soon-to-be-completed 
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams was to be marketed and transmitted.  In January 
1935, Washington Representative Knute Hill introduced a bill in Congress that would 
transfer Bonneville Dam to the Bureau of Reclamation upon its completion and assign 
the Bureau full responsibility for Columbia River development and power marketing.  
The Corps of Engineers, not surprisingly opposed this proposal (Norwood, c.1981).   
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent a letter requesting the PNWRPC 
provide recommendations on several issues, including a regional organizational 
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system.  Presumably with the intent of preempting whatever the Commission might 
recommend, on July 29 Oregon Senators Charles McNary and Frederick Steiwer and 
Washington Representative Martin Smith introduced bills in their respective houses of 
Congress that would have the Corps of Engineers operate Bonneville Dam and market 
its power.  The bill also called for the Corps to build local transmission lines to serve 
the Portland and Vancouver urban areas.  The Corps‟s service area would be limited to 
the lower Columbia River.  The bill assigned rate-setting authority to the Federal 
Power Commission.  It specified the use of “railroad rates” which varied dependent on 
distance from the point of generation.  Proponents of this proposal included Oregon, 
private power advocates, and local business owners (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, 
c.1981).  On its part, the Corps believed that the Northwest electricity market was 
limited, and thus argued for building short transmission lines to service the Portland 
urban area and industries near the river as the best use of public funds (Pope, 2008).   
Opponents included public power advocates in general and much of the public 
sentiment in the states of Oregon and Washington.  Many still recoiled from memories 
of the role that business leadership in public affairs had played in bringing about the 
Depression.  Washington‟s delegation in particular was comprised mostly of New 
Dealers opposed to the McNary proposal and its tilt to private power interests 
(McKinley, 1952).  Because of this opposition, neither the Senate nor the House bill 
went to hearings.  However, they did help frame the debate between advocates of 
single-agency management of the Columbia (by either the Corps of Engineers or the 
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Bureau of Reclamation) and advocates of the proposed Columbia Valley Authority 
(Norwood, c.1981). 
Proposals for a Columbia Valley Authority. 
For Progressives in the 1930s, the Tennessee Valley Authority represented the 
epitome of government planning and service provision for the greater public good, 
successfully protecting government resources from the clutches of rapacious corporate 
interests.  It thus served as an inspiration and guiding model for many in the ensuing 
governance discussions in the Columbia (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Conklin, 
1983, quote from p. 4; DeLuna, 1997).   
Later in January 1935, after submittal of the Hill Bill favoring Bureau of 
Reclamation management of the system, Senator James Pope of Idaho introduced a 
bill in the Senate, with Washington‟s Hill agreeing to introduce an identical bill in the 
House, to establish a Columbia Valley Authority modeled after the TVA.  The CVA 
would take over operation of Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams and administer 
future development over the Basin (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).   
Proponents of the Columbia Valley Authority proposal included Progressives 
and New Deal liberals throughout government and public power advocates (Norwood, 
c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997).  Norwood (c.1981) adds the states of Idaho and 
Washington as supporters, and DeLuna (1997) notes qualified support from the 
Departments of Commerce
72
 and Interior.
73
  Opponents included the Corps,
 74
 private 
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 According to DeLuna (1997), the Department of Commerce favored a CVA but one bureaucratically 
weaker than the TVA.  Commerce supported a central authority for dam planning and building in order 
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utilities, and a number of local chambers of commerce throughout the region, 
including Portland‟s (Norwood, c.1981; Goodwin, 1983; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997).  
Goodwin (1983), DeLuna (1997) and White (1995) state that the Bureau of 
Reclamation was also opposed, with White stating that its opposition was muted in 
order to not offend the Secretary of the Interior.  Goodwin (1983) and DeLuna (1997) 
also note opposition from the Department Agriculture due to concerns over potential 
threats to the Department‟s land management authorities in the Forest Service and its 
agricultural programs.  In general, a belief in market forces, a more opportunistic 
approach to development, and opposition to the general power such an organization 
would wield regionally philosophically drove non-federal CVA opponents.  For their 
part, ever since the early 1900s, private power companies had been skeptical that a 
market demand for power from large projects would ever materialize – a skepticism 
shared by the Corps of Engineers.  Federal agencies, especially the Corps, Bureau of 
                                                                                                                                            
to provide cheap electricity in support of economic development.  But it was wary of a central 
bureaucracy with authority over a potentially broader array of policy arenas. 
 
73
 Disagreement existed within the Department of Interior over whether valley authorities in general 
should be under the supervision of DOI, the position favored by Secretary Ickes, or independent 
(DeLuna, 1997).    
 
74
  A general Corps of Engineers‟ policy position on valley authorities is hard to gauge.  White (1995) 
states that “the Tennessee Valley had no equivalents to the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of 
Engineers, large bureaucratic players, on the river who [sic] could not be easily replaced” (White, 1995, 
p. 65).  White is correct insofar as the Bureau of Reclamation is concerned since the 1902 Reclamation 
Act limited the Bureau‟s jurisdiction to the states west of the Mississippi.  But his statement regarding 
the Corps implies that, had the Corps been a stronger presence in the Tennessee Basin, the TVA may 
not have been developed.  But Conklin (1983) presents a relatively cooperative relationship between the 
Corps and TVA promoters, with the Corps primarily interested in preserving its navigational 
prerogatives through partnership.  McKinley (1952, pp. 521-525) notes some tension in the dual 
jurisdictional arrangement on the Tennessee but that the two agencies eventually developed protocols 
and worked through it.  With regard to the CVA proposal, it is not clear if Corps opposition represented 
an institutional change of heart after the TVA experience, differing perspectives between the different 
local Corps offices, or some other reason.   Regardless, the Corps was staunchly opposed to establishing 
a valley authority in the Columbia.    
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Reclamation, and Department of Agriculture (led by the Forest and Soil Conservation 
Services) were fearful of the potential for impingement on agency prerogatives 
(McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Goodwin, 1983; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; 
Pope, 2008).     
Compromise: the Bonneville Power Administration and Bonneville Advisory 
Board. 
In the spring of 1935, after the Hill and Pope Bills had been submitted, the 
chair and the executive director of the PNWRPC and Senator Pope met with the 
President to determine his preference for a Columbia Basin organizational system 
(Norwood, c.1981).  Roosevelt, though supportive of the TVA, “was not 
precommitted to any particular plan or type” for the Columbia (Bessey, 1963, p. 25).  
Roosevelt urged the three to study the problem with an open mind, cautioning that a 
region‟s characteristics may make a valley authority approach unsuitable (Norwood, 
c.1981).   
Because of that meeting, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent a letter on 
July 9, 1935, that requested the PNWRPC to develop a report on the future of the 
Columbia Basin regarding planning, construction, and operation of public works in the 
area.  The study was to provide a holistic look at power generation and transmission in 
the Northwest, as well as potential organizational systems (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, 
c.1981). 
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The Commission held seven meetings to collect regional views the following 
September (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).
 75
   Bessey (1963) stated that views were 
collected from “official, commercial, industrial, utility, agriculture, forest, and 
transportation interests.”  He further stated that the resulting study confirmed the 
“broad homogeneity and coherent regionality of the Pacific Northwest” (p. 30).  
Neither Bessey (1963) nor Norwood (c.1981) mentions any participation by regional 
Indian tribes or fishing interests.  In fact, Norwood (c.1981, p. 57) states, “Chamber of 
Commerce witnesses dominated the meetings.”  Neither Bessey (1963) nor Norwood‟s 
(c.1981) accounts clarify whether the region‟s Indian tribes and fishery interests were 
not invited or chose not to attend.  Regardless, the views of regional fishermen and 
tribes, as future events were to demonstrate, were distinctly at odds with the views of 
those who did participate.     
Each of the four state Commission members, the Chair, and the executive 
director signed the Commission‟s report (Bessey, 1963) and submitted it to the 
National Resources Committee on December 28, 1935.  The Committee wrote a 
strong letter endorsement and published the report for public consumption in May 
1936 under the title Regional Planning Part 1 – Pacific Northwest (Norwood, c.1981).  
However, the Committee‟s endorsement did not carry the signature of the Secretary of 
War, reflecting continuing opposition by the Corps of Engineers and its supporters 
who opposed any recommendation that would take the construction of transmission 
lines from Bonneville Dam and the marketing of power away from the Corps 
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 These meetings were held in Helena, MT; Seattle and Spokane, WA; Portland and Pendleton, OR: 
and Boise and Pocatello, ID.  See Norwood, c.1981, p. 57. 
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(McKinley, 1952).  Two of the PNWRPC report findings of interest to this study were 
its recommendations regarding the regional transmission grid and its analysis and 
recommendations regarding regional organization.   
The report proposed a “high-voltage, high-capacity, synchronized, constant-
voltage network of lines, and switching and transformer stations” (quoted in Bessey, 
1963).  Initially, transmission lines were to run from the Puget Sound in western 
Washington through Grand Coulee to Spokane; from Puget Sound south to the 
Willamette Valley in Oregon; and from Grand Coulee through Bonneville Dam to 
Portland.  Future extensions would connect Spokane to western Montana and through 
the Snake River Basin to southeastern Idaho and from Portland and The Dalles 
southward through western Oregon (Bessey, 1963). 
Organizationally, the report evaluated five alternatives: 
 Project operation and power marketing by both Corps and Bureau of 
Reclamation for their respective projects,  
 Selection of either the Corps or Bureau to assume control of power 
generation, transmission, and marketing for all or part of the Basin, 
 Creation of a new public agency to generate, transmit, and market power, 
 Establishment of a Columbia Valley Authority, or 
 Establishment of a new federal corporation to generate and market power.  
The Commission favored creation of a regional valley authority of some kind or a 
power agency paralleled by a regional planning and program-coordinating agency.
 
  
They chose the latter in recognition of significant opposition to the former.  The 
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Commission recommended creation of a federal corporation, and included multiple 
staff studies as annexes in support of its analysis and recommendations.  The 
voluminous report and its annexes thus provided the administration a “carefully 
evaluated proposal and supporting arguments” (Norwood, c.1981, p. 58)76.   
The new corporation was to be overseen by a three-person board of directors 
selected by the president and approved by the Senate, one of whom would also serve 
as PNWRPC chair.  The proposal allowed the Corps and/or Bureau to add a fourth 
and/or fifth board member on temporary terms (Ogden, 1949).  The Corps, Bureau of 
Reclamation, Forest Service, and Resettlement Administration provided staff to collect 
and analyze data and help prepare the report‟s recommendations (McKinley, 1952).  
The Commission‟s recommendation for a statutorily constituted regional planning and 
program coordination entity (presumably to be itself) was not acted upon (Bessey, 
1963).
77
  Had it been, and assuming these functions were assigned to the PNWRPC, 
the mission of the PNWRPC would have expanded from one of just planning into 
operational oversight.  
Norwood (c.1981) reports on the April 1937 testimony of Oregon Governor 
Martin who complained of thirty-eight bills submitted in Congress on the Columbia 
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 It is not clear if fishery interests felt threatened by the pending river development at this early date; 
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), and Norwood (c.1981) do not mention them one way or the other. 
 
77
 The recommendation for a statutorily supported regional planning entity was eventually implemented 
upon passage of the Water Resources Planning Act in 1965 and establishment of the Pacific Northwest 
River Basins Commission in 1967.  These events occurred after publication of Bessey‟s work and are 
discussed further in the next chapter.   
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issue since 1935.
78
  At the end of the day, the debate resulted in a bill that, with the 
exception of the planning and coordination entity, largely followed the 
recommendations of the PNWRPC report.  The bill called for establishment of a 
government corporation to sell the power produced by the Corps and Bureau and 
develop a transmission system to connect generation with markets.  It was supported 
by the Corps, provided the Corps retained operational control over the projects it 
constructed.  Oregon, Washington, and Idaho Congressional delegations and the 
administration also supported it.  The PNWRPC recommendation thus became the 
basis for the 1937 Bonneville Project Act that established the “Bonneville Project” 
under the Department of Interior (Norwood, c.1981; Blumm, 1982; White, 1995; 
Pope, 2008).   
Those engaged in the debate viewed the Bonneville Project Act as an interim 
measure, driven by the Corps‟s construction schedule for Bonneville Dam and the 
belief by public power advocates that an ultimate CVA-like system was inevitable 
(Pope, 2008).  In its initial form, it applied only to Bonneville Dam.  The Act stated 
that “the form of administration herein established for the Bonneville project is 
intended to be provisional pending establishment of a permanent administration for 
Bonneville and other projects in the Columbia River Basin (Bonneville Project Act, 
1937, Section 2 (a)) (emphasis added).
79
  The Act also called for preference of sales to 
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 Norwood (c.1981) details these various proposals and the political debate around them in pp. 56-62.    
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 The provisional nature is further illustrated in that the Act did not name the new agency thus created.  
Consequently, a lot of confusion was generated in the minds of the public as to the role of the new 
Bonneville Project Administrator with regard to the role of the Corps in completing, operating and 
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public utilities and required the power thus sold to be at uniform “postage stamp” 
rates.  It addressed transmission, but did not specify which agency was to actually 
build and operate transmission lines (Bonneville Project Act, 1937; Norwood, c.1981).  
It made clear that construction, operation, and future maintenance of Bonneville Dam 
was to be the responsibility of the Corps subject to the Act‟s provisions regarding the 
authority of the administrator (see Section 1).  President Roosevelt signed the 
Bonneville Project Act into law on August 20, 1937.   
Long-standing public power advocate James D. (“J.D.”) Ross was appointed as 
Administrator of the “Bonneville Project” the following October.  Described by 
Norwood (c.1981) as a “one-man whirlwind” (p. 66), Ross successfully pushed for a 
policy of postage stamp rates to govern sale of federal power and strongly promoted 
early construction of a transmission intertie between Bonneville and Grand Coulee 
Dams.  His premature death in March 1939 cut short his tenure.  Paul J. Raver 
succeeded to the administrator‟s chair the following September.  Raver was to serve 
until 1954.  Just as Pinchot‟s drive and personality shaped the values and culture of the 
Forest Service, so to would Raver‟s come to shape the values and culture of BPA 
(Norwood, c.1981).    
The Bonneville Project Act illustrates just how provisional the new agency was 
intended to be in that it did not give it a name.  The Act‟s title of Bonneville Project 
Administrator generated confusion in the minds of the public as to the role of the new 
                                                                                                                                            
maintaining the actual dam.  This was finally resolved in 1940 when the agency was made permanent 
and the Secretary of the Interior approved “Bonneville Power Administration” as the agency‟s name.   
See Norwood, c.1981, pp. 68 and 124. 
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agency with regard to the role of the Corps in completing, operating and maintaining 
the actual dam.  This was finally resolved in 1940 with amendment of the Bonneville 
Project Act to make the new agency permanent and assign it authority to build and 
operate transmission lines.  Raver recommended, and the Secretary of the Interior 
approved, the “Bonneville Power Administration” as the agency‟s name (BPA) 
(Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997). 
The Bonneville Project Act (1937) also established the first governance system 
based on federal agency cooperation.  It required that the administrator “… act in 
consultation with an advisory board” to be named the Bonneville Advisory Board (the 
Board).  The Act specified the Board‟s membership, calling for representatives 
designated by the Secretaries of the Army, Interior, and Agriculture and by the Federal 
Power Commission (Bonneville, Project Act, 1937, Section 2 (a)).
 80
   General Theron 
Weaver of the Corps of Engineers represented the Army; Reclamation‟s Robert 
Newell represented Interior; the Forest Service‟s Robert Putman represented 
Agriculture; and Lester Wing represented the Federal Power Commission (Bessey, 
1963). 
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 The Bonneville Power Administration would come to establish other advisory groups, such as the 
Bonneville Regional Advisory Committee, established 1944 – 1978, and the Pacific Northwest Utilities 
Conference Committee, established 1946 – present.  These were set up as advisory and/or sounding 
boards to assist BPA in rate setting and other policy issues.  Although federal agency members were 
invited to sit in on the meetings, the organizations were not intended to implement policy or otherwise 
directly participate in system management (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).  Additionally, the 
Department of Interior instituted its Pacific Northwest Field Committee in 1946 as part of a 
Department-wide effort to better coordinate regional Interior agency activities.  BPA participated 
(Bessey, 1963).  These groups are not discussed in detail as they did not exercise Basin “governance” in 
the sense used in this study. 
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The Board‟s first meeting occurred on November 30, 1937.  It held 11 more 
between 1939 and 1946, meeting four times in 1943 to coordinate War requirements 
(Norwood, c.1981).  McKinley (1952) reports that the board‟s sessions were usually 
held in Washington, DC, with Washington-level officers usually in attendance.  Issues 
addressed by the board included the rates to be charged by Bonneville Dam, funding 
for transmission line construction, and plans for additional generators during the War 
years.  Eventually, the board came to agreement that there should be only a single 
marketing agency for the electricity produced by Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams, 
and recommended BPA be designated that responsibility through executive order.  
President Roosevelt signed such an order in 1940 (McKinley, 1952).   
Board participation dropped off after 1943 as war-related generation and 
transmission construction efforts ended.  In 1946, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee assumed its regional coordination functions (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 
1963; Norwood, c.1981).    
 The governance debates of the 1930s resulted in a rejection of the 
decentralized, decision-oriented governance by the private market and iron triangle 
arrangements that dominated the region prior to the Depression‟s onset.  The debates 
also resulted in a rejection of a more centralized valley authority type decision-making 
system.  Instead, the region agreed to two collaboration-based systems.  The first was 
the PNWRPC, a state led entity intended to provide centralized planning to guide 
resource development in the Columbia River Basin.  The second was the Bonneville 
Advisory Board, a federal-agency collaborative body intended to inform the 
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Bonneville Power Administrator in the performance of his duties and coordinate 
operations.  Establishment of both the PNWRPC and Bonneville Advisory Board 
introduced a regional preference for collaborative versus decision-oriented governance 
systems.  Although specific governance systems would change in the years to come, 
this preference for collaboration-based systems would prove enduring.  
  
Chapter Summary: 
The events and circumstances related to the Basin governance systems of the 
period 1929 – 1945 can be summarized as follows: 
 The onset of the Great Depression ushered in sweeping Democratic 
majorities in Congress enabling the New Deal Program of the Roosevelt 
Administration.  Economic restoration was the most visible priority during 
the 1930s.  The public expected the federal government to undertake a 
direct role in economic recovery efforts.  In response, new federal agencies 
were created and existing agencies reorganized (Hays, 1959/1999; Bessey, 
1963; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; Billington, et al., 2006; Kennedy, 
2009).  
 Two precepts of the New Deal were centralized planning and regionalism.  
The National Industrial Recovery Act authorized creation of the Public 
Works Administration (PWA) and establishment of subordinate 
organizations under the PWA.  Its subordinate national planning committee 
believed that successful planning for economic growth and resource 
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development depended on regional, state and local participation.  
Accordingly, the committee established regional, state, and local planning 
boards (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981, Vogel, 2007). 
 Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana established state planning boards 
between 1933 and 1934.  The national planning committee established the 
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission in 1934 to provide 
governance over regional planning.  Although chaired by a part-time 
representative of the national planning committee, it was a state-centric 
system, comprised of members from the four Northwest states‟ planning 
boards.  Federal agency participation was relegated to provision of 
technical advice and expected execution of Commission plans (McKinley, 
1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981). 
 The Corps‟s 308 Report, released in 1932, provided a blueprint for future 
development of the Columbia Basin.  It presented technical and economic 
analyses of multipurpose dam development but left unanswered 
management questions regarding future design, construction, and 
operations.  President Roosevelt used the 308 Report to justify Bonneville 
and Grand Coulee Dams the construction of which began in 1933 by the 
Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, respectively (Ogden, 1949; 
Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995).  
 Congressional bills that would keep management of hydropower 
generation, transmission, and marketing in the hands of either the Corps of 
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Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation were introduced in 1935 (Norwood, 
c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008). 
 In the minds of many Progressives, the ideal governance system for river 
development was the Tennessee Valley Authority.  Proponents in the 
Northwest promoted a similar valley authority for the Columbia.  
Congressional bills to this effect were also submitted in 1935 (Ogden, 
1949; Bessey, 1963; McKinley, 1953; DeLuna, 1997; Billington, et al., 
2006; Pope, 2008) 
 The Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission proposed a 
compromise, eventually codified in the 1937 Bonneville Project Act.  The 
Act created the ambiguously named Bonneville Project as a government 
corporation to market public power at cost to preferred public customers.  
It also created the Bonneville Advisory Board to advise the Bonneville 
Project administrator in the execution of his duties.  Responsibility for 
project operation would reside with the constructing agency.  An 
amendment to the Bonneville Project Act made the agency permanent and 
renamed it as the Bonneville Power Administration in 1940 (Ogden, 1949; 
Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008). 
 The region‟s potential for low-cost hydropower, coupled with aggressive 
promotion by BPA in the mobilization for the War, attracted aluminum and 
other electricity-dependent defense industries to the Northwest (Ogden, 
1949; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008). 
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 Just as the PNWRPC was the region‟s first effort at multi-jurisdictional 
planning, so to was the Bonneville Advisory Board its first effort at 
collaborative governance to coordinate operations.  Board members 
included the regional executives of BPA, the Corps, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Forest Service, and the Federal Power Commission.  The 
Board did not possess a decision-making mechanism to resolve differences 
among the agencies.  This was not a major issue in the early 1940s due to 
common interest in successful prosecution of the War effort.  However, 
once construction of the war-related transmission lines and project 
generation facilities were completed and Allied victory imminent, interest 
in Board participation fell off (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, 
c.1981).   
The onset of the Depression thus created the opportunity for change to the 
market and iron triangle governance systems that dominated up to the early 1930s.  
The conceptual framing of Columbia Basin governance in the Northwest shifted from 
one of isolated communities to a region unified by the potential of a developed 
Columbia River (White, 1995; Vogel, 2007).  New Deal policies asserted federal 
authority to regulate private power, opened the door for federal ownership and 
operation of power facilities, and encouraged cooperative arrangements between 
federal agencies and with private industry (DeLuna, 1997).   
By 1946 major Columbia River dams were under federal construction or 
already online, and the region was struggling with how to manage the necessary 
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cooperation between the federal agencies responsible for project purposes, private and 
public utilities, and others impacted by project activities.  Progressives and public 
power advocates viewed the voluntary structure of the Bonneville Advisory Board as a 
short-term situation, inherently unworkable and destined to ultimately collapse.  They 
continued to hold out and advocate for a Columbia Valley Authority arrangement to 
direct, manage, and balance the production of electricity and other river purposes 
(McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997).   
The return of national prosperity following the end of World War II caused a 
loss of support for expensive government-led programs, valley authority-type systems, 
and centralized planning.  A renewed confidence in private markets began to emerge 
(Bessey, 1963; DeLuna, 1997).  The end of the War provided the region‟s second 
catalytic opportunity to change its governance arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE END OF WORLD WAR II (1945) 
   
Introduction 
The end of World War II presented the region‟s second critical situation that 
resulted in a shift between Basin governance models.  The model of state dominance 
in planning gave way to a return to systems of federal agency cooperation.  
Meanwhile, the region again rejected renewed calls for governance under a centralized 
valley authority.   
The War ended for the United States in 1945.  Three events occurred around 
that time that collectively created the circumstances for change in Columbia Basin 
governance systems.  The first was the decision by Congress to cease funding for 
national level planning in 1943 (Bessey, 1963).  The second event was the surprise 
reelection of Harry Truman as president in 1948 and a return of Democrat majorities 
in both houses of Congress, majorities they had lost to the Republicans in 1946 
(DeLuna, 1997).  The third event was the end of the Depression.  The buildup to 
World War II, the War‟s prosecution, and the prosperity that followed in the War‟s 
aftermath ended the nation‟s economic hardships.  Prosperity brought a lessening of 
support for the central role of government in the economy and a return to faith in 
private markets (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997).   
Regional issues events played out against this national backdrop.  Key regional 
issues affecting governance decisions included the rise in regional influence of the 
Bonneville Power Administration, jockeying by the state governors to maintain a 
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strong voice in Basin development, the rise of opposition by fishery interests to river 
development, severe floods in the late 1940s, and the continued construction of dams 
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981). 
These changes brought an abrupt end to the Pacific Northwest Regional 
Planning Commission and eventual disintegration of the Bonneville Advisory Board.  
Whereas the Bonneville Advisory Board continued to exist, the completion of efforts 
to expand hydropower generation and transmission coupled with growing confidence 
that the Allies would win the War reduced the sense of immediacy regarding the 
Board‟s purpose.  Consequently, the Board operated in a rather desultory fashion until 
1946 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970, Norwood, c.1981).   
Congress, federal departments, and the states collectively originated eleven 
governance system proposals during this period.  Five systems were enacted, although 
only three operated for any extended period.  These proposed and enacted systems are 
summarized below: 
 State led system proposals.  Northwest states made three efforts to maintain 
the state-centric nature of the PNWRPC in regional development.  The first 
was the Northwest States Development Association, established in 1943 
upon the demise of the PNWRPC.  It disbanded in either late 1943 or early 
1944.
81
  The second was the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy 
Committee.  It was ostensibly set up in 1953 as a committee under the 
CBIAC to implement the Eisenhower administration‟s partnership 
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 The record on this point is not clear.  The Association produced a report in December, 1943 and 
disbanded “shortly thereafter.”  See McKinley(1952), Bessey (1963), and Scheufele (c.1970).   
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program.  It disbanded in 1958.  The third was an attempt at an interstate 
compact.  Negotiations began in 1949 but the proposal failed when state 
legislatures refused to ratify the resulting proposal. 
 Valley authority proposals.  Congress introduced five bills to again attempt 
to establish some form of a Columbia Valley Authority.  One was 
introduced in 1945 and four others between 1947 and 1949.  None was 
enacted. 
 The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC).  A regional 
association of federal agencies, with invited state participation, established 
in 1946.  The federal agencies instituted the CBIAC based on a recognized 
need for effective interagency coordination in Basin planning and 
operations and as a counter to the renewed called for some form of 
Columbia Valley Authority.  It effectively assumed the planning function 
of the PNWRPC and operational coordination function of the Bonneville 
Advisory Board.  It was replaced by the Pacific Northwest River Basins 
Commission in 1967. 
 The Committee on Fish Operations (COFO).  Established in the 1960s to 
better address the impact of Basin development on regional fish runs.   
 The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (PNWRBC).  Federal-
agency centric successor to the CBIAC.  Authorized by the Water 
Resources Planning Act of 1965 and established by executive order in 
1967.     
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The remainder of this chapter discusses the social and political context outlined 
above and the key issues and events in the Northwest that influenced the debates over 
the various governance forms.  It then describes the nature and structure of each of the 
proposed or enacted governance systems. 
 
Social and Political Context 
The main national level developments that affected Columbia Basin 
governance systems were the ending of funding for New Deal planning structures, the 
reelection of Truman in 1948, and the return of national prosperity which brought with 
it a resurgence of influence by private power interests.   
The War, which ended for the United States with the Japanese surrender on 
August 15, 1945 and subsequent signing of the surrender terms on September 2, had 
destroyed or seriously damaged the economies of the major European and Asian 
nations.  Of the War‟s major participants, only the United States and Canada retained 
functioning economic systems.  The worldwide demand for post-war goods and 
commodities for rebuilding greatly expanded the American economy and ushered in a 
period of renewed national prosperity (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, 
c.1981). 
Prosperity brought a renewed confidence in private markets and a decline in 
support for many New Deal bureaucracies and programs.  Congress, despite its 
Democratic majority, ceased funding for the National Resources Planning Board (the 
latest incarnation of the national planning committee) in 1943.  This in turn led to the 
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disbanding of state and regional planning commissions, including the PNWRPC 
(McKinley, 1953; Bessey, 1963).     
Executive Branch interagency planning and coordination may have lost favor 
with Congress, but the affected agencies still believed in a need for some collaborative 
mechanism to coordinate river basin operations and development.  Northwest agencies 
were also concerned about the greatly diminished but still simmering interest on the 
part of public power advocates and New Dealers to install a valley authority in the 
Columbia.  Federal departments, reacting to the defunding of the National Resources 
Planning Board, 
 
established the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee 
(FIARBC, known colloquially as “Firebrick”) in1943.82  FIARBC resulted from a 
voluntary agreement between the Chief of Engineers, the Commissioner of the Bureau 
of Reclamation (on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior), the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and the chair of the Federal Power Commission.  The Secretary of 
Commerce was added in 1947.
83
  Its purpose was to better coordinate the preparation 
of reports dealing with multipurpose water projects, and the signatories agreed to 
ensure their respective field offices would “communicate and confer” (McKinley, 
1952, p. 90) regarding data and to avoid duplication of effort (McKinley, 1952; 
Scheufele, c.1970).   
                                                 
82
 The accounts of Bessey (1963) and Scheufele‟s (c. 1970) differ as to the date of the FIARBC‟s 
establishment.  Bessey claimed it was 1943.  Scheufele stated it was established in 1939, although he 
mistakenly referred to it as a “commission” instead of “committee.”  McKinley (1952) did not give a 
date.  The National Archives supported Bessey‟s account, so the 1943 date is used here.  See 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/315.html#315.2. 
 
83
 The Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare were apparently added later as well, 
although not mentioned by McKinley (1952) or Bessey (1963). See the National Archives web site at 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/315.html#315.2. 
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The Eisenhower administration reorganized FIARBC as the Inter-Agency 
Committee on Water Resources (ICEWATER) in 1954 (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, 
c.1970).  ICEWATER continued the planning role of FIARBC but shifted from an 
emphasis on federal leadership in centralized planning under Truman to a more 
limited federal role under Eisenhower (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).    
Despite the national trending toward a lessening of government role in the 
economy, there were still progressives and New Deal supporters that held little faith in 
the efficacy of voluntary cooperation among federal agencies.  They continued to 
believe that valley authority type entities best served the public‟s interests in regional 
resource development.  Valley authority advocates in Congress submitted bills to 
establish some form of Columbia Valley Authority in 1945 and 1947.  However, the 
retirement of many New Deal senators and congressional representatives in the 
election of 1946 and the increase in Republicans doomed those particular efforts.  The 
1948 reelection of Truman, who in part championed valley authorities during his 
campaign, reenergized valley authority supporters (DeLuna, 1997).    
Despite Democrats maintaining modest majorities in both Houses of Congress 
in 1948 and retaining them in 1950, the post-War economic boom and the election of 
the Republican Eisenhower administration in 1952 generated a resurgence of influence 
by private power.  Private power advocates worked with the administration to block 
further efforts at public ownership and operation of electricity generation.   
The Eisenhower administration‟s energy policy revolved around “partnerships” 
between federal and private power entities.  This policy, endorsed by private power 
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interests as a way to undo pubic power advances in the 1930s, resulted in a variety of 
relationships and arrangements.  Few depended on federal funding, federal 
construction, or federal operation of facilities.  If private utilities were willing to make 
the investments, they were free to develop new hydropower sites at locations 
previously envisioned for federal projects (Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; Pope, 
2008).  However, the administration in general and Eisenhower in particular provided 
little direct support to the partnership program.  Democratic majorities in Congress 
and the lukewarm support from the administration caused the partnership concept to 
“sputter to a halt” during Eisenhower‟s second term (Scheufele, c.1970; Pope, 2008). 
The ending of Congressional funding for New Deal planning structures, the 
reelection of Truman, and the return of prosperity following the end of World War II 
thus presented a wave of conditions that would lead to Columbia Basin governance 
system changes.  Within this national context were circumstances unfolding in the 
Northwest.   
   
Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest   
This study identified five activities during this period that significantly affected 
perceptions of governance needs within the region in the mid to late 1940s.  These 
were (1) the emergence of the Bonneville Power Administration as a major regional 
institution; (2) state interest in maintaining their centrality in regional planning and 
development following the dissolution of the PNWRPC, (3) the development of 
opposition from fishery interests to further river development; (4) severe flooding in 
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the lower Columbia River in 1949; and (5) continued construction of dams in the 
Columbia and its tributaries.  Each is discussed in turn.   
Emergence of BPA as a regional institutional leader.  
Paul Raver assumed the role of Administrator of the Bonneville Project in 
1939 and served until 1954.  His tenure would instill in BPA a set of values and 
operating traditions that continue to this day.  These values included the New Deal 
ideals of rural electrification; cost-based rates for public power; the use of public 
power as a yardstick against which to gage private pricing; and the use of “postage 
stamp” rates84  to set federal prices.  Under his leadership, BPA would rise to become 
a major institutional actor in matters of regional development and energy (Norwood, 
c.1981). 
Upon assuming the job in 1939, Raver immediately set out to strengthen the 
agency‟s administrative structure.  He was instrumental in drafting the 1940 
amendments that made the agency permanent and recommended the agency‟s name.  
Organizationally, he opened field offices around the region to ensure close ties to 
regional parties and interests.  He led the effort to give BPA the authority to construct 
and operate transmission lines and orchestrated the wartime expansion of generation 
capacity at Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams.  Over the course of his tenure he met 
                                                 
84
 The term “postage stamp” rates refers to the policy of charging the same rate for the same unit of 
electricity, regardless of where in the service area the end-user resided.  The term comes from the 
postage rates for mail delivery as practiced by the U.S. Postal Service.  The alternative, favored by 
private utilities, were “railroad rates” which would be determined by the marginal cost of delivery.  
Under a railroad rate policy, electricity sold to rural areas would cost significantly more than delivery in 
urban areas due to the need to distribute the infrastructure and operating costs of generation, 
transmission, and distribution over long distances among a relatively small population.       
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continuously with electricity customers and public and private utilities throughout the 
Northwest, building relationships and promoting BPA‟s regional role.  Valuing their 
input and support, he invited them to participate in numerous advisory bodies he 
formed to help inform BPA decisions in response to regional circumstances.
85
  He 
worked closely with the region‟s Congressional delegation and encouraged BPA staff 
to think of the delegation as the agency‟s board of directors.  He strengthened BPA‟s 
office in Washington, DC to better keep Congressional members informed of regional 
events and coordinate legislative initiatives.  He also worked hard to establish close 
working relationships with his fellow regional agency executives (Norwood, c.1981).   
Regional public power advocates under Raver‟s leadership largely 
outmaneuvered private power efforts to limit federal project development in the 
Northwest.  An example is BPA‟s response to the impact of the decline in regional 
power demand at the end of World War II.  Once the War ended, the region faced 
huge layoffs as defense plants, airplane factories, and shipyards curtailed production.  
Reduced demand for aircraft forced aluminum plants to lay off hundreds of workers 
and created a corresponding reduction in electrical demand.  The unrest generated by 
the layoffs provided an opportunity for private utilities to reassert themselves.  Four 
private utilities issued a joint memorandum in January 1946 and later testified to 
Congress that the region faced a power surplus of about a million kilowatts.  
Consequently, in their view, there was no need for additional federal hydropower 
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 An example is the Bonneville Regional Advisory Council established in 1944 to advise BPA on 
regional policy.   
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dams (Norwood, c.1981).  In effect, the private utilities hoped for a return to the pre-
Depression market dominated governance model. 
In response to the utility memorandum, Raver formed the Tacoma Conference, 
later renamed the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee.  This group 
assembled the load forecasts of individual regional utilities and consolidated them into 
a regional forecast.  Rather than showing a surplus of capacity as alleged in the utility 
memorandum, the consolidated report displayed a shortfall.  Raver presented the 
report in testimony to Congress (Norwood, c.1981).
86
  As they had in the 1930s, the 
public power advocates won and additional multi-purpose federal dams began coming 
on line in 1952.  This effort was indicative of Raver‟s style throughout his time as 
BPA Administrator. 
Raver was also instrumental in laying the groundwork that finally resolved the 
Northwest public-power debate.  Pope (2008) argues that the Eisenhower 
administration‟s “partnership” policy contained within it a fundamental paradox for 
the Northwest.  The envisioned partnerships implied decentralized operations within a 
competitive market.  But development at the major hydropower sites was too 
complicated and expensive for all but the largest utilities to finance.  Utilities therefore 
had to work together in order to raise capital and develop markets by promoting 
demand.  Raver recognized this and worked to establish he institutional arrangements 
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 The Tacoma Conference‟s load forecasting effort was fortuitously assisted by an increase in 
worldwide aluminum demand that began in 1947 and extended through the Korean War (Norwood, 
c.1981); severe regional flooding in 1948 and the coincidentally released joint report of the Corps and 
Bureau regarding Columbia River development (McKinley, 1952); and by record Northwest cold in the 
winter of 1948/1949 (Ogden, 1949).    
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that would eventually guide cooperation between private and public utilities.  The 
ultimate result was a more closely coordinated and centrally planned system than a 
purely competitive market model would anticipate (Pope, 2008).    
The upshot was that the structures and processes initiated by Raver largely 
muted the public-private power debate by the end of the 1960s.  The Corps, Bureau of 
Reclamation, BPA, and regional utilities signed the Pacific Northwest Coordination 
Agreement in 1964.  At about the same time the United States signed a treaty with 
Canada that doubled flood storage protection capacity to the United States in exchange 
for hydropower benefits (Blumm, 1982; Ogden, 1997; Pope, 2008).  The coordination 
agreement and Canadian treaty codified Raver‟s vision of regional energy producers 
operating together (Norwood, c.1981; Pope, 2008).   
The foregoing illustrates Raver‟s belief in and efforts to establish structures 
and relationships at the national and regional levels to improve coordination among 
the multiple parties engaged in Northwest energy and development issues.  It thus 
explains his continued support for the otherwise dysfunctional Bonneville Advisory 
Board and its more successful replacement, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee.  Following in the tradition established by Raver, BPA would continue to 
be a major participant in and shaper of the Basin‟s future governance systems. 
State efforts at Basin governance. 
The Northwest states strongly supported the purpose, functions, and state-led 
nature of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.  Although nominally 
a federal entity, it was designed to give maximum voice to its representatives from 
 186 
 
each of the state planning commissions.  The federal coordinator at the time, like the 
other members of the National Resources Planning Board, was not a federal 
employees but a part time advisor engaged in his own business enterprises.  This 
arrangement, coupled with the relatively subordinate relationship of the federal 
agencies to the Commission, meant that the states could guide plans that would 
leverage federal funding and expertise in development that would benefit state 
economies (Vogel, 2007).   
This arrangement collapsed when Congress stopped appropriating federal 
funds for the National Resources Planning Board and state and regional planning 
commissions in 1943.  The demise of the PNWRPC left the federal-agency-only 
Bonneville Advisory Board as the sole multi-jurisdictional coordinator of Columbia 
Basin development and operations.  The states were not included as Board members 
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981). 
In 1943, the Bonneville Advisory Board began considering ways to increase 
upriver storage in order to better regulate streamflow and allow for greater power 
generation.  One option was to increase the level of Flathead Lake in western Montana 
by seventeen feet.  This was not a new proposal as it had been a provision of the 1932 
308 Report.  However, the federal agencies did not vet the proposal local interests who 
generated a storm of protest over the impact of changes in water level on those living 
and working around the lake.  The states reacted to the ending of the PNWRPC and 
the Flathead Lake controversy by establishing the Northwest States Development 
Association to ensure local and state interests were properly consulted in future 
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development proposals (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, 
c.1981).   
This was the first of three state-led efforts to assert a prominent state role in 
Basin governance.  Despite the support of state governors, all state-led systems faced 
serious challenges in overcoming parochial state interests in favor of regional 
priorities, obtaining funding and appropriate authorities from multiple state 
legislatures, and the tendency of the bodies to serve as veto mechanisms over actions 
perceived as contrary to the interests of state or local interests (McKinley, 1952; 
Bessey, 1963).  The experience of these efforts underscores the challenge to 
governance presented by the tension among the states themselves and between the 
states and federal agencies over who gets to decide regional priorities. 
Fishing interest opposition to continued Columbia system development. 
In 1943, the Senate Commerce Committee directed the Corps to extend and 
revise the 308 Reports and prepare a plan for further development of the Columbia.  
The Committee directed the Corps to complete the report by October 1948 (McKinley, 
1952).    
In 1944, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife requested that the Corps, as part of its 
review, conduct a comprehensive investigation of the effects of federal dams on 
Columbia River juvenile salmon.  The Corps and Bureau of Reclamation agreed, 
dedicated funds to this purpose, and launched an “elaborate research program” 
(McKinley, 1952, p. 110).   
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As the Corps study progressed, regional opposition to further large dam 
construction arose despite fish passage facilities having been installed at Bonneville 
dam and included in designs for proposed new projects (Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 
2004).  Sports and commercial fishers, Indian tribes, conservation groups objected to 
the potential impacts on fisheries and natural character of the Columbia and Snake 
Rivers.  These groups forced a series of formal and informal hearings.  The first, held 
in The Dalles in 1945, provided a forum for fishery interests to protest plans for a dam 
that would ultimately inundate Celilo Falls and destroy a tribal fishery that had existed 
for centuries.  Other hearings were conducted from 1946 through 1947, largely pitting 
fisheries associations and tribes against regional development promoters (Robbins, 
2004).   
The objections voiced by the Fish and Wildlife Service to the Corps were not 
resolved to the satisfaction of the Fish and Wildlife Service.  In October 1946, the 
agency, with the later support of the Office of Indian Affairs, protested in a memo to 
the Secretary of the Interior the proposed construction of four dams planned for the 
lower Snake River and the two Columbia mainstem dams proposed below the 
confluence of the Snake and Columbia (McKinley, 1952).  The agency recommended, 
among other things, a ten-year moratorium on further dam construction on the 
Columbia and lower Snake Rivers to study and better understand the impacts of the 
dams on the rivers‟ fisheries (Robbins, 2004). 
The Secretary of Interior invited both BPA and the Bureau of Reclamation to 
comment and asked the Interior Department‟s Pacific Northwest Coordination 
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Committee
87
 to address the question as well.  The Committee submitted a report,
88
 
backed by substantial technical analysis, detailing the conflicting interests at stake.  It 
established the threat to salmon runs of the existing Columbia dams and by the new 
dams under consideration for the Columbia and Snake Rivers.  It also pointed out the 
pending loss of tribal fishing grounds, particularly at Celilo Falls, a fact that the Office 
of Indian Affairs protested as a violation of 1855 treaty obligations.  The National 
Park Service joined the protest due to probable damage to sports fishing on the 
tributaries of the Snake and Columbia.  BPA, on its part in defending the new 
development, noted the projected power demand increases for the region in support of 
the proposed dams.  Reclamation did the same with respect to projected irrigation 
needs.  Eventually the regional Interior agencies reached accord, producing a 
consensus report that adopted the Fish and Wildlife Service‟s proposed ten-year 
moratorium to give time to resolve the salmon and tribal issues, with additional funds 
requested to do so.  Interior‟s assistant secretary endorsed the report on March 6, 1947, 
essentially presented a Department-wide critique of key provisions of the pending 
Corps report (McKinley, 1952). 
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 The Pacific Northwest Coordination Committee was part of a Department of Interior effort to better 
coordinate its programs and to provide Interior‟s representative to the Bonneville Advisory Board and 
the later Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee.  It was formally established by departmental order 
in September, 1946 and consisted of the regional office chiefs from the BPA, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and newly created Bureau of Land Management.  It 
also included staff representatives from the U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau of Mines, and Office of 
Indian Affairs.  The executive director was Roy Bessey.  A similar intradepartmental coordination body 
had previously been established in the Department of Agriculture during the War years.  Since the 
purpose of these groups was intradepartmental coordination and to provide departmental positions to 
the aforementioned interdepartmental structures, they are not considered as “regional governance 
structures” for the purposes of this study.  See McKinley (1952), pp. 411-479 and Bessey (1963), p. 65. 
 
88
 The formal name of this report, if it had one, is not given by McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), or 
Norwood (c.1981).  It has not been determined as of this writing. 
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News of the Department‟s position leaked and aroused immediate regional 
opposition, especially from river navigation interests.  The Fish and Wildlife Service, 
the Office of Indian Affairs, and the National Park Service asked the Department to 
release the full coordination committee report in order to get the committee‟s detailed 
assembly of facts and analysis in front of the public.  They wanted to preclude 
regional condemnation before the facts of the conservation and tribal issues could be 
made known.  Instead, the Department referred the report to the interdepartmental 
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee
89
 for resolution, only later releasing the full 
report to the public (McKinley, 1952). 
The CBIAC held hearings in Walla Walla, Washington, in June of 1947.  
Hydropower, irrigation, inland-navigation, and urban development advocates testified 
in strong opposition to the Interior position, especially the proposed ten-year delay in 
further dam construction in the interests of fish impact studies.  They questioned the 
evidence as to whether the dams would do the harm that opponents argued, and, 
regardless, hatcheries could make up any losses in fish numbers.  Fishery advocates 
testified in favor of the moratorium, arguing the economic value of the salmon fishery 
to the region would be lost to regional electrical needs.  They predicted extinction of 
the salmon and ruination of one of the richest fisheries in the nation (Robbins, 2004).   
Of interest to this study is the fact that these two generalized arguments, made 
by a numerous pro-dam and anti-dam organizations and individuals, shared the world-
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 The CBIAC is discussed in greater detail below. 
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view of natural resources as market commodities.  The argument was essentially over 
which resource should take precedence in the name of economic development.   
Testifying from an entirely different perspective was Tommy Thompson of the 
Wyam Indian band, who said “I don‟t know how I would live if you put up a dam 
which will flood my fishing places” (Robbins, 2004, p. 62).  Although speaking 
specifically about the fish as his only dependable food source, the context of 
Thompson‟s comments spoke to the profound place salmon occupied in tribal society. 
The CBIAC did not support the recommendation for a moratorium.  Tellingly, 
the two Interior Department members of the CBIAC (BPA and Reclamation) did not 
support their department‟s position in discussions within the CBIAC despite the 
supposed agreement reached by Interior agencies within the Coordination Committee 
(McKinley, 1952).  The CBIAC did, however, recommend protection of all fishery 
interests below The Dalles.  The CBIAC forwarded its recommendation to the Federal 
Inter-Agency River Basins Committee, which provided its support in 1947 (Robbins, 
2004).  
Scheufele (c.1970) described the salmon issue as among the most contentious 
faced by the CBIAC.  Although it did not affect the debate over governance systems 
following the end of World War II, the fish issue did result in the formation of the 
Committee on Fish Operations to focus on the design of facilities to improve fish 
passage at the dams.  The overall frustration of fishery interests and continued declines 
of Columbia salmon continued to mount.  Although dissatisfied with the way the 
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CBIAC addressed fishery issues, fishery interests had no choice but to wait until an 
opportunity to establish a more sympathetic governance system presented itself.  
The Memorial Day Flood of 1949. 
With the salmon debate seemingly settled, at least in the mind of the Corps of 
Engineers, the Corps completed its draft report in October 1948.  The Corps made 
substantial revisions in the months just prior completing its final report due to 
devastating flooding that occurred in late May and early June 1949.  The so-called 
Memorial Day Flood destroyed the city of Vanport, located on the lower Columbia 
River between Portland and Vancouver, Washington, along with other communities 
along the lower Columbia.  The impact of the flood on the Corps report was to induce 
a new basis for economic justification of flood protection and a completely revamped 
plan for flood control.  The report called for immediate Congressional authorization 
for an integrated system of seven storage dams,
90
 a levee construction and renovation 
program, and navigation improvements up into Idaho.  It addressed some of the issues 
raised by the Fish and Wildlife Service.  For example, it called for salmon passage 
improvements at new dams below Grand Coulee and fish restoration efforts in the 
lower Columbia tributaries.  It also called for irrigation and sub-basin development in 
the lower Columbia and new transmission lines.  The lower Snake River dams and the 
dam at The Dalles remained over the objections of the tribes and fishery interests.  The 
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 These dams were to be located at Libby, Albeni Falls, Priest Rapids, Hells Canyon, John Day, The 
Dalles, and at Glacier View in Glacier National Park.  With the exception of Glacier View, which was 
dropped due to objections from the National Park Service, all of these dams were eventually completed 
although the Priest Rapids and Hells Canyon projects were built by public utility and private utility 
interests respectively.  See McKinley, 1952, pp. 636 – 643. 
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estimated cost for the full program was $3 billion (McKinley, 1952).  The flood thus 
effectively washed away, along with the city of Vanport, any hopes by opponents for a 
construction moratorium on the proposed projects. 
Continued system development.    
Concurrent with the Corps‟s flood study was the Bureau of Reclamation‟s 
Report on the Columbia River Power System, completed in 1947.
91
  At the height of 
the 1948 flooding, before the Corps report was finished, the President requested the 
Department of Interior to review and comment on existing long-range plans for the 
Columbia in light of the flooding.  Presumably, this meant review of the pending 
Corps‟s revision to the 308 Report and the Bureau‟s report, although McKinley (1952) 
does not specifically state this.  The regional field offices of the Corps and 
Reclamation entered into discussions to “harmonize the two separate comprehensive 
reports for the river system” (McKinley, 1952, p. 638).  They reached agreement in 
early December a few days before DOI formally released its report, causing some 
consternation within Interior as the offices had entered into negotiations before the 
Department had agreed on a position (McKinley, 1952).  Subsequent “harmonization” 
discussions took place at the Washington DC level resulting in a joint letter signed by 
the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the Corps of 
Engineers, and the Commission of the Bureau of Reclamation on April 11, 1949.  The 
agreement included provisions on policy, project features, construction 
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 Ogden (1949) reported that the Bureau of Reclamation completed a comprehensive study in 1947 
(see p. 425) as did Bessey (1963).  McKinley (1952) did not give a date, ambiguously stating only that 
the report was “recently prepared and about to be published” (p. 436) when speaking of events 
occurring around 1947 and 1948.  
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responsibilities, and construction scheduling.  The Northwest now had a revised, 
comprehensive planning document addressing the areas noted above plus watershed 
protection, soil conservation, water supply, recreation, and pollution.  It did not, 
however, resolve the tribal treaty issues or fully address salmon conservation needs 
(McKinley, 1952).  Regional commercial development needs of electricity, navigation, 
irrigation, and flood protection had sidelined tribal and salmon fishery issues.  
In accordance with the agreed to plan, The Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
Reclamation built major dams on the mainstems and /or tributaries of the Columbia, 
Willamette, Yakima and Snake River Basins.  Joining Bonneville and Grand Coulee 
Dams on the Columbia main stem were McNary Dam (in service 1952),
92
 Albeni Falls 
(1955), The Dalles (1957), Chief Joseph (1958), and John Day (1971).  The Flathead 
and Kootenai and Flathead tributaries to the upper Columbia saw completion of 
Hungry Horse (1953) and Libby (1975) respectively.  Dams built on Willamette
93,94
  
tributaries were Big Cliff, Detroit, and Lookout Point (1953); Dexter (1954), Green 
Springs (1960), Hills Creek (1962), Cougar (1963), and Foster and Green Peter 
(1967).  Chandler and Roza Dams came in service on the Yakima in 1956 and 1958, 
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 McNary dam completion was delayed by the DOI – Corps negotiations over the two plans 
(McKinley, 1952).   
 
93
 Whether the Willamette projects are actually a formal part of the FCRPS is a point of some 
confusion.  For purposes of the ongoing salmon litigation, the federal government has tended to not 
count them as they are outside of the “action area” as defined by the action agencies and evaluated by 
NMFS in their biological opinions.  The same is true for projects in the Yakima and Snake River above 
Hells Canyon.  However, the dams on all of these tributaries are included in the joint BPA-Corps-
Reclamation brochure (2003) entitled the Federal Columbia River Power System.  Consequently, they 
are included here.   
 
94
 No federal dams were constructed on the mainstem of the Willamette River. 
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respectively.  In the Snake Basin, Anderson Ranch (1950) and Palisades (1958) were 
completed in the upper tributaries and Ice Harbor (1962), Lower Monumental (1969), 
Little Goose (1970), and Lower Granite (1975).  Dworshak Dam, on the Clearwater 
River tributary to the lower Snake, came into service in 1973 (FCRPS, 2003).
95
  Lost 
Creek on the Willamette was soon to follow, coming into service in 1977.  Twenty-six 
major dams were completed for hydropower, navigation, flood control, and other 
purposes over twenty-five years.  These, plus the five completed prior to 1946, 
brought the FCRPS to 31 projects ultimately leading to a total federal hydropower 
generating capacity of over 22,000 megawatts.  All were constructed, operated, and 
maintained by either the Corps or Bureau, with BPA marketing the electricity 
generated (FCRPS, 2003).  With the exception of Grand Coulee Dam, The Corps and 
Bureau included fish passage facilities at all federal projects on the Columbia River 
mainstem and lower Snake River (Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004). 
  
Resulting Governance Systems  
The abolishment of the national central planning committee and PNWRPC in 
1943 and the weakness of the Bonneville Advisory Board at War end highlighted the 
need for continued coordination and collaboration on Columbia development issues.  
The states, reacting to the loss of the PNWRPC and the Flathead Lake controversy, 
implemented the Northwest States Development Association in 1943.  This state-only 
effort collapsed in early 1944.   
                                                 
95
 All dates shown are the dates the projects came on line for hydroelectricity generation.  These may 
vary from the dates of construction or when other purposes became available.   
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The vacuum in Basin governance highlighted in others the need for a more 
robust governance entity.  In 1945, new bills were introduced in the Senate and House 
to resurrect and establish some form of Columbia valley authority.  These bills failed, 
but in response to them and in recognition of the need for more effective planning and 
operational coordination, the regional federal agencies recommended establishment of 
the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee in 1946.  The CBIAC was formed as a 
subcommittee of the national FIARBC.  The CBIAC assumed the functions of both 
the PNWRPC and the now replaced Bonneville Advisory Board (McKinley, 1952; 
Scheufele, c.1970).   
Continued concerns over the voluntary nature of CBIAC participation and the 
lack of a decision making structure to overcome agency differences resulted in other 
governance systems being proposed.  There were several revised efforts between 1947 
and 1949 to establish some form of valley authority for the Columbia.  These efforts 
failed due to a general nationwide collapse in support for powerful centralized 
government entities in general, loss of public and political support for valley 
authorities in particular (Goodwin, 1983), and lackluster support from the Truman 
administration (DeLuna, 1997).  The Northwest states made another effort to establish 
a state-led system by initiating negotiations for a Columbia River Basin Interstate 
Compact in 1949.  This state effort was also inspired in part by the resurrection of the 
valley authority idea and in part by the desire of the states to play a significant if not 
dominant role in regional development (Bessey, 1963).  While these negotiations were 
underway, the states established a Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy 
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Committee in 1953.  This committee, ostensibly created within the framework of the 
CBIAC for purposes of coordinating regional implementation of the Eisenhower‟s 
partnership policy, was in reality an attempt by the states to assert a more influential 
voice in regional development.  When the partnership policy ended so too did this 
committee.    
Events surrounding the end of the War inspired these governance proposals.  
Evolutionary changes within existing systems led to two other governance systems 
being enacted that were not directly due to events occurring around the time of the 
War‟s conclusion.  Both were evolutionary improvements among existing systems.  
One of these was the Committee on Fish Operations established in the 1960s in 
response to growing agency concerns over the impact of the dams on regional salmon 
runs.  The other was the result of a proposal from the Truman administration‟s Water 
Policy Commission to abolish the voluntary inter-agency committees and replace them 
with congressionally authorized and statutorily supported river basin commissions.  
Congress responded with the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 authorizing the 
recommended commissions.  The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission was 
established in 1967 to replace the CBIAC.  The states and federal CBIAC members 
strongly supported the PNWRBC as a significant improvement over the CBIAC. 
Further discussion of each of these eleven systems follows.    
The Northwest States Development Association. 
Following the dissolution of the national planning board and the PNWRPC in 
July of 1943, five of the Pacific Northwest governors agreed to establish the 
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Northwest States Development Association.  Complaints by Montana over the 
Bonneville Advisory Board‟s failure to consult with the state in its proposal to raise 
Flathead Lake water levels prompted them to do so.  The loss of the central role held 
upon the PNWRPC‟s termination also motivated the governors.  The Association‟s 
purpose was to coordinate and correlate the plans of member states with regard to 
interstate developmental issues.
 
 Its priorities were development of irrigation, power, 
and flood control.  The group produced one report on Basin development in December 
1943, and then became inactive.  It disappeared shortly thereafter due to conflicts over 
state interests and priorities, changes in governors, and a general lack of public and 
political interest (Bessey, 1960; Scheufele, c.1970).
 
    
Columbia Valley Authority: redux I. 
The shortcomings of the Bonneville Advisory Board‟s cooperative structure, 
including its lack of a decision-making mechanism and inability to manage 
interagency rivalry became apparent once the war-related construction effort ended.  
These limitations, coupled with the lack of access by non-federal interests, led to a 
renewed effort to implement a Columbia Valley Authority (McKinley, 1952).  Senator 
Hugh Mitchell of Washington introduced a bill to that effect in 1945.  His proposal 
would transfer the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams and all future Basin 
development responsibilities to a new public corporation, managed under a three-
person board of directors and under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior.  It 
would also establish an advisory council of regional governors.  Although the CVA 
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was to conduct its operations in cooperation with other agencies, McKinley considered 
this limitation “hortatory, rather than legally enforceable” (McKinley, 1952, p. 551). 
That same year Congressman Walt Horan introduced a bill promoting a 
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority.  This proposal was a modification of the 
original valley authority idea.  It limited the authority‟s duties to planning, 
development, and management of a single resource – water.  Other than that, its 
structure and provisions were similar to Mitchell‟s Senate bill, to include the transfer 
of BPA to the new authority.  A significant difference was its provisions for a 
presidentially appointed corporate oversight board of which at least one member 
would be from one of the regional states as recommended by that state‟s governor.  
The proposal also called for an advisory council comprised of the state governors and 
supported by a staff-level commission that would review all proposals for water 
resource utilization.  Like Mitchell‟s bill in the Senate, Horan‟s bill went nowhere, 
especially in light of the Republican victories in 1946 (McKinley, 1952).    
The Grange,
96
 labor, and public power leaders seeking more integrated river 
management strongly supported the idea of a valley authority.  However, even these 
proponents disagreed with the centralized nature of Mitchell‟s proposal and demanded 
greater local involvement in decision-making.  The Grange, for example, opposed the 
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 The Grange was founded by Oliver Hudson Kelley.  A farmer himself, Kelley was appalled by the 
way carpetbaggers from the north were taking advantage of the plight of southern farmers in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.  Kelley joined with six others to form the Order of the Patrons of 
Husbandry, the National Grange on December 4, 1867.  The Grange‟s stated purpose was to unite 
private citizens in improving the economic and social position of the nation‟s farm population.  In the 
Northwest, it proved an instrumental voice in the development of the Columbia for irrigation and 
navigation purposes (Ogden, 1949; Gilliam, 1999). 
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apparent surrender of state water law to federal authority and proposed alternatives to 
Mitchell‟s provisions on irrigation and water rights (McKinley, 1952).  Mitchell 
submitted a second bill later in the year that contained “elaborate appointment 
requirements and advisory council review” provisions (Ogden, 1949, p. 358).  
Organized labor and farmers, the Washington governor, and public power advocates 
supported these provisions, but others felt them to be too awkward for efficient 
administration.  Opposition to the new CVA proposal appeared almost immediately, 
led by private power and reclamation associations such as the Northwest Development 
Association, an influential lobbying group formed in 1945 to promote private-federal 
agency partnerships and oppose CVA establishment.
97
  The CVA effort ultimately 
failed with the temporary loss of Democrat majorities in Congress and Mitchell‟s 
retirement in 1946 (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Scheufele, c.1970; Robbins, 
2004).    
The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee.   
The Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee charter allowed creation of 
regional “subcommittees.”  FIARBC established the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee as one such subcommittee in 1946 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; 
Scheufele, c.1970; DeLuna, 1997).  The CBIAC was the second regional 
subcommittee so established, the other being in the Missouri River Basin (McKinley, 
1952; Scheufele, c.1970).  The CBIAC came at the urging of the heads of the regional 
federal agency offices, based on the need for interagency cooperation after the 
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 Not to be confused with the by-then disbanded Northwest States Development Association, discussed 
earlier. 
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dissolution of the PNWRPC and in response to renewed proposals for establishment of 
a Columbia Valley Authority-like agency (Scheufele, c.1970; Ogden, 1997).   
FIARBC intended the CBIAC as a forum for regional field representatives of 
federal agencies to exchange information and effectively coordinate their activities.  
At the urging of BPA Administrator Raver, CBIAC federal membership was 
established as the same as the former Bonneville Advisory Board.  CBIAC members 
thus included the Commander of the Corps‟s North Pacific Division, the Northwest 
regional director of the Bureau of Reclamation, a representative from the Federal 
Power Commission, a special field representative from the Department of Agriculture, 
and the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration (Scheufele, c.1970).  
The Department of Commerce was added in 1947 (McKinley, 1952) as was the 
Department of Labor (Bessey, 1963).   
Of interest was that Interior representation was limited to the Department‟s two 
development-oriented agencies: BPA and the Bureau of Reclamation.  The 
conservation-oriented Fish and Wildlife Service, the preservationist-oriented National 
Park Service, and the tribal-oriented Office of Indian Affairs were not members and 
had to route their issues through the Departmental representative from the Bureau of 
Reclamation.  Passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act changed this in 1956, 
at which time the Fish and Wildlife Service became Interior‟s third CBIAC member 
(Ogden, 1997).    
The states were not included as members in the original resolution, but the 
governors of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Washington, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada 
 202 
 
were later invited to participate by jointly designating five representatives.  The intent 
for these representatives was to participate in regular meetings and advise the CBIAC 
on state interests.  The states never formally designated their five representatives.  
However, from the outset, as a practical matter once they began meeting, the CBIAC 
considered all seven state governors (or their designated representatives) as bonafide 
members allowed to cast votes along with the federal agency representatives.  Initially, 
all but Washington accepted the opportunity to formally participate.
98
  Despite this 
formal declination, once the CBIAC began to meet, Washington would participate in 
an “observer” status at each meeting.  It finally accepted formal membership in 1949 
(McKinley, 1952; Scheufele, c.1970).    
State contributions varied throughout the life of the CBIAC, however.  To 
some members, it appeared that the individual state representatives were more 
interested in protecting state and local interests than contributing to region-wide 
planning vision.  The status of the states with respect to the federal members and state 
interest in participating varied over time (Scheufele, c.1970).    
The CBIAC chair rotated on an annual basis among the federal members.  
Meetings were conducted at cities throughout the region in order to stay in touch with 
local concerns, with part of each meeting was open to the public.  There was no 
dedicated funding for supporting staff; the Chair‟s agency provided any needed staff 
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 According to McKinley (1952), the Washington governor‟s stated reason for declining was that 
Washington had a predominate interest in the Columbia Basin and should not be considered an equal 
with states of lesser interest.  McKinley (1952) opined that the real reason was suspicion on the part of 
Washington that the CBIAC was just a substitute for a CVA, to which the state was philosophically 
opposed. 
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support (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).
99
  The CBIAC 
established several technical committees and produced numerous technical studies in 
areas such as hydrologic data, power planning, stream flow, recreation, demographic 
trends, noxious weeds, and fisheries.
100
   
FIARBC intended their regional subcommittees to function as a coordination 
forum between the federal agencies and participating states (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 
1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  Bessey (1963) and Scheufele (c.1970) argued that the 
CBIAC performed the coordination function quite well and served admirably as a 
vehicle for keeping the Committee‟s members in touch with local regional needs and 
the public informed of Committee activities.  Oregon governor Mark Hatfield echoed 
this feeling, declaring at a 1959 meeting, “In my opinion, the Columbia Basin Inter-
Agency Committee has completely justified its existence under its present charter.  It 
has provided a forum for discussion and dissemination to the public of facts and group 
thinking on various basin problems...It has, through its subcommittees and task forces, 
developed much basic data of vital importance in planning activities” (Quoted in 
Bessey, 1963, p. 111).   
Nevertheless, the CBIAC was roundly criticized as well, mostly by valley 
authority proponents.  From the beginning, “will of its membership, always precarious 
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 McKinley (1952) claimed that this format did not work particularly well, arguing that “coordination 
in the usual administrative sense of the term cannot be effectively practiced in the atmosphere of a 
public hearing” (p. 471).  Bessey (1963) was more supportive, claiming that the public hearing aspect 
helped keep the region informed and the CBIAC in touch with local concerns.   
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 Many of these reports can be found online through a web search  for “Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee.” 
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and by the laws, policies, and practices of member agencies” (Scheufele, c.1970, p. 1) 
could limit movement on any issue.  The CBIAC was thus “notoriously silent on many 
controversial issues, partly because one Federal [sic] agency hesitates to criticize 
publicly the views and determinations of another such agency and partly because the 
state and federal members are reluctant to take positions on which there is not 
unanimity” (Mark Hatfield, as quoted by Bessey, 1963, p. 111).  Hatfield‟s ultimate 
point was the need for one, single comprehensive plan for water resource development 
and utilization that all of the basin‟s entities would use to guide their respective 
projects and programs.  Such unified agreement apparently eluded the CBIAC even 
after the Corps-Reclamation 1949 report was completed.  Portland‟s Oregonian 
editorially criticized the CBIAC as a “paper tiger” that was unable to arrive at a 
comprehensive plan as long as it could not make decisions to resolve interagency 
disagreements (Bessey, 1963, p. 111).  Others criticized the CBIAC‟s cooperative 
structure to call for its replacement by “a single agency not charged with the primary 
responsibility of any one use of water” (Bessey, 1963, p. 112) – in effect, a valley 
authority.   
In his 1952 argument for a Columbia Valley Authority, McKinley cites the 
failure of the CBIAC to adopt the Interior proposal regarding the dam construction 
moratorium in 1946 as an example of the failure of the CBIAC process.
101
  McKinley 
also notes “sharp conflict” (McKinley, 1952, p. 110) between the development-
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 It‟s not clear if McKinley (1952) was critiquing the process in general or the outcome of this 
particular decision.     
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oriented CBIAC and conservation-oriented Fish and Wildlife Service (and presumably 
the Office of Indian Affairs) as well among CBIAC members in general.  For 
example, the CBIAC was unable to resolve a conflict between BPA and the Bureau of 
Reclamation when the former wanted to extend its transmission system into southern 
Idaho in 1946 (McKinley, 1952).
102
  Neither the CBIAC nor its parent FIARBC had 
an authoritative decision mechanism to resolve such differences (McKinley, 1952).  
Scheufele (c.1970) was more forgiving, noting that the harshest critics tended to base 
their criticism on what they thought the CBIAC ought to do, rather than evaluating it 
against the reasons for which it was actually established.  When assessed from the 
perspective of its originating resolution, Scheufele (c.1970) declared the CBIAC 
remarkably successful.   
Despite its weaknesses, the CBIAC functioned for a little over twenty years.  
During that time, it was the only intergovernmental regional entity active in resource 
planning and development (Bessey, 1963).  It held its last meeting in 1967 at which 
point it amiably transferred its responsibilities to the Pacific Northwest River Basins 
Commission (Scheufele, c.1970).
103
   
Columbia River Basin Interstate Compact. 
In 1949, regional governors asked the governor of Washington to lead an effort 
to establish an interstate compact for Pacific Northwest states.  Each interested state 
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 See McKinley, 1952, pp. 210-224 for further discussion of the southern Idaho issue. 
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 Norwood (c.1981) stated that the last meeting occurred in 1966.  Ogden (1997) agreed with 
Scheufele (c. 1970) that the date of the last CBIAC meeting was in 1967.  As Scheufele (c.1970) based 
his report upon review of CBIAC records, it is his 1967 date that  is used here.   
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was to name a delegate to participate in a commission to negotiate an interstate 
compact.  Delegates from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming met in 
1950.  Utah and Nevada would later join for the first formal meeting of the Columbia 
Interstate Compact Commission in 1952 (Bessey, 1963). 
This was the second state effort (after the Northwest States Development 
Association) intended to carve out a larger regional planning role for the states 
(Bessey, 1963) and to provide a forum for resolving upper and lower Columbia Basin 
water allocation issues (National Research Council, 2004).  Myriad other motives 
energized promoters both for and against the effort in the region (Bessey, 1963).  The 
governors opposed establishment of a federal-centric valley authority, although 
opinions on this point varied sharply among their respective state officials and 
legislatures (Bessey, 1963).  Much of the compact negotiations focused on public-
private hydropower issues with arguments among the states with a history of private 
power development and those with a history of public power (National Research 
Council, 2004).  Ogden (1997) says that negotiations collapsed in the late 1950s due to 
opposition by public power advocates and the state of Washington, who came to see 
the effort as an attack on the federal hydropower system.  Bessey (1963) noted the 
effort as still alive though unresolved at the time of his writing.  The National 
Research Council (2004) says negotiations continued up to 1968, at which point the 
state compact commissioners finally signed a Columbia River Basin Compact.  
Congress approved the Compact the same year.  The effort collapsed, however, when 
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the legislatures of Washington and Oregon refused to ratify it (National Research 
Council, 2004).    
Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy Committee. 
  The third state effort at regaining a central role in development planning came 
in 1953.  President Eisenhower‟s partnership program anticipated replacing reliance 
on the federal bureaucracy for natural resource planning and management with joint 
venture type arrangements among federal agencies, state and local governments, and 
private interests (Scheufele, c.1970).  In response, the Northwest governors proposed 
at the September CBIAC meeting that a subcommittee be formed to implement this 
new policy direction.  At least one governor saw this subcommittee as an interim 
measure pending ratification of the Columbia River interstate compact then under 
negotiation among the states.  Federal members saw it as a veiled attempt to wrest 
control over regional resources - especially the hydrosystem - away from the federal 
agencies and transfer it to state or private entities.  In time, this committee all but took 
over the role of the full CBIAC, operating as an independent group led by the 
governors.  As a result, participation in CBIAC meetings dwindled to just about the 
point of collapse (Scheufele, c.1970). 
 The Governors‟ group produced seven technical reports before disbanding by 
mutual consent in 1958.  The group suffered from the same interstate conflicts that had 
doomed the Northwest States Development Association.  It did not help that the 
administration‟s “partnership” policy was poorly defined, never well received 
politically, and enjoyed little support from the administration especially in the latter 
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half of Eisenhower‟s second term.  The partnership policy died around 1958 taking the 
Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Policy Committee with it.  With the demise of 
the governors‟ committee, members renewed their participation in the CBIAC 
(Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981).   
 Columbia Valley Authority: redux II.  
The Columbia Valley Authority idea was resurrected in three variants between 
1947 and 1949.  The first, introduced in the House 1947 and entitled the Columbia 
Interstate Commission, was essentially a resubmitted version of Horan‟s 1945 
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority.  It envisioned a public corporation similar to 
the CVA but with its jurisdiction limited to water resources and hydroelectricity.  The 
second was a reintroduction the CVA along the lines of the revised 1945 Mitchell bill 
submitted to the Senate in 1947 and House in 1948.  The third was a proposal for a 
Columbia Valley Administration, backed by the administration to the degree that it 
eventually completely eclipsed discussion of the other proposals (McKinley, 1952).   
The election of 1946 “retired” a number of New Deal congressional 
representatives and senators, including many in the pro-public power state of 
Washington.  In their place were elected Republicans that were more conservative.  As 
a result, the “political stock of the CVA movement took a drastic tumble” (McKinley, 
1952, pp. 561-562).  The banner of CVA leadership thus passed from the now-retired 
Senator Mitchell of Washington to Congressman Walt Horan of Washington and 
Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho.   
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In 1947, Horan revised his 1945 Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority 
proposal in deference to the pro-business sympathies of the Republicans.  He 
introduced a House bill calling for establishment of a Columbia Interstate 
Commission.  This agency would be the same as contemplated in his earlier bill but 
limited water resource development to only those activities not suitable for private 
development and restricted transmission and sale of electrical energy to wholesale 
markets only (McKinley, 1952).  It too failed.     
Taylor of Idaho introduced his Columbia Valley Authority bill to the Senate 
later in 1947.  It retained the major components of the second 1945 Mitchell bill.  A 
significant modification was a joint federal-state-private interest advisory structure to 
review unified plans and major policy proposals and advise as to which programs were 
suitable for private development.  “Though there was little serious hope” that the 80th 
Congress would pass this bill, it served “to keep the [CVA] idea alive in the region” 
pending the return of a more supportive political environment (McKinley, 1952, p. 
564).     
The surprise reelection of the Truman administration in 1948 brought new 
hope to Columbia Valley Authority proponents (DeLuna, 1997).  Congressman Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson took the opportunity rendered by the election results to reintroduce 
the second Mitchell CVA bill in the House in 1948, supporting Taylor‟s effort in the 
Senate the year before.  President Truman sent a special message to Congress in April 
1949 in support, urging establishment of a CVA (McKinley, 1952).   
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Shortly thereafter, the administration established a team under one of the 
president‟s personal aides to create a legislative plan for the Columbia.  Senator 
Warren Magnuson of Washington introduced the resulting bill in April 1949.  Debate 
over this bill took “center stage” in the valley authority discussions, essentially 
sidelining the previous Jackson and Taylor proposals (McKinley, 1952).    
The newly proposed agency was entitled the Columbia Valley Administration 
(CVAd).  Like the Horan proposals, it limited operating responsibilities to water 
resources, power generation, and power transmission.  Unlike other CVA proposals, it 
would not transfer land management functions of the Department of Agriculture or the 
lands, minerals, and wildlife functions of the Department of Interior unless Congress 
otherwise appropriated funds especially for that purpose.  In effect, the CVAd would 
take over the regional water resource responsibilities of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
BPA, and the Corps of Engineers, eliminating the first two from the Pacific Northwest 
and limiting the Corps civil functions to the coastal tributaries and operation of the 
Columbia navigation system (McKinley, 1952).     
 As originally proposed, the CVAd would be a government corporation with a 
general manager appointed by a board of directors.  This board was to be comprised of 
the regional agency leaders and the governors of the Northwest states.  The board was 
to develop unified plans and programs for the President to submit for approval to 
Congress.  Proponents within the Administration claimed that this granted no new 
authorities to the federal government, just “relocated” the decision-making power 
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from old agencies to this new entity that was answerable to a board with substantial 
regional representation (McKinley, 1952; DeLuna, 1997). 
 In addition to the New Dealers, supporters included the state agency staff and 
most legislators from Washington and Oregon, farmers, public utilities, and the 
Department of the Interior.  Opponents saw this as a thinly disguised version of the 
CVA.  In contrast to their agency staffs, the governors of Oregon and Washington 
opposed the measure, as did governors from Utah, Idaho, and Nevada.  Their reasons 
were the same as their opposition to the CVA – relinquishment of local control over 
natural resources, especially water, to a central federal decision-maker.  Additional 
opponents included the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, private power 
advocates, and many local towns and jurisdictions.  The Department of Agriculture 
voiced neutrality (DeLuna, 1997).   
The CVAd represented the final attempt by New Dealers to impose a stronger 
decision-making system over Northwest resource development.  Its purpose was to 
serve as a balance between the decision-by-consensus model of the CBIAC and the 
authoritative CVA.  It failed due to tepid support from the Truman administration 
coupled with strong opposition from federal agencies and regional governors.  Its 
demise effectively ended serious efforts to establish a central federal authority to 
oversee federal natural resource programs in the Northwest (DeLuna, 1997). 
 Committee on Fish Operations. 
The Committee on Fish Operations was established in the 1960s to find ways 
to operate the FCRPS in order to address the impact of the system on fish and 
 212 
 
wildlife.
104
  COFO consisted of state fish and wildlife managers and federal operators 
and regulators.  It apparently evolved into a committee of apparently narrower focus 
entitled the Water Budget Implementation Work Group under some association with 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council soon after passage of the 1980 Power 
Act (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996).  COFO coexisted 
alongside the CBIAC and the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission.  It is not 
clear at the time of this writing if COFO was a component of one or the other or 
established independently of these other two systems. 
 Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission. 
In 1950, the presidentially appointed Water Resources Policy Commission 
issued a report on water resources development.  Although the commission believed 
that empowering a single federal agency to oversee water development was the 
preferred alternative, it realized after the defeat of the administration‟s CVAd effort 
that Congress would not support such an approach.  Instead, they proposed that 
FIARBC‟s regional subcommittees be reconstituted as congressionally created 
“commissions.”  The commissions were to consist of the federal agencies involved in 
the given river basin.  The President would appoint an independent chairman 
answerable only to him.  A board of review established within the executive branch 
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 The only reference to COFO found in the course of this study was a brief mention in the Mainstem 
Operations Work Group Revised Draft dated 1996 and found on the Northwest Power and Planning 
Council‟s website.  It is not clear whether COFO was established as a committee under the CBIAC 
(Scheufele, c.1970, does not mention it).  It does not appear in any of the other sources reviewed for this 
study.  Its exact dates of origin and termination and its exact membership were not identified.  It is also 
not clear if its “fish and wildlife managers” membership included tribal representation or was limited to 
state and federal agencies.  There are several COFO participants still active in regional fish and 
hydropower issues, however.  Further information could likely be obtained through interviews with 
them. 
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would provide oversight.  States would be consulted but would not be formal 
commission members.  The board recommended changing the congressional 
authorization and appropriation‟s processes for each individual agency to be 
supportive of the commission concept.  Unresolved was the issue of whether 
commission chairs would be empowered to authoritatively resolve agency disputes 
(DeLuna, 1997).   
Congress acted on this proposal through passage of the Water Resources 
Planning Act in 1965.
105
  The Act established a Water Resources Council to be 
comprised of cabinet level representatives from the Departments of Interior, Army, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and the 
Federal Power Commission (later the Department of Energy).  It further authorized 
establishment of river basin commissions upon recommendation from a state governor 
or from the Council.  In a major departure from the inter-agency committees, it also 
authorized federal funding for regional basin commission staff, supplies, and office 
space (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965; Ogden, 1997). 
Executive Order 11331 subsequently established the Pacific Northwest River 
Basins Commission on March 6, 1967 (National Archives, undated).  Consistent with 
the recommendation of the 1950 commission report, the PNWRBC chair was a federal 
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 The circumstances surrounding passage of this Act in 1965 could arguably serve as another critical 
situation in governance paradigms for this paper.  However, the lack of published secondary 
information and analysis regarding the formulation of this act and the resulting river basin commissions 
made such a division hard to define.  Additionally, in practice, the PNWRBC does not seem to present a 
significant departure from the purpose and function of the CBIAC.  Its formation was supported by 
most if not all CBIAC participants and its membership was identical to that of the CBIAC (Bessey, 
1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  Consequently, for the purposes of this study, its passage is considered an 
evolutionary improvement to the CBIAC rather than a forced change under a critical situation. 
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appointee.  Federal members included the Corps of Engineers; Department of 
Agriculture agencies Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, and Economic 
Research Service; Department of Interior agencies Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of 
Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries,
106
 and Water Pollution 
Control Administration; the Federal Power Commission; the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development; and the Bonneville Power Administration acting as a 
separate agency (Ogden, 1997).  Later, some agencies were replaced due to 
reorganizations and other, newly created, agencies added.  The Department of Energy 
replaced the Federal Power Commission.  The Department of Commerce absorbed the 
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and reorganized it to the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, which in turn joined the Commission.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
joined upon its establishment under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(Ogden, 1997).   
In contrast to the 1950 recommendation, there were no adjustments made to 
congressional authorizations or appropriations.  Established congressional authorizing 
and appropriating committees would continue to oversee the agencies charged with 
implementing the statutes under committee jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the 1965 Act 
specifically retained each agency‟s decision-making prerogatives.  Participants were to 
make a “reasonable endeavor” (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965, section 203 (d)) 
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 Weber (2002) stated that the bureaus of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife and Commercial Fisheries 
were created in 1956 as subordinate bureaus of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  Clarke and McCool 
(1996) stated that they functioned more as independent entities.  The fact that Ogden (1997) identified 
them separately implies they acted in their own right with regard to PNWRBC business. 
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to reach consensus, and, failing consensus, dissenting views were to be included in 
Commission reports (Water Resources Planning Act, 1965).   
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and Nevada were eligible to 
send representatives although, in practice, Nevada was not an active participant.  The 
states could choose the Commission‟s vice-chair from among their representatives 
(Ogden, 1997).  The PNWRBC was authorized its own staff, funded under Water 
Resources Council appropriations.  It had responsibility for comprehensive planning 
for water and related land resources planning.  During its time, it completed a 
comprehensive report on the Columbia River Basin and several studies on individual 
subbasins (Ogden, 1997).  Similar to the CBIAC, it produced numerous technical 
reports covering fish, power, nuclear energy development, the Columbia River 
estuary, and water requirements, among others.
 107
    
There was no indication in the material reviewed for this study as to who 
supported or opposed the river basins commission concept.  Apparently, no one has 
yet written general history of the 1965 Water Resources Planning Act or the 
PNWRBC.  Regardless, on September 30, 1981 President Ronald Reagan terminated 
the PNWRBC by Executive Order 12319.  Congress never repealed the statutory 
authorization, however and, theoretically, the President could reestablish the 
commissions by executive order (Ogden, 1997; National Archives, undated).   
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 These topics were derived from the titles of multiple reports, published under the name of the 
PNWRBC or its committees, obtained through a web search for material related to the PNWRBC. 
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Chapter Summary 
The events surrounding the end of World War II and their impact on regional 
governance can be summarized as follows:   
 The return of economic prosperity following the end of World War II 
resulted in a lessening of support for large governmental bureaucracies and 
a return of confidence in private markets.  As a result, the National 
Resources Planning Board lost its congressional funding and the Pacific 
Northwest Regional Planning Commission and associated state planning 
commissions were disbanded (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Goodwin, 
1983). 
 Eleven proposals to establish governance systems were made to replace the 
PNWRPC and address the weaknesses of the Bonneville Advisory Board.  
Five were enacted, of which three lasted for any length of time.  Those 
three were the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (1946 – 1967), its 
successor the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967-1981), 
and the Committee of Fish Operations (1960s – early 1980s) (McKinley, 
1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; DeLuna, 1997; 
Ogden, 1997).  
 Northwest states made three efforts to reestablish the central role they lost 
with the demise of the PNWRPC.  Two (the Northwest States 
Development Association and the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power 
Policy Committee) were enacted but short lived.  State legislatures did not 
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ratify the third, an initiative to establish an interstate compact even though 
agreed to by the governors and supported by Congress.  These efforts 
succumbed to interstate rivalries, lack of funding, and diminished public 
and political interest (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1981; 
DeLuna, 1997; Ogden, 1997).   
 Congressional proponents of a Columbia Valley Authority renewed their 
efforts in 1945 and 1947.  The surprise reelection of Harry Truman in 1948 
reenergized them, leading a series of valley authority bills up through 1949.  
All failed to pass as public and political support for the valley authority 
idea dwindled ((McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Goodwin, 1983; Ogden, 
1997; DeLuna, 1997). 
 In the Northwest, the Bonneville Power Administration developed as a 
major regional institutional actor under the leadership of Administrator 
Paul Raver.  Raver‟s aggressive promotion of close collaboration with 
regional utilities, fellow federal agencies, and the regional congressional 
delegation strengthened the agency‟s position in the region and established 
a tradition within BPA that exists to this day (Norwood, c.1981, Blumm, 
1982; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008).   
 Opposition to planned construction of mainstem dams by commercial, 
sport, and tribal fishery interests appeared in the mid 1940s, represented by 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Office of Indian Affairs.  Efforts to 
impose a moratorium on dam construction pending more research on the 
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effects of the dams on fish failed (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; 
Scheufele, c.1970; Norwood, c.1981; Robbins, 1997). 
Although the Northwest salmon issue made its way onto the governance 
agenda beginning in the mid 1940s, the efforts of the governance systems in place – 
comprised almost exclusively of development-oriented agencies – failed to satisfy the 
concerns of fishery managers.  However, pressure for change was building.  A tribal 
sovereignty movement emerged in the 1950s to restore tribal culture and promote 
tribal interests.  Backed by major court victories in the 1970s, the tribes sought to 
obtain a greater voice in regional decision-making.  In addition to the emergence of 
the tribes as regional actors, the nascent American environmental movement was 
gaining traction beginning in the 1960s.  Environmentalists voiced concerns about the 
impact of development on Northwest resources but, like the tribes, could not find 
traction in the region‟s governance systems.   
The development-oriented institutions controlling Basin policy decisions 
continued to see management of Columbia Basin issues through the lens of 
commercial benefit.  The agencies perceived the governance challenge to be a 
balancing of federal agency prerogatives with the interests of the states and non-
governmental trade associations dependent upon the system‟s commercial uses of 
navigation, power, irrigation, water supply, recreation, land, timber, and fish harvest.  
The competing interests of a relatively limited set of participants all of whom shared 
the same general commercial market-oriented worldview thus effectively guided 
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governance decisions.  As of 1976, tribal members and environmentalists holding 
different worldviews had not yet obtained a seat at the regional governance table.   
The opportunity for them to do so came with the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis 
of the 1970s.  A mixture of miscalculations and overconfidence by energy planners led 
to a major financial crisis in the 1970s and presented the region with its third critical 
situation.  It resulted in a governance system that offered those holding worldviews 
based on tribal culture and environmental values their first foothold in regional 
decision making.    
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CHAPTER 6 
THE HYDRO-THERMAL CRISIS (1976) 
  
Introduction 
The region‟s hydro-thermal crisis, symbolized by the notice of insufficiency 
issued by the Bonneville Power Administration in 1976, provided the catalyst for the 
Basin‟s third major change between governance models.  The resulting Pacific 
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 (Power Act) created 
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (NPPC or 
Council) that shifted the locus of Basin developmental decision-making away from the 
federal cooperation model back to a state-centric model.  The pressure for change this 
had been building over the previous thirty years.   
Several national trends set the social and political context for events in the 
Northwest.  A tribal sovereignty movement began in the 1950s in response to a new 
national policy to terminate Indian treaties, end the tribal trust relationship with the 
federal government, and assimilate Indian people into mainstream American culture.  
This movement resulted in improvements in tribal capacity for self-government, a 
renewed confidence in asserting their rights, and a partial return to traditional tribal 
culture and beliefs (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).  In addition to the tribal movement 
was the American environmental movement.  Events such as publication of Rachel 
Carson‟s Silent Spring, the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire in Ohio, and the first Earth Day 
in 1970  propelled environmentalism into the national consciousness (Dunlap and 
Mertig, 1992a; Kline, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2005).  Finally, the election of Ronald 
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Reagan to the presidency in 1980 brought with it a philosophy of smaller government 
and an emphasis of the prerogatives of local government and private enterprise.   
Four regional developments converged with national trends and led to the 
governance provisions of the Power Act.  The first was the region‟s hydro-thermal 
program and resulting financial crisis provided the proximate cause for the Power 
Act‟s passage (Pope, 2008).  The second was the continuing decline in regional 
salmon runs.  The decline continued the opposition to the dams by fishery interests 
that began in the 1940s.  It also led to a coalition of commercial, sport, and tribal 
fishery managers with environmental activists.  Although operating from three 
dramatically different worldviews, the impact that dams were having on regional fish 
united them in opposition to existing management systems and structures 
(Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).  The third regional development was two major 
court victories won by regional tribes regarding their trust and treaty rights to fish 
(Wilkinson, 2005).  The fourth, related to the third, was the decision by the tribes of 
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, the Confederated 
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation,  the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakama Nation, and the Nez Perce tribe to unite in a coalition to promote tribal 
fishing rights and manage intertribal fisheries (CRITFC, 2010).   
Absent the the regional salmon decline, the common opposition to dams by 
environmentalists and regional fishery interests, and the growth in tribal influence, the 
1980 Power Act would likely have only addressed regional electric power issues in 
response to the hydro-thermal financial crisis.  Instead, it established a new 
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governance system oriented on resource conservation as well as power production and 
insisted that the Basin‟s fish and wildlife receive equal consideration with the region‟s 
electricity needs (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; Bodi, 1995).   
Coincident with the establishment of the Council was the disbanding of the 
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission, along with almost all of the other river 
basin commissions, by executive order in 1981.  The termination of the PNWRBC had 
more to do with the philosophical leanings of the Reagan administration than specific 
issues in the Northwest.  Its disestablishment and the apparent dissolution of the 
Committee on Fish Operations at around the same time left the state-led Council as the 
Basin‟s governance system for the next several years.  No other governance systems 
were proposed at this time. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the national social and political trends 
and the regional issues and events outlined above that led to the Council‟s creation.  It 
also describes the Power Act‟s provisions regarding the Council and the Council‟s 
organization and operation.   
 
Social and Political Context 
Two national trends that would come to effect regional governance included 
the rise of the tribal sovereignty movement and the rise of the American 
environmental movement.  In the case of the tribes, the renewed interest in traditional 
Indian culture meant a reestablishment of the tribal worldview toward resources.  The 
environmental movement generated a third worldview.  It provided a critique of the 
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dominant market-oriented capitalist system and called for greater stewardship of 
resources.  Each would prove influential in the writing of the 1980 Power Act.    
The rise of the tribal sovereignty movement and reestablishment of the Indian 
worldview. 
By the early 1900s tribal society had descended into what Wilkinson (2005) 
describes as an “abyss.”  The Bureau of Indian Affairs, assigned to manage federal 
trust and treaty obligations to the tribes, pressured tribes to abandon their traditional 
ways.  Unemployment far exceeded the national average.  A program to educate 
Indian children in white public schools began to systematically erase tribal culture and 
promote Indian integration into white society.  A traditional economy built on hunting, 
fishing, gathering, and gift giving was transformed through federal programs to one 
built on farming (Wilkinson, 2005).   
Despite treaties with the federal government, northwest state governments 
imposed restrictions on tribal fishing practices in the name of conservation.  The 
public generally supported the states‟ actions, believing that non-Indian sport and 
commercial fisheries were important to the economy.  There was also an underlying 
resentment felt toward the tribes holding “special privileges” (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 
151).   
However bad conditions were locally, policy at the national changed abruptly 
in the early 1930s in a direction interests that were more sensitive to tribal.  There 
were several reasons for this shift.  The Depression all but eliminated demands for 
further confiscation of Indian land due to the general lack of financing for 
 224 
 
development.  Additionally, publication of the Brookings Institution‟s influential 
Meriam Report in 1928 made the public aware of the abysmal conditions of life on 
tribal reservations through.  This study documented the “extreme poverty, devastating 
epidemics, inadequate food, and inadequate education” resulting from previous federal 
policy (Pevar, 2002, p. 10).   
Roosevelt responded by appointing a new Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
more sympathetic to the tribes.  At the new Commissioner‟s urging, Congress in 1934 
passed the Indian Reorganization Act designed to “rehabilitate the Indian‟s economic 
life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of 
oppression and paternalism” (Pevar, 2002, p. 10).  The Act prohibited further 
allotment of tribal land, encouraged tribal constitutions for purposes of self-
government, gave Indians preferential hiring within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and 
established a revolving credit fund to provide tribal loans (Pevar, 2002).  However 
welcome these changes may have been to reservation life, traditional tribal culture was 
barely on life support.  Missionary and government efforts to erase Indian culture 
coupled with the reservations‟ poor conditions took their toll, sapping confidence and 
hope.  In their weakened state, the tribes had little voice to challenge the extensive 
changes taking place within the Columbia Basin in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.    
Federal policy toward the nation‟s Indian tribes did two about-faces between 
1949 and the 1960s.  The compassionate attitude toward tribal culture reflected in the 
1934 Indian Reorganization Act was relatively short lived.  The Hoover Commission 
Report, issued in 1949, recommended the integration of Indians into white society, 
 225 
 
asserting once again that assimilation was in the best interests of tribal peoples.  It 
further argued that the federal government could save money by ending Indian 
programs.  When the Eisenhower administration came to power in 1953, federal 
policy took the Hoover recommendations to heart, changing official policy from 
promoting tribal self-government to the outright termination of the tribal trust 
relationship with the United States (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005). 
Termination meant ending the federal trust relationship along with federal 
benefits and support services.  It also meant dissolution of tribal governments and the 
closing of reservations.  For tribal governments so terminated, tribal land and property 
was to be distributed among tribal members or to a tribal corporation.  The states were 
to acquire full jurisdiction over terminated reservation land.  Between 1954 and 1966, 
Congress terminated 109 tribes, most of them in Oregon and California.  Public Law 
83-280 further extended state jurisdiction over reservations in Alaska, California, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin by subjecting reservation residents to 
state criminal law (Pevar, 2002).  Nationwide, “termination affected at least 1.3 
million acres and 11,000 people, diminishing tribal trust lands by 2.5 percent and 
cutting off federal services to 3 percent of all federally recognized Indians.”  As a 
result, “every terminated tribe floundered” (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 81). 
Whereas the 19
th
 century relocation from traditional homelands to reservations 
had been brutal, and the Indian Reorganization Act programs less successful than 
hoped for in relieving reservation misery, the termination policy meant cultural 
extinction.  Termination served as a tribal rallying cry, although the organizational 
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challenges were substantial.  Tribal society possessed little tradition in intertribal 
cooperation, and, in several cases, the federal government had deliberately collocated 
tribes with histories of conflict on the same reservation.  Wilkinson (2005) credits a 
handful of leaders and writers with providing the intellectual energy for the tribal 
sovereignty movement and inspiring others to regain long-promised rights.   
The Johnson administration supported the tribal efforts.  It shifted federal 
policy once again, repudiating the previous administration‟s termination policies.  The 
Nixon administration followed suit, with the president stating in 1970 that, “[t]his, 
then, must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people: to 
strengthen the Indian sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.”  
Congress subsequently promoted tribal sovereignty and autonomy through legislation 
and programs directed toward enhancing the capacity for tribal self-rule and economic 
development.  Examples include the prohibition to states from acquiring any new 
authorities over Indian reservations in 1968; development of the Indian Business 
Development Fund; and passage of the Indian Financing Act and Native American 
Programs Act to create and provide financing for commercial opportunities.  
Particularly important from the cultural perspective was the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, allowing tribes to administer health, law 
enforcement, education, and social service programs on the reservation (Pevar, 2002, 
quote from p. 12).  These efforts did not solve all tribal social problems, but they did 
begin to reverse previous efforts to eradicate the tribal worldview and provided a 
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tribally run social infrastructure within which traditional Indian culture could at least 
be partially reestablished.
108
   
The rise of the American environmental movement and worldview. 
The worldview of environmentalism has a seemingly paradoxical parentage, 
with deep roots in Western Judeo-Christian biblical teachings, Progressive 
Conservatism, and market capitalism (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Kline, 2000; 
Rosenbaum, 2005).  It emerged as a powerful critique of the market capitalist 
worldview in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Motivated by Euro American aesthetic 
values regarding natural beauty, the impacts of pollution on human health, and 
concerns over challenges to ecological stability that many came to think threatened the 
continued existence of the human race (Hays, 2000), environmentalists faced a 
monumental challenge in reversing the market worldview.  Thomas Dunlap (2004) 
captures the essence of this challenge.  Echoing – but not citing – Max Weber‟s 
(2002/1920) theory about the connection between religious belief and protestant-
market-capitalism Dunlap states,  
…defenders of the [market oriented] status quo gaze in rapture on the 
goodness of the market and the gross domestic product, which 
distributes benefits to all who strive – for they are the virtuous.  They 
look on the market as the Hand of God, endless economic growth as the 
path to the Earthly Paradise, and the conquest of nature, human destiny 
… Because society accepts these propositions as self-evident truths and 
rational descriptions of the universe, other views – ecological 
interdependence as the Hand of God, a sustainable economy as the path 
to the Earthly Paradise, and living as citizens of the biotic community 
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 The spiritual aspect of the traditional tribal worldview did not recover to pre-contact levels within 
Indian society.  Almost a century of white efforts to move Indian peoples away from their traditional 
beliefs had achieved many of its objectives.  Current tribal religious affiliations among reservation 
residents present a mix of various Christian denominations and traditional beliefs.    
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as human destiny – look like emotional arguments, unworthy of 
consideration (Dunlap, 2004, p. 165).     
 
It would take time for the concept of a “biotic community” to crystallize.  
Similar to Progressives‟ treatment of water, timber, and wildlife as independent 
entities, early environmental protection focused on protection of individual 
components of the environment, such as air, water, and soil.  It evolved to a belief in 
the interconnectedness among nature‟s components (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a; Hays, 
2000; Dunlap, 2004).  In this, it was similar to the tribal worldview with an important 
distinction.  Rosenbaum (2005) states that environmentalism “assumes that humanity 
is part of the created order, ethically responsible for the preservation of the world‟s 
ecological integrity” (p. 39).  Thus humankind, while part of the greater whole, is the 
senior partner within the whole.  It is in control of, capable of, and responsible for 
managing its actions to minimize negative impacts and making improvements as it 
can.  The tribal worldview, in a subtle but important contrast, held humans as integral 
and equal components within nature.  Although a vocal minority – termed “deep 
ecologists” (Rosenbaum, 2005) - adopted a view of man as an integral and equal 
member of the natural order, the mainstream environmental movement viewed 
humans as being above the rest of nature with a responsibility to minimize their 
impact on the environment and mitigate for damage already done.   
In 1962, Rachel Carson‟s Silent Spring put forward the dangers posed by 
modern technology on human health and welfare in clear, non-technical language.  
Inspired by Carson‟s book, environmental interest groups like the Sierra Club and 
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National Wildlife Federation initiated campaigns for public education and awareness.  
Highly publicized events such as the Cuyahoga River fire near Cleveland in 1969 
punctuated their message.  The upshot was that by Earth Day 1970 there was within 
the country a growing consensus that the concept of conserving resources for 
sustainable development alone was not enough.  A national view of environmentalism 
emerged which focused on the interrelationships and interdependencies between man 
and nature.  Environmentalism thus became the dominant natural resource policy 
paradigm (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992b).   
The mainstream leadership of organized environmentalism was concentrated in 
a small number of nationally recognized organizations.  Referred to by some as “The 
Group of Ten”109 (Rosenbaum, 2005; Mitchell, et al, 1992), this group represented 
some of the oldest and best-established lobbying organizations in America.  The three 
oldest date back to the Progressive Era and followed the preservationist philosophy of 
John Muir.  These were the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and the 
National Parks and Conservation Association founded in 1892, 1905, and 1919 
respectively.  Groups that are more recent include those formed during a widespread 
expansion in the number of interest groups that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Examples are the Environmental Defense fund established in 1967, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council in 1970, and the Environmental Policy Institute in 1972 
(Dunlap and Mertig, 1992b).   
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 The “Group of Ten” included the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, the National 
Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
National Parks and Conservation Association, the Izaak Walton League, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and the Environmental Policy Institute. 
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The wide range of environmentally oriented groups resulted in emergences of a 
variety of perspectives as to goals, methods, and priorities.  Most sought to work 
within the framework of the American political and legal systems (Rosenbaum, 2005).  
Some believed that American democratic capitalism was not up to resolving the 
environmental crisis facing humankind and called for a complete restructuring of the 
American political system (Ophuls and Boyan, 1992).  Others believed tighter 
government regulation and control unnecessary and that the environmental movement 
was nothing more than a hoax intended to extend government control over private 
property.  In this view, society could depend on market mechanisms alone to preclude 
resource extinction (Simon, 1999).     
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw an unprecedented array of environmental 
legislation.  Most of the legislation focused on discrete classes of resources.  The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) (enacted 1966; revised 1973), the Clean Air Act 
(1970), the Clean Water Act (CWA) (1972), the Pesticides Control Act (1972), the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972), and the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (1977) are a few of many statutes passed to address complex but 
relatively distinct environmental problems.  These laws replaced earlier, largely 
ineffective attempts that relied on partnerships between the federal government and 
often hostile or disinterested states that tried to treat pollution issues as local problems.  
Broader in nature was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed by 
Congress in 1969 and signed into law in 1970.  NEPA imposed public involvement 
and the requirement to address environmental impacts on agency decision-making 
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(Cortner and Moote, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005).  The result were strong, enforceable 
policies that produced measurable results in cleaning up the nation‟s air and water, 
identified and protected endangered species, and fundamentally changed behaviors in 
federal resource agencies. 
The environmental worldview brought about significant changes in the formal 
institutions of federal government.  These changes included the creation of new 
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency created under NEPA in 1970.  
Established agencies received new environmental responsibilities.  For example, the 
Endangered Species Act assigned regulatory jurisdiction over listed species to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service – both of whose origins 
lay in promoting sport and commercial fishing.  All agencies were required under 
NEPA to consider the impact of new programs and activities on the environment and 
publish the results in publicly reviewable environmental impact statements.  Agencies 
not in compliance with the provisions of these environmental statutes were subject to 
suit.  Consequently, environmental legislation had a profound effect on the process 
and substance of agency decision-making (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Rosenbaum, 
2005). 
Once labeled a fad that would run its course by the mid 1970s, the 
environmental movement grew to enjoy broad public support.  It successfully 
deflected efforts by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s to overturn or undermine 
the laws noted above, despite Reagan‟s personal popularity (Dunlap and Mertig, 
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1992b).  By the 1970s, environmentalism was institutionalized as a core value of 
American society and an influential force in American politics (Rosenbaum, 2005).   
That influence of both the tribal sovereignty and environmental movements 
would be felt in negotiations over the 1980 Power Act. 
  
Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest 
Anticipations of regional growth coupled with rising demand for electrical 
energy led to a plan to integrate the Northwest‟s hydropower dams with the 
construction of new nuclear plants.  Misjudgments by the Bonneville Power 
Administration and Northwest energy utilities in the program‟s planning and 
execution resulted in a regional financial crisis that began in 1973.  In 1976, events 
forced BPA to issue a notice that it might not be able to meet its statutory obligations.  
This crisis occurred coincident with a worldwide energy crisis, stagflation, and a 
growing movement away from nuclear power (Pope, 2008).   
Champions of greater involvement in regional power decisions by tribal, 
fishery, and environmental interests seized the opportunity presented by the crisis.  
They sought to ensure that the resulting policy not only created a mechanism for 
public involvement and oversight of future electrical load and capacity projections but 
also a fish and wildlife program to mitigate for the environmental effects of the dams 
in the Columbia.  Thus, the hydro-thermal crisis provided the catalyst for fishery, 
environmental, and tribal voices to finally gain influence in Basin governance.  The 
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result was the Northwest Electrical Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 that 
created the Council (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983).    
Three regional events directly affected regional governance.  The first was 
termination of the Pacific Northwest Regional River Basins Commission by executive 
order in 1981.  The second was the apparent dissolution of the Committee on Fish 
Operations at around the same time.  Both have already been discussed to the degree 
relevant to this study and nothing further will be added here.  The third and most 
significant issue was region‟s hydro-thermal program and resulting financial crisis that 
led to passage of the 1980 Power Act.  Strongly related were the continued declines in 
regional fish runs; significant tribal court victories regarding tribal fishing rights; an 
increase in capacity for self-governance by regional tribes; and the negotiations 
leading up to the Power Act. 
The hydro-thermal program. 
Never supportive of public power, the Eisenhower administration slowed 
construction of federal hydropower dams in the Northwest prompting public and 
investor owned utilities to build their own facilities in the face of the expected demand 
increases.  In 1956, the administration sought to sell the Tennessee Valley Authority.  
The State of Washington and regional public utilities feared the administration might 
also try to sell BPA‟s transmission grid (Pope, 2008).   
The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) was formed in part to 
present a joint operating agency of public utilities that could pool resources to 
purchase the transmission lines should that become necessary.  A secondary purpose 
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was to provide the capacity to build new generating plants.  WPPSS was state 
approved as a joint operating agency in 1957.  The Washington governor appointed 
the WPPSS leadership.  PUD representatives made up the members of an oversight 
board.  As such, WPPSS had no direct accountability to or oversight from voters or 
ratepayers.  In essence, WPPSS represented an organization grounded in the 
democratic ideals of the Progressive era but that lacked any public accountability 
(Pope, 2008). 
A belief in supply side, construction-oriented policies by the Northwest energy 
community marked the period from the 1950s through the 1970s.  A 1958 update by 
the Corps to the 308 Report found that regional demographic growth would eventually 
exceed the supply provided by the hydropower system.  The report implied that, if the 
region provided additional energy supply, then regional development and economic 
growth would follow.  In effect, BPA, WPPSS, and private utilities would promote 
regional growth in the interest of increasing the demand for power.  Planners would 
then use the estimates of projected growth to justify additional generation capability 
through new plants.  This somewhat circular logic led to adoption and publication of 
the hydro-thermal program in 1969 (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008).   
There were no effective mechanisms for those outside the power planning 
interests to challenge this logic.  National oversight waned with the demise of the 
national planning apparatus in 1943 and was limited to annual testimony to 
congressional appropriations committees.  Furthermore, BPA enjoyed exemption from 
the Administrative Procedures Act.  Consequently, policy and program development 
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plans and the non-federal utilities and related trade associations were not subject to the 
same level of public scrutiny and review applied to other federal agency decisions.  
This included review by the utility customers and bondholders who would eventually 
be responsible for the costs incurred by BPA and WPPSS decisions.  This lack of 
oversight, coupled with power promotion through industrial use, led to the impending 
crisis (Blumm, 1982). 
The resulting Ten Year Hydro-Thermal Power Program for the Pacific 
Northwest (the hydro-thermal program) envisioned a twenty-year program, projecting 
that by 1990 the region would need the equivalent of the power produced from twenty 
nuclear plants of 1000 megawatt capacity each, plus one coal fired plant of 1400 
megawatts.  The nuclear and coal thermal projects would provide the region‟s base 
load, with the federal hydropower dams meeting peaking needs.  The federal 
contribution consisted of completion of those hydropower projects underway, 
planning for new projects, and expansion of the regional transmission grid.  The 
hydro-thermal program anticipated a tripling of electrical output within the Pacific 
Northwest from all sources between 1970 and 1990.  Interestingly enough, 
environmental groups (most notably the Sierra Club) who believed nuclear power to 
be less environmentally destructive than large dams and less polluting than fossil-fuel 
plants initially applauded the program (Norwood, c.1981; Pope, 2008).   
The initial plan was to build three nuclear plants (projects 1, 2, and 3) at the 
federal nuclear site at Hanford, Washington.  The Hanford site had originally been 
built to produce the uranium that went into the atomic bombs that ended World War 
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II.  BPA financially guaranteed the projects, planning to finance them through a 
process termed “net billing” (Pope, 2008).   
Prior to 1974, the law precluded BPA from owning generation capability or 
buying power from non-federal power plants.  Net billing involved a complicated 
process to bypass this restriction.
110
  In essence, BPA combined the high cost of 
nuclear plant construction with the low cost of hydropower production and set “net” 
rates based on a blending of the two.  In effect, regional hydropower customers 
subsidized the construction costs of the WPPSS utilities engaged in nuclear power 
development.  This ensured that the high nuclear plant costs were not directly billed to 
WPPSS utilities‟ customers.  If those costs had been directly billed during 
construction, the utilities would have to impose significantly higher rates until the new 
plants came on line and began generating revenue.  The theory was that once the new 
plants came on line, rates would significantly drop throughout the region and everyone 
would benefit (Pope, 2008).   
The legality of net billing was never really tested.  Its legal justification rested 
on advisory opinions from the DOI solicitor‟s office and the GAO office of counsel 
and a letter from the chair of the congressional subcommittee overseeing BPA.  It 
never received formal legislative approval or subjected to public scrutiny (Pope, 
2008).  
The risks were substantial, if not fully understood at the time.  The utilities 
priced power from net-billed projects well below its marginal cost of production, 
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 See Pope (2008) for a detailed explanation of the net billing mechanics. 
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encouraging consumption.  The arrangement ignored or dismissed any elasticity of 
demand for electricity.  It also ignored the risk that if a net-billed nuclear plant failed, 
then BPA would still have to distribute the costs of the failed plant to ratepayers 
without any revenue in return.  In effect, BPA assumed the risk of construction non-
performance on behalf of the utilities nuclear program (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008).  
Net billing ended in 1973 when it became apparent that delays to the nuclear plant 
construction schedule and increases in cost would render the process under the current 
rate structure insolvent by 1981.  If this were to occur, the result would be a dramatic 
increase in regional rates – the exact circumstance that net billing was created to avoid 
(Pope, 2008).   
Ever-increasing estimates of demand led WPPSS to determine that two 
additional plants (projects 4 and 5) were needed.  However, Bonneville would not 
provide the same financial guarantees for these plants they had for projects 1, 2, and 3.  
Instead, BPA encouraged WPPSS to issue bonds to cover construction costs of the two 
newly proposed projects, threatening that the agency would be forced to issue a 
“notice of insufficiency” if they did not do so.  An NOS is a statement whereby 
Bonneville declares an inability to meet demand from its public preference 
customers,
111
 thus requiring rationing of federal hydropower and forcing public 
utilities to purchase the difference on the open market (Pope, 2008).   
The utilities were slow to react, and BPA issued its NOS in June of 1976.  
Later that year, 88 public utilities signed a participants‟ agreement that resulted in 
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 The Bonneville Act of 1937 requires BPA to give preference to public utilities in its sale of power 
and sell that power at cost.      
 238 
 
issuance of $2.25 billion in bonds to fund projects 4 and 5.  Eventually, the entire 
financial structure collapsed.  The utilities defaulted on the bonds, costs soared, 
schedules expanded, and the actual market demand for power fell far short of 
predictions (Pope, 2008).   
Pope (2008) diagnosed the causes of the financial fiasco as self-delusion, 
misdiagnosis, mismanagement, and over-optimism over demand forecasting.  
Additionally, he described BPA as an agency not historically oriented to open 
collaboration.  However, Pope‟s assessment regarding BPA‟s collaborative history is 
at odds with BPA‟s history with the Bonneville Advisory Board and other 
collaborative forums initiated to inform agency decision making.  McKinley (1952) 
probably offers a more accurate albeit inadvertent assessment when he defended 
BPA‟s decision to keep those not in agreement with BPA‟s basic mission from 
participation in the Bonneville Regional Advisory Council, designed to serve as a 
sounding board for BPA policy.  Regardless, Pope (2008) accurately claimed that 
BPA and WPPSS throughout the process tended to dismiss concerns expressed by 
ratepayers and environmentalists.   
At the time, the WPPSS bond default was the largest in United States history.  
The default, BPA‟s 1976 NOS, the worldwide oil shortage brought about by an 
embargo by countries in the Middle East, and economic stagflation set the stage for a 
new national energy policy (Blumm, 1982; Pope, 2008)  This opened the door for 
those heretofore excluded from direct participation in governance decision making to 
claim a seat at the governance table.  Among those were regional fishery interests. 
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The continued decline in salmon runs. 
The commercial salmon fishery continued to suffer from the legacy effects of 
over-fishing and habitat degradation due to mining, timber harvest, and agriculture.  
To these were added new threats from development as the region‟s population 
expanded and with the completion of the federal hydropower system dams (National 
Research Council, 1996).  As predicted during the hearings of the 1940s and by 
Interior‟s Pacific Northwest Coordination Committee, salmon returns continued to 
decreased as new dams were completed.  As measured by fish harvest, the average 
annual salmon fishery yield dropped from 24 million pounds in the 1940s to 11 
million pounds in the 1950s.  By the early 1980s, the average yield dropped to 1.2 
million per year (National Research Council, 2004).  Not reflected in these numbers is 
the impact on naturally spawning fish.  Since the late 1800s, an ever-increasing share 
of the commercial fishery came from hatcheries.  However, regional hatcheries were 
failing to live up to their earlier promises of being able to sustain virtually unlimited 
levels of harvest despite other economic development (Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, 
1999). 
The decline in numbers of fish underscored a long simmering conflict among 
sports, commercial and tribal fishery institutions.  Recreational fishing was largely a 
pastime for middle and upper income Americans.  They looked to nature as a source 
of solace and renewal and reveled in the personal scale of catching fish one at a time.  
In contrast, commercial fishermen were part of a large-scale industrial effort to collect 
food.  The work was manual and often dangerous.  Tribal fishing represented more 
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than food collection; it was a fundamental social and religious component of tribal 
life.  As fish numbers dwindled, each institution looked at the other as competition to 
their respective interests.  Conflict was common over allocations of catch among the 
groups and each often criticized the fish-catching technologies of the others as 
wasteful and unfair (Taylor, 1999). 
The newly developed river of the 1930s held additional consequences for the 
region‟s iconic salmon runs.  Although private, state, and federal entities constructed 
dams in Columbia tributaries since the late 1800s, none would have the impact on fish 
of the mainstem dams.  The dams modified the ecological organization of the 
Columbia at the expense of naturally spawned fish.  Fishery interests argued to 
moderate the damage, but “their combined numbers and strongest arguments paled 
before the bureaucratic might, popular appeal, and Progressive ideology” (Taylor, 
1999, p. 226) that drove the dam construction projects of the Bureau of Reclamation 
and Corps of Engineers.  The cold fact was that most regional institutional leaders 
perceived the salmon fishery as less valuable than the combined potential benefits of 
hydropower, navigation, irrigation, and flood control (White, 1995; Taylor, 1999).   
 Fishery interests proved unable to mount any effective opposition to early river 
development.  Nor, for the most part, were they sufficiently motivated or organized to 
do so.  Some tried.  For example, Miller Freeman continually criticized the impacts of 
dams and the reliance on hatcheries in the Pacific Fisherman, a publication he founded 
in 1902 and remained associated with it until his death in 1955 (Cone and Ridlington, 
1996).  But a 1937 report on the salmon impacts of Bonneville Dam prepared by the 
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U.S. Commissioner of Fisheries better illustrated the general tone.  The report 
dutifully noted the many problems salmon were experiencing but concluded that 
further study and technological improvements would in all likelihood resolve those 
problems (Cone and Ridlington, 1996; Lichatowich, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, 
Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).
112
     
Taylor (1999) suggested two reasons for the early lackluster involvement of 
fishery managers in governance.  First, the legacy of commercial development 
(timber, mining, settlement, agriculture, and dams) may have been perceived as 
unstoppable, especially since the role of the federal government, based on past 
practice, was to facilitate and support such development.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, prior to the later enactment of federal environmental statutes, the states 
had sole jurisdiction over fisheries in state waters and controlled most hatchery 
production.  Therefore, the policy focus of white fishing interests centered more on 
state, not on federal, activities and decisions.   
Additionally fishermen, like everyone else in the region, operated on the 
widespread belief that hatcheries and other technical measures could and would make 
up for lost habitat (White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; McConnaha, 
Williams, and Lichatowich, 2006).  Consistent with the 1937 Fish Commission report, 
and in response to the decline in naturally spawning salmon, Congress passed the 
Mitchell Act in 1938.  The act intended to provide for conservation (in the Progressive 
sense of the term) of the salmon and steelhead fishery resources of the Columbia River 
                                                 
112
 See Cone and Ridlington (1996) pp. 100-105 for further discussion. 
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to serve tribal, recreational, and commercial needs.  It authorized the construction of 
hatcheries, fish ladders, screens for irrigation intakes, restoration and mitigation 
projects, and studies.  Ultimately, the program would come to fund 25 hatcheries and 
produce over 100 million juvenile fish before Endangered Species Act concerns 
caused it to be scaled back (Cone and Ridlington, 1996; NMFS, 2009b). 
Tribal court victories. 
U.S. federal courts consistently upheld tribal treaty rights since the early 
1900s.  US v. Winans (1905) and US v. Winters (1908) form the legal foundation for 
tribal fishing and water rights Winans upheld the tribes‟ rights to take fish at their 
usual and accustomed places, even if those places were now privately owned or 
surrounded by privately non-Indian owned land.  Winters recognized tribal water 
rights as reserved on reservation land (National Research Council, 2004; Wilkinson, 
2005).  Despite Winans and Winters, northwest state governments routinely ignored 
treaty provisions and imposed restrictions on tribal resource gathering in general and 
fishing in particular.   
The states asserted that state fish and game laws applied to Indian fishermen 
whether on or off the reservation, especially during the termination years, despite 
federal court decisions to the contrary.  In the 1960s, tribal fishermen faced dozens of 
prosecutions in county and state courts in Oregon and Washington.  Juries seldom 
convicted, but state departments of fish and game continued to prosecute on the belief 
that tribal fishing methods were wasteful and contrary to state conservation laws.  
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Commercial and sports fishing organizations often prompted these prosecutions to 
minimize competition (Wilkinson, 2005). 
The dispute moved to federal court in 1968 when the U.S. Department of 
Justice filed a lawsuit on behalf of David Sohappy, a Yakama tribal member, in the 
Federal Court of the District of Oregon.  Washington arrested and jailed Sohappy for 
three days for violation of state fishing law.  Sohappy believed the treaties protected 
him from state prosecution.  The Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce 
tribes joined as interveners.
113
  The court consolidated several similar cases, rendering 
the states of Oregon and Washington as joint defendants.  Ruling in 1969, Belloni held 
tribal treaty provisions as valid; that state regulations did not apply to treaty tribes; and 
that the tribes had a legal right to a share of the fishery.  In this, he broke new ground.  
He did not specify what that share might be, expecting the states to negotiate an 
allocation with the tribal governments.  The decision caused an immediate and angry 
response from sports and commercial fishing interests concerned that dedicating a 
percentage of harvest to the tribes would potentially put many of them out of business 
(Wilkinson, 2005).   
A suit filed in 1970 on behalf of seven tribes in the District Court of 
Washington followed the Belloni decision.  Ruling in 1974, Judge Boldt took 
Belloni‟s decision a step further by finding that the tribes were entitled to a 50-50 
share of fish that moved through recognized tribal fishing grounds in the state of 
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dismissive of tribal fishing regulations.  See Wilkinson (2005), pp. 164-166. 
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Washington.  Like the US v. Oregon decision, the Boldt ruling set off an angry and 
prolonged reaction among non-Indian fishermen.  Many openly defied Boldt, fishing 
on tribal land and refusing to recognize the court‟s decision.  The Washington 
Supreme Court further complicated matters by ruling that the state fish and game 
agencies could not legally enforce the provisions of Judge Boldt‟s decision.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court finally settled the matter in 1979, ruling to uphold Boldt.  The court‟s 
key findings were that the tribes were entitled to fish in their usual and accustomed 
places; that the states had the right to set harvest limits within state waters in the 
interests of conservation and sustainability; that all fish caught by Indians counted 
against the tribal share; that all fish caught by non-Indians counted against the non-
Indian share; and that Indians had exclusive use of fishing sites on their reservations 
(National Research Council, 2004: Wilkinson, 2005). 
The Belloni and Boldt decisions engendered increasing confidence on the part 
of tribes to assert their rights in federal court, especially in the wake of federal 
termination efforts.  The decisions also created a new governance system made up of 
representatives from the state, tribal, and federal governments, under continued court 
supervision, to manage the fishery (Wilkinson, 2005; personal knowledge and 
experience of author).
114
  Success in court motivated the tribes to a new assertiveness 
in reminding federal agency members of federal trust and treaty responsibilities and 
looking for opportunities to more proactively engage in the regional decisions that 
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 This system, known as the U.S. v. Oregon Process, is oriented solely on setting and overseeing 
fishery allocations and related hatchery issues.  Consequently, it is outside the scope of this study.   
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could affect them.  They improved their capacity for interacting with federal agencies 
by establishing intertribal coalitions to promote their collective interests. 
Establishment of multi-tribal governance coalitions.   
For generations, the tribes had relied on traditional social arrangements and 
tribal authority to manage tribal fisheries (Johansen, 1967; Taylor, 1999; CRITFC, 
2010).  One such authority was the "Celilo Fish Committee."  This committee 
regulated fishing practices to ensure that the salmon resource would flourish and 
always exist (CRITFC, 2010).  These traditional practices proved successful in 
sustainably managing tribal harvest (Taylor, 1999; CRITFC, 2010).   
Traditional management could not work, however, in the face of removal to 
the reservations and the construction of dams and other obstacles to salmon migration.  
In 1977, the tribes of the Warm Springs, Yakama, and Umatilla reservations and the 
Nez Perce tribe, all holding treaties with the United States, joined together to renew 
their authority in fisheries management.  The tribes established a coordinating and 
technical organization to support their joint and individual exercise of sovereign 
authority.  Entitled the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), this 
organization served as an intertribal representation body for purpose of regional 
planning, policy, and decision-making (CRITFC, 2010) and greatly increased the 
visibility and influence of lower Columbia tribal perspectives within the Basin 
(personal experience and observation of the author).   
 Concerned and inspired by the influence that CRITFC was beginning to 
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exert on fishery policy issues, particularly over water releases from reservoirs 
serving upper river fisheries (personal knowledge of author), the upper Columbia 
River tribes soon mimicked the strategy of the lower river tribes by forming their 
own coalition to protect their interests.  The Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Kalispel Tribe of 
Indians, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho and the Spokane Tribe of Indians joined to 
establish the Upper Columbia United Tribes (UCUT) in 1982.  The Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Reservation joined in the mid 1990s (UCUT, undated).
115
   
Commercial and sport fishery, environmental groups, and the tribes each had 
their own goals and objectives and operated within their own worldview.  This led to 
conflicts among them.  For example, recreational, commercial, and tribal fishermen 
had long disputed each other‟s fishing methods and the allocation of catch among 
them (Taylor, 1999).  The tribes and environmentalists were at odds over hatchery 
policy, specifically the marking of hatchery fish for selective fishing, a dispute that 
continues as of this writing (personal knowledge of author) and different factions 
within the environmental movement differed over priorities and policy approaches 
(Rosenbaum, 2005).  Upriver and downriver tribes often split over legal standing, 
water issues, and fish catch allocations.  Those tribes with treaties with the United 
States argued that the federal government should accord their concerns greater 
deference than the concerns of non-treaty tribes.  But what united this disparate 
group was their common opposition to the impact of major dams on the river‟s fish 
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 Tribes living in the Snake River Basin (Shoshone Paiute, Burns Paiute, and Shoshone Bannock) 
formed a similar coalition through compact in 2006 creating the Upper Snake River Tribes (USRT).  
Since that event occurred outside the period covered by this history, it will not be further discussed.   
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runs (McKinley, 1952; Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004; Crampton and Espenson, 
2009).  The hydro-thermal crisis and Congressional efforts to forge a new Northwest 
energy policy provided the opportunity for tribal and environmental group concerns 
over dam impacts addressed in a new governance system. 
The 1980 Power Act. 
BPA‟s exemption to the public review procedures of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA) insulated the agency from critical public examination of its 
policy and program development.  Its method of operation, in concert with public 
and private utilities, was to develop a unified front over a particular course of action 
and present an essentially completed product for pro forma comment by the public.  
As such, BPA had no institutional capacity to deal with critical public review of its 
actions (Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).   
BPA issued its notice of insufficiency in 1976.  In 1977, the agency was 
transferred from the Department of the Interior to the newly created Department of 
Energy.  The agency was now subject to the rule-making procedures of the federal 
Administrative Procedures Act as well as the public review provisions of NEPA 
(Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).  A lawsuit filed under NEPA enjoined BPA from 
pursuing the hydro-thermal construction program until it completed an 
environmental impact statement (EIS).  Hemmingway (1983) argues that BPA‟s lack 
of experience in dealing with true public involvement extended the time needed to 
complete its EIS.   
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Meanwhile, private utility rates rose sharply upward.  In response, the 
Oregon state legislature created the Oregon Domestic and Rural Supply Authority in 
1977.  Always more dependent on private power than the state of Washington, 
Oregon planned to create a public power entity in order to lay claim, under the 1937 
Bonneville Project Act‟s preference clause, to a share of electricity from the federal 
hydrosystem.  This would create additional demand that the system was not prepared 
to meet, especially with the supply contracts BPA had signed with local aluminum 
and other industrial customers for its “excess” power.  Oregon‟s demand for cheap 
federal hydropower threatened to spark a regional “civil war” over power allocations 
(Blumm, 1982). 
The completion of the dams under the Canadian treaty doubled the Columbia 
Basin‟s reservoir storage capacity, providing flood protection to the lower river 
(especially Portland).  It also disrupted the natural flow of the river, depriving 
downstream fish of much of the natural spring freshet juvenile salmon depended on 
to flush them to sea.  The hydro-thermal program‟s plan to shift the hydropower 
system from meeting relatively steady base loads to peak loads would further disrupt 
the natural flow of water.  Fishery interests believed that this would lead to even 
further declines in fish returns.  They argued that fish and wildlife losses caused by 
hydrosystem operations were in effect subsidizing power production (Blumm, 1982). 
Regional power interests first attempted to rewrite the 1937 Bonneville 
Project Act in the 1950s.  Their objective was to get BPA self-financed through 
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power sales as opposed to being subject to the unpredictable nature of Congressional 
appropriation funding.  Those efforts failed, but growing concerns over the budding 
hydro-thermal crisis led to a renewal of effort.  The Pacific Northwest Utilities 
Conference Committee (PNUCC) took the lead in coordinating and drafting a new 
legislative proposal.  After several failures, PNUCC completed an acceptable draft in 
1977.  Washington Senator Jackson subsequently introduced it as a bill in the House 
(Blumm, 1982).
116
  Meanwhile, prompted by environmental interests, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initiated a process in 
1978 to review the biological status of upper Columbia salmon and steelhead and 
determine whether the fish warranted listing under the Endangered Species Act 
(Bodi, 1979).   
Fishery interests found a champion for their cause in Congressman John 
Dingell of Michigan.  Dingell chaired the House Commerce Committee.  Upon 
receiving the Jackson bill, Dingell‟s committee staff, working with an ad hoc 
committee
117
 of utility, industry, fishery, and tribal representatives,  wrote into it 
extensive fish protection and public involvement measures.  Responding to tribal and 
fishery manager concerns, Dingell‟s provisions would require public input with 
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 Jackson, who was first elected to Congress in 1940 and had introduced a CVA bill upon Truman‟s 
election in 1948, left the House upon election to the Senate in 1952.   
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 The ad hoc Pacific Northwest Power and Fisheries Committee was formed from the regional 
confluence of power and fishery interests.  The committee was a compromise worked out between the 
Columbia River Fisheries Council, representing state and tribal federal fishery managers, and the Public 
Power Council.  The Public Power Council represented utility concerns that fish mitigation language 
being considered in the new legislation could present an “open checkbook” from regional ratepayers.  
See Crampton and Espenson, 2009, pp. 29-30.   
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respect to regional energy planning and fish and wildlife mitigation efforts.  
Although opposed by power interests, Dingell‟s seniority and strong position in the 
House ensured that a new bill would not pass without addressing the impacts of the 
dams on regional salmon and other wildlife (Hemmingway, 1983; Bodi, 1995). 
President Jimmy Carter signed the resulting Power Act into law on December 
5, 1980.  Among its purposes was to provide for conservation and energy efficiency 
and “provide for participation and consultation of the Pacific Northwest states, local 
governments, consumers, customers, users of the Columbia River System."  These 
users specifically included federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes, 
and the public at large (Power Act, 1980, section 2.(3)).   
Several converging interests brought the Power Act about.  NMFS and the 
Fish and Wildlife Service were considering ESA protection for Basin salmon, an 
action that would place the fish stocks so listed under the primary jurisdiction of 
federal regulatory agencies (Bodi, 1979; Blumm and Simrin, 1991), a situation the 
region very much wished to avoid.  Bonneville customers sought a legislative 
solution to allow better access to agency decision-making.  Oregon‟s threat to create 
an unsupportable demand on the federal hydrosystem aligned with the corresponding 
interest of BPA and utilities to allow BPA to buy power on the open market to meet 
load.  In addition, tribal and fishery interests sought a way to address the impacts of 
the dams on regional fisheries.  The Power Act passed because it benefited all 
affected parties.  It minimized rate disparities by giving private utilities access to 
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federal power.  Although overall rates increased, the Power Act gave industrial users 
long-term contracts to protect them from future rate fluctuations.  Bonneville 
received its long sought market purchase authority.  Fish and wildlife advocates 
gained access to decision-making and the guarantee that federal hydrosystem 
revenues internalized into regional electrical rates would pay the cost of mitigation 
efforts.  In addition, the region was given a new governance system designed to 
ensure the Power Act‟s purposes and provisions were met (Blumm, 1982).  
Confidence in the Act was so high that NMFS terminated its ESA review process 
(Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Wright, 1995; Bodi, 1995). 
 
Resulting Governance Systems   
Based on a recommendation by the Water Resources Council, and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Water Resources Planning Act, President 
Reagan disbanded the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission along with five 
similar commissions by executive order on September 9, 1981 (Executive Order 
12319, 1981).  The Committee on Fish Operations appears to have become inactive at 
about the same time, perhaps in response to the passage of the Power Act.
118
  With the 
loss of the PNWRBC, responsibility for Basin governance transferred to the Pacific 
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 The sole reference found regarding COFO does not explain why the group ceased to function. 
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Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council upon its establishment 
in 1981.  No other systems were proposed or enacted at this time.
119
 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council 
 The Power Act defined the Council as to be comprised of two members each 
from Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Idaho appointed by their respective 
governor.  The Council was authorized an executive director and staff.  The Power Act 
assigned the Council two broad responsibilities.  The first was to develop a regional 
energy plan to guide electrical planning.  The second was to establish a program to 
“protect, mitigate, and enhance” fish and wildlife impacted by the hydrosystem 
(Power Act, 1980, section 4.(h)(1)(A)).  Experts hired to the Council‟s staff would 
develop the energy plan.  The Fish and Wildlife program, in contrast, was to solicit the 
active involvement of the public and regional interests (Power Act, 1980).  
The Power Act required that proceeds of the sale of federal electricity by BPA 
pay Council expenses.  Decisions were to be made by majority vote “of members 
present and voting” (Power Act, 1980, section 4.(c)(2)) with a majority of members 
constituting a quorum.  This potentially precluded the inability of the previous CBIAC 
and PNWRBC to reach decisions due to their dependence on full consensus.  There 
were exceptions to this general majority vote rule, however.  The regional energy plan 
and amendments to the fish and wildlife program required a majority plus a vote from 
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 As far as the author can determine, the timing of President Reagan‟s executive order and enactment 
of the Power Act were purely coincidental.  Had the Power Act not been enacted, or it had been delayed 
for any period of time, the region may have been without any form of interjurisdictional governance 
structure in the Basin for the first time since 1934.  However, the history of the region suggests that 
some form of federal cooperation system would likely have formed, similar to the manner in which the 
CBIAC formed following the disbanding of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission. 
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at least one member of each state or agreement by at least six members of the eight 
members (Power Act, 1980). 
The Act did not change the missions or authorities of federal agencies, states, 
or local governments (Hemmingway, 1983).  It did, however, require federal agencies 
to exercise their responsibilities “consistent with the purposes of this Act and other 
applicable laws” with regard to fish and wildlife impacts (Power Act, 1980, section 
4.(h)(11)(A)(i)).  It further required federal agencies to “take into account…to the 
fullest extent practicable” (Power Act, 1980, section 4.(h)(11)(A)(ii)) the Council‟s 
program when exercising discretionary decision-making.
120
  Due to the multi-state 
nature of the Council‟s area of jurisdiction, lawsuits against the Bonneville Power 
Administration were to bypass federal district courts and be filed directly with the 
federal 9
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals (Power Act, 1980, section 9.(e)(5)). 
The Council has had its critics.  Utility rate payers and BPA staff complained 
that, rather than produce a coherent strategy for fish mitigation, the Council more 
frequently “buys off” regional interests by paying for poorly thought out actions and 
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 Council members frequently complained that federal agencies, especially the Corps and 
Reclamation, did not take this provision seriously and essentially ignored the Council‟s fish and wildlife 
program provisions in making agency decisions.  The Council recommended repeatedly that the 
language of the Power Act be strengthened.  See, for example, NPPC, 1996, p. 5, and option 3 in the 
attachment to Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998.  For their part, the agencies argued that the 
language in Power Act section 10. (h) specifically stated that the provisions of the Power Act were not 
to “affect the rights or jurisdictions of the United States” or other entities over waters of any river or 
stream.  They further argued that, regardless, the sovereignty clause of the Constitution precluded the 
states from dictating actions to federal agencies.  The issue was settled in court by Federal Magistrate 
Leif Erickson in 1999.  Erickson, in a case involving water releases from dams in Montana designed to 
help downriver fish, ruled that the Power Act‟s requirements for agencies to take fish and wildlife 
provisions into account at each relevant stage of decision making did not contravene federal law.  In 
effect, Erickson ruled that the Power Act required that Corps and Reclamation operational decisions 
should comport to the Council program unless there were reasons not to and that, if such reasons 
existed, they be documented and justified.  See NPPC, 1999.    
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exercising little or no oversight of project quality (personal experience of author).  
Ogden (1997) notes that the Power Act‟s singular focus on the water resources for fish 
and wildlife does not allow for integration of those issues with other regional resource 
planning needs such as land use, irrigation, fishery harvest, and recreation.  
Furthermore, its scope of authority is limited to the geographic boundaries of the 
Columbia River basin.  Hemmingway (1983) notes the limited authority over the 
actions of federal agencies.  The Army Corps of Engineers, The Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and BPA, while required to 
consider Council plans, are not necessarily required to follow them.  Despite these 
shortcomings, no alternative governance proposals were forthcoming until the ESA 
listings of 1991. 
 
Chapter Summary 
Events leading up to the region‟s hydro-thermal crisis, the resulting passage of 
the 1980 Power Act, and establishment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Planning Council can be summarized as follows: 
 Nationally, the tribal sovereignty movement gave new confidence to Indian 
tribes in asserting their rights in the policy arena and in court.  It resulted in 
a renewed tribal interest in traditional Indian culture and beliefs and 
expansion of tribal governance capacity (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).   
 The American environmental movement transitioned from its roots in 
Progressive era conservationism to an ecological based worldview toward 
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natural resources.  The movement resulted in multiple environmental 
statutes and regulations promulgated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  It 
brought the impacts of unrestrained resource development and pollution 
into the public consciousness and institutionalized itself as a core national 
value (Hays, 1999/1959; Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a; Dunlap, 1992; 
Rosenbaum, 2005).  
 BPA and utility estimates concluded that the federal hydropower system 
alone could not meet projected regional demand growth.  The hydro-
thermal program was developed and designed to integrate the regional 
hydropower system with new coal and nuclear generation plants 
(Hemmingway, 1983; Luce, 1996; Pope, 2008).   
 Faulty predictions, mismanagement, program cost overruns, delays due to 
environmental lawsuits, and the fact that the anticipated electrical demand 
did not materialize in the time predicted caused Bonneville to at first 
threaten and then issue a notice of insufficiency on June 24, 1976.  The 
NOS declared an inability to meet the demand of its preference customers 
and perhaps its Treasury payments.  The region needed a new energy 
policy to address the causes of this problem (Hemmingway, 1983; Luce, 
1996; Pope, 2008).   
 The resulting financial crisis provided the catalyst for long-excluded 
fishery interests to gain access to regional decision-making (Blumm, 1982; 
Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008). 
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 Regional salmon runs, already stressed by overfishing, the legacy effects of 
mining, timber harvest, and agricultural practices continued their decline 
due to the construction and operation of additional mainstem dams in the in 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.  Fishery and tribal advocates protested the 
river‟s development but to no avail (McKinley, 1952; Taylor, 1999; 
Robbins, 2004; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 
2006). 
 The need for a new Northwest energy policy to deal with the hydro-thermal 
crisis, coupled with pressure from fishery and tribal interests, resulted in 
passage of the 1980 Power Act and creation of the Pacific Northwest 
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council.  The Council, 
comprised of appointees from the four states governors, was responsible 
for development of an energy plan and fish and wildlife mitigation program 
(Power Act, 1980, Blumm, 1982, Hemmingway, 1983). 
 NMFS first considered listing Columbia and Snake River salmon and 
steelhead in the late 1970s.  They terminated this effort in the belief that the 
fish and wildlife provisions of the Power Act would lead to fish restoration 
(Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Blumm and Simrin, 1991).   
The Power Act represented a turning point in Basin governance and planning.  
For the first time, tribes and fishery interests were in a position to influence the actions 
of federal system managers (Harden, 1996).  It was also the first time that the impacts 
to fish and wildlife by the dams were to be given equal footing with hydropower with 
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substantial revenues generated by electricity sales directed to fund mitigation efforts 
(Hemmingway, 1983; Volkman, 1997).  In addition, the Act precluded, at least 
temporarily, ESA listing of Basin salmon in the belief that the Power Act‟s provisions 
would result in meaningful recovery plans (Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Bodi, 1995).   
The Council developed its first fish and wildlife program in 1982.  Initially, 
fish runs rebounded although that was more likely due to a period of favorable ocean 
conditions than any results from the embryonic restoration efforts.  Mid Columbia 
stocks improved from about 12,000 fish in 1980 to over 100,000 a few years later, and 
Snake River spring fall chinook jumped from 9-10,000 to about 50,000 over the same 
period
121
 (Wright, 1995).  The period 1982-1991 was one of great hope for fish 
interests.  The state-centric Council‟s program led many to believe that the region had 
finally found an effective counterweight to the influence of the electrical power and 
commercial river user communities on federal agency decision-making (Bodi, 1995).    
Despite the Council‟s program, fish returns crashed in the late 1980s.  Wild 
Snake River spring and fall chinook fell to less than 10,000 by 1990 and Snake River 
fall chinook numbered just 78 wild fish in 1990 and 318 in 1991 (Crampton and 
Espenson, 2009).  NMFS subsequently reopened its status review process under the 
ESA in 1990 and listed Snake River Sockeye in 1991, the very action regional 
interests had hoped the Power Act would preclude.  Listings of Snake River 
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 In a conversation with the author regarding the early period of the Council and the early apparent 
improvement in fish returns, Angus Duncan, Oregon Council representative from November 1994 – 
October 1995, quipped, “It looked like this [fish and wildlife restoration] was going to be a lot easier 
than we thought.”  Angus‟ father, Robert, was among the Council‟s first appointees (NPPC, 2007).    
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spring/summer and fall chinook followed in 1992.  These actions by NMFS prompted 
an “elaborate series of discussions” seeking revised strategies for averting ESA 
listings (Blumm and Simrin, 1991, quote from p. 660) the most notable of which was 
Senator Mark Hatfield‟s “Salmon Summit” of state, federal, and tribal fish managers 
in 1990 (Cone and Ridlington, 1996).   
These ESA listings would present the region with it fourth critical situation and 
once again shift the prevailing governance model.  The governance dominance of the 
states enjoyed through the Council would shift back to a federal cooperative model led 
by the National Marine Fisheries Service.  The ESA listing and resulting governance 
changes are the subjects of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE FIRST ESA SALMON LISTINGS (1991) 
  
Introduction 
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) halted their review of 
Columbia Basin salmon stocks in the belief that the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife 
Program would render listing under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) unnecessary 
(Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Blumm and Simrin, 1991).  However, Basin salmon and 
steelhead numbers continued their decline and confidence in the Council‟s program 
waned.  In 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation petitioned 
NMFS to list Snake River sockeye salmon.  NMFS subsequently listed Sockeye as 
endangered in November 1991.
122
  Additional listings of Snake River chinook salmon 
and steelhead soon followed.  The ESA listings starkly highlighted the need for an 
even greater governance emphasis on fish.  They reopened the debate over regional 
governance systems, resulting in the greatest variety of alternative governance 
proposals since the debates of the 1930s and 40s as federal agencies and the Council 
tussled over which would lead salmon restoration efforts.  The federal nature of the 
ESA all but preordained a federally coordinated effort.  As a result, the locus of Basin 
governance-decision making shifted away from the state led Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council and back to regional federal agencies – most notably the 
National Marine Fisheries Service.   
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 Under the Endangered Species Act, an “endangered” species is one that is at risk of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.  A “threatened” species is one that is likely to 
become endangered in the foreseeable future.  See ESA sections 3(6) and 3(20).     
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The listings highlighted another important shift as well.  Beginning with 1930s 
era planning efforts, the focus for FCRPS construction and operation was on 
harnessing commercial benefit from the Columbia River (White, 1995; Harden, 1996).  
As fish issues evolved from the first protests in the 1940s up through the ESA listings 
in the 1990s, the priority for dam operations gradually shifted from a sole focus on 
commercial benefit to an ever-increasing emphasis on mitigation for environmental 
impacts.  The Basin‟s governance systems slowly began to respond, beginning with 
the CBIAC (Scheufele, c.1970).  Whereas the Bonneville Power Administration had 
led the federal agency collaboration during the years of the FCRPS‟ initial 
development, the ESA listings caused the federal leadership role to shift from BPA to 
the National Marine Fisheries Service.  Additionally, an ever increasing share of 
revenue generated by hydropower sales would eventually fund fish mitigation 
measures such as hatcheries, habitat  restoration, predation reduction, and improved 
juvenile and adult fish passage facilities and programs at the dams costing hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year (Vogel, 2007; FCRPS, 2010).  Not surprisingly, the 
Basin‟s governance debate became ever more focused on fish related issues as well. 
The election of William Clinton as president in 1992 and his subsequent 
reelection in 1996 shaped the national political context.  Clinton ran in part on a 
platform friendly to environmental goals in stark contrast to the policies of the Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush administrations that preceded it (Rosenbaum, 2005).  
Although the Clinton administration maintained an active interest in the Northwest 
salmon issue and established an interdepartmental-level oversight team led by the 
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Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), it delegated much of the 
leadership on the issue to its appointee to the regional NMFS office.   
The biggest regional issue was the ESA salmon listings.  NMFS followed 
those listings with biological opinions regarding FCRPS operations.  The biological 
opinions in turn initiated what became a long-running sequence of litigation.  
Additional regional issues were the structural weaknesses of the Council as exposed 
by the salmon crisis, the Council‟s efforts to retain control of the salmon issue, and 
Oregon Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new regional governance process.   
Nine governance systems were proposed during the period between the first 
salmon listings in 1991 and the establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum in 
1999.  The Council proposed most of them, recommending ways to amend the Council 
and/or the 1980 Power Act in order to strengthen Council authority over the salmon 
issue.  Of these nine proposals, three were enacted.  The proposed and enacted systems 
were the: 
 Fish Operations Executive Committee.  Formed as provision of the 
Council‟s 1992 Fish and Wildlife Program.  Brought fishery managers (to 
include the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries 
Service) into a Council committee to advise on salmon issues.  Apparently 
assumed the membership and functions of COFO.  Merged into the 
Regional Forum in 1995. 
 Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum).  Created as provision 
of NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion on FCRPS operations.  Included 
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executives and staffs from the states, Basin Indian tribes, and federal 
agencies.  Absorbed the members and functions of the Fish Operations 
Executive Committee.  Introduced a new governance model in which the 
Basin‟s sovereign entities would engage as partners, albeit within the 
context of the federal Endangered Species Act. 
 Columbia River Administration.  Essentially, a revised Columbia River 
Valley Authority that would consolidate federal resource management 
agencies into one department.  Recommended in 1997 by Dan Ogden.  Not 
enacted. 
 Three Sovereigns Process.  Proposed by Governor John Kitzhaber in 1997.  
Developed further by the Council in 1998.  It was included among five 
options presented to the region in a memo signed by the governors of 
Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana.  Called for a full partnership of 
Basin federal, state, and tribal sovereigns to address a wide array of Basin 
issues.  Not enacted. 
 Expansion of Northwest Power and Conservation Council.  Option to 
expand the Council membership to include tribes.  Proposed by the Council 
in 1998 as an alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of 
five options in a memo signed by the four governors to the region.  Not 
enacted. 
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 Regional Resources Council.  Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an 
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a 
memo signed by the four governors to the region.  Not enacted. 
 Northwest Rivers Commission.  Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an 
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a 
memo signed by the four governors to the region.  Like the Council, this 
commission would consist of two members appointed from each state plus 
tribal representatives.  Would be legislatively empowered with jurisdiction 
over regional Endangered Species Act issues.  Not enacted. 
 Comprehensive River Agency.  Proposed by the Council in 1998 as an 
alternative to the Three Sovereigns and included as one of five options in a 
memo signed by the four governors to the region.  A river basin 
commission modeled after the Delaware River Basin Commission.  Not 
enacted. 
 Columbia Basin River Forum.  Established in 1999 as an outgrowth of the 
debate over the five proposals identified in the governors‟ memo.  
Collapsed in 2000. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the national context outlined above and 
the key issues and events in the Northwest that influenced the debates over the various 
governance forms.  It then describes the nature and structure of each of the proposed 
or enacted governance systems. 
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 Social and Political Context 
The Clinton administration‟s approach to the salmon crisis and the goals of the 
ESA set the context for this period immediately following the salmon listings.  In 
passing the ESA, Congress found and declared that “various species of fish, wildlife, 
and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of 
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and 
conservation” and that “these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historic, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people.”  The purposes of the ESA are thus to “provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and 
threatened species” and to meet the provisions of international conservation-related 
treaties and agreements (Endangered Species Act, 1973, section 2).  The ESA carried 
strong, legally enforceable mandates to ensure federal actions would not cause further 
harm to species already on the brink of extinction.   
Bill Clinton campaigned in part on an environmental platform, aggressively 
promoted by vice presidential nominee Al Gore.  Election of the Clinton-Gore 
administration in 1992 raised the hopes of the nation‟s environmental community for a 
reversal of the anti-environmental agenda of the Reagan administration and the 
lackluster environmental record of the George H.W. Bush administration.  However, 
the Clinton administration never quite lived up to environmentalist expectations.  
Faced by Republican majorities in Congress and Clinton‟s personal attention being 
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drawn to other issues, the hoped for renaissance of new environmental policies and 
legislation never materialized (Rosenbaum, 2005).   
Environmental groups did enjoy far greater access to the Clinton 
administration than they had their predecessors (Rosenbaum, 2005).  Once litigation 
commenced over the Northwest ESA salmon listings, environmental groups initiated a 
coordinated campaign to nationalize the issue seeking to exercise influence over the 
government‟s position in court and regional agency decision-making.  The intent was 
to generate political pressure on Congress and the administration to achieve salmon 
policy objectives through the Endangered Species Act and legislative action.  The 
most dramatic of these objectives was partial removal of four federal dams on the 
lower Snake River in order to restore that portion of the river to a more natural 
condition.
123
     
The administration assigned responsibility for coordinating federal salmon 
policy to the president‟s Council on Environmental Policy.  The CEQ was established 
under NEPA.  Among its assigned responsibilities were to develop and promote 
policies to improve environmental quality.  CEQ‟s influence on presidential policy 
enjoyed its zenith under the Carter administration and then suffered a dramatic decline 
in influence during the Reagan and Bush administrations.  Rosenbaum (2005) argues 
that the election of the Clinton administration did not greatly increase CEQ‟s influence 
on policy, despite the hopes of the environmental community.  Rosenbaum writes, 
“[t]he CEQ remains, but it has long ceased to be a major player in White House 
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 These dams were Little Goose, Monumental, Lower Granite, and Ice Harbor, all operated by the 
Corps of Engineers.   
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Politics” (2005, p. 89).  Whereas Rosenbaum‟s argument may be true from a broad 
national perspective, the CEQ came to play an influential role in the Northwest salmon 
issue.   
 
Salient Issues in the Pacific Northwest   
On April 2, 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe petitioned for the listing of 
Snake River sockeye salmon under the Endangered Species Act.  Environmental 
groups soon followed suit, filing petitions for listing of Snake River spring-summer 
and fall runs of chinook salmon and lower Columbia River coho salmon (National 
Research Council, 1996).  Responding to the Shoshone-Bannock petition, NMFS 
listed Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered on November 20, 1991.  More 
listings followed, with NMFS listing Snake River fall and spring-summer chinook as 
threatened on May 22, 1992 (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).   
The listings resulted in the National Marine Fisheries Service assuming a 
dominant role in federal salmon efforts, eventually eclipsing the state-led NPPC effort 
with each additional listing (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).  The ESA listings also 
provided greater advantage for the environmental community and tribes through the 
Act‟s enabling of “citizen suits” by third parties who believed that provisions of the 
ESA were being violated or not carried out.
124
   
The listings thus created conditions that resulted in a series of proposals for 
new governance systems.  Several regional events and circumstances influenced the 
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 See Endangered Species Act, 1973, section 11 (g). 
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debate over the choice of a new governance system.  The biological opinions by 
NMFS regarding the effect of FCRPS operations on listed fish and the lawsuits that 
followed the salmon listings were most prominent.  Additional issues included the 
manner in which the Clinton administration chose to address the salmon issue and 
efforts by the Council to address its weaknesses and retain control over the salmon 
problem.  Each of these issues is discussed in turn. 
The ESA biological opinions and lawsuits. 
NMFS listed fourteen additional species of salmon in the Pacific Northwest 
and along the California Coast following the 1991 Snake River sockeye listing 
(NMFS, 2009a).  The listings were a major disappointment to regional state and 
federal fishery managers.  Up until that point, it was believed that the NPPC fish and 
wildlife program would preclude such an outcome (Blumm and Simrin, 1991; Bodi, 
1995; Wright, 1995).   
In a biological opinion issued in 1992, NMFS determined that the operation of 
the FCRPS would not jeopardize the survival and recovery of the listed salmon.  In 
May 1992, a coalition of environmental, tribes, and fishing groups led by the Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund, sent a 60-day notice of intent to sue under the ESA to 
federal dam operating agencies (Buchal, 1998).  Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit federal 
District Court on August 4, 1992.  Plaintiffs contended that the primary cause of the 
decline of listed salmon was the construction and operation of the region‟s dams.  The 
suit ignited a “legal free-for-all” (Crampton and Espenson, 2009, p. 9) with suits, 
claims, and cross-claims filed by power users, irrigation interests, navigation interests, 
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tribes, sports fishers, commercial fishers, and environmental groups joining the case as 
plaintiffs, plaintiff-interveners, or defendant-interveners.  Litigation proceeded 
through several phases and a series of biological opinions (Crampton and Espenson, 
2009).  NMFS followed its 1992 biological opinion with another in 1993: the court 
found both deficient remanded them back to NMFS.  NMFS voluntarily withdrew its 
third opinion in 1994 in order to reinitiate consultation and revise it.  NMFS issued its 
revised opinion in 1995, which the district and appeals courts upheld (Crampton and 
Espenson, 2009).   
Litigation continues as of this writing.  It is not the intent to capture the full 
history of the litigation here.  What is of interest here is the juxtaposition of interests 
and worldviews and the seemingly incongruous coalitions that formed within the 
litigation crossfire. 
The listings unleashed what Taylor (1999) labels the region‟s “centrifugal 
forces,” forces that had been building for decades.  It is to these forces that Oregon 
Governor Kitzhaber referred when noting the balkanization of the Northwest over the 
salmon issue in his call for a new governance system (O‟Bryant, September 24, 1999). 
  This study groups those forces under three general categories.  These were 
salmon harvesters; the power, irrigation, and navigation interests that commercially 
benefited from the presence of the dams; and environmental interests. 
The region‟s commercial and sports fishery advocates represented salmon 
harvest as an important region‟s history and culture and a rapidly disappearing 
foundation of the economy, although they often clashed over harvest allocations 
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(Taylor, 1999).  Lower river Indian tribes, while sharing a commercial interest in 
harvest, were more concerned with the depleted fish runs‟ impacts on their culture and 
the roles played by salmon in their sense of identity and ways of life.  Although often 
bitterly opposed to the goals and objectives of each other (Taylor, 1999) and often 
litigation adversaries (Pevar, 2002), this three-way harvest community were united in 
their blame of the impacts of the dams as a primary reason for declining fish numbers 
(Taylor, 1999; Robbins, 2004).   
To those dependent on the dam‟s commercial benefits, the dams were symbolic 
of the region‟s economic health and a guarantor of public safety through flood control.  
The electricity produced by the dams provided inexpensive power to fuel the region‟s 
economy; the irrigation system supported the region‟s agricultural community; and 
waterborne navigation provided an inexpensive means to move timber and agricultural 
products to market (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963).  To them, the moralistic 
arguments of the fishery community were a self-serving and disingenuous attempt to 
subsidize an anachronistic fishing industry under pressure from natural changes in 
ocean conditions, rising global competition, and an inability to curb their own historic 
excesses.  As with the members of the fishery community, there were deep 
disagreements among members of the economic development community.  
Nevertheless, they all shared a belief in the economic and symbolic importance of the 
dams and related to them as a sign of the region‟s historic economic development and 
growth potential (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; 
Wilkinson, 2005).   
 270 
 
The third category was the growing interest in restoring naturally viable 
populations of wild fish for their own sake.  This value is embodied in national and 
state environmental protection statutes in general and the Endangered Species Act in 
particular (Dunlap, 1992; Taylor, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2005).  Environmental 
organizations interested in raising national political interest in the case further 
promoted this value.  The ESA‟s emphasis on “esthetic” and “ecological” values is 
consistent with the worldview of the environmental movement.  However, up until the 
1992 lawsuit, ecological values were rarely, if ever, invoked in the regional debate.
125
   
Rather, the debate had previously centered on the commercial interests of those 
whose livelihoods depended upon the dams and those whose livelihoods depended 
upon the fishery harvest.  It was essentially a debate that occurred among adherents to 
a worldview embracing commercial markets and resource commoditization.  Dam 
defenders blamed overfishing, poor hatchery practices, and natural conditions over 
which humans had little control (Buchal, 1998).  Fishery, tribes, and environmental 
groups blamed the existence and operation of the dams (Blumm, et al., 1998).  Taylor 
(1999) cogently summarizes the situation by stating, “…each perspective sees the 
[salmon] problem lying elsewhere” (p. 247).   
The Clinton administration‟s response.     
The environmental community‟s efforts to nationalize the salmon debate 
captured the attention of the Clinton administration.  The administration delegated the 
coordination of the federal response to the Council on Environmental Quality.  The 
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 Ecological restoration, when called for, was advocated in the interest of a means of increasing the 
fishery for purposes of harvest, seldom as a value in its own right.   
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CEQ chair organized a team of departmental assistant- and under-secretary level 
officials from the Department of Army, Department of Interior, Department of 
Agriculture, and Department of Commerce.  Also included were the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Management and Budget, and attorneys from the 
Department of Justice.  This group would eventually be designated the Salmon Policy 
Team (personal knowledge of author).     
Although the Salmon Policy Team would pay close attention to events in the 
Northwest, the administration delegated the lead in devising a solution to the crisis to 
its newly appointed regional administrator for the NMFS‟s Northwest Region, 
William W. Stelle, Jr.  Appointed in 1994, Stelle arrived in the northwest with 
administration backing to preside over development of a revised salmon policy and 
coordinate the actions of the other regional federal agencies.  Whereas during the era 
of the FCRPS‟s development the BPA administrator exerted a leadership role among 
federal agencies, Stelle assumed that role as the agencies struggled to get the FCRPS 
into compliance with the Endangered Species Act (personal knowledge of author).  
Although the biological opinions issued under Stelle stopped short of requiring dam 
breaching, they squarely raised that once unthinkable possibility should other 
mitigation efforts fail to reverse the salmon decline.   
Under Stelle, NMFS issued a new Biological Opinion in 1995 that declared 
jeopardy on listed salmon due to FCRPS operations and called for a series of actions 
and studies under a “spread the risk” strategy.  The intent was to issue a revised 
opinion in 1999 that would address the system‟s most serious issues.  Crampton and 
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Espenson (2009) characterized the period 1995 to 1999 as the “interim” and “sound 
science years” as fisheries scientists, economists, and bureaucrats conducted research 
and compiled information to inform the decisions expected in 1999.  They also 
represent a period where the region reengaged the debate on governance systems in 
order to keep regional decision making out of the courts and within the region (Batt, 
Kitzhaber, Racicot, and Locke, 1998). 
NPPC efforts to regain control of the salmon issue. 
The NPPC continued to function, although its role as salmon restoration leader 
would gradually be eclipsed by the federal government efforts led by NMFS.  In 1995, 
Congress requested, through language in its energy and water appropriations 
legislation, that the Council prepare a report outlining options for more effective 
management of regional salmon conservation efforts.  The Council provided the 
requested report on May 15, 1996.  Upon conclusion of a process that occurred 
between November 1995 and April 1996, involving “extensive discussion” (NPPC, 
1996, p. 4) within the region, the Council reported “widespread agreement” on the 
need for a single fish and wildlife plan as opposed to the multiple plans then in 
existence.  It further called for a responsible, accountable, and transparent decision-
making system for implementation; independent scientific input into decision-making; 
and a watershed-up versus top-down decision-making approach (NPPC, 1996). 
The report offered three general recommendations.  The first called for federal, 
state and tribal fish and wildlife efforts to be consistent with each other.  The report 
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notes improved and constructive collaboration to this effect.
126
  But it goes on to say 
that, if this cooperative effort should fail, either legislation or an executive order 
directing federal implementation of the Council’s program may be needed (emphasis 
added).  The second recommendation was that, if such legislation was needed, the 
Corps, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, NMFS, and 
the Fish and Wildlife Service be required to act consistently with the 1980 Power 
Act‟s Fish and Wildlife Program (again, emphasis added).  Third was a 
recommendation for direct funding by BPA to a monitor and evaluate programs to 
better determine the results of actions undertaken (NPPC, 1996).   
The report also offered a concise and astute summary of the institutional 
challenges that led to so much conflict over governance in the Basin‟s far and recent 
history.  This section of the report opens as follows: 
“The fact that the salmon declines resumed even after passage of the 
Northwest Power Act, the Magnuson Act, the Salmon and Steelhead 
Conservation Act and the U. S. - Canada Salmon Treaty inevitably raises 
questions about the efficacy of these remedial measures.  For purposes of 
this review, it is important to focus specifically on institutional questions 
that arise in fish and wildlife governance on the river” (NPPC, 1996, p. 7, 
emphasis added). 
 
The institutional questions dealt with the limitations on effective planning posed by 
the Council‟s lack of authority over river uses other than power and fish and wildlife, 
the nature of Council membership, the diffusion of responsibility for policy 
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 The structure under which this improved cooperation was occurring was not specified in the report.  
Note that the Regional Forum, discussed below, was only just being established.     
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formulation and implementation among multiple regional entities, and the inability to 
balance Council program needs with those of other agency programs.
127
   
The report goes on to highlight important differences between the requirements 
of the Endangered Species Act and the Power Act.  These include the federal-only, 
internal decision making structure of the ESA versus the open public process of the 
Power Act; the lack of attention to non-listed species under the ESA; the lack of ESA 
consideration for economic and community impacts; and the lack of explicit protection 
of tribal treaty rights in the language of the ESA.  According to the report, these issues 
lead to one of three conclusions:   
“Some conclude that the Endangered Species Act and the Northwest 
Power Act can complement each other, each shoring up the other‟s weak 
points.  From this perspective, the question is not whether one law should 
be implemented at the expense of the other but how to make the two work 
better together.  
 
Others conclude that the Endangered Species Act listings have knocked 
things out of balance.  They argue that regardless of whether the two laws 
could work together in principle, in fact the Endangered Species Act 
dominates decisions on the river and leads to decisions that insufficiently 
reflect the region‟s values and concerns.  These voices do not necessarily 
argue for changes in the Endangered Species Act, but they do suggest that 
the region play a more prominent role in Endangered Species Act 
decisions.   
 
Yet a third possibility is that neither the Endangered Species Act nor the 
Northwest Power Act strikes the right balance among species, ecosystems 
and economic development.  They should be replaced by a single law that 
properly accounts for these interests” (NPPC, 1996, p. 9, emphasis added).  
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 See NPPC, 1996, pp. 7-8 for a complete list and discussion. 
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This analysis implicitly underscored Council and others‟ concern over the potential 
shift in regional decision making from the Council to the federal government resulting 
from the ESA listings.   
The report is relatively modest in its identification of new governance systems.  
It presents five alternative approaches to Basin decision making.  Two specifically 
address governance arrangements; two suggest potential revisions to the Power Act 
and/or ESA; and one suggests merely reinterpreting existing law.  Of the system-
oriented approaches, one called for an inter-agency federal agreement to implement 
the Council‟s program or explain why not.  The other called for replacement of the 
Council with a new entity comprised of state, tribal, and federal representatives 
(NPPC, 1996, Table 1, p. 28).  These recommendations were to find a more definitive 
form in the governance alternatives prepared for the governors‟ memo released to the 
region in 1998.   
Instead of pushing immediately for new systems and structures, the Council‟s 
report outlines recently adopted processes and procedures and asks that they be given 
time to mature.  Among the recently adopted measures identified in the report was 
creation of a revised charter in 1994 for the Independent Science Group, first 
established in 1992.  Another was the implementation in 1995 of a prioritization 
process to align proposed fish and wildlife projects within a prescribed budget.  Yet 
another was the recent creation of the Regional Forum (NPPC, 1996).  In substance 
and tone, the Report presented a thoughtful, insightful, and guardedly optimistic status 
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of the governance and salmon recovery situations.  Current institutional arrangements 
should thus be allowed to continue pending evidence of failure.    
 
Resulting Governance Systems   
The optimism of the Council‟s 1996 Report did not last long.  The 
collaborative framework hoped for in the NPPC report and embodied in the NMFS‟ 
Regional Forum collapsed in 1997.  Frustration over the lack of progress led to 
Oregon Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new governance system later that year, the call 
that sparked establishment of the Columbia River Basin Forum as recounted in 
Chapter 1.  The Council offered a leadership role in the development and 
dissemination of alternative governance structures for consideration by the public, 
albeit by ignoring the institutional questions they so carefully presented in 1996 and 
focusing instead on legislative proposals to expand the scope of the 1980 Power Act 
(NPPC, 1996).   
The limitations of the NPPC (Hemmingway, 1983; Ogden, 1997; Blumm and 
Simrin, 1991) and ESA inspired lawsuits and listings caused many to rethink the 
options for regional governance.  Industrial groups and political leaders felt the 
economic benefits enjoyed by the region‟s inexpensive hydropower were seriously at 
risk and sought ways to prevent its loss.  Multiple proposals were put forward, with 
new efforts at joint federal-state-tribal decision making enacted.    
The nine Governance systems proposed following the salmon listings included 
creation of a committee of federal and state fishery managers under the auspices of the 
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Council, a Regional Implementation Forum called for in NMFS‟ 1995 biological 
opinion, a new call for a valley authority, Governor Kitzhaber‟s proposed “Three 
Sovereigns” process, various proposals to revise and expand the Council, and the 
Columbia River Basin Forum.   
 Fish Operations Executive Committee. 
Following NFMS‟ 1991 and 1992 ESA listings of Snake River fish, the 
Council released its 1992 Fish and Wildlife Program.  Section 3 of that program called 
for creation of a Fish Operations Executive Committee (FOEC) to be comprised of 
“senior management representatives of the Council, as well as power and fishery 
interests.”  In practice, the FOEC seems to have adopted the membership and 
functions of the previous COFO (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 
1996).
128
  The Council‟s 1994 program carried forward the language of section 3.  
Under both plans, the FOEC was to produce a detailed implementation plan for and 
resolve conflicts concerning such issues as flow, spill, juvenile fish transportation, fish 
passage, and other “mainstem passage matters” as found in various regional plans and 
programs (NPPC, 1992 and 1994/95).  FOEC was a creation of the Council, and, 
therefore, viewed by the Council as subordinate to it.  This changed with NMFS‟ 1995 
Biological Opinion and establishment of the Regional Implementation Forum. 
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 The Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996, also mentions a “Water Budget 
Implementation Work Group” that succeeded COFO.  Other than this passing reference, even less 
information on this Work Group was found in the sources reviewed for this study than was found for 
COFO.  Consequently, it is not included as a governance system.  
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 The Regional Implementation Forum (Regional Forum). 
In his 1994 court ruling, Judge Malcolm Marsh struck down NMFS‟ 1993 
biological opinion, declaring that “the process is seriously flawed, significantly 
flawed” in that it favored the status quo of river operations through small incremental 
actions and that “The situation literally cries out for a major overhaul” (Marsh, quoted 
in Crampton and Espenson, 2009, p. 110).  In response, NMFS issued a revised BiOp 
in March 1995.  In addition to its enhanced biological provisions and spread-the-risk 
strategy, the new BiOp called for an adaptive management structure involving states, 
tribes, and federal agencies (NMFS, 1995; Crampton and Espenson, 2009).   
This system envisioned an “Executive Committee” consisting of top policy 
makers from the regional federal agencies, state governors‟ offices, and tribal 
governments.  Unlike the FOEC, which was organized under the Power and 
Conservation Council, NMFS regional administrator Will Stelle chaired this 
committee.  The Executive Committee introduced a new model of governance to the 
Columbia Basin.  Previous governance system membership was limited to federal 
agencies and representatives from the state governors‟ offices.  The Regional Forum 
was the first system to seat the tribes, states, and federal governments as co-managing 
equals, albeit with a limited focus on implementation of the 1995 biological opinion.   
Under the Executive Committee was an “Implementation Team” comprised of 
senior managers and policy advisors from the same entities as represented on the 
Executive Committee.  The Implementation Team subsumed the membership of the 
FOEC (Mainstem Operations Work Group Revised Draft, 1996).  Although the 
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membership was unchanged, this revised organization was now answerable to the 
federal agencies under the auspices of the Endangered Species Act as opposed to the 
Council under the authorities of the 1980 Power Act.   
Under the Implementation Team were three technical teams.  The Technical 
Management Team (TMT), comprised of staff from participating entities, served to 
advise the dam operators on day-to-day operations.  TMT members could submit 
systems operating requests to the action agencies, which could be negotiated or taken 
under advisement.  If the TMT members could not agree on the operation, they 
referred the issue up to the Implementation Team.  Disagreements within the 
Implementation team were in turn referred to the Executive Committee.  The other 
two technical teams consisted of a Systems Configuration Team to recommend and 
assist in prioritizing physical changes to the dams and a Water Quality Team to 
address dam-related issues of water temperature and dissolved gas (Interim 
Procedures, 1997; Crampton and Espenson, 2009). 
Participation for all parties was voluntary, and the Regional Forum did not 
impose any obligations on individual agency decision-making beyond the provisions 
of the 1995 BiOp.  As such, it had no decision-making authority beyond items upon 
which the parties could agree (Crampton and Espenson, 2009). 
The lack of authority was a source of friction among some parties.  Others 
criticized the Forum for its lack of clear guidelines, its lack of participation by the 
public, the erratic attendance by participants, its lack of a dispute resolution 
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mechanism, and, finally, the little or no explanation offered regarding resulting 
decisions (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
129
 
Judge Marsh ruled in favor of the 1995 BiOp in 1997, albeit with a large 
degree of pessimism over whether it would work.
130
  This ruling in effect shifted the 
locus of salmon recovery planning away from the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife 
Program and to NMFS‟s BiOp provisions and the implementation-oriented Regional 
Forum (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).   
The Regional Forum‟s executive structure did not last.  Suspicious of Oregon, 
NMFS, and tribal designs on water from upriver reservoirs and lacking the confidence 
in NMFS‟ Regional Forum to “integrate the needs of Snake River salmon with other 
resource needs,” Montana withdrew from the Executive Committee shortly after 
Marsh issued his ruling.  Montana held that the Power and Conservation Planning 
Council was the more appropriate forum with which to address resource management 
issues.  A month later the lower river tribes (Nez Perce, Yakama Nation, Confederated 
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and Confederated Tribes of the Warm 
Springs Indian Reservation) followed Montana, stating that the NMFS process was 
flawed in that it failed to properly recognize tribal sovereignty and treaty rights.  The 
tribes also objected to the use of technical committees to resolve operating issues 
instead of the government-to-government consultations they felt were obligated by the 
                                                 
129
 Criticism over procedures, transparency, and dispute resolution would be partially answered in a set 
of interim operating procedures produced in 1997 and a revised set of guidelines agreed to in 2002. 
 
130
 American Rivers and other plaintiffs appealed Marsh‟s ruling to the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals in January, 1999.  The Appeals Court issued its opinion later that year, upholding Marsh.  See 
Crampton and Espenson, 2009, pp. 34-35.   
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treaties.  Despite the collapse of the Executive Committee, the Implementation Team 
and technical teams continued to meet and advise on day-to-day operations and policy 
issues (Crampton and Espenson, 2009).
131
  The federal members of the Executive 
Committee continued to meet occasionally, however, to resolve disputes elevated from 
the Implementation Team and to discuss interagency issues related to BiOp 
implementation (personal experience of author).   
The Regional Forum was a significant departure from past governance systems 
in that it invited direct participation by tribal leaders in discussions with state and 
federal leaders over Basin decisions.  The context of those discussions was the 
Endangered Species Act listings, with NMFS retaining final jurisdictional decision 
authority over ESA related issues.  Despite its short tenure, the state-tribal-federal 
structure of Executive Committee would inspire further attempts at joint sovereign 
decision-making.  The departure of Montana and the tribes from the Forum‟s 
Executive Committee was the proximate cause of Governor Kitzhaber‟s call for a new, 
“Three Sovereigns” process.  While that proposal gained momentum, other 
governance models were being proposed as well.   
 Columbia River Administration (CVA III). 
In 1997, Dan Ogden presented a paper calling for a new structure capable of 
comprehensive river basin planning and authoritative governance.  His proposal was 
                                                 
131
 These teams continued to meet up until 2009, at which time the Implementation Team was abolished 
and the technical teams subsumed into the Regional Implementation Oversight Group (RIOG).  As the 
RIOG was established after the period covered in this report it will not be further discussed here 
(personal knowledge of author).   
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sweeping in its scope, offering a nationwide framework for restructuring national 
resource management.
132
  Consistent with the Hoover Commission‟s recommendation 
in 1948 and McKinley‟s in 1952, Ogden recommended consolidation of federal 
resource management agencies into one department.  This consolidation would include 
all bureaus within the Department of Interior, the civil works function of the Corps of 
Engineers, the Department of Energy, the Forest Service, the Small Watershed 
program of the National Resources Conservation Service, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
(including NMFS), elements of the Coast Guard, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.  
They would be combined into a newly created Department of Natural Resources.   
The new department would be internally organized along functional lines at the 
departmental level.  Subordinate field bureaus would be organized on a watershed 
basis, with an “Administration” for each major river basin.  He specifically proposed a 
Columbia River Administration, encompassing both the drainage area of the Columbia 
plus Northwest coastal streams and rivers.  The chief of the Administration would be a 
career civil servant with responsibility to “plan and manage the river, and also smaller 
basins, for all purpose in a carefully balanced, multiple purpose manner” (p. 16).  
States, tribes, organized interest groups and other interested parties were to participate 
through a permanently established advisory council.  He called upon Congress to 
reorganize its committee structure accordingly.   
                                                 
132
 It is not clear if Ogden prepared this paper with knowledge of the Congressional request to the 
Council for new governance proposals or whether it was prepared in response to the Council‟s 1996 
report.   
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Ogden‟s proposal was, in effect, a resurrection of the valley authority concept 
the region consistently in years past.  Although Ogden presented his proposal at 
several public forums at which he was respectfully received (personal experience of 
author), his idea garnered apparently even less support than had previous valley 
authority efforts.  It is not clear whether the Council formally considered his 
recommendation when they pulled together their 1998 governance alternatives in 
response to Governor Kitzhaber‟s 1997 Three Sovereigns proposal.  Regardless, 
neither Ogden‟s Columbia River Administration nor any other valley authority 
proposal was included among the Council‟s proposed governance alternatives.133    
Ironically, his proposal did an arguably better job of addressing the seven institutional 
questions identified in the Council‟s 1996 report to Congress, although perhaps 
inadvertently, than most of the Council‟s own proposals. 
 The Three Sovereigns Process and Columbia Basin River Forum. 
As recounted in Chapter 1, Governor Kitzhaber proposed his Three Sovereigns 
process in October 1997 (Crampton, 1998, October 16).  Chapter 1 of this study 
covered the ensuing process, culminating in the signing of the Columbia River Basin 
Forum Memorandum of Agreement in January 1999, in detail.   
Recall from Chapter 1 that, as the draft CRBF MOA was about to be released 
for public comment, power, agriculture, and other river user interests criticized the 
Three Sovereigns process as being poorly defined and lacking in non-governmental 
participation.  In response to these criticisms, the Council developed and presented 
                                                 
133
 Not surprising, given the regional governors‟ historic opposition to any valley authority system.  
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five alternatives for governance reform.  A letter “to interested parties” jointly released 
by the governors of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana on July 15, 1998 
forwarded the alternatives for regional consideration and discussion.  The five options 
were entitled (1) The Three Sovereigns, (2) an expansion of Council membership to 
include the tribes, (3) a Regional Resource Council, (4) a Northwest Rivers 
Commission, and (5) a Comprehensive River Agency (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and 
Locke, 1998).
 134
  Three of the proposals were sketchy at best.  None, as written, 
addressed all of the very profound governance challenges within the region outlined in 
the Council‟s 1996 report.135  All emphasize a greatly increased state and modestly 
increased tribal role in decision-making.  In effect, the proposals represented an effort 
by the Council and regional fishery managers to move decision-making away from the 
federally centric ESA BiOp related process, represented by the now federal-agency 
heavy Regional Forum, and back to either a statutorily enhanced Council or a 
muscled-up replacement.   
 Council alternative 1: the Three Sovereigns. 
The intent of this system was to establish a “principal-level forum” consisting 
of four states, thirteen tribes, and one federal representative.
136
  A senior staff level 
                                                 
134
 The paper Models for Columbia River Governance was distributed under the governors‟ letter dated 
July 15
th
, 1998 but is archived separately on the NPPC website.  The letter is found at 
http://www.nwppc.org/fw/3sov; the Models attachment at http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/3sov/ 
models.htm. 
 
135
 This statement refers to the proposals as written.  Presumably, the authors of those documents would 
disagree with this characterization.  This could be confirmed through interviews with those authors. 
  
136
 Presumably, these principals were envisioned to be the four governors, the chairs of the tribal 
governments, and a DC level federal member, perhaps the Chair of the President‟s Council on 
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committee consisting of four state, four tribal, and four federal representatives would 
support the principals group.  This system required no change in existing law and was 
to be established by memorandum of agreement signed by participating sovereigns.  
The proposal envisions “collaborative decision-making” plus “different approaches for 
different issues and processes” without specifying what those approaches might be.  In 
making its decisions, the sovereigns recognize the ultimate “decision-makers‟ legal 
obligations” inferring that the principal forum could not require federal agencies to do 
anything contrary to their federal statutory obligations (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and 
Locke, 1998, quotes from p. 3 of the Models attachment).  This model is essentially 
the same as “Approach 1” identified in the Council‟s 1996 report to Congress (NPPC, 
1996, table 1, p. 28). 
This proposal addressed the problems for which the Regional Forum‟s 
Executive Committee was first envisioned.  It called for participants to unify the 
multiple fish and wildlife recovery plans then vying for attention, including a salmon 
recovery plan produced by CRITFC entitled the Spirit of the Salmon, the NMFS draft 
1994 recovery plan for Snake River fish stocks, and the Council‟s 1994 Fish and 
Wildlife Program.  Somewhat naively, given the recent experience of the Regional 
Forum, this proposal was based on the that the assumption “that shared information, 
process and commitment to finding solutions will foster consensus….If the Three 
Sovereigns agree on a recommendation, the recommendation will continue to carry 
significant weight” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, quotation from Models 
                                                                                                                                            
Environmental Quality.  The proposal, however, did not specify.  See Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and 
Locke, 1998, model option 1. 
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attachment, p. 4).  As discussed in Chapter 1, the CRBF MOA incorporated this 
general approach.  The Council‟s Three Sovereigns option required no legislative 
changes, implying that ultimate decision-making, in the absence of consensus, would 
remain with the agency or entity holding jurisdiction over the issue at hand (Batt, 
Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 1). 
 Council alternative 2: expansion of Council membership to Indian tribes. 
This option called for the governors to appoint tribal members to the Council.  
This alternative proposed no changes to the Council‟s state makeup as specified under 
the 1980 Power Act.  Rather, the proposal expanded Council membership to include 
appointments made “from the ranks of the region‟s tribes” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, 
and Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 5).   
This proposal explicitly assumed that the primary problem with the existing 
Council was its lack of participation by the tribes.  It called for no changes to the 
Power Act and assumed that existing Council authorities are sufficient to facilitate 
collaborative efforts.  It made no provision for federal participation, and was silent as 
to how including tribal participation would address issues with federal agency 
discretionary decision-making.  In this, it ignored several of the profound governance 
issues identified in its 1996 report to Congress (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 
1998, Models option 2). 
 Council alternative 3: the Regional Resources Council. 
The Regional Resources Council alternative envisioned a “more broadly 
representative and authoritative new council” that would replace the Power and 
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Conservation Council.  This proposal is very similar to the Council‟s “Approach 3” 
alternative in its 1996 report excepting the new Council‟s role under the ESA.  The 
1996 report stated that an “expanded council” would exercise unspecified 
“Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power Act responsibilities” (NPPC, 1996, 
table 1, p. 28).  Under the 1998 proposal, this new council would “participate in 
federal agency consultations under the Endangered Species Act, not supplanting 
existing federal agency authorities, but ensuring the council an opportunity to assert a 
system-wide perspective in hydropower operations” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and 
Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 7).   
This new council would be authorized by revisions to federal statue and/or a 
congressionally approved interstate compact to develop “an integrated resource plan to 
offset the effects of the hydropower facilities on anadromous fish, resident fish and 
wildlife in the Columbia River Basin.”  The council would “integrate fish and wildlife 
obligations, power system operations, energy conservation and resource needs” (Batt, 
Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 5).  Unstated 
was whether the council would also influence other federal water resource issues such 
as harvest, hatcheries, flood control, irrigation, navigation, and water supply.   
Membership would consist of “some number of state and tribal 
representatives” with a super-majority vote required for major decisions.  Federal 
agencies, though not members, would be required to “act in a manner consistent with 
the resource council‟s integrated resource plan, as Bonneville is now obliged to do 
under the Northwest Power Act.”  The proposal stated that this authority would be 
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limited, however, due to the need to comply with federal law, with no federal agency 
required to contravene its legal authorities.  In this, the proposal addressed the 
criticism that federal agencies frequently ignored the NPPC Fish and Wildlife program 
provisions (Blumm and Simrin, 1991).  The council would be an entity unto itself, 
developing its own program based on its own analysis as opposed to the current 
Council‟s requirement to develop its program based on recommendations from fish 
and wildlife agencies and tribes.  The Regional Resource Council would fund its 
program by overseeing federal funds from whatever source (both appropriated and 
ratepayer generated) and federal project expenditures were to be consistent with the 
overall plan (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 3). 
 Council alternative 4: the Northwest Rivers Commission.    
This proposal called for a ten-person Northwest Rivers Commission comprised 
of two governor appointed members from each state and two tribal members 
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.  An advisory council would assist through 
establishment of subcommittees oriented on river operations, fish resources and 
facilities (presumably hatcheries), fish harvest, agriculture and irrigation, and public 
lands management.     
This commission would assume most Endangered Species Act functions, to 
include making jeopardy determinations, developing recovery plans, approving 
incidental take permits, and developing habitat conservation plans.  It is not clear from 
the proposal if this Commission would replace the Power and Conservation Council or 
operate alongside of it.  It is also not clear if the commission would assume the 
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responsibilities of the Power Act.
137
  It sees the primary problem facing the region as 
the manner in which federal agencies implement the ESA, and suggests that a joint 
state-tribal entity could do better.   
The proposal did not explain why four states should be given eight 
representatives to the commission while the thirteen basin tribes are limited to only 
two.  Nor does it explain how ESA responsibilities would be transferred from NMFS 
and the Fish and Wildlife Service to the commission.  It does not provide a role for 
federal agencies; presumably, they would participate in the advisory and technical 
subcommittees and, in effect, become implementers of decisions rendered by the 
commission (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 4). 
Council alternative 5: a Comprehensive River Agency. 
Although entitled “A Comprehensive Agency,” this proposal was in effect a 
modified river basin commission, patterned after the Delaware River Basin 
Commission.  Unlike the more expansive Pacific Northwest River Basins 
Commission, participation would be limited to the states of Oregon, Idaho, 
Washington, and Montana and “one or more” presidentially appointed federal 
representatives.  The tribes would be afforded membership, although the allocation of 
tribal seats was not specified.  This new river agency would prepare long range and 
annual plans recognizing the “hydrologically and ecologically integrated” nature of 
the river system (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models attachment, p. 9).   
                                                 
137
 The proposal somewhat ambiguously states that “it is possible that the Northwest Power Planning 
Council could comprise the eight state members of the commission” (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and 
Locke, 1998, quote from Models attachment, p. 9). 
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Federal law would apply to the river agency as if it were a federal agency.  
This represented a substantial change from the 1980 Power Act that specifically 
described the Council as not being a federal entity.  Unlike the other models, this one 
focuses on “broad and evolving” interests in the river and would not focus solely on 
fish and wildlife issues.  The alternative did not specify the role of the federal 
agencies, again implying that they act to implement the river agency‟s plans and 
decisions (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998, Models option 5). 
  
Chapter Summary 
Events surrounding the first ESA listings and the impacts on Basin governance 
can be summarized as follows: 
 The initial salmon listings under the ESA precipitated a bevy of legal and 
administrative actions, including four biological opinions from NMFS and five 
court challenges.  They also resulted in an institutional tug of war over whether 
regional decision-making would reside in systems designed around the 
federally centric ESA or state centric Power Act (Crampton and Espenson, 
2009). 
  The limitations of the NPPC and the ESA inspired listings and lawsuits caused 
a rethinking of options for regional governance (Hemmingway, 1983; Ogden, 
1997; Blumm and Simrin, 1991).   
 Under its 1995 BiOp, NMFS established a “Regional Forum” to oversee the 
implementation of BiOp provisions.  This Forum consisted of an Executive 
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Committee comprised of leaders from federal agencies and regional state and 
tribal governments.  It was supported by a policy level Implementation Team 
and three technical teams.  Although the Executive Committee dissolved with 
the departure of Montana and the four lower river tribes in 1997, the rest of the 
system continued to operate into 2009 (NMFS, 1995a; Interim Procedures, 
1997; Crampton and Espenson, 2009). 
 In 1995, Congress requested a review of regional governance systems by the 
Power and Conservation Council.  The Council‟s ensuing report identified 
seven “institutional questions” upon which any governance proposal would 
need to focus.  Rather than call for immediate changes to existing 
arrangements, the Council‟s report highlighted recent advances in regional 
cooperation and recommended that the new tools and processes be given a 
chance to work.  If success was not achieved, changes to legislation and 
structure may become necessary (NPPC, 1996). 
 In response to the collapse of the Regional Forum Executive Committee, 
Governor Kitzhaber proposed a “Three Sovereigns” process for regional 
decision-making (Crampton, 1998, October 16).   
 Opposition to the government-only nature of the original Three Sovereigns 
proposal by river users prompted a regional discussion, led by the Power and 
Conservation Council, to identify governance alternatives.  The Council 
identified five, forwarded to the region under a letter signed by the governors 
of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Washington in July 1998.  All of the 
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Council‟s proposals were state centric, with varying degrees of federal and 
tribal involvement.  As a result, none fully addressed the seven “institutional 
questions” the Council identified in its 1996 report to Congress.  Several called 
for legislative changes to the 1980 Power Act and/or the Endangered Species 
Act (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998).   
 In 1997, Dan Ogden prepared a proposal for a Columbia River Administration, 
essentially resurrecting the valley authority concept last promoted in 1949 
(Ogden, 1997).  The Council and governors‟ 1998 letter to the region did not 
include this proposal (Batt, Racicot, Kitzhaber, and Locke, 1998).    
Instead of uniting regional decision-making under one structure, the turmoil 
caused by the lawsuits and sequence of biological opinions resulted in three coexisting 
systems.  These were the continuation of the Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council as first envisioned under the 1980 Power Act, the establishment and 
continuation of the Regional Forum minus its originally envisioned Executive 
Committee, and the fledgling Columbia River Basin Forum.    
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CHAPTER 8 
FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 
Introduction  
This study report began by introducing the following seeming paradox in 
Columbia Basin governance as illustrated by the Columbia River Basin Forum 
(CRBF) experience: whereas prominent northwest political and institutional leaders 
believed some form of regional governance system necessary, those same leaders 
failed to enact systems with the decision-making authority necessary to resolve the 
issues that led them to think such systems were needed in the first place.  The study 
study sought to determine why this phenomenon seemed to repeatedly occur. 
This study investigated this paradox using an historical approach.  It used the 
institutions involved in the development and implementation of Basin governance 
systems as its unit of analysis.  The institutions examined included Basin Indian tribes, 
federal and state agencies, and private enterprises involved with land and water use, 
river infrastructure development, and the salmon fishery within the geographic area of 
the Columbia River Basin.  The report emphasized the role of federal agencies in the 
interest of time and given the scope of federal responsibility for management of Basin 
resources.   
Research proceeded through three steps.  The first step documented the history 
of the rise, operation, and collapse of the CRBF.  Chapter 1 presented the results of 
that effort.  From this came a research framework around which a history of Basin 
governance was constructed.  The components of that framework were the events or 
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circumstances that created the opportunity for change to existing systems and 
structures; the governance systems proposed or enacted in response to the perceived 
changes in circumstance; the locus of decision making for each governance system 
proposed or enacted; the political and social context surrounding the points in time at 
which change occurred; salient Northwest issues;  the institutional participants; and the 
positions, interests, agendas and general worldviews held by the institutional 
participants.  
The second step used that framework develop an institution-level historical 
overview of past Basin governance efforts primarily relying on previously published 
work.  Chapters 3 through 7 provided the results. 
The third step inductively analyzed the findings from the historical record to 
identify the themes and conclusions as may be relevant in explaining the Basin‟s past 
approaches to governance and inform future governance decisions.  This chapter 
presents those findings and conclusions.   
The subsequent five sections present the study‟s findings organized under the 
following headings:  
 The complexities of Columbia Basin governance. 
 The role of law and legal structure. 
 Columbia Basin governance systems and models. 
 Patterns of change between systems and models. 
 The regional preference for collaboration-oriented systems. 
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The study‟s conclusions follow the findings.  A closing section introduces a theoretical 
framework to address the limitations of the institutional approach and guide further 
research. 
  
The Complexities of Columbia Basin Governance 
Each enacted system had to address a wide array of substantive and structural 
issues, issues that rendered any effort at governance an enormously complex 
undertaking.  The success and longevity of each enacted system was to a large degree 
dependent on how they chose to address these issues.  These issues are summarized 
below under the following headings: 
 The scope of substantive issues to be addressed. 
 The legacy effects of the region‟s settlement and development. 
 Structural issues. 
 The impact of differing worldviews. 
The scope of Columbia Basin management issues. 
In one sense, the scope of Basin governance grew easier over the years.  The 
primary focus of the Basin‟s first governance system was planning.  The original 
purpose of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC, 
established 1934) was to create comprehensive long-range plans for development and 
management of all basin resources to foster economic growth.  The array of issues 
addressed by the PNWRPC included hydropower development, agriculture, ranching, 
water use, mining, land use, navigation, flood control, and recreation (Bessey, 1963; 
 296 
 
Vogel, 2007).  Consequently, the scope of planning potentially touched the interests of 
just about every institution in the Basin.   
This vision of multipurpose planning continued with establishment of the 
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC) and Pacific Northwest River 
Basins Commission (PNWRBC).  However, this broad-scope approach to planning 
came to an abrupt end with the termination of the PNWRBC by executive order in 
1981 (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  In its place came the state led Pacific 
Northwest Electrical Power Planning and Conservation Council (NPPC) and later the 
federally led Regional Forum.  The Council‟s mandate under the 1980 Power Act was 
limited to power planning and development of a fish and wildlife program (Power Act, 
1980; Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; NPPC, 1996) whereas the Regional Forum 
concentrated on the effects of the hydropower system on salmon and steelhead listed 
under the Endangered Species Act (NMFS, 1995; NPPC, 1996).  In effect, holistic 
regional planning became “easier” because the region simply stopped doing it.  
Multijurisdictional governance entities took up planning for discrete resource domains 
such as fish and power only to the degree mandated under law.
138
  Planning for those 
domains not so mandated (agriculture, grazing, mining, recreation, hunting, timber, 
water) were left to the discretion of those state, federal, tribal or private institutions 
under whose control they lay.          
                                                 
138
 Other examples include the management of timber under the Northwest Forest Plan due to the ESA 
listing of spotted owls and the management of state-tribal harvest under the US v. Oregon process.  
Both of these examples, however, are outside the scope of this study. 
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As the scope of Basinwide planning decreased the scope of Basin operations 
became much more complicated.  The 1990s saw a culmination of a long-building and 
profound shift in the focus of FCRPS operations.  Planning for and construction of the 
dams in the 1930s focused primarily on the commercial benefits of electrical power, 
irrigation, flood control, and navigation.  However, over time, operations to mitigate 
the dams‟ impact on fish and wildlife gradually assumed an ever-increasing share of 
budget, time, and staff from FCRPS management agencies.  It also gradually assumed 
an ever-increasing dominance on the governance agenda (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, 
c.1970).   
Meanwhile, the region‟s demographic and economic growth resulted in 
increased demands for electrical power, water, recreation, and transportation.  National 
and global growth increased demand for regional timber and minerals.  Absent a 
mechanism for holistic long-range resource planning to guide development, the 
challenge of balancing competing demands was left to operational managers.  The 
challenge of operational governance over the conflict between the commercial benefits 
provided by Basin dams and their impact on fish became one of the region‟s most 
pronounced. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Indian Affairs, commercial fishermen, 
and tribes first raised concerns over the impact of dams on salmon in the 1940s.  
Requests from Department of Interior and fishery and tribal interests for a moratorium 
on dam construction until the impacts on salmon runs could be further studied were 
denied.  These initial efforts by fishery and tribal interests failed to halt or delay plans 
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for further dam construction, especially following the devastation of the May Day 
flood in 1946 (McKinley, 1952; Robbins, 2004).     
Early river development agencies anticipated (although badly underestimated) 
the impact that the envisioned system of dams would have on fish runs.  The Corps of 
Engineers included adult and juvenile passage facilities as part of the initial design for 
Bonneville and subsequent dams on the Columbia and its tributaries (Arndt, Stroud, 
and Mogren, 2004).
139
  The Corps and other development interests believed these 
technical adaptations, coupled with agreements to improve habitat in the lower 
Columbia River and the construction of hatcheries, to be enough (McKinley, 1952; 
Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999).      
As the years progressed and the toll that dams and other Basin commercial 
development enacted on fish became clearer, the Corps, BPA, and other agencies 
made additional investments in mitigation.  They improved fish bypass facilities, 
barged juvenile fish around the dams, restored habitat, constructed hatcheries, reduced 
predation, adjusted flow and spill, and took other actions at the expense of hydropower 
production.  By the late 1990s, Council and agency programs were spending millions 
of dollars each year in to mitigate the effects of the dams.  Frustration mounted, 
however, as these investments failed to reverse the downward spiral in numbers of 
                                                 
139
 Fish passage facilities were ultimately included in all federal and nonfederal mainstem dams in the 
Columbia and Snake Rivers except Grand Coulee and Hells Canyon.  The early efforts were 
rudimentary and often not particularly effective – especially for juvenile fish passage.  However, as 
studies were made and the lessons learned applied to each succeeding generation of projects, salmon 
survival improved.  See Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004. 
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returning fish (Buchal, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Arndt, Stroud, and Mogren, 2004; 
Williams 2006). 
Furthermore, the bevy of environmental legislation enacted in the 1960s and 
1970s meant FCRPS operators had to contend with a slew of new environmentally 
oriented regulations and requirements affecting more than just fish.  The 1996 report 
to Congress prepared by the Northwest Power and Conservation Council and the 2004 
Government Accounting Office report illustrated just how complex operations had 
become.  Both reports delineated the region‟s federal, state, and tribal institutional 
actors and myriad laws, treaties, executive orders, court decisions, and operating plans 
and programs that defined and guided agency responsibilities (NPPC, 1996; GAO, 
2004).    
Adding to this complexity is the fact that dealing with standing and new 
governance challenges is more than an intellectual exercise in rational analysis of 
objective data to solve the current problem of the day.  The multiple institutions 
charged with managing the Basin‟s resources and the constituencies dependent upon 
them have interests and perspectives shaped by their respective histories.  The legacy 
effects of the region‟s settlement hold strong influence over the way current issues and 
problems are perceived, rationalized, and addressed. 
The legacy effects of regional settlement and development. 
Settlers arriving in the Northwest in the mid to late 1800s almost exclusively 
immigrated from the American Midwest.  Many carried with them a belief in the 
American political system as divinely ordained.  They saw the resources of the land as 
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a gift given presented by Providence to secure individual liberty through the 
generation of individual wealth and to promote social virtue through hard work and 
self-reliance.  National policy further enabled this belief through its focus on on 
putting public land and natural resources into private hands for beneficial use 
(Conover, 1923; Cameron, 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986).   
The settlers that flowed into the Northwest in the 19
th
 century dispersed 
throughout the region, creating a few large cities and numerous small towns.  Isolated, 
“island” communities developed with early economies centered on agriculture, 
ranching, or resource extraction (Lyman, 1963/1917; Wiebe, 1967; Dodds, 1986; 
Vogel, 2007).  A Protestant-market-capitalist worldview dominated, modified by 
unique attitudes toward western land and resources and a self-confidence bred by 
surviving the arduous move westward (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 
1986; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Hays, 1999/1959; Kline, 2000; Weber, 
2002/1920; Wilkinson, 2005; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 
2006). 
This worldview coupled with the dispersed nature of the settlements fostered a 
localist approach to decision-making.  Communities and private businesses exercised a 
great deal of autonomy in determining what they were going to do and how they were 
going to do it.  This sense of localism pervaded the region and became well 
entrenched.  The key point for the purpose of this study is that the dispersed nature of 
regional communities, the self-confidence of the population, the belief in resource 
development as a means to foster social virtue, and a tradition of localism combined to 
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breed a suspicion of and resistance to strong centralized government, centralized 
planning, and centralized decision-making
140
 (Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986; Wilkinson, 
1992; Vogel, 2007).    
The historic pattern of regional settlement affected the legacies of government 
agencies as well.  The new arrivals found the Northwest to be rich in natural resources.  
They saw opportunities to make their fortunes through timber, agriculture, ranching, 
fisheries, or mining.  Exploitation of these resources was driven by a “legend of 
inexhaustibility,” the lack a perceived need for effective regulation, moral attitudes 
regarding the role of development in promoting social virtue, and simple greed.  The 
federal and state governments established agencies to support national, regional, and 
state economic development (Cameron, 1928 and 1929; Lyman, 1963/1917; Dodds, 
1986; Wilkinson, 1992; Robbins, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, 
Stanford, and Williams, 2006).  Local interests and private corporations working alone 
or in partnership with state and federal agencies and appropriate congressional 
committees emerged as “iron triangle”-type governance structures for natural resource 
management (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Clarke and McCool, 1996).  These clusters 
of relationships among agencies, local interests, and congressional committees 
developed into relatively autonomous island communities of policy with little cross-
agency coordination or planning and frequent conflict over turf and congressional 
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 The structure of the state governments reflects this regional aversion to strong centralized authority.  
Many Northwest state agencies and institutions, rather than reporting directly to the governor, either 
report to an appointed board of citizens or are elected in their own right.  Consequently, Northwest 
governors hold limited direct authority over many state agencies. 
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attention (Cameron, 1928; McKinley, 1952; Steen, 1976; Shallat, 1994; Clarke and 
McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002).   
The physical isolation of communities, the nation‟s laissez fare attitude toward 
private business, and the political insularity of federal policy and agency establishment 
resulted in Northwest institutions putting down strong roots and achieving a large 
measure of economic and political strength.  Powerful private and public institutions 
developed around water, land use, fisheries, agriculture, ranching, timber, river 
navigation, irrigation, and – eventually – hydropower.  Whereas national Progressive 
era ideals of sustainable use and management of public resources for the public good 
were very much part of the national political debate, these ideals made relatively few 
inroads against the prevailing belief in private markets and laissez faire in the 
Northwest until the early 1930s (Hays, 1957; Hays, 1990/1959; McKinley, 1952; 
Johansen, 1967; Steen, 1976; Norwood, c.1981; Cortner and Moote 1999; Billington 
et al., 2005).    
As a result, the region‟s institutions were well entrenched when proposals for 
multi-domain governance entities with more holistic planning and operational 
responsibilities and authorities were first made.  Many eventually recognized the value 
of working together to further common purposes or to preclude imposition of a 
stronger governance form that may work against institutional prerogatives (McKinley, 
1952; Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  Examples include the alignment of private 
and public electrical utilities in signing the Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement 
under the single utility concept (Pope, 2008) and the creation of the Columbia Basin 
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Inter-Agency Committee to better coordinate federal responsibilities (Scheufele, 
c.1970).  The recognized need for institutional cooperation grew as institutional 
interests and issues expanded and intertwined.   
However, this growing recognition of the value of institutional cooperation did 
not extend to surrendering institutional prerogatives in the interest of more efficient 
decision-making.  The conflictual desires for better coordination and retention of 
institutional decision authority greatly complicated the design of governance system 
structures. 
The challenges of structure. 
Giddens (1984) refers to the formal and normative rules that govern the 
internal operation of any social system as system structure.  This study found four 
significant issues of system structure in its examination of the Columbia River Basin 
Forum (CRBF) experience.  As the CRBF was the only governance system whose 
internal structure was examined in any depth in this study, the findings from the CRBF 
are used here.  The challenges identified from the CRBF experience were the difficulty 
of agreeing to a common purpose, generating institutional commitment to that 
purpose, funding, and decision-making.   
Competing institutional interests, perspectives as to priorities and the nature of 
the problems to be addressed, and lack of trust confounded the CRBF‟s initial simple-
sounding task of defining a common vision and sense of purpose.  Even when CRBF 
parties finally agreed on language defining the group‟s vision and purpose, 
disagreements still arose over what the language meant and how it applied to given 
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issues(“Montana, Idaho won‟t Sign on to Northwest Salmon Plan,” 1999; Espenson, 
Feb 5, 1999; Espenson, Mar 12, 1999).  Reaching agreement over any system‟s goal 
and purpose is a fundamental step for system effectiveness.   
Related is the difference between agreeing to a statement of purpose and 
obtaining true commitment to that purpose.  From the beginning, participants 
approached the CRBF with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  All voiced commitment to 
the process, but the lack of support to address key issues, the failure for all parties to 
sign the MOA, and the failure to appoint individuals to all positions served to 
aggravate existing senses of distrust over other parties‟ motives (Espenson, Feb 5 and 
Mar 12, 1999; Meeting Minutes, May 27, June 24, and October 1999).   
Whereas the MOA (1999) called for each participant to contribute an equitable 
amount of funds for CRBF operations, only the Bonneville Power Administration 
(BPA) and, to a lesser degree, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did so.  Holding 
participants to the funding terms of the MOA could have potentially accomplished 
several things.  It would have signaled the commitment of each participating 
government to the process, would contribute to the sense that the deliberations of the 
group were “real” to its participants, and would have likely sustained attention of the 
region‟s elected leadership.  None of these occurred since BPA managed ratepayer 
dollars predominantly funded the CRBF.  Consequently, none of the participants other 
than BPA had a financial stake in ensuring process efficiency (Meeting Minutes, April 
29, July 21 and October 11, 1999; Fazio, July 2, 1999).   
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Finally and perhaps most importantly was the cumbersome and ineffectual 
decision-making process called for in the CRBF‟s MOA.  The process required almost 
complete agreement before the Forum Committee could even discuss and issue, let 
alone resolve it.  The results of this decision-making process were not binding, even if 
strong majority agreement existed, in that anyone disagreeing with an outcome could 
simply veto it (MOA, 1999; Meeting Minutes, April 29, May 27, June 24, July 21, and 
September 7, 1999; Espenson, July 30, 1999).   
Every governance system established with the Basin faced the governance 
challenges posed by the scope of planning and operational issues within the Basin, the 
legacy effects of regional settlement, and the need to agree to acceptable rules and 
operating procedures.  However, only recently did systems need to account for an 
additional confounding layer of complexity posed by the differing worldviews of 
governance participants.     
The impact of differing worldviews. 
A number of the sources reviewed for this study (Harden, 1996; White, 1996; 
Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and 
Williams, 2006) argue the profound impact worldviews have on the way people 
interpret the world around them, structure social systems, and define acceptable 
behavior.  For example, many accounts of Columbia River development either begin 
with or eventually refer to early descriptions of the river as it existed at the time of 
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early Anglo-American arrival.
141
  Such descriptions cited the journals of the Lewis and 
Clark expedition, letters and journals of early white settlers, and/or traditional Indian 
accounts.  These accounts portrayed a river of awesome power that supported an 
abundance of fish and wildlife.  Wild rapids, waterfalls, and dramatic and 
unpredictable changes in flow volumes characterized the river.  To the original tribal 
inhabitants, these conditions were statement of a natural order within which humans 
were spiritually entwined.  To the initial white settlers, they represented either 
problems to be conquered (flooding, dangerous and erratic river navigation, 
agricultural aridity) or opportunities for commercial exploitation (mining, commercial 
fish harvest, navigation, irrigation, recreation, hydropower).  To Progressive 
conservationalists and preservationists and the more recent environmentalists these 
conditions constituted a natural treasure at risk and in need of government regulation, 
management, and protection.  Regardless, the worldviews held by members of the 
region‟s dominant institutions shaped the region‟s governance history as those 
institutions debated, enacted, or rejected various governance systems.   
This study identified three worldviews relevant to Columbia Basin governance 
choices.  The first and oldest is the worldview of Native American tribes and their 
beliefs regarding man‟s place in the natural order (Trosper, 1995; Lichatowich, 1999; 
Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich et al,, 2006).  The second is Euro American market 
capitalism (Weber, 2002/1920; Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Kline, 2000; 
Lichatowich et al., 2006) as leavened by Northwestern attitudes toward natural 
                                                 
141
 For example, see Norwood (c. 1981) pages 9-10,  Wilkinson (1992) pages 175-187, Harden (1996) 
pages 15 and 59-64, Robbins (1997) pages 50-54, and Lichatowich (1999) page 44.  
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resources (Cameron, 1928 and 1929) and the virtues of American republicanism 
(Lyman, 1963/1917; Smith, 1950; Dodds, 1986).  The third and newest is American 
environmentalism as injected into issues of governance (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992a; 
Hays2000; Dunlap, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2005).   
From the mid-1800s up to the 1970s, adherents to the market-capitalist 
worldview dominated Northwest resource development.  The tribal sovereignty 
movement, coupled with tribal court victories and an increase in governance capacity, 
reintroduced the tribal perspective – albeit modified by years of effort to Christianize 
the Indians, erase tribal culture, and assimilate tribal people into mainstream American 
society (Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005).  Passage of the National Environmental 
Protection Act, Endangered Species Act, and other environmentally oriented 
legislation injected the environmental perspective into regional decision-making.  The 
addition of these differing worldviews added an additional layer of complication to 
those of issue scope, developmental legacy, and governance system structure.  No 
longer were debates limited to how best to manage the system or distribute 
developmental benefits.  Rather, adherents to the tribal and environmental worldviews 
challenged previously taken for granted assumptions over whether the dams and 
associated commercial infrastructure of the Columbia should ever have been built, let 
alone allowed to operate as they had in the past.   
In recent years, environmental perspectives became well entrenched in major 
population centers such as Portland and Seattle and held significant sway in the 
regional policy discourse.  Both states cite with pride their signature environmental 
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legislation, such as Oregon‟s so-called bottle bill regarding recycling and 
Washington‟s establishment of salmon recovery boards.  However, rural parts of the 
region often derided the environmental worldview as elitist and more interested in 
preserving natural conditions for their own recreational interests at the expense of 
rural community economic health (Harden, 1996; Taylor, 1999).   
Both the environmental and tribal worldviews gained some measures of 
influence over governance through court victory.  The environmentalist perspective 
won a major victory over timber interests in obtaining through the courts the ESA 
listing of the Northern spotted owl and significantly altering timber practices on 
federal lands (Swedlow, 2003) and in litigation over salmon (Crampton and Espenson, 
2009).  In a similar vein, the tribal worldview made major inroads in governance 
decisions regarding fishery management through litigation success in the US v. 
Washington and US v. Oregon lawsuits.  Tribal voices are now major players in 
decision making through the court supervised US v. Oregon governance process 
(Pevar, 2002; personal observations of author).  However, environmental and tribal 
perspectives have been far less successful until recently in gaining direct participation 
in FCRPS related governance systems.   
Both the spotted owl and tribal fishery cases, however bitterly fought, involved 
a relatively limited number of regional interests.  In both cases, the plaintiff 
complaints represented very strong legal positions.  In the spotted owl situation, the 
defendant market worldview (represented by timber interests) went up against an 
environmental worldview armed with the rigorous regulatory provisions of the 
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Endangered Species Act.  In the tribal fishery cases, defendant commercial and sports 
fishery interests, backed by state fishery agencies, went up against the treaty 
provisions guaranteed by the federal government.  In both instances proponents of the 
market worldview lost. 
In contrast, the commercial benefits of the FCRPS take in a large number of 
regional institutional interests and affect far greater numbers of people.  Utility and 
energy proponents often describe be the federal electricity generation and transmission 
system as the backbone of the regional economy.  To them and other commercial 
beneficiaries the dams represent as much a regional icon as do the historic salmon 
runs.  The river navigation system moves petroleum, timber, and agricultural cargo 
between Lewiston Idaho, the farthest inland seaport in the country, and the Pacific 
Ocean.  Water from system reservoirs supports regional agriculture and provides 
domestic and municipal water supply.  As a result, decision-making processes for the 
FCRPS attract a greater variety of divergent interests than did either the spotted owl or 
fishery issues.   
The worldview of tribal and state fishery managers obtained a measure of 
influence over hydropower operations through passage of the 1980 Power Act and its 
provisions regarding the process by which the Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council is to develop its Fish and Wildlife Program (Power Act, 1980).  However, 
decisions rendered by the Council under the 1980 Power Act are not necessarily 
binding on federal agencies and, in any event, only address power, fish, and wildlife.  
The Power Act claims no jurisdiction over navigation, flood control, recreation, 
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irrigation, water supply, hatcheries, or fishery management (Power Act, 1980; NPPC, 
1996).  Federal agencies govern these areas under their discretion as authorized by 
federal law.  Consequently, although the Power Act requires input from regional 
salmon managers in the development of the Council‟s fish and wildlife program, 
fishery voices hold less influence over these other river uses.   
The environmental worldview exerted even less influence with regard to the 
FCRPS.  Environmental interests were successful in forcing listings of Columbia 
Basin salmon and steelhead under the ESA and ensuring fish and wildlife concerns 
were included in the 1980 Power Act.  But environmentalists have been markedly less 
successful to date in getting the courts to significantly alter the system to the degree 
many believe is necessary to restore the Columbia‟s ecological health (Crampton and 
Espenson, 2009).  As a result, debates over governance systems for the FCRPS have 
more often than not taken place within the conceptual framework of the capitalist 
market worldview (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006), 
characterized by fishery interests‟ opposition to the initial construction and later 
operation of Columbia dams.  Prior to the ESA listings, the debate was framed 
characterizing the fish as a market commodity instead of a critical component of the 
region‟s ecology and thus reduced to comparison of economic value relative to other 
commercial river uses (Lichatowich, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Lichatowich, McConnaha, 
Liss, Stanford, and Williams, 2006).  There was little or no success with arguments 
made in favor of fish restoration strictly for the purposes of ecological health.   
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The scope of issues to be addressed, the legacy effects of early regional 
settlement and resultant strength of regional institutions, the established lines of 
conflict among those institutions, the scope of issues to be addressed, the challenges of 
system structure, and the differing worldviews held by governance participants frame 
the complexities that every enacted governance system had to face.  The success of 
any chosen system was therefore dependent on the manner in which the system dealt 
with those complexities.  But regardless of whatever structure was ultimately agreed 
to, each system had to operate within the confines of federal and state law, a legal 
framework that added yet an additional layer of complexity and has both hindered and 
enabled Basin governance efforts. 
 
The Role of Law and Legal Structure 
The Government Accounting Office report released in June 2004 highlighted 
the legal structure within which regional institutions operate.  It noted the often-
overlapping jurisdictional boundaries of the Northwest states, Indian tribes, and 
federal agencies engaged with Basin issues.  The report identified the “multilayered” 
collection of laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions that defined and 
guided federal agency responsibilities for mission authority and operations, fish and 
wildlife mitigation, and tribal relationships (U.S. Government Accounting Office, 
2004).  Consequently, a central challenge of any governance system is the mediation 
of the often-inconsistent goals and requirements imposed by these myriad directives 
and statutes. 
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The provisions of these legal mandates can be roughly divided into two 
categories.  The first constitutes mandates that federal and state agencies are required 
to meet.  Examples from this group include Congressional and state authorizations and 
appropriations for agency programs; mandates imposed on agency programs by 
federal or state environmental statutes; water allocations per state water law; and 
fishery allocations per the treaties with Canada and the Indian tribes.  In essence, these 
provisions define what agencies are supposed to do.  This category will not be further 
discussed.  
The second category defines or informs the manner in which federal, state, and 
tribal agencies interact with each other.  Examples include the U.S. Constitution‟s 
provisions regarding the relationships among the federal, state, and tribal 
governments; the consultation requirements of the Endangered Species Act; the 
federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes; and the degree of discretionary decision-
making allowed by each agency‟s authorizing statutes and regulations.  These 
examples illustrate the importance of the law in creating the standing of government 
agencies to act within their scope of authority within the various governance systems 
and with its member partners.  Consequently, the remainder of this section addresses 
this process-centered (authorizing) legal category.    
Regional governance under the U.S. constitutional framework. 
The U.S. Constitution sets up a federal system of government whereby the 
people of the Nation delegate certain rights and powers to the national government.  
The states or the people reserve any power not so delegated (U.S. Constitution, 10
th
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Amendment).  In addition to this vertical dispersion of power, the Constitution shares 
power laterally among the executive, judicial, and legislative functions of government.  
The concept of a regional governance system sandwiched between the national, state, 
and tribal governments, although not expressly prohibited, does not easily fit within 
this paradigm.      
The Constitution also defines the relationships among the federal government, 
states, and tribes.  Article I section 10, Article IV, and Article VI establish the 
supremacy of the Constitution, federal law, and treaties over the states.  Within this 
framework of federal sovereignty, Amendment X recognizes state sovereignty by 
reserving those powers not delegated to the United States to the states.  The 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes is defined by section 6 
of Article I, which Congress the power to regulate commerce with the tribes; section 
10 of Article I, which  prohibits the states from forming their own treaties, and Article 
6, which establishes the supremacy of treaties established by the federal government.  
Although the interpretation and enforcement of these provisions by the federal 
government has varied dramatically over time (Pevar, 2002), and, despite past efforts 
by the states to encroach on tribal rights with regard to fishing, hunting, and taxation 
(Pevar, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005), the courts have affirmed the federal responsibility 
regarding tribal treaty rights and federal government trust obligations.  They have also 
affirmed state limitations regarding tribal resources.    
The constitutional framework thus severely constrains establishment of a state 
or tribal led decision-oriented governance system, defined as governance system in 
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which one agency has the authority and power to direct the actions of others.  
However, constitutional constraints alone cannot explain the success or failure of the 
various governance systems dependent on voluntary collaboration among parties that 
the Basin has employed.
142
  A number of systems identified in this study established in 
the face of these same challenges functioned relatively successfully for extended 
periods.  Examples include the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission 
(nine years), the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (twenty-one years), the 
Regional Forum (less the executive committee) (fourteen years) and the Northwest 
Power and Conservation Council (thirty years and running).  Alternatively, several 
collaboration-oriented systems collapsed after relatively short periods.  Examples 
include the the Northwest States Development Association (less than a year), the 
Regional Forum executive committee (less than a year), and the Columbia River Basin 
Forum (thirteen months).  In each of the long-term cases, participants agreed to an 
initial framework of rules and procedures, modified them through experience and 
institutionalized them over time.  Consequently, the creation a workable governance 
framework is not solely a function of the Constitution‟s framework.       
Legal standing of federal and state agencies.    
Federal and state statutes authorize the legal existence of most federal and state 
agencies, respectively.  For example, the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802 
established the Corps of Engineers; the Reclamation Act of 1902 established the 
Bureau of Reclamation; and the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 the Bonneville Power 
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 A further discussion of decision and collaboration-oriented governance systems is provided later in 
this chapter. 
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Administration.  In some cases, federal agencies were established by executive order, 
as was the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970.  Similar laws or orders 
established all state and federal agencies, granting them the legitimacy and authority to 
carry out the duties and programs for which they were created.  In many cases, 
original agency authorities were expanded by subsequent legislation.  For example, the 
originally authorized duties of the Corps of Engineers were to “constitute a military 
academy” at West Point and to “do duty in such places, and on such service, as the 
President of the United States shall direct”  (Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802, 
Section 27).  This mission was initially construed as the teaching of engineering at the 
Military Academy, construction of military coastal fortifications, and the surveying of 
roads and canals (Shallat, 1994; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).  Examples of 
added missions include navigation improvements in the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers 
in 1824, management of the Washington DC water supply in 1853, flood control in 
1936, and regulation of dredging and dumping in U.S. waters in 1972, and many 
others (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).  All federal and state agencies in the 
Columbia Basin operate under similar law granting them authority for prescribed sets 
of activities within their respective domains of responsibility. 
Statutes themselves provide but the broadest framework within which a field 
office of a given agency must operate.  Agency rules and regulations supplement the 
statutes and govern internal operations.  They also can define, to some degree, the 
discretionary authority delegated to each field office.  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to describe the details of each law and regulation governing Northwest agencies.  
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Rather, the point here is that the combination of law and regulation establishes 
boundaries within which agencies must operate and the degree of discretionary 
decision-making delegated to regional office leaders and managers.   
Statutory support for Basin governance systems. 
Each of the decision-oriented governance system proposals identified in this 
study included recommended legislative proposals to either grant broad decision 
authority to an existing agency or transfer authority to a new agency.  In 1935, 
Representative Hill introduced a bill in Congress that would transfer Bonneville Dam 
to the Bureau of Reclamation upon its completion and grant the Bureau authority to 
manage future federal Columbia River development and power marketing.  Later that 
year, Senators McNary and Steiwer and Representative Smith introduced bills in their 
respective houses of Congress that would expand Corps of Engineers authority to 
include the marketing of power construction of transmission lines in the lower 
Columbia.  Subsequent multiple proposals for a valley authority-type system also 
carried legislative proposals to define decision authorities and reorder agency 
relationships (McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).  While none of these proposals was 
enacted, they underscored the necessity of legally reordering agency authorities and 
reporting relationships if an effective decision-oriented governance system model 
were to be established.   
Several of the collaboration-oriented systems enacted enjoyed statutory 
support.  The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 created the Bonneville Advisory Board 
consisting of the administrator of the Bonneville Project (later the Bonneville Power 
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Administration), the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Forest 
Service, and the Federal Power Commission.  The 1965 Water Resources Planning 
Act authorized creation of the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission 
(PNWRBC), established by executive order in 1967.  The 1980 Power Act established 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (the Council).  Collaborative systems 
supported by statutes enjoyed marked benefits, such as a dedicated stream of funding 
for internal operations and staff and a defined relational framework.  For example, the 
1965 Water Resources Planning Act authorized appropriated funds for an inter-agency 
executive director and staff for the PNWRBC.  The 1980 Power Act directed that the 
Council staff be funded by funds generated through the sale of federal hydropower as 
collected by the Bonneville Power Administration (Power Act, 1980, section 
4(h)(10)(A)).  In some cases, these statutes helped define the relationships among 
regional institutions, such as the provision in the 1980 Power Act that requires 
managers of federal hydropower operations to take the Council‟s Fish and Wildlife 
mitigation program into account in rendering decisions (Power Act, 1980, section 
4(h)(11)(A)).   
However, federal statutory support for collaborative systems is no guarantor of 
system effectiveness or even establishment.  The effectiveness of the Bonneville 
Advisory Board, although mandated by the 1937 Bonneville Project Act, dissipated 
upon completion of the generation and transmission projects needed to support World 
War II industrial production due to a lack of purpose and personality conflicts 
(Norwood, c.1981).  After almost twenty years of interstate negotiations, Congress 
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authorized creation of an interstate Columbia River Basin Compact in 1968.  The 
effort subsequently failed, however, when the Oregon and Washington legislatures 
refused to ratify the agreement their appointed commissioners so carefully negotiated 
(Bessey, 1963; National Research Council, 2004).  The limited jurisdiction afforded 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council under the 1980 Power Act is 
frequently critiqued for its inability to address impacts on fish and wildlife other than 
those imposed by the hydropower system (Blumm, 1981; Bodi, 1995; NPPC, 1996; 
Crampton and Espenson, 2009).  Statutory support does thus not necessarily guarantee 
governance success. 
Conversely, two collaborative systems enjoyed both effectiveness and 
longevity absent any statutory support.  The Columbia Basin Interagency Committee 
(CBIAC), established in 1946, existed until its transition to the PNWRBC in 1967.  
The CBIAC and its parent the Federal Interagency River Basin Committee were 
created through the exercise of agency discretionary decision-making and interagency 
agreement.  Although criticized for its inability to resolve tough interagency disputes 
(McKinley, 1952), it generally met the purposes for which it was established (Bessey, 
1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  Although the federal-state-tribal Executive Committee of 
the Regional Forum collapsed shortly after being established in 1995, the Regional 
Forum‟s policy-level Implementation Team and technical-level System Configuration, 
Technical Management, and Water Quality teams went on to function through the 
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period of this study.
143
  Although called for in NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion on the 
hydropower system, the Regional Forum and its subordinate teams functioned entirely 
on the basis of interagency and inter-institutional coordination and cooperation.   
In summary, the nation‟s legal framework both enabled and constrained the 
agencies involved in Basin governance.  Agency existence, mission, and authority are 
grounded in statute.  Discretionary authority is shaped by both statue and regulation.  
Interagency relationships can be defined by both statute and agency discretion.  
Responsibility over resource domains is relegated to specific agencies based on legal 
authorizations, and agency decision authority is granted to them within the boundaries 
of those domains.  The law imposes constraints on institutions wishing to encroach on 
a single agency domain or on the sovereign prerogatives of the federal government, 
states, or tribes.  Consequently, governance system effectiveness is dependent on both 
the degree of latitude perceived in the law (Constitution, statute, executive order, rule, 
court opinion, etc.) and the personal proclivities of and relationships among 
institutional leaders. 
 
Columbia Basin Governance Systems and Models 
Prior to 1929, a private market-oriented governance system dominated, with 
natural resource decisions essentially rendered by private enterprises often assisted by 
supportive agencies with jurisdictional authority over individual resource domains.  
Examples include the relationships among commercial and sport fishermen and state 
                                                 
143
 The Implementation Team and three technical teams were absorbed into the Regional 
Implementation Oversight Group (RIOG) in 2009.   
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fish and wildlife agencies, timber harvesters with the U.S. Forest Service, the 
navigation community with the Corps of Engineers, and agricultural interests with the 
Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Agriculture agencies.   
Among the many New Deal programs initiated in response to the Depression 
was a national planning board to oversee regional planning commissions.  The Pacific 
Northwest Regional Planning Commission was subsequently established in 1934 
(Vogel, 2007).  Between then and 1999, this study found twenty-six governance 
systems that were proposed for the Basin of which eleven were enacted.   
This study characterized each proposed and enacted systems as either decision 
oriented or collaboration oriented.  As the names imply, decision oriented systems 
were structured to make decisions while collaboration oriented systems are structured 
for the inclusion of the greatest number of relevant parties.  There is an inherent 
tension between the two.  Decision-making becomes more difficult with larger 
numbers of participants due to the increased number of interests and worldviews to be 
taken into account.  Decision-oriented systems favored efficient, authoritative 
decisions at the expense of inclusiveness.  Collaborative systems favored inclusion at 
the expense of authoritative decision-making.  This study characterized nine of the 
twenty-six governance proposals identified as decision-oriented in nature.  None of the 
decision-oriented systems was enacted.  There were seventeen collaboration-oriented 
proposals.  All eleven enacted systems were drawn or negotiated from these seventeen 
collaborative proposals.      
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This study further categorized the decision-oriented and collaboration-oriented 
systems under different models distinguished by the entity or entities holding control 
over each system.  This study identified three models for the decision-oriented systems 
and three for the collaboration-oriented systems.  The decision-oriented models were 
termed the Market Model, the Iron Triangle Model, and the Valley Authority Model.  
The study categorized collaborative systems under models termed the Federal 
Cooperation Model, the State Cooperation Model, and the Three Sovereigns Model.  
The following sections discuss each of these models in turn and tabulate the systems 
categorized under each.  Each table presents the name of each system, a short 
description, system institutional supporters and proponents (when identified) and a 
short discussion of the system‟s outcome.144 
The Market Model.    
Governance systems under the Market Model vested natural resource decision-
making to private firms.  The fur companies that arrived in the Pacific Northwest 
beginning in the late 1700s represent the earliest and extreme forms of this model.  
The British Hudson‟s Bay Company, Canadian North-west Fur Company, and 
American Pacific American Fur Company all exercised the functions of government in 
                                                 
144
 There is a seventh potential model as well: governance through court supervision.  Such a model has 
been used elsewhere in the region.  For example, a “Court Supervision” system resulted from the United 
States v. Oregon litigation and now guides Basin fishery allocations between the states and tribes.  State 
and national political leaders and the federal agencies have generally (Oregon being an occasional 
exception) been as opposed to the application of a “Court Supervision Model” for the FCRPS as they 
have been to proposals for a valley authority.  In the past, the threat of system operation under court 
oversight has prompted better coordination between regional parties.  This is evidenced by the regional 
reaction to the first ESA salmon listing in 1991, the support for the Regional Forum implemented under 
NMFS‟ 1995 biological opinion, and reaction to more recent court directions.   
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addition to pursuing their business objectives (Lyman, 1963/1917; Johansen, 1967; 
Dodds, 1986).  The the strength of the early fur company position is evidenced by 
Hudson‟s Bay Company actively campaign that almost blocked formation of the first 
provisional government in the Northwest Territory in the belief such a government 
could eventually hamper company discretion and autonomy (Lyman, 1963/1917; 
Shafer, 1943/1918; Johansen, 1967; Dodds, 1986).     
The advent of American industrialization in the 1860s saw creation of large 
corporate trusts that owned companies of finance, railroad, timber, electrical utility, 
and mining.  Each corporation operated the governance system over its respective 
resource domain, often operating in cooperation with supportive federal and state 
agencies.  Examples include the railroads and land developers cooperation with the 
General Land Office, navigation interests working with the Corps of Engineers, and 
organized agricultural interests working with agencies of the Department of 
Agriculture.  The nation‟s belief in private markets and the doctrine of laissez fare 
conferred legitimacy to market resulting decisions (Conover, 1923; Hays, 1957; Hays, 
1999/1959; Wiebe, 1967; Wilkinson, 1992; Shallat, 1994; Pisani, 2002).   
The influence of these corporate giants reached its zenith in the late 1800s 
under a governmental doctrine of laissez faire.  The Depression of 1873 presented the 
first challenge to this all-but unfettered influence and in part inspired the Progressive 
movement.  The primary relevance to Northwest governance is the impact on 
governance of the private-public power debates of the 1920s and 30s.  The onset of the 
Depression in 1929 and imposition of New Deal legislation and programs caused the 
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collapse of this model as the Northwest‟s dominant resource governance system 
(Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Wiebe, 1967; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; 
Robbins, 2004).    
The Market Model never regained the dominance it enjoyed in the 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries although its precepts have enjoyed periodic resurgence, usually 
under Republican administrations.  Corporations and trade associations trade 
associations continued to play a role in mustering political support for or against 
particular governance systems or policies.  Examples include the halt to federal 
hydropower construction under the Eisenhower administration, the transfer of the 
Hells Canyon dams from federal to private purview, and efforts at environmental 
deregulation and government downsizing supported by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations.  In recent years, calls for the privatization of the FCRPS or the sale of 
federally produced hydropower at market rates echo the Market Model (Ogden, 1949; 
McKinley, 1952; Wiebe, 1967; Norwood, c.1981; White, 1995; Munson, 2001; 
Robbins, 2004).   
Table 8-1 summarizes Northwest governance systems under the Market Model.  
In the interests of space, and because the purposes of this study would not be served by 
listing each regional corporation over history, individual corporations are not shown.     
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Table 8-1. 
Governance Systems under the Market Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
The Hudson‟s 
Bay Company, 
the North-west 
Fur Company, 
and the 
American 
Pacific Fur 
Company all 
vied for 
dominance 
over the 
regional fur 
trade. 
Private corporations whose networks 
of  posts and forts established the 
first systems of white governance in 
the Northwest, providing social 
organizations for defense, trade, food 
production, administration of justice, 
and other regulations over day to day 
life. 
British, Canadian, and 
American governments and 
associated business 
partners. 
Opposition came from the 
competition among firms 
for dominance of the fur 
trade and by the 
governments supporting 
their respective 
companies.  Later opposed 
by settlers that favored a 
more pro-settlement 
provisional government 
modeled after the 
American governmental 
system. 
The Hudson‟s Bay 
Company bought out the 
North-west Fur Company 
in 1821.  American Pacific 
Fur went out of business 
following the War of 1812 
when in Northwest 
holdings were seized.  Fur 
company influence 
gradually declined with 
the collapse of the fur 
trade and creation of the 
region‟s first provisional 
government in 1841. 
Laissez faire 
doctrine; 
primacy of 
relatively 
unregulated 
commercial 
markets in 
resourced 
development. 
Federal policy in early-late 1800s 
was to transfer public lands into 
private ownership.  Goal was to turn 
western land over to individual 
farmers and entrepreneurs.  But the 
enormity of the task and fraud 
resulted in large tracts of land going 
to large corporate trusts such as 
railroads, private power, timber 
corporations, and mining interests.  
State regulation proved largely 
ineffective.   
Individual settlers, private 
trusts and developers. 
Progressive reformers 
concerned about extensive 
degradation on public land 
by large scale industrial 
exploitation. 
Stock market crash of 
1873 undermined public 
trust in large corporations; 
Progressive era agencies 
imposed government 
control over resources on 
public land; 1929 crash set 
stage for stronger 
government role in the 
economy.  Echoes of the 
market model are heard in 
calls for privatization of 
BPA and for sale of 
federal hydropower at 
market rates. 
 
3
2
4
 
 325 
The Iron Triangle Model. 
Coincident with the rise of the Market Model was the rise of the Iron Triangle 
Model.  Although some agencies, notably the Corps of Engineers and General Land 
Office, were first established in the early 1800s, a large number of state and federal 
agencies came into being in the late 1800s and early 1900s during the Progressive era.  
Progressives intended many of these agencies to counter the severe impact the Market 
Model was having on public lands and resources.  The states and Congress created 
state and federal agencies to research and apply scientific management practices to 
fisheries, wildlife, forests, waterways, agriculture, and public lands.  Few of these 
agencies were regulatory in nature beyond their assigned jurisdictions.  Each often 
developed close working relationships with the private entities engaged in their 
respective policy domain and with the congressional committees overseeing their 
authorities and appropriations (Conover, 1923; Cameron, 1929; Steen, 1976; 
Wilkinson, 1992; Shallet, 1994; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Weber, 2002; Cart, 2004).   
These co-called “iron triangles” exercised almost exclusive decision-making 
within their respective domains and gained strong institutional and political support 
from their supported constituencies.  The locus of decision-making under this model 
rested with the individual agencies, working in cooperation with local constituencies 
and the agency‟s congressional oversight committees.  Examples include relationships 
among commercial fishermen, state fishery agencies, and the federal Bureau of 
Fisheries; timber companies and the Forest Service; and water resource developers and 
the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation.  Garnering the support of 
 326 
legislative committees and meeting local needs conveyed legitimacy to the decisions 
made (Cater, 1954; Griffith, 1961; Steen, 1976; Heclo, 1978; Shallat, 1994; Weber, 
2002; Pisani, 2002). 
“Iron triangle” relationships existed in just about every resource domain in the 
Northwest.  However, as in the case with the individual corporations of the Market 
Model, listing each iron triangle relationship that existed prior to the 1930s would not 
contribute to the purposes of this study.  There are, however, two examples that 
directly affected the earliest debates over Basin governance.  In the 1930s, in response 
to proposals for creation of a Tennessee Valley Authority-type agency in the 
Northwest, congressional proponents of agency prerogatives introduced bills in 
Congress that would delegate the oversight of Basin hydrosystem operations to either 
the Corps of Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation.  The debate between proponents of 
iron triangle and valley authority governance led to the compromise that created the 
Bonneville Power Administration and Bonneville Advisory Board (Ogden, 1949; 
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981).      
 Table 8-2 summarizes the systems promoted under this model.   
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Table 8-2. 
Governance Systems under the Iron Triangle Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
“Iron Triangle” 
oversight by 
federal 
agencies over 
individual 
resource 
domains 
Relatively autonomous arrangements among 
federal agency, congressional committees, and 
local interests.  Earliest example is Corps of 
Engineers, established 1802, and its relationship 
with navigators and ports.  Other examples 
include USFS and timber interests, USBR and 
irrigators, Bureau of Mines and miners, Bureau 
of Fisheries and commercial fishing interests, and 
USFWS and recreational fishers and hunters. 
 Progressives and 
agencies. 
 Private industry 
supported those 
agencies designed to 
provide technical 
assistance and 
planning. 
 Private industry 
whose felt interests 
being challenged.  
Initial opposition 
often overcome 
through outreach 
(example: USFS and 
timber). 
 Environmentalists and 
others by mid 1960s. 
These arrangements 
still exist although 
much less powerful 
than in the past due to 
the the New Deal and 
the later rise of issue 
networks, 
environmental statutes, 
and other government 
reforms. 
System 
operation by 
Bureau of 
Reclamation 
Proposed in 1935 House bill (Hill).  Bill called 
for transfer of Bonneville Dam to the Bureau of 
Reclamation upon completion and assigned the 
Bureau full responsibility for Columbia River 
development and power marketing.   
 Bureau of 
Reclamation 
 Private power 
 Valley authority 
opponents 
 
 Corps 
 Portland area 
businesses 
 Public power 
advocates 
 Valley authority 
proponents 
Not enacted.   
Power sales, 
transmission, 
and operations 
by Corps of 
Engineers 
Proposed in 1935 (McNary, Steiwer, and Smith).  
Bills would have the Corps operate Bonneville 
Dam, build local transmission lines to serve the 
Portland and Vancouver urban areas and 
industries along the river, and charge “railroad 
rates” in a service area limited to the lower 
Columbia.  The Corps would market power with 
rates set by the Federal Power Commission.   
 
 Corps of Engineers 
 State of Oregon 
 Private power 
advocates 
 Portland-Vancouver 
chambers of 
commerce and 
business owners 
 Public power 
advocates 
 State of Washington 
 Public sentiment in 
Oregon and 
Washington 
Not enacted.  
Succeeded, along with 
the Bureau bill, in 
framing the debate as a 
choice of structures 
between a valley 
authority and existing 
agency.  This framing 
led to the 1937 
compromise and 
creation of Bonneville 
Power Administration. 
3
2
7
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The Valley Authority Model. 
The Valley Authority Model is the third decision-oriented governance model 
identified by this study.  Whereas Market and Iron Triangle Model systems exercised 
decision-making on a decentralized basis, proposals for Valley Authority systems 
called for consolidation of individual agency functions into one agency or 
subordination of individual agency decisions to a supervising administrative structure 
(McKinley, 1952).     
Many Progressives were wary of the power of iron triangle relationships and 
the close relationship exercised between agencies and private entities and staunchly 
opposed to the resulting corruption and abuses of public resources.  Progressives were 
supportive of centralized planning as the best means to ensure the greatest public good 
from regional resources.  In keeping with this belief, they favored creation of a new 
regional agency for the Northwest with broad planning and operational authority.  This 
agency would assume the resource management functions of existing agencies, 
although exactly which agencies affected varied between proposals.  In general, these 
proposals were modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority.  However, proposals 
varied with regard to scope of responsibility, degree of participation by state and non-
governmental entities, and whether the proposed systems would supplant or supervise 
existing agencies.  The common thread of all valley authority proposals was that new 
statutes would vest decision-making authority in the new agency.  Despite the model‟s 
apparent success in the east, Northwest institutions that did not want their previously 
enjoyed prerogatives encroached upon vigorously opposed them.  Consequently, the 
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Northwest as a whole never supported any version of this model (Ogden, 1949; 
McKinley, 1952; Norwood, c.1981; Conklin, 1983).  Calls in recent years to establish 
a “salmon czar” with undefined authority to direct the actions of regional federal 
agencies with respect to the hydrosystem and fish restoration efforts echo the Valley 
Authority Model.
145
 
This study found seven varieties of valley authority proposals made during the 
period covered by this study, none of which were enacted.
146
  These were: 
 A Columbia Valley Authority, patterned after the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, jointly introduced in the Senate by Pope and in the House by 
Hill in 1935.   
 A modified version of the 1935 proposal introduced in the Senate by 
Mitchell in 1945.   
 A revised version of Mitchell‟s 1945 bill, submitted by Mitchell later in 
1945.  Taylor introduced this same proposal in the Senate (with some 
revisions) in 1947; Jackson did likewise in the House in 1948.   
 A proposal for a Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority introduced in the 
House by Horan in 1945. 
                                                 
145
 Suggestions for appointment of a “salmon czar” to direct federal agencies toward more salmon-
friendly operational decisions emerged under the Clinton administration in the 1990s.  To the author‟s 
knowledge, the idea was never fleshed out as a formal proposal.  Consequently, it is not included as a 
governance system in this study. 
 
146
 McKinley‟s 1952 book Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest presents an argument strongly 
supportive of some form of centralized decision authority over natural resource development in the 
Pacific Northwest.  However, the author clearly states that his intent is not “to outline a complete plan 
for rationalizing the national executive organization” (p. 573).  As such, his book is taken by the author 
to offer general support for any valley authority-type proposal and is not therefore considered a separate 
proposal in its own right. 
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 A proposal for a Columbia Interstate Commission introduced in the House 
by Horan in 1947.  This bill offered a revision of Horan‟s 1945 proposal. 
 A proposal for a Columbia Valley Administration proposed by the Truman 
administration in 1949. 
 A proposal for a Columbia River Administration proposed by Dan Ogden 
in 1997. 
Table 8-3 summarizes proposals made under the Valley Authority Model.   
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Table 8-3. 
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters
147
 Opponents
143 
Outcome 
Columbia 
Valley 
Authority 1 
Modeled after the TVA.  Submitted in 1935 
following bills to assign future development to 
either the Corps or Bureau.  Introduced in the 
Senate by Pope and House by Hill.  The CVA 
would take over operation of Bonneville and 
Grand Coulee Dams and administer future 
development over the Basin.  Would centralize 
Columbia decision-making on river system 
planning, construction, operations, and, in some 
cases, land management under one administrative 
structure. 
 
 
 Grange (with 
reservations) 
 Labor groups 
 Public power 
advocates 
 Progressives/New 
Dealers among some 
state agencies 
 ID and WA 
 DOI (if new agency 
assigned under DOI) 
 Federal agencies,  
(Corps, Department 
of Ag, UFSF, SCS, 
and (quietly) USBR) 
 State governors 
 Reclamation 
associations 
 Navigation interests 
 Private utilities 
 Railroads 
 TVA 
 Chambers of 
commerce 
Not enacted. 
 
Resulted in 
1937 
compromise 
creating the 
Bonneville 
Power 
Administration. 
Columbia 
Valley 
Authority 2 
Introduced in the Senate by Mitchell in 1945.  
Modified the 1935 proposal.  Would transfer the 
Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams and all future 
Basin development responsibilities to a new 
public corporation, managed under a three-
person board of directors and under the 
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior.  
Would also establish an advisory council of 
regional governors.  Included unenforceable 
provisions calling for the new agency to conduct 
its operations in cooperation with other agencies. 
 Same, except Grange, 
labor, and public 
power opposed 
centralized nature of 
decision-making. 
 Same 
 
Not enacted due 
to Republican 
majority in ‟46 
and Grange, 
labor, and 
public power 
concerns. 
 
                                                 
147
 The full array of local, regional, and national supporters and opponents of each valley  authority proposal is too complex to be provided in a simple table.  
See McKinley (1952), pp. 556-566 for a more in-depth discussion. 
3
3
1
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Table 8-3.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model  
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Columbia 
Valley 
Authority 3  
Second Mitchell bill introduced 1945.  Revised 
earlier bill to include elaborate appointment 
requirements and advisory council review 
provisions requested by labor, the Grange, and 
public power advocates.   
 
The second Mitchell proposal was reintroduced 
in the Senate by Taylor in 1947 and House by 
Jackson in 1948.  Both retained the major 
components of the second 1945 Mitchell bill.  A 
significant modification in Taylor‟s version was 
a joint federal agency – state – private interest 
advisory structure to review unified plans and 
major policy proposals.  Thus, existing agencies 
would still have a role even though their river 
development management responsibilities were 
transferred to the new agency.   
 Same; Grange, labor, 
and public power 
supported revisions. 
 Same. 
 
  
Not enacted due 
to opposition 
from 
Republicans. 
Columbia 
Valley 
Cooperative 
Authority 
Introduced in 194 5 (Horan).  Modified the valley 
authority idea in that it limited the authority‟s 
duties to planning, development, and 
management of a single resource – water.  Other 
than that, its structure and provisions were 
similar to Mitchell‟s 1945 CVA bill.  A 
significant difference was its provisions for a 
presidentially appointed corporate oversight 
board of which at least one member would be 
from one of the regional states as recommended 
by that state‟s governor.  An advisory council 
comprised of the state governors and supported 
by a staff-level commission that would review all 
proposals for water resource utilization.   
Not identified.  
Presumably similar to 
supporters for the CVA. 
Not identified.  
Presumably similar to 
opponents of the CVA. 
Not enacted due 
to Republican 
congressional 
victories in 
1946.   
3
3
2
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Table 8-3.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model  
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Columbia 
Interstate 
Commission 
Introduced in 1947 (Horan).  Essentially a 
revised, more pro-business version of the 1945 
Columbia Valley Cooperative Authority.  This 
agency would be the same as contemplated in his 
earlier bill, but limited water resource 
development to only those activities not suitable 
for private development and restricted 
transmission and sale of electrical energy to 
wholesale markets only. 
Not identified.  
Presumably similar to 
supporters for the CVA 
plus business and private 
developers. 
Not identified.  
Presumably similar to 
opponents of the CVA. 
Not enacted.  
Overcome by 
the unexpected 
reelection of 
President 
Truman in 1948 
and renewed 
calls for a more 
robust valley 
authority. 
Columbia 
Valley 
Administration 
(CVAd) 
Proposed by the Truman administration in 1949 
to respond to concerns over CVA.  Introduce in 
the Senate by Magnuson.  Promoted as improved 
organization for federal programs, and not as an 
extension of federal power.  Would limit 
operating responsibilities to water resources, 
power generation, and power transmission.  Did 
not transfer land management functions of 
Agriculture or the lands, minerals, and wildlife 
functions of Interior.  In effect, the CVAd would 
take over the regional water resource 
responsibilities of Reclamation, BPA, and the 
Corps.  Envisioned as a government corporation 
with a general manager to be appointed by a 
board of directors.  The board was to be 
comprised of the regional agency leaders and the 
governors of the Northwest states.  Responsible 
for developing unified plans and programs to be 
recommended to the President and submitted for 
approval to Congress.   
Progressives and New 
Dealers; similar support as 
for CVA. 
States, private utilities, 
manufacturing interests, 
Corps, Bureau of 
Reclamation, BPA, and 
irrigators opposed it as 
thinly veiled CVA. 
Died in 
committee; 
never enacted.   
 
Echoed in late 
1990s and early 
2000s with calls 
for a regional 
“salmon czar.” 
3
3
3
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Table 8-3.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the Valley Authority Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Columbia 
River 
Administration 
(CVAd) 
Proposal by Daniel Ogden in 1997 in response to 
regional governance debates following ESA 
salmon listings.   
 
Proposal called for single agency capable of 
comprehensive river basin planning and 
authoritative governance.  Recommended 
consolidation of federal resource management 
agencies into one department.  They would be 
combined into a newly created Department of 
Natural Resources.   
 
The new department would be internally 
organized along functional lines at the 
departmental level.  Subordinate field bureaus 
would be organized on a watershed basis, with an 
“Administration” for each major river basin.  He 
specifically proposed a Columbia River 
Administration, encompassing both the drainage 
area of the Columbia plus Northwest coastal 
streams and rivers.  Other interested parties were 
to participate through a permanently established 
advisory council.  Recommended that Congress 
to reorganize its committee structure accordingly.   
Unknown Unknown Not enacted.   
 
Was not 
included in the 
array of 
governance 
proposals 
presented to the 
Northwest by 
four governors 
in 1998. 
3
3
4
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The Federal Cooperation Model. 
The Federal Cooperation Model is one of three collaboration-oriented models 
identified in this study.  The Federal Cooperation Model emerged from the debate 
between advocates for system management by individual agencies and the 1935 
proponents of a Columbia Valley Authority.  The 1937 Bonneville Project Act created 
what became the Bonneville Power Administration as a temporary compromise to 
market power from the federal dams at Bonneville and Grand Coulee and to construct 
transmission lines from federal projects to local energy markets.  The Act also 
required establishment of an advisory board to assist the new agency‟s administrator in 
carrying out his duties.  This board, called the Bonneville Advisory Board, was 
comprised of the Administrator of the Bonneville Project, the Corps of Engineers, the 
Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Forrest Service, and the Federal Power Commission 
(Bonneville Project Act, 1937; Norwood, c.1981).  The provisions of the 1937 
Bonneville Project Act thus ensured that collaboration would be hard-wired into 
FCRPS decision making.  The Bonneville Advisory Board was the Basin‟s first 
experience in cooperative decision making among federal agencies. 
Under the Federal Cooperation Model, each agency retains its decision 
authorities but agrees to coordinate its discretionary decision making with other 
agencies and to take their concerns and issues into account.  These cooperative 
systems were thus essentially strategies adopted by the federal agencies to both better 
manage the Basin as well as to ward off imposition of a more authoritarian valley 
authority-type system (Scheufele, c.1970).     
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At times Federal Cooperation systems opened participation to other Basin 
entities.  For example, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (1946 – 1966) 
and the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1967 – 1981) expanded 
participation to include the states, and the Regional Implementation Forum (1996 – 
2009) included state and tribal participants.   
This study categorized six governance systems as belonging under this model, 
all of which were enacted.  These were: 
 The Bonneville Advisory Board, 1937 – 1946. 
 The Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, 1946 – 1967. 
 The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission, 1967 – 1981. 
 The Committee on Fish Operations, c.1960s – c.1980s. 
 The Fish Operation Executive Committee, 1992 – 1996. 
 Regional Implementation Forum, 1996 – 2009 (Executive Committee 
disbanded in 1997). 
Federal Cooperation governance systems are summarized in Table 8-4. 
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Table 8-4. 
Governance Systems under the Federal Cooperation Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Bonneville 
Advisory 
Board 
Called for in the1937 Bonneville Project Act that 
“temporarily” established Bonneville Power 
Administration.  Members were BPA, Corps 
(representing Department of Army), Bureau of 
Reclamation (representing Interior), USFS 
(representing Agriculture) and Federal Power 
Commission.  Preserved individual agency 
authorities and prerogatives.  Required cooperation 
among federal agencies; no one agency has 
directive authority over another. 
  Held 12 meetings 
between 1937 and 1946.  
Participation waned as 
War effort wound down.  
Suffered from lack of a 
decision-making 
structure and agency 
disagreements.  
Replaced in 1946 by 
CBIAC. 
Columbia 
Basin Inter-
Agency 
Committee 
(CBIAC) 
Prompted by renewed calls for a valley authority in 
1945 and a recognized need for agency cooperation.  
Served as forum for coordination among federal 
agencies and states.  Rotating federal chair.  
Participants included Corps, Department of Interior, 
Department of Agriculture, Federal Power 
Commission, and Bonneville Power 
Administration.  Commerce and Labor added in 
1947; USFWS in 1956.  Governors of OR, WA, ID, 
MT, WY, UT, and NV were invited to attend.  
Meetings open to public.  No separate funding; 
activities donated by participating agencies. 
 Valley 
authority 
opponents 
 Federal 
agencies at 
regional and 
departmental 
levels 
 States 
 
 
  
 Not 
identified; 
presumably, 
valley 
authority 
proponents 
Operational 1946-1967. 
 
Criticized for inability to 
resolve disagreements, 
address tough issues, and 
produce a 
comprehensive river 
plan. 
 
Held 138 meetings until 
replaced by the Pacific 
Northwest River Basin 
Commission in 1967. 
Pacific 
Northwest 
River Basins 
Commission 
(PNWRBC) 
Authorized by Water Resources Planning Act and 
constituted by executive order in 1967.  Chaired by 
federal appointee.  Consisted of same 
representatives as CBIAC, less UT.  Appropriation 
funded.  Function was regional water resource 
planning.  No operational authority over agency 
projects or decision-making.   
Not identified Not identified Operational 1967 to 
1981.  Terminated by 
executive order.  Its 
congressional authority 
to exist, however, was 
never withdrawn. 
Compromise between supporters of 
single-agency and valley authority 
proposals. 
3
3
7
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Table 8-4.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the Federal Cooperation Model   
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Committee on 
Fish 
Operations 
(COFO) 
Established in the 1960s to find ways to operate the 
FCRPS to better address the impact of the system 
on fish and wildlife.  Consisted of fish and wildlife 
managers and federal operators and regulators, 
although exactly who is not clear.  Apparently co-
existed with the CBIAC and the later Pacific 
Northwest River Basin Commission.  It is not clear 
if COFO was established as part of one of these 
other systems or existed independently. 
 FCRPS 
agencies 
 Fish and 
wildlife 
managers. 
Not identified Established in the 1960s, 
although exact date is not 
clear.  Apparently 
became the Water Budget 
Implementation Work 
Group under the NPPC 
sometime after passage 
of the 1980 Power Act.   
Fish Operation 
Executive 
Committee 
(FOEC) 
Called for under the NPPC 1992 Fish and Wildlife 
Program.  Comprised of “senior management 
representatives of the Council, as well as power and 
fishery interests.”  The policy level committee 
consisted of federal agency executives, regional 
Indian tribal leaders, and appointed Council 
members.  The purpose was to coordinate federal 
obligations following ESA listings of salmon 
Not identified Not identified Established in 1992 upon 
request by the NPPC.  
Ceased to exist upon 
establishment of 
Regional Implementation 
Forum. 
Regional 
Implementation 
Forum 
(Regional 
Forum) 
Created by National Marine Fisheries 1995 FCRPS 
Biological Opinion.  Constituted 1996.  Purpose 
was to ensure a unified approach to recovery of 
ESA listed stocks.  Essentially replaced the NPPC 
Fish Operation Executive Committee.  Multi-
government in nature, with Executive Committee 
consisting of regional agency executives, governor 
representatives, and regional tribal leaders.  
Established policy level implementing team (IT) 
and three technical subcommittees for technical 
coordination of system operations.   
Initially supported 
by states, federal 
agencies, and upper 
and lower river 
tribes.   
Montana left 
group over 
disagreements 
regarding upper 
Columbia water.  
Lower river tribes 
soon followed. 
Operational 1996 – 2009.  
Difficulty in reaching 
consensus among states 
and tribal interests as to a 
regional recovery plan.  
Executive Committee 
ceased to exist in 1997.  
IT and technical teams 
continued until functions 
assumed under a new 
system in 2009. 
 
 
3
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The State Cooperation Model. 
The State Cooperation Model encompasses systems structured either under 
agreements among Northwest states or federal statute in which the states have the lead 
in planning, development, and – under some system proposals – operational decisions.  
State Cooperation systems sought to leverage federal agency resources to meet 
regional needs as defined by the participating states and to ensure federal agency 
decision-making reflected state interests.   
This study found nine State Cooperation Model systems proposed over the 
period covered by this study, of which four were enacted:   
 Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, 1934-1943. 
 Northwest States Development Association, 1943-1944. 
 Columbia Basin Interstate Compact, negotiations initiated in 1949, not 
enacted. 
 Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, 1953-1958. 
 Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (later 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Council), 1981-present. 
 Alternative governance system proposed by the the Council developed in 
1998 to expand NPPC membership to include tribal representatives.  Not 
enacted. 
 Regional Resource Council, an alternative governance system proposed by 
the the Council developed in 1998.  Not enacted. 
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 Northwest Rivers Commission, an alternative governance system proposed 
by the the Council developed in 1998.  Not enacted. 
 Comprehensive River Agency, an alternative governance system proposed 
by the the Council developed in 1998.  Not enacted. 
 These nine systems are summarized in Table 8-5. 
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Table 8-5. 
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Regional 
Planning 
Commission 
(PNWRPC) 
First attempt at regional governance; outgrowth of 
New Deal efforts to use public works to invigorate 
the national economy in response to the Depression 
and develop plans to implement National Recovery 
Act.  Comprised of four state planning board chairs, 
with part time federal chair who reported to DC level 
planning board.  Federal agencies not included at 
regional level due board member interest in 
protecting state prerogatives; agencies effectively 
relegated to technical support role.  Functions were 
investigational and advisory, not operational.   
Not identified; 
presumably New 
Deal and public 
power advocates 
Not identified; 
presumably New 
Deal opponents 
and private power 
interests 
Established 1934 – 1943.   
 
Terminated in 1943 
when the Republicans 
won the majority in 
Congress and ended 
funding for numerous 
New Deal programs, 
including national and 
regional planning.   
Northwest 
States 
Development 
Association 
Established by the governors of the Northwest states 
(not clear exactly which states were involved) as a 
replacement of the PNWRPC to coordinate interstate 
issues.   
 Northwest 
states; others not 
identified 
 Not identified Operational from July 
1943 – early 1944.  
Disbanded after 
production of one report. 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Governors‟ 
Power 
Planning 
Committee 
(PNWGPPC) 
Initially organized in 1953 as a subcommittee of the 
federal centric Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee.  Ostensibly formed to assist in 
implementing the Eisenhower administration‟s 
partnership program.  Led by state governors.  
Consisted of public and private power interests, 
federal agencies, and others.   
 Governors‟ 
offices 
 Electrical power 
utilities and 
interests 
 Not identified Established 1953.  
Almost supplanted the 
CBIAC.  Produced at 
least seven influential 
technical reports.  
Interest waned, and 
members agreed to 
disband in 1958. 
Columbia 
Basin Interstate 
Compact  
Effort initiated in 1949.  Intent was to provide a 
larger role for the states in regional planning, 
partially motivated by renewed calls for a valley 
authority and partially by weaknesses in CBIAC.  
Planning commission comprised of representatives 
from Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Washington was 
organized to promote the effort.  Utah and Nevada 
joined in 1952.   
 Governors‟ 
offices 
 Valley authority 
opponents 
 
 Public power 
advocates 
 Washington 
and Oregon 
legislatures 
Effort failed when 
Washington withdrew its 
support over public 
power concerns 
regarding threats to 
federal hydropower and 
the Oregon legislature 
refused to ratify. 
3
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Table 8-5.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model  
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Electric Power 
and 
Conservation 
Planning 
Council 
(NPPC) 
Product of 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power 
Planning and Conservation Act.  Council comprised 
of two representatives from each of the four 
northwest states.  Charged with developing regional 
power plan and a fish and wildlife program to 
balance needs of energy and fish.  Agencies must 
consider Council programs in making decisions but 
are not bound by them.  Name subsequently changed 
to Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
(NPPC). 
  Operational 1981 to 
present. 
 
Influence in broader 
governance issues 
somewhat marginalized 
by the Council‟s 
relatively limited scope 
and upon the first salmon 
ESA listings in 1991. 
Tribal 
members on 
Power and 
Conservation 
Council  
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter 
to the region.  Called for the governors to allocate 
some of the seats on the Power and Conservation 
Council to tribal members.  Proposal called for no 
changes to the Power Act.  No federal members.   
Not identified. Not identified. Not enacted. 
Regional 
Resources 
Council 
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter 
to the region.  Would replace the Power and 
Conservation Council, exercising ESA and Power 
Act responsibilities.  Membership of state and tribal 
representatives with no federal members.  Federal 
agencies would be required to act consistent with 
council plans.   
Not identified. Not identified. Not enacted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Act was a compromise between  
regional power customers and utilities  
seeking legislative response to the  
region‟s hydro-thermal crisis and 
fisheries advocates. 
 
3
4
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Table 8-5.  (Continued) 
Governance Systems under the State Cooperation Model   
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Northwest 
Rivers 
Commission 
 
Option presented in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter 
to the region.  Called for a ten-person commission 
comprised of two governor-appointed members from 
each state and two tribal members appointed by the 
Secretary of the Interior.  An advisory council would 
assist in river operations, fish resources and facilities 
(presumably hatcheries), fish harvest, agriculture and 
irrigation, and public lands management.  Not clear 
if this Commission would replace the Power and 
Conservation Council or operate alongside of it.   
Not identified. Not identified. Not enacted. 
Comprehensive 
River Agency 
Proposed in the PNW governors‟ 1998 letter to the 
region.  Patterned after the Delaware River Basin 
Commission.  Participation would be limited to four 
PNW states and one or more presidentially appointed 
federal representatives.  Membership would include 
tribes, although the allocation of tribal seats was not 
specified.  Purpose to prepare long range and annual 
plans recognizing the integrated nature of the river 
system.  Role of the federal agencies was not 
specified, implying that they act to implement the 
river agency‟s plans and decisions.   
Not identified. Not identified. Not enacted. 
3
4
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The Three Sovereigns Model. 
The Three Sovereigns Model was a direct outgrowth of the growing awareness 
of the wide-ranging impacts of that ESA salmon listings in the 1990s were going to 
have throughout the basin.  The model name is borrowed Governor Kitzhaber‟s 1997 
suggestion to implement a “Three Sovereigns” process of state, federal, and tribal 
leaders to oversee policy and development of the Columbia Basin.  What separates this 
model from the others was the inclusion of regional Indian tribes as co-equal 
management partners.   
Arguably, the Regional Implementation Forum established under NMFS‟ 1995 
biological opinion represented the first system under this model.  The Regional Forum 
envisioned an Executive Committee of state, federal, and tribal leaders to oversee the 
biological opinion‟s implementation.  However, the scope of the Regional Forum‟s 
structure was more oriented to implementation of federal agency actions than 
oversight of Basin policy in general.  Consequently, this study considered the Forum 
under the Federal Cooperation Model. 
This study categorized two proposals under this model, one of which was 
enacted.  These are listed below and summarized in Table 8-6: 
 The Three Sovereigns Process proposed by Governor Kitzhaber in 1997 
and included in the Council‟s list of governance alternatives in 1998.  Not 
enacted. 
 The Columbia Basin River Forum, established 1999-2000. 
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Table 8-6. 
Governance Systems under the Three Sovereigns Model 
 
Governance 
System Description Supporters Opponents Outcome 
Three 
Sovereigns 
 Proposed by Governor Kitzhaber in 1997 and 
fleshed out as a governance proposal by the NPPC 
in 1998.  Envisioned as a “principal-level forum” 
consisting of representatives from the four PNW 
states, thirteen tribes, and one federal 
representative.  Principal group to be supported by 
a senior staff-level committee with four seats each 
allocated to the states (one per state), federal 
agencies, and thirteen tribes.  No change required in 
existing law; would be established by memorandum 
of agreement among participating sovereigns.  In 
effect, proposal mirrored the purpose and structure 
of the Regional Forum Executive Committee but 
broadened its scope of activities.   
Governors and 
regional 
congressional 
delegation generally 
supportive of new 
governance system.  
Supported “Three 
Sovereigns” as 
starting point for 
discussion. 
Non-
governmental 
river users such as 
irrigation 
associations, 
navigation 
interests, and 
utilities.   
Not enacted; modified to 
in response to river user 
concerns; became the 
CRBF. 
Columbia 
River Basin 
Forum (CRBF) 
Established in response to the Oregon governor‟s 
“Three Sovereigns Process.”  Established under a 
memorandum of agreement signed in 1999.  Intent 
was to establish consensus-based collaborative 
decision-making process pending legislative action 
on a new governance system (which never 
materialized).  Existed alongside the Regional 
Forum and Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council. 
  Effectively ceased to 
exist in 2000 due to 
inability to reach 
consensus, funding 
issues, and loss of 
interest by participants. 
 
  
Compromise between federal agencies 
and proponents of governance models 
favoring stronger state control over 
FCRPS operations and fish restoration 
efforts. 
3
4
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In addition to identifying the specific systems and models debated and adopted 
within the Basin, this study also analyzed them for patterns.  The purpose of this 
analysis was to determine if such patterns existed that could inform both this study‟s 
research question on the apparent paradox of governance and future regional 
governance efforts.  As it turned out, this study found two such patterns to exist. 
  
Patterns of Change between Systems and Models 
 This study characterized changes in governance systems under two general 
patterns.  The first pattern concerned changes in systems within a given governance 
model.  This category included instances where system participants recognized 
structural weaknesses within the system and voluntarily acted to improve upon them.  
Examples included the non-conflictual rolling of the Bonneville Advisory Board into 
the Columbia Inter-Agency Committee.  Weaknesses in decision-making and the lack 
of a statutory basis for dependable CBIAC funding led in turn to creation of the 
Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (DeLuna, 1997; Ogden, 1997).   
This category also included situations where structural weaknesses within a 
system were recognized but for which participants lacked compelling reason to 
change, resulting in system termination.  Examples included the non-controversial 
dissolution of the Northwest States Development Committee in 1944, the disbanding 
of the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee in 1958, and the 
collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum in 2000 (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; 
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Norwood, c.1981).  This pattern is not further discussed here as it did not offer much 
insight into this study‟s primary research question. 
The more interesting and informative is the pattern identified for changes 
between models.  These changes were most often conflictual in nature as institutional 
actors who believed their interests and aspirations were not being adequately 
addressed under existing system(s) sought opportunities to challenge the status quo.  
In each case, the opportunities for change presented themselves through situations of 
such critical significance to challenge existing governance arrangements and establish 
new ones established in their place.   
This section examines this second pattern in some depth.  It begins by 
identifying the critical situations that allowed dramatic change between governance 
models to occur.  It then maps the evolution of the systems and models identified in 
the previous section in relation to the critical situations experienced.  It concludes by 
presenting a model of governance system selection as determined from the findings of 
this study.   
The catalytic role of critical situations. 
Giddens (1984) defines critical situations as those situations where the 
“established modes of accustomed life are drastically undermined or shattered” and 
“circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial 
numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of 
institutionalized routines” (Giddens, 1984, p. 60-61).  Under Giddens‟ construct, 
critical situations are identified by their practical effect and are therefore only apparent 
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in hindsight.  This point is important in understanding the failure of the CRBF in 
particular and the nature of Basin governance change in general.   
Recall that the reasons given for the need for the CRBF included concerns over 
the pending NMFS biological opinion, collapse of the Regional Forum Executive 
Committee, the potential for Snake River dam removal, and energy industry 
deregulation coalesced in the period 1996-1997.  Regional leaders saw any or all of 
these as risking a loss of regional control over decisions regarding salmon and all or 
part of the FCRPS and its attendant benefits.  Consequently, regional leaders deemed 
them critical enough to warrant a new decision-making governance system.   
However, the perceived threat never materialized to the degree necessary to 
inspire significant change.  All either proved to be less threatening than originally 
feared or were resolved through process other than the CRBF.  Consequently, by 
definition, those circumstances did not pose a critical situation in the sense used by 
Giddens (1984).  The CRBF thus failed in part due to lack of a sufficient crisis that 
would cause its members to structure it in a way to ensure its continuation over the 
long term. 
This study identified four critical situations that challenged the status quo to 
the point where opportunities for change opened not just between existing governance 
systems but also between models.  The onset of the Great Depression (as symbolized 
by the stock market crash of 1929), the end of World War II, the issuance of BPA‟s 
notice of insufficiency (symbolizing the hydro-thermal financial crisis), and the first 
listing of Snake River salmon under the Endangered Species Act provided those 
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opportunities.  These situations framed the narrative presented in Chapters 4 through 
7.  This study found that changes between models could be either conflictual or non-
conflictual in nature.    
In three cases, the transition between governance models was decidedly 
conflictual.  The onset of the Depression resulted in a bitter debate among Market 
Model, Iron Triangle, and Valley Authority model proponents that resulted in the 
compromise that created the Bonneville Power Administration and introduced the 
Federal Cooperation model through the Bonneville Advisory Board.  The hydro-
thermal crisis of the 1970s provided an opening for fishery, tribal, and environmental 
interests to challenge the federal-centric Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission 
and establish the state-led Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation 
Planning Council (McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Bodi, 1979 and 1995; Norwood, c. 
1981; Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; DeLuna, 1997; Pope, 2008; Crampton and 
Espenson, 2009).  The ESA salmon listings in 1991 reopened tensions between 
proponents for state-led and federal-led efforts and resulted in reestablishment of a 
federal lead in governance initially through the Fish Operation Executive Committee 
and later the Regional Forum.   
Governance changes brought about by critical situations did necessarily 
involve conflict.  Whereas events around the end of World War II precipitated 
significant changes in Columbia Basin governance systems, those changes were 
relatively conflict free.  Congress eliminated funding for New Deal programs that 
resulted in the termination of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission in 
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1943.  This was a Congress still holding slender Democrat majorities in both houses, 
indicating a joint recognition between both parties that the need for expensive New 
Deal programs and agencies was nearing its end.  Shortly after abolishment of the 
PNWRPC, the federal agency participants agreed to establish the CBIAC and invited 
the continued participation by the states that had been PNWRPC members.  A 
recognized need for interagency cooperation in managing the hydropower system, 
coupled with the weaknesses of the Bonneville Advisory Board and the nascent threat 
of some form of valley authority system imposed by Congress, led the Board‟s federal 
members to create interagency committees at the federal (Federal Inter-agency River 
Basin Committee) and regional (Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee) levels in 
(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c. 1981; DeLuna, 1997).  This change 
from a State Cooperation based system (PNWRPC) to a Federal Cooperation based 
system (CBIAC) appears to have occurred without major controversy.  
The genealogy of Columbia Basin governance systems. 
Figure 8-1 illustrates the trajectory of the Basin‟s governance history and the 
causal relationships between critical situations and governance systems and models.  
The figure maps the evolution of the various governance systems and models 
identified in this study and maps them in the general chronological order in which they 
were proposed or enacted.  Critical situations are shown in the vertical scale on the 
left.  Solid line arrows indicate where direct evolutionary linkages were found between 
systems.  The figure demonstrates two important findings.  First is the fact that the 
Basin has continuously employed some form of inter-jurisdictional governance system 
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since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission was in 
1934.  The second is the connection between each system enacted with its 
predecessors.  In effect, Figure 8-1 presents the CRBF‟s institutional family tree. 
Figure 8-2 illustrates the relationship among the social and political context of 
the the periods leading up to each critical situation, regional issues, and relevant 
participants to the governance systems enacted.  The figure summarizes the key issues 
and participants that influenced governance system debates and selection as discussed 
above. 
The trajectory of governance system evolution discussed above and illustrated 
in Figures 8-1 and 8-2 suggests a recurring pattern that the region seems to follow.   
The pattern of Columbia Basin governance structuration. 
The six governance models reflect a long-running four-way struggle among 
proponents for the prerogatives and authorities of individual federal agencies, valley 
authority proponents, advocates for state control over regional resources; and 
commercial interests advocating market mechanisms as to which system provides the 
best allocator of resource values and optimum economic development.  Historically, 
the commercial interests have generally allied with state and federal agencies holding 
jurisdiction over their resource area of interest (such as navigation interests and the 
Corps; irrigation interests and the Bureau of Reclamation; public power interests and 
the Bonneville Power Administration; fishing interests and state departments of fish 
and game) in favor of Market or Iron Triangle Model systems.    
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Figure 8-1. 
Governance Models, Systems, and Critical Situations 
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Figure 8-2. 
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Figure 8-3 illustrates these historic lines of tension.  Historically, commercial 
interests resisted the creation of a centralized valley-authority system that could 
impinge on their plans for economic development or encroach on the prerogatives of 
supportive individual agencies.  Proponents of state control sought greater influence in 
regional decision-making, often proposing systems that would require federal agencies 
to operate consistent with state plans and programs.  Proponents of strong, central 
federal authority cited the exploitation of natural resources by market forces, the 
inefficiencies of resource management by individual agencies, the lack of coherent 
central planning, and the lack of alignment between the political boundaries of the 
states and ecological boundaries of watersheds.  The systems enacted at any given 
point in time (displayed in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 above) were more often than not 
compromise solutions among these competing perspectives.    
 
Figure 8-3. 
Traditional Lines of Tension in Columbia Basin Governance 
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The historic record in general and the CRBF experience in particular reveal a 
pattern to governance structuration as illustrated in Figure 8-4.  The box on the left 
indicates the traditional participants in Columbia Basin issues as identified in this 
study.  It portrays status quo governance systems and the relationships and lines of 
conflict among regional institutions, thus further elaborating on the lines of conflict 
introduced in Figure 8-3.  These relationships and systems existed in some form of 
stability until faced one of the four critical situations identified earlier.   
The emergence of a critical situation may or may not result in conflict.  If it 
does, it reopens the standing lines of regional conflict among the Basin‟s major 
institutional actors.  Regional political and/or institutional leaders then initiate a series 
of steps that have been repeated to the point of ritual in the Northwest.  Institutional 
leaders and representatives engage in calls for rational processes to resolve the crisis, 
convene meetings, initiate negotiations, and sometimes litigate.  Over time, they reach 
agreement on one or more new system.  These new systems eventually become 
stabilized pending emergence of the next critical situation.   
This concludes this study‟s findings regarding the pattern that regional leaders 
seem to follow when confronted with challenges to existing governance systems.  Of 
particular interest is the tendency of this process to yield relatively consistent results.  
Regional leaders have consistently settled on one of the collaboration-oriented models 
and have historically rejected models with authority to render final decisions.  The 
next section presents the study‟s findings with regard to this phenomenon.  
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Figure 8-4. 
The Historical Pattern of Basin Governance System Establishment 
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The Preference for Collaboration-Oriented Governance Systems 
McKinley (1952) described that in 1944, BPA Administrator Paul Raver 
invited twenty select community leaders to discuss with him the impact of the BPA 
program on the life of the region.  This call was the beginning of the Bonneville 
Regional Advisory Council,
 148
 designed to provide a two-way communication 
between the Administrator and regional leaders regarding system policies and for 
those leaders to provide recommendations on system operations.  Council participation 
was by invitation only, with Administrator Raver limiting admittance to those holding 
“a friendly acceptance of the basic policies established by Congress for the BPA.  In 
choosing the council members, the administration has regarded such acceptance as an 
essential common denominator in obtaining useful advice.  Consequently, this 
advisory group excludes any person who has actively opposed the Bonneville 
program.”  (McKinley, 1952, p. 200).  McKinley (1952) goes on to justify this 
exclusionary practice by stating, “After all, an administrator could hardly expect to 
obtain useful advice from people in basic disagreement with his job” (p. 200, emphasis 
added).  McKinley (1952) underscores a fundamental truism: it is far easier to reach 
agreement on complex issues if you limit the discussion to those sharing a common 
worldview and value set with regard to the issue in question.   
It also underscores the centrality of worldview and values as held by 
participants in the governance discussions.  Up until the establishment of the 
                                                 
148
 This committee is not to be confused with the Bonneville Advisory Board mandated in the 1937 
Bonneville Project Act.  This committee was advisory only and did not execute governance functions as 
defined for this project.  It was not, therefore, identified as a governance system for the purposes of this 
study. 
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environmental and tribal sovereignty movements as viable forces in the Northwest, 
meaningful participation in decision-making was limited to those holding the “market” 
worldview.  As previously discussed, adherents to the tribal and environmental 
worldviews, although scoring victories in some areas were historically unable to affect 
FCRPS decision making to the degree that they wished.  
In establishing governance systems, the region has had to face the tension 
between establishing decision-oriented systems with a capacity for problem solving 
and those that would allow greater inclusion of regional worldviews and values.  The 
historic trend has been to select systems from that favor inclusion over decision-
making.  Of the eleven systems enacted, six were formed under the Federal 
Cooperation Model, four under the State Cooperation Model, and one under the Three 
Sovereigns Model.  None was enacted from the decision-oriented systems offered 
under the Market, Iron Triangle, and Valley Authority models.  Why?  The historical 
record and CRBF experience suggest the following reasons.    
First is the sheer number of competing interests directly or indirectly involved 
with the FCRPS.  In contrast, as bitter and hard-fought as they were, the debates 
between timber interests and environmentalists over the spotted owl and between state 
and tribal fishery managers over salmon harvest involved a relatively small number of 
affected players.  Conversely, the scope of interests affected by the hydrosystem 
system includes almost every major social entity in the Pacific Northwest.  Efforts to 
establish governance systems over the system unveiled fault lines of conflict among 
fishery and energy interests; fishery and development interests; the states; states and 
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tribes; individual tribes; federal agencies; urban and rural communities; upriver and 
downriver interests; public and private power advocates; and others.  These groups 
were represented by hundreds of interest based organizations and associations of 
organizations.  These groups have been disinclined to give up some aspect of their 
core interests to benefit another.  Regional parties agreed to the collaborative systems 
selected because they pose the least threat to established interests, practices, and 
arrangements.   
Second, and related to the first, is the role of worldviews.  Prior to the 
hydrothermal crisis of the 1970s, the dominant voices in the region controlling 
governance processes were members of the commercial market worldview.  These 
entities were comprised of interests that benefit from commercial development of river 
resources, such as manufacturers, irrigators, navigators, hydropower proponents and 
sports and recreational fisheries managers.  Debates within this group primarily 
involved disputes over goals and interests.  These debates all took place within the 
paradigm that the commercial exploitation of the river was acceptable, inevitable, and 
morally supportable based on economic growth.  It was not until the late 1960s and 
early 1970s with the regional hydro-thermal crisis, the increase in environmental 
legislation (especially NEPA and the ESA), and the rise of the tribal sovereignty 
movement that parties with a different value set began to challenge the premises under 
which the river had originally been developed.  These other parties emphasized respect 
for tribal treaty rights and argued for operational adjustments and/or dam removal in 
the interests of improving fish harvest and for the intrinsic ecological value of a 
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natural river system.  Entities not sharing the same market-oriented worldview sorely 
tested the Basin‟s traditional approach to development, such as when the tribes were 
included in the Regional Forum and Columbia River Basin Forum.  Holders of one 
worldview have proven reluctant to submit to a regional governance system dominated 
by adherents to another. 
Third is the fact that the FCRPS is a federally owned and operated system.  
The sovereignty and appointments clauses of the United States Constitution State 
frequently confounded state and tribal efforts to assert greater control.  The language 
of the 1980 Power Act this reflects this reality with its provision that, should a court 
hold the Council to be unconstitutional, it be reformed as a federal agency with 
Council members to be appointed by the Secretary of Interior.  Absent supporting 
federal legislation that realigns existing agency authority and prerogatives, 
establishing a decision-oriented system would prove constitutionally problematic.     
Fourth is the federal agencies‟ historical experience that cooperation and 
coordination provide their best defense against external imposition of a more robust 
valley authority type arrangement.  The region‟s states and commercial interests have 
generally shared agency interest in avoiding a robust decision-oriented system.  
Regional institutions held different reasons for supporting such an approach: 
 Federal agencies: Federal agency goals were to protect discretionary 
authority and preclude oversight over core functions by a valley authority-
type structure (Bessey, 1963; Scheufele, c.1970) and to provide for 
coordination for more efficient operation of the FCRPS (Scheufele, 
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c.1970).  This is not to say interagency competition did not exist 
(McKinley, 1952; Reisner, 1993; Clarke and McCool, 1996; Pisani, 2002) 
but that regional federal leaders frequently rose above parochial disputes in 
the interest of better coordination of the hydropower system and its related 
purposes.  
 Northwest States:  The states based their support for governance on 
protecting state interests affected by the operation of what is in fact a 
federal system (Ogden, 1997).  Prominent among these interests was 
ensuring that the benefits of the hydropower system and its multiple 
purposes remain in the Northwest and maintaining access to federal 
programs and resources to advance state interests (Vogel, 2007).  
 Regional Indian Tribes:  This study found mixed tribal motivations 
regarding regional governance.  Some tribes like the Nez Perce, insisted on 
the paramount nature of their treaties and argue that the only appropriate 
governance relationship for treaty tribes is with the federal government as 
trustee of Indian resources.  Others, such as the Spokane, argue that the 
only way the region can address its natural resource issues is through joint 
decision-making forums of the federal government, states, and tribes 
meeting as co-equals.  Confounding tribal participation is a history that 
undermined trust due to fluctuations in federal Indian policy (Pevar, 2002), 
fishery disputes with the states (Taylor, 1999; Dompier, 2005, and long-
standing disputes with other tribes over land and resource access.      
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 Non-governmental entities:  Representatives of private commercial 
interests and non-profit organizations (such as environmental groups) 
varied widely regarding governance model preferences.  In general, they 
tend to support systems that minimize encroachment into the discretionary 
or mandated decision-making by supportive agencies and constrain the 
actions of agencies whose missions do not align with organization goals.       
As a result, regional institutions have tended to see collaboration-oriented governance 
systems as more in keeping with their core interests than more decision-oriented 
systems. 
Fifth is recognition of the practical need by the federal hydropower agencies to 
coordinate their various programs with regard to the Columbia.  This started shakily 
with the Bonneville Advisory Board in 1937 then progressed and improved with 
establishment of the CBIAC, PNWRBC, and later Regional Forum.   
The 1937 Bonneville Project Act in effect construed what became the FCRPS 
as a shared operation by BPA, the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Federal Power Commission, and Forest Service.  The subsequent level of agency 
involvement and cooperation has varied.  The Bonneville Advisory Board and 
Committee on Fish Operations enjoyed participation from a relatively small number of 
the Basin‟s federal agencies, whereas the PNWRPC, PNWRBC and CBIAC saw 
support from almost all of them.  The broad plans produced by the PNWRPC, 
PNWRBC, and CBIAC were endorsed by all member agencies.
149
  In time, the 
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 It is not clear from the sources used in this report as to the degree to which single regional plans 
developed by the PNWRPB, CBIAC, and PNWRBC influenced individual agency programs.  In other 
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agencies came to see some degree of cooperation as being in their collective best 
interest.   
Sixth is the consistent reluctance of the federal government to reorganize itself 
along lines more conducive to efficient resource management.  Such realignments have 
been proposed in the pass, most dramatically illustrated by calls to consolidate resource 
agencies under a Department of Natural Resources with subordinate field offices 
organized around watersheds (Ogden, 1997).  Related to this is the historic reluctance of 
Congress to change its authorization and appropriation procedures to be more supportive 
of regional institutional arrangements, despite at least two formal reports recommending 
they do so.   
As a result, collaboration-based systems are the historically preferred alternatives 
for the Northwest.  They provide a framework for institutional dialogue and have a history 
of some achievement.  They also do not threaten institutional interests with the authority 
to make decisions contrary to in institutional goals and programs.  The preference for 
collaboration-oriented models thus partially explains the paradox of Northwest 
governance.   
This concludes discussion of the findings regarding the regional preference for 
collaborative governance systems.  This study‟s conclusions, drawn from the previously 
discussed findings, are presented below.    
 
                                                                                                                                            
words, not clear that projects agency constituents promoted, but were either not included or received 
low priority in favor of more regionally advantageous projects.  This is an area of further inquiry in 
order to determine the efficacy of centralized planning absent a supportive congressional authorization 
and funding process. 
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Conclusions 
The findings presented above lead to six general conclusions.  These are listed 
below and discussed in further detail in the sections that follow: 
 Regional leaders will continue to support multijurisdictional governance 
systems. 
 The apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s 
preference for a collaborative approach to governance. 
 Third, statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system success.  
Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a 
sufficient condition for any decision-oriented system that the region may 
desire to establish. 
 The region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decision-oriented 
governance system. 
 Critical situations will continue to emerge and provide catalytic opportunities 
for change between models and systems. 
 The institutional analysis used in this study proved inadequate to fully 
understand the paradox of Basin governance.    
Regional leaders will continue to support multijurisdictional governance systems. 
On the surface, establishment of a multi-jurisdictional governance system may 
seem a superfluous waste of time and money.  The region has multiple federal, tribal, 
and state agencies assigned to manage regional resources and staffed with competent, 
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skilled public servants.  These agencies are generally well supported with sufficient 
funding by their respective legislatures.  All are well established.  Meanwhile, other 
regions of the country seem to get by without the myriad sorts of governance systems 
found in the Columbia River Basin. 
Yet the region clearly perceives a need for some form of multijurisdictional 
governance system.  The Columbia River Basin has had at least one system 
continuously in place since establishment of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning 
Commission under the New Deal in 1934.  Many of these systems enjoyed the support 
of regional leaders and existed successfully for many years.  Examples include the 
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (ten years), the Columbia Basin 
Inter-Agency Committee (twenty years), the Pacific Northwest River Basins 
Commission (fourteen years), The Northwest Power and Conservation Planning 
Council (thirty years and counting) and the Regional Forum (fourteen years, less 
Executive Committee).  This fact is by itself evidence of a perceived regional need on 
the part of institutional leaders.    
Records and accounts available for the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee (Scheufele, c.1970), Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPPC, 
2007) and the Columbia River Basin Forum (press accounts, meeting notes, and 
facilitator notes) provide reasons for this broad institutional support.  From these 
accounts can be concluded the following: 
 Regional leaders seek multijurisdictional governance systems that 
transcend individual federal and state agency and tribal jurisdiction in order 
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to objectively resolve (or preclude) problems of competing interests among 
regional institutions.    
 The intent of regional leaders is to reach joint decisions through rational 
discussions inclusive of all relevant regional parties. 
The apparent paradox of Basin governance is inherent in the Basin‟s consistent 
choice of a collaborative approach to governance.   
The historic regional preference for collaboration-oriented governance systems 
is not likely to change.  There is an inherent tension between the desire for 
inclusiveness and the desire for decision-making.  The greater the degree of 
inclusiveness, the greater the likelihood of conflict among participant interests and/or 
their respective worldviews.  In essence, the desire for better decisions through 
inclusiveness works against the intent to resolve or preclude problems.   
Prior to the 1930s, regional natural resource-related decisions were made either 
through uncoordinated commercial enterprises responding to market supply and 
demand (the Market Model) or by individual federal agencies often working in concert 
with constituencies and Congress but independently of each other (the Iron Triangle 
Model).  These were decision-oriented systems, with decisions made to meet the goals 
and objectives of those who made them.  Progressive and New Deal proponents sought 
to curb the cumulative waste and excesses of those models through more rigorous 
government regulation and greater governmental involvement in regional resource 
planning.  The interest in centralized planning resulted in creation of the state-centric 
PNWRPC in 1934, the region‟s first experiment with the State Cooperation Model.   
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The interest in greater central control of resource decisions resulted in 
Progressive and New Deal proposals for a Columbia Valley Authority patterned after 
the Tennessee Valley Authority.  The Valley Authority Model represents a third 
decision-oriented model that the regional historically rejected.  The compromise 
between valley authority proponents and proponents of decision by individual agency 
resulted in the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, creation of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, and establishment of the Bonneville Advisory Board – marking the 
first experiment the Federal Cooperation Model.  Thus, the collaboration-oriented 
approach was hard-wired into the Basin‟s first two governance systems. 
Ever since the region has relied on systems oriented toward the inclusion of 
multiple parties.  Up until the 1970s, “inclusiveness” was largely limited to parties 
sharing the commercial-market worldview of natural resource development.  Since the 
1970s, parties holding dramatically different worldviews gained access to governance 
decisions due to due to the tribal sovereignty and environmental movements.  Whereas 
earlier debates over basin resource development were based on economic priorities 
and allocation of benefits, these new worldviews questioned whether such 
development should be allowed at all.   
From this discussion the following suite of conclusions may be drawn: 
 The region derives value and benefit from collaboration-oriented systems 
established under the Federal Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three 
Sovereign models.  Despite recurring frustration over the inability of such 
systems to solve the region‟s more intractable problems, regional leaders 
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find that living with those weaknesses is preferable to the risks to core 
institutional interests posed by decision-oriented model alternatives.    
 The concept of “relevant parties” has evolved over time.  Originally 
including only development-oriented agencies and state governors‟ offices, 
it has grown to include fishery interests, be more sensitive to environmental 
concerns, and to a willingness to include regional tribal leaders as co-equal 
management partners.   
 The region will likely continue its tradition of establishing new governance 
systems from the Federal Cooperation, State Cooperation, and Three 
Sovereign models.  The emergence of the tribes as a recognized relevant 
party will likely mean a preference for finding a workable Three 
Sovereigns system. 
 The success of collaboration-based systems in solving difficult problems 
will be limited.    
 Frustrations over the inability of collaboration based systems to resolve 
significant issues will likely result in future system and model changes as 
participants take advantage of critical situations to emplace systems more to 
their liking.   
The necessity and sufficiency of system statutory support. 
Of the eleven collaboration-based governance systems enacted in the Columbia 
Basin between 1934 and 2000, three – The Bonneville Advisory Board, The Pacific 
Northwest River Basins Commission, and the Northwest Power and Conservation 
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Council – were established in law as detailed above.  One system – the Northwest 
Interstate Compact – was authorized in federal law but never established.  A fifth 
system – the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission - enjoyed indirect 
statutory support through the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which created 
the Public Works Administration (PWA).  It authorized the PWA to establish 
additional planning agencies, among which was the central planning committee (a 
committee that underwent numerous name changes during the course of its existence).  
This committee went on to establish state and regional planning boards, of which the 
PNWRPC was one.  Thus, although authorized by law, it was not specifically 
established in law as were the Bonneville Advisory Board or Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council.  The remaining seven enjoyed no statutory support but were 
established instead through voluntary agreement among participants.   
There is some correlation between system effectiveness and system support in 
law, if one judges effectiveness as the accomplishment of the goals specified for a 
given organizational entity.  .  The PNWRPC, PNWRBC, and NPPC all existed for 
extended periods of time and produced reports and plans enjoying broad institutional 
support (Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1980; Vogel, 2007).  Alternatively, the Bonneville 
Advisory Board essentially ceased to function upon completion of its World War II 
related tasks, although it nominally existed until replaced by the CBIAC in 1946.  The 
Northwest Interstate Compact, although negotiated over a span of almost twenty years 
and authorized in law by Congress, failed to win ratification in the state legislatures 
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(McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c.1980).  Consequently, support in law 
does not guarantee collaborative system success.   
Systems established through voluntary agreements among participants enjoyed 
similarly mixed records of achievement.  The Columbia Basin Interagency Committee 
and the Committee on Fish Operations, which later became the Fish Operations 
Executive Committee and later yet the Regional Forum, all enjoyed extended periods 
of cooperative existence and were successful within the parameters of their formation.  
Conversely, the Northwest States Development Association, Pacific Northwest 
Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, and Columbia River Basins Forum existed 
for only short periods of time and produced little of consequence (Bessey, 1963; 
Scheufele, c. 1970; Norwood, c.1980).   
Thus, the absence of statutory support does not preordain collaborative system 
failure.  Instead, almost by definition, collaborative systems are dependent on the good 
will of participants, the support of their parent institutions, the degree of rapport 
among members, and their willingness to compromise within the bounds of their 
statutory authority.  They require voluntary cooperation to resolve differences in 
agency interests and mediate differences in institutional values. 
In contrast to collaboration-oriented governance systems, statutory support is 
necessary for adoption of a decision-oriented governance system.  This is because of 
the fragmented nature of Basin institutions and the myriad laws, regulations, and 
directives guiding regional institutional activities (NPPC, 1996; GAO, 2004).   
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All of the decision-oriented system proposals found in this study carried with 
them recommendations to substantively reorder existing institutional relationships.  
For example, the bill by Washington Representative Knute Hill in 1935 transferred 
responsibility for Columbia River development exclusively to the Bureau of 
Reclamation, assigning to the Bureau responsibilities previously authorized to the 
Corps of Engineers.  Bills by Senators Charles McNary and Frederick Steiwer and 
Representative Martin Smith submitted the same year would expand Corps of 
Engineers‟ authority to include power marketing and transmission in the Lower 
Columbia.  The bill by Senator James Pope and Representative Hill, also submitted in 
1935, proposed to establish a Columbia Valley Authority that would transfer the 
authorities and responsibilities from multiple Basin federal agencies to the jurisdiction 
of an entirely new agency.  The bill submitted by Senator Warren Magnuson in 1949 
would subordinate Columbia Basin federal functions of water resources, power 
generation, and transmission under the supervisory structure of a Columbia Valley 
Administration.  Daniel Ogden offered a more sweeping proposal in 1997, calling for 
reordering of not just regional agency offices, but a restructuring of the national 
departments and congressional committee structure as well.  The key point is that any 
system intended to render final decisions must be empowered with the authority to 
reconcile and, if necessary, override the interests and proclivities of individual 
regional institutions.  Such a system would also require support at the national level – 
either voluntarily provided or enacted through statute - to preclude departmental or 
congressional actions that may undermine the system‟s goals and priorities 
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(McKinley, 1952; Ogden, 1997).  Historically, regional institutional leaders, state 
political leaders, congressional representatives, and federal agency heads have never 
collectively supported such a step. 
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions: 
 Statutory support for collaboration-oriented governance systems is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure system effectiveness.  
Rather, collaborative systems by their nature are dependent on the 
relationships among institutional participants.    
 Conversely, statutory support is a necessary condition and may be a 
sufficient condition for establishment of a decision-oriented governance 
system.  The authorities and prerogatives of state, federal, and tribal 
governments and agencies and, to some degree, the relationships among 
them are all established in law.  Any system with the authority to direct 
agency priorities and prerogatives must therefore have statutory authority 
to do so.  The degree to which institutional relationships among regional 
agencies, federal departments, and the congressional committee structure 
are defined in any new authorizing statute will determine the degree of 
voluntary cooperation that may still be needed. 
An institutional reordering of the magnitude needed for an effective decision-
oriented system would invest that system with enormous power and influence over the 
Basin‟s residents and institutions.  Under what conditions could such a reordering be 
supported?  How likely is it to occur? 
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The region is highly unlikely to ever support an authoritative decision-oriented 
governance system. 
Calls for greater centralized decision-oriented systems have consistently been 
made since the 1930s.  Recent examples include the suggestions for a “Salmon Czar” 
to oversee Basin salmon recovery efforts during the Clinton administration and Dan 
Ogden‟s 1997 proposal for a Columbia River Administration.150  Calls for greater 
market control have come in the form of proposals to privatize the federal hydropower 
system or sell it electrical power at market rates (see Munson, 2001).  Regional 
Institutional and political leaders have consistently rejected all of these decision-
oriented proposals. 
Even if regional leaders were to agree to a valley authority system, they would 
have to overcome significant structural challenges if such a system were to be 
effective.  Political leaders would have to address the constitutional provisions 
regarding the sovereignty of federal agencies.  They would have to address respective 
agency authorizing statutes at the federal and state levels.  Congress would need to 
revise their fractured oversight of federal agencies by multiple committees in both 
houses.  Absent any of these steps, the resulting body would default to a collaborative-
system in that it could only advise and not direct federal action.   
Consequently, only a governance body that is empowered through legislation, 
executive order, court order, and/or a binding compact among the states and tribes 
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 The “Salmon Czar” suggestion, though frequently made, was never to the knowledge of the author 
developed into a coherent governance proposal.  Consequently, it was not considered in this study. 
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with the legal authority to override parochial opposition will be able to render 
decisions or come to compromise on significant differences. 
From this discussion come the following conclusions: 
 Based on the region‟s history, institutional leaders are not likely to enact a 
robust, authoritative system unless a threat emerges of such magnitude that 
sovereign political leaders and their constituents are convinced that such a 
system better serves their interests than otherwise. 
 An event of such magnitude is highly unlikely.  None of the region‟s 
previous critical situations – the Great Depression, the end of a world war, 
the hydro-thermal crisis, or the 1991 ESA salmon listings - was sufficient to 
put a more decision-oriented system into place.  It is hard to imagine one of 
greater criticality that would.   
 Imposition of such a system from outside the region, say by legislative 
action or Executive order, is equally unlikely given the democratic nature of 
American decision making, likely state opposition, and the entrenched nature 
of regional interests and institutions. 
Critical situations will continue to emerge and provide catalytic opportunities for 
change between models and systems. 
Regardless of how inclusive and collaborative future governance systems prove to be, 
parties excluded from the process or who believe the extant system is not meeting their 
needs will likely take advantage of future critical situations to force change.  Future 
governance model and system changes will likely follow the historic pattern illustrated 
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in Figure 8-4 and generalized below in Figure 8-5.  Opportunity for change may occur 
through a critical situation that either reopens traditional lines of conflict as institutions 
vie for influence or causes leaders to meet on a less conflictual basis.  Regardless, there 
will likely be calls for public meetings, negotiations, testimony to state and/or federal 
legislators, representatives to meet in negotiation, and other ritualistic exercises 
intended to arrive at a new system.  If successful, these newly adopted systems will 
eventually institutionalize as the new status quo pending appearance of the next critical 
situation.   
This study bases its conclusion regarding the likelihood of future conflictual 
changes in governance systems the complexities of the region‟s issues, the large number 
of institutional interests affected by activities within the Basin, and the region‟s 
governance history.
 151
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 A possible candidate for the next critical situation is the pending decision by Judge James Redden 
regarding the litigation over the NMFS 2008 Biological Opinion and operation of the FCRPS.  Should 
Judge Redden rule against the government and order future operations under court supervision, it would 
(1) introduce a new model of governance for the FCRPS (a Court Supervision model, perhaps similar to 
tht operating under the Unites States v. Oregon process for basin fisheries) and (2) initiate thresolution” 
rituals to determine what the form and structures of the new system will be. 
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Figure 8-5. 
Generalized Model of Basin Governance System Establishment 
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Limitations of the Institutional Approach    
Using an institutional level of analysis provided a workable methodology for 
exploring the history of regional governance.  It offered insights into institutional 
interests over time, the social and political context and issues that shaped governance 
choices, and the governance systems and models that subsequently emerged.  It also 
provided a basis for establishing governance and trends, allowing for development of 
the models provided in Figures 8-1 through 8-5.   
The institutional approach only partially explained the region‟s governance 
paradox.  It did not provide for full explanation as to why some systems failed and 
others succeeded, even when faced with a relatively similar array of issues and 
challenges.  For example, both the Columbia River Inter-Agency Committee and 
Columbia River Basin Forum were collaboration-oriented systems created by 
voluntary participants.  Both faced participant conflict over fish and hydropower 
system priorities.  Arguably, the CBIAC faced the more difficult challenge in that it 
faced a broader scope of activities, such as public land use planning for timber, 
mining, and grazing.  Furthermore, funding for the CBIAC came solely from 
participant contributions, while the CRBF received additional funds for facilitation and 
staff support and tribal participation from BPA and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Yet 
the CBIAC operated relatively successfully for fourteen years while the CRBF 
collapsed in a little over one.   
Moreover, while the institutional approach was able to identify institutional 
interests, it could not explain the passion that regional participants attached to those 
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interests.  It could not explain the close identity that individuals felt toward 
organizational purposes, goals, and objectives.  Nor could it explain why different 
participants interpreted established facts so differently.  To get to a more complete 
answer requires research in areas not available in the historic record. 
This study identified three worldviews operative in the Pacific Northwest.  It 
concluded, based on the material reviewed, that differences over the values that 
underlay those worldviews may be as important in regional resource conflicts as 
tangible competition over resource use.  It has alluded to the influences of 
organizational culture (Schein, 2004) and organizational and social identity (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Hogg and Terry, 2001).  However, it 
has done so in the abstract, not providing any empirical link between the values of any 
given institution and the decisions and actions of that institution‟s representative 
agent(s) in governance forums.   
The theoretical concept of “agency” (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) suggests 
the importance of such a link.  Agency represents the capacity to make things to 
happen.  Agents are knowledgeable individuals acting alone or as a group to defend, 
modify, or replace existing systems and structures.  Individuals exercise agency.  
Agency manifests through individual decisions and action and it is through agency that 
social organization occurs.  As Sztompka explained it:  
“If we think of any empirical event or phenomenon in a society, anything 
that is actually happening, is it not always, without exception, a fusion of 
structures and agents, of operation and action?  Show me an agent who is 
not enmeshed in some structure.  Show me a structure which exists apart 
from individuals.  Show me an action which does not participate in 
societal operation.  Show me societal operation not resolving in to action.  
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There are neither structureless agents nor agentless structures” (Sztompka, 
1991, p. 92). 
 
A greater understanding of agency and the ways in which institutional values and 
personal principles influence the decisions of institutional representatives may provide 
greater insight into the workings of collaboration-based models.  Furthermore, 
empirically supported findings that organizational identity is malleable (Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000) suggest that conflict over values 
may not be as intractable as they so often appear.  An understanding of the influences 
that motivate individual agents and the degree to which institutional values contribute 
to those motivations would complete the understanding as to why more robust regional 
governance systems have not been brought about.  It could also suggests strategies to 
develop systems and structures that instill their own sense of identity in participants, 
potentially transcending competing attachments to parent groups and offering a more 
sophisticated approach to regional conflict resolution.   
A situation that to a stronger system does not even register in the organizational 
consciousness may pose an existential threat to systems with weak senses of identity 
and culture, weak affinity between organizational values and individual principles, 
weak alliances with external stakeholders, and/or weak psychological bonds between 
the system and its participants.  The implication for governance is that establishing 
senses of organizational identity and creating psychological bonds between individual 
members and system principles enhances the potential for system success.  The 
circumstances of the negotiations over the CRBF MOA provide a unique opportunity 
for this sort of research. 
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Framework for Additional Research 
The Columbia River Basin Forum adopted a collaborative process based on the 
belief that, if reasonable leaders from the region‟s key stakeholders could rationally 
discuss the issues at hand they would reach reasonable compromises.  This approach 
underestimated the deep differences in values within the region.  By ensuring that 
every representative reserved veto authority over any collective position not in accord 
with the interests of their respective constituency, participants in the CRBF had no 
institutional incentive to address substantive issues.  As observed by Russell Linden 
(2002) in his book on collaboration, “the forces that pull people apart are very strong, 
some of them wired into the very DNA of organizations, and it takes far more than 
good intentions and kind-hearted people to make collaboration work” (Linden, 2002, p. 
36). 
Theory states that belief patterns embedded in institutional identity and culture 
condition the members of those institutions as to how to perceived and interpret events 
around them (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Schein, 2004).  The 
tendency for institutions to evolve into groups of like-valued individuals exacerbates 
this phenomenon (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  In the case of 
the CRBF, those influences resulted in the adoption of the MOA designed to preclude 
any real decision making.   
The operative question is “why?”  Determining the processes by which agents 
internalized institutional values, what those values were, and how they played in the 
negotiation of the CRBF MOA and the CRBF‟s subsequent activities a research 
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framework beyond the review of historical literature and primary sources presented 
heretofore.  However, the historical record discussed in Chapters 3 through 7 and the 
analysis in Chapter 8 suggests the following set of hypotheses to guide development of 
such a framework:     
 The organizations and institutions participating in the development of the 
CRBF MOA and subsequent CRBF activities held interests and aspirations 
(both stated and unstated) they wished to defend and/or pursue.  Theses 
institutional interests and aspirations were functions of the institution‟s tangible 
goals and objectives as well as its worldview, organizational culture and sense 
of social identity. 
 Representative agents from each participating institution each held their own 
set of personal principles, goals, and plans.  These principles, goals and plans 
were functions of the individual‟s upbringing and reflective of the institutional 
values with which the agent most closely identified.   
 The “macro” influences of worldview, culture, and identity coupled with 
individual principles shaped the way agents construed information, perceived 
the issues at hand, and interpreted the motivations of other participants to the 
process.   
 Agents selected to represent organizations in negotiations and CRBF activities 
were expected to either win a governance system that would further parent 
institutional interests and validate parent institutional values or, at a minimum, 
prevent the adoption of a system that could threaten those interests and values.  
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Consequently, organizations selected representatives who identified with and 
believed in the inherent “rightness” of institutional interests, values, and 
positions.         
 The circumstances that drove regional leaders to believe that t new system of 
regional governance was necessary turned out to be of insufficient magnitude 
to either transcend individual principles and beliefs or threaten institutional 
interests or existence.   
 The lack of an overwhelming threat coupled with deeply held principles and the 
expectation to defend institutional goals and objectives translated into position 
taking that limited opportunities for compromise and rendered achievement of 
the rational decision making system sought by regional leaders extremely 
difficult to achieve.  A general lack of trust between parties and a lack of 
common purpose was hard-wired into the CRBF MOA, thus preordaining its 
failure.   
Appendix B presents a theoretical framework under which these hypotheses may be 
tested. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPANDED LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
Introduction 
This study research the history of governance from works in five literature 
domains.  These were: 
 Regional Native American tribes and tribal perspectives, 
 Euro-American exploration and settlement of the Pacific Northwest,  
 Columbia River Basin commercial development,  
 The impact of Basin development on regional salmon runs, and  
 The American environmental movement. 
These domains were reviewed using a content-analysis approach as 
recommended by Neustadt and May (1988) and Ritchie and Spencer (2002).  
Specifically researched were insights into the worldviews held by the major regional 
institutions and for elements of governance suggested by the Columbia River Basin 
Forum experience in order to construct the history presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Those elements were:   
 The name and nature of governance systems proposed or enacted. 
 The locus of decision making for each governance system proposed or 
enacted.    
 The critical situations or catalytic events that created the opportunity for 
change to existing systems and structures.    
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 The political and social context of the periods as framed by the dates of the 
selected critical situations. 
 The salient issues in the Pacific Northwest that the proposed or enacted 
system was intended to address. 
 The institutional participants and their positions, interests, and agendas. 
 The worldviews held by the institutional actors. 
 The governance systems both proposed and enacted within each period and 
their supporting structural components (to the degree recorded). 
 Additional information as available.  Such information included the 
duration of enacted systems, types of products produced, effectiveness, and 
any other material as may be relevant to the research question. 
 
Domain: Regional Native American Tribes and the Tribal Worldview 
The literature reviewed here was selected for two purposes.  The first was to 
present the events and circumstances of the tribes‟ and their cultural role in the 
Northwest from the early 1800s up through the period of the CRBF.  The second 
purpose is to identify the worldviews and perspectives that tribal participants later 
brought to the governance discussions.  Trosper (1995) provides a summary of Indian 
cultural precepts that he generalizes from his study of native peoples nationwide.  
Pevar (2002) also takes a nationwide perspective, focusing on the legal and political 
evolution of tribal rights.  Wilkinson (2005) traces the history of the tribal sovereignty 
movement.  Ruby and Brown, in two books, (1981 and 1992) provide an 
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encyclopedia-like overview of the tribes and bands of the Pacific Northwest, while 
Clark (1953) transcribes traditional Northwest Tribal stories that provide Indian 
interpretations of the creation and man‟s relationship with nature.  Finally, portions of 
Lichatowich (1999), Williams (2006) and Taylor (1999) present, compare, and 
contrast the tribal worldview with the worldview of the Northwest‟s Anglo-American 
settlers and the regional implications of those differences; the review of these three 
accounts is provided in the discussion of the regional salmon crisis further below.   
Ronald L. Trosper is a researcher and professor at the School of Forestry and 
Department of Applied Indigenous Studies, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, 
Arizona.  He has written numerous articles on tribal economic culture and traditions.  
His Traditional American Indian Economic Policy was published in 1995.  In this 
paper, Trosper defines and generalizes traditional Indian views and compares them 
with western societal views for purposes of deriving policy implications.  He begins 
by noting the danger in generalizing about Indian culture since tribal societies vary 
significantly in time and space, and therefore the elements discussed may not apply to 
all tribes equally.  However, he argues that the four fundamental components he 
presents are sufficiently present across Indian culture to offer a general philosophical 
understanding of tribal economic perspectives.   
Trosper argues that traditional Indian culture is based on respect for the natural 
world in which man lives.  This notion of respect contains four basic components: 
 Community: People are members of a community that includes all beings, 
living and non-living.  Each has its proper role, and each has obligations to 
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others.  The sacred aspect is that all beings have a spirit.  The economic 
aspect is that reciprocity in exchange must exist; for everything that is 
taken, something must be given back. 
 Connectedness:  Whereas community provides a source of obligation and a 
guide as to how people ought to behave, the concept of connectedness is a 
description of how things are.  All elements of the earth are connected to 
each other, and one cannot violate the principals of community without 
having some negative impact on the natural order.   
 Seventh Generation:  Past human generations left a legacy and people have 
a duty to pass it on so it will be present seven generations hence.   
 Humility:  Humanity should be humble in its actions.  The natural world is 
powerful and well able to cause trouble if not treated properly. 
These four components result in an Indian economic perspective that is 
dramatically different from the Anglo-American tradition.  For example, “high 
grading” (taking best first – such as old-growth trees) is not allowed since respect for 
the 7
th
 generation means leaving enough of the best to be enjoyed by that generation.  
Connectedness and humility dictate that there is an upper bound on consumption.  In 
addition, the notions of community and connectedness require that ecosystem health 
be maintained.   
Trosper further argues that these components guided development of tribal 
social institutions.  For example, private real property ownership as understood by 
Anglo-Americans did not exist.  People had a right of use of what was on the land but 
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not of ownership of the land or its resources.  The concept of individual property rights 
as applied to land, water, and wildlife was all but incomprehensible within the tribal 
concept of community. 
Central to Northwest tribal economies was the practice of what Trosper calls 
“reciprocal exchange” as practiced through the potlatch.  The potlatch was a gift 
giving and barter event in which collective wealth was shared and redistributed.  It 
modeled what the natives interpreted as the natural process; soil gave seeds the 
opportunity to produce plants; plants fed the animals; some animals fed other animals; 
and in death the animals fed the soil.  It was a natural cycle in which no element was 
dominant, not even humans, and in which each element depended on the others.  
Under the concept of reciprocal exchange, anything received had to be returned in 
equal or greater measure – to included gifts among individuals.       
Not everyone agrees with Trosper‟s construct.  Environmental historian 
Samuel Hays (2000) notes that “…the Native Americans engaged in practices little 
different for those of the Europeans who displaced them.”  After listing examples such 
as Indian use of fire for land clearing; the use of land for agriculture, hunting, fishing, 
and edible plant gathering; and irrigation in the Southwest, Hays concludes that 
“These practices reflect not a people „in harmony with nature‟ but a native people who 
used their immediate environment intensively.”  (p. 6).  Hays attributes the differences 
in environmental impact of the two cultures to the tribes‟ relatively small numbers 
dispersed over an immense landscape in comparison to the all-but unlimited number of 
Anglo-Americans with their advanced technologies.  William Robbins (1997) makes a 
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similar point.  Pointing to archaeological studies, Robbins states that tribal peoples 
deliberately manipulated the natural landscape in support of their subsistence 
activities.  Their primary technology was fire, strategically set to stimulate new growth 
for browsing by wildlife and waterfowl, to enhance development of a variety of plant 
foods, to assist in hunting, to maintain clearings for travel, and, once horses were 
acquired, to provide graze.   
Stephan Pevar‟s The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Authoritative ACLU 
Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights (3
rd
 edition) (2002) is one of a series of writings 
published by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to help inform individuals 
about their rights under the law.  The author is an attorney for the ACLU, lecturer, and 
former adjunct professor at the University of the Denver School of Law.  His purpose 
is to present the unique nature of federal Indian law.     
Pevar (2002) begins with a just-the-facts review of federal Indian policy.  He 
provides an overview of the estimated number of tribal nations prior to European 
arrival, aspects of their general culture, and the consequences of contact with whites.  
Pevar characterizes, based on evidence of policy, the fluctuations in official policy 
positions with regard to American Indians during periods of time as: 
 Tribal independence (1492 – 1787). 
 Agreements between equals (1787 – 1828) 
 Relocation of the Indians (1828 – 1887) 
 Allotment and assimilation (1887 – 1934) 
 Indian reorganization (1934 – 1953) 
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 Termination (1953 – 1968) 
 Tribal self-determination (1968 – present) 
Pevar (2002) then methodically and objectively lays out the fundamentals of 
Indian law, beginning with basic definitions and moving from there through the 
federal trust responsibility, the nature and role of tribal treaties, the relationship 
between the tribes and states, issues of criminal and civil jurisdiction on tribal 
reservations, and other aspects.  He carefully cites his work back to statute or treaty 
language or the determinations of relevant litigation.  Relevant statutes are included as 
appendices.  The book provides an accessible and straightforward reference for issues 
regarding the legal status of the tribes and their relationship with the federal and state 
governments. 
Whereas Pevar (2002) concentrates on policy and law, Charles Wilkinson‟s 
2006 book Blood Struggle: the Rise of Modern Indian Nations traces the rise in tribal 
capacity for self-governance.  Wilkinson is a professor of law at the University of 
Colorado and former attorney for the Native American Rights Fund, specializing in 
American Indian law.  While providing a summary background history of United 
States policy toward its Indian peoples, he concentrates on the period from the mid-
twentieth century onward.  Writing from a national perspective, he notes the poverty 
and despair that pervaded Indian reservations in the 1940s and 50s.  Government 
policy toward Indians varied over the nation‟s history from severe to expansive with 
regard to native rights and enforcement of treaty provisions.  By the 1950s, the mood 
in Congress was to end federal subsidies to tribal people, sell of tribal land, and more 
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aggressively assimilate Indians into mainstream American society.  The policy of 
“termination” was formally announced through House Concurrent Resolution 108. 
Passage of this resolution was a catalyst for tribal action.  Wilkinson (2005) 
recounts the tribal efforts at defending their rights and land in the courts.  Within the 
next forty years tribal leaders succeeded to a degree few would have predicted.  For 
this study, Wilkinson (2005) is used for its background on key legislation regarding 
fishing and land rights, insights into tribal perspectives, and the development of tribal 
governance. 
Two books by Robert Ruby and John Brown provide an archeological overview 
of regional tribes and their history and interrelationships.  Indians of the Pacific 
Northwest: A History (1981) and A Guide to the Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest 
(1992) together provide an exhaustive (but by the authors admission still incomplete) 
description of the tribes and bands found in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and western 
Montana.  The authors provide excellent summary histories of individual tribes, 
collected through research in older narratives, documents, and tribal oral histories 
where they could be found.  Ruby and Brown do not try to interpret or evaluate the 
meanings of the tribal practices and social structures they record.  As such, they do not 
provide the cultural insights offered by Trosper (1992), Lichatowich (1999), Taylor 
(1999), or Williams (2006).  What Ruby and Brown do offer is an encyclopedic 
account of tribal groupings, maps, photographs, outlines of reservation governance, and 
descriptions of tribal life.  They seemingly (there are few citations used) base their 
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work on primary source material and their own interviews with tribal leaders and other 
historians. 
Ruby and Brown‟s (1981 and 1992) sorting of Northwest tribes and artifacts is 
complemented by the transcription of traditional Northwest tribal stories in Ella 
Clark‟s 1953 Indian Legends of the Pacific Northwest, the first of four books she 
wrote to capture native American traditional stories.  Like Ruby and Brown, Clark 
only recorded the stories she had heard; she offers no attempt at interpretation or 
sociological insight as to the stories meanings to tribal peoples.  Her intent is to 
“prepare a collection of Pacific Northwest myths and legends that the general reader 
will enjoy, either as entertainment or as information about an American way of living 
strange to him” (p. 1).  Her sources include accounts “tucked away in obscure” books 
(p. 1), government documents, reports of anthropologists and folklorists, pioneer 
manuscripts and journals, and her own discussions with tribal members during visits 
to fourteen reservations.   
The stories Clark (1953) records include tribal traditions regarding the 
creation, natural phenomena, and origins of tribal people and regional geographic 
features.  She also includes Wasco and Chinook/Clatsop stories regarding the first 
native encounters with white people and their ships on the Oregon coast.  Mindful of 
Schein‟s (2004) admonition that such stories should be treated as “artifacts” whose 
meanings are often not obvious to those outside the culture, this study leaves 
interpretations to others.  Rather, Clark is used to help illustrate the close relationship 
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that regional tribal people felt with the natural world as demonstrated by their 
characters and story lines. 
  
Domain: Euro-American Exploration and Settlement of the Pacific Northwest
153
   
Literature in this domain was research for insights into the worldviews brought 
to the Pacific Northwest by Euro-American settlers and for facts and circumstances of 
the region‟s early white exploration and settlement. 
Four authors were reviewed whose works captured the origins and nature of 
the worldviews brought by settlers to the Pacific Northwest.  These were Max Weber 
(2002/1920), Henry Nash Smith (1950), Jenks Cameron (1929), and Gordon Dodds 
(1986).   
Weber (2002/1920) argued that the growth of western capitalism is directly 
attributable to and derived from Protestant religious beliefs.  The essay was based on 
Weber‟s observations and research in Germany in particular and European countries 
and the United States in general.  Weber observed that, in developed capitalist 
countries, business leaders, the owners of capital, senior factory managers, and the 
more highly skilled members of the work force were predominately of Protestant 
religious denominations.  He further noted that the percentage of Protestants in 
positions of leadership far exceeded the percentage in the general population.  
Furthermore, Protestants tended to pass on larger estates to their heirs and to favor 
                                                 
153
 Settlers pushing west over the Alleghenies and into the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri River 
valleys were a mix of several European nationalities.  Those who later moved to the Northwest from the 
Midwest were largely of British descent.  See Smith (1950) and Dodds (1986).  Consequently, “Euro-
American” is used when speaking of western settlement in general and “Anglo-American” when 
speaking of settlement to the Pacific Northwest. 
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higher education, especially in the sciences, math, and other technical fields.  By 
contrast, Catholics tended to end their education earlier and concentrate in liberal arts 
fields.  In the work force, he noted that even poorer Protestants tended to strive to 
exceed to a greater degree than their Catholic counterparts, often moving from cottage 
crafts to city factories in which they moved up in either managerial or skilled labor 
occupations.  Catholics, on the other hand, seemed predisposed to stay at the crafts, at 
best working up to master craftsman.  Weber (2002/1920) believed that these differing 
occupational choices were due to “distinct mental characteristics which have been 
instilled into them by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of their 
locality and home background” (p. 4, emphasis in original).  Weber‟s (2002/1920) 
argument challenged the prevailing belief that rejection of the feudal economic model 
opened the door to challenges to other traditional authorities, such as the Catholic 
Church.  Weber argued the opposite – it was the challenge to Church authority by the 
Reformation that led to a revolution in the way people perceived the relationship 
between their worldly existence and the accumulation of individual wealth.  Weber 
attributed Protestant success to “distinct mental characteristics which have been 
instilled into them and indeed by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of 
their locality and home background” (p. 4, emphasis in original).  He further notes the 
distinct “points of view” (p. 9) held by members of the Catholic Church and the 
various Protestant denominations.   
Weber‟s (2002/1920) argument draws from his study of the formative writings 
of early and influential leaders of various Protestant sects.  He traced the evolution 
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from the belief in the Middle Ages that one‟s place in life and material circumstances 
was a preordained part of God‟s plan, through the Protestant Reformation, to the 
eventual Protestant belief in social progression and wealth creation through hard work 
and individual effort.   
Smith‟s book Virgin Land: the American West as Symbol and Myth (1950) 
studied the impact of the vast lands of the western United States on the consciousness 
of Americans.  He traces that impact on the literature and social thought at various 
periods of American history.  Smith notes the change in the way Americans thought 
about America, offering as evidence the way the west was portrayed in fiction and 
written accounts.  Up through the early 1800s, America viewed itself as a sea power in 
the tradition of Europe in general and Great Britain in particular.  Under this view, the 
way to national prosperity was through seaborne trade, initially with Europe and later 
with Asia.  This view created the global (and national) obsession with the long sought 
for passage to India believed to exist across North America.  For the United States, 
finding that passage meant true independence from England and would symbolize 
national greatness.  But by the late 1800s, American thinking changed.  They began to 
think of the vast expanse of land between the east and west coasts as the basis for an 
American continental empire.  Free land to the west was seen as the way to ensure 
individual liberty and prosperity, and a vehicle to eliminate poverty.   
Smith (1950) further argues that the exploration and settlement of the frontier 
assumed a romantic conceptualization captured in the feats of fictional heroes, such as 
James Fenimore Cooper‟s Leatherstocking and pulp fiction hero Dead Eye Dick and 
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the fictionalization of the lives of living frontiersmen, such as Daniel Boone and 
William Cody.  These symbolized and celebrated the values of frontier independence 
and individualism.  He also presents the political implications of western settlement, 
the organization of regional economies in the Northeast, Southeast, and West, and the 
impact on the Civil War.  He also examines the consequences when idealized notions 
of the west came up against actual conditions on the frontier.  However, for the 
purposes of this study, it is his capturing of the perspective of the western settler that is 
of primary interest.   
Turn-of-the-century western perspectives on natural resources were captured 
by Jenks Cameron‟s introduction to his 1928 The Development of Governmental 
Forest Control in the United States and his 1929 The Bureau of Biological Survey: Its 
History, Activities and Organization.  In addition to his work on federal forest policy 
and the Bureau of Biological Survey, he produced the Brookings Institution‟s service 
monographs for the National Park Service (1922) and Bureau of Dairy Industry 
(1929).  His book on federal forest policy was apparently highly regarded and is cited 
in Forest Service histories (see, for example, Steen, 1976).  
Cameron‟s Forest Control traces the origins of federal involvement in U.S. 
forest policy.  Most relevant to this study is his first chapter.  It focuses on the 
worldview held by early explorers and settlers that the resources of the North 
American continent in general and timber in particular, were inexhaustible.  
Cameron‟s (1929) Bureau of Biological Survey was one of a series of monographs on 
U.S. government agencies prepared in the 1910s and 1920s.  The monographs were 
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prepared by the Brookings Institution in response to a charge from President William 
Taft to examine the missions and structures of all the federal agencies of the time in 
order to create a framework for more an efficient and economical approach to the 
conduct of government business.   
His primary purpose was to present the history of the Bureau of Biological 
Survey in keeping with Brookings Institution guidelines, which he does.  In this work, 
he also does something much more.  As he did in his study of forest policy, he 
provides in Bureau of Biological Survey a rich cultural and social context within 
which this Bureau and other agencies emerged during the Progressive era.  This is a 
context he did not provide in his earlier monograph on the National Park Service and 
is not found in the other Brookings Institution monographs reviewed for this study.  
Although studiously avoiding any subjective judgments regarding the Bureau, he does 
offer his impressions of his and the public‟s thoughts regarding the relationship 
between the natural order, agriculture, and economics.  He seems to celebrate in tone 
what he sees as the impending eradication of wolves, cougar, bobcat, and lynx.  He 
notes that bears are not predators, per se, but occasionally become “…addicted to a 
diet of lamb, goat, steer, or colt.  Once they do this, they are killers for life and can 
only be shunted from their evil ways by complete elimination.”  (p. 51, emphasis 
added) and supports rodent control as a means of disease reduction.  He decries 
“sentimentalists” who refuse to see the practical aspects of wildlife management 
through lethal take.  Underscoring Weber (2002/1920) and Kline (2000), he further 
notes that the history of the Bureau underscores the “inevitability of economics” and 
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believes economics to be “…a force that could no more be withstood than the force 
that pulls the tides.”  (p. 63).  In a departure from the just the facts tone of other 
monographs (to include his 1922 monograph on the National Park Service), he seems 
to support the promotion of economics development as guided by principles of 
scientific conservation.  Thus, he writes in the vein of Pinchot and other progressive 
conservationists.  He seems to either ironically miss or disagree with the findings of 
his own research where he describes the interconnectivity between species, the 
“harmony” of nature, and the consequences of upsetting the natural balance.154   
The implications of Weber‟s (2002/1920), Smith‟s (1950), and Cameron‟s 
(1928 and 1929) arguments and the manner in which the cultural forces they describe 
influenced settlement in the Northwest is found and amplified in Gordon Dodds‟ 1986 
book The American Northwest: A History of Oregon and Washington.  The author‟s 
intent was to provide an introductory history to settlement in the Pacific Northwest.  
Dodds claims that, at the time of writing, it was the “first book to do so in almost 
twenty years” (p. ix).  The author concentrates on major regional economic, social, 
political, and cultural events.  His discussion of regional governance focuses on the 
establishment of the territorial, state, and, to a limited degree, county government 
systems; he does not discuss regional governance in the sense used in this study.  The 
book is organized by major periods of time, tracing the arrival of the region‟s earliest 
inhabitants in c.15,000 BC, first European contact in 1542, British and Anglo-
American settlement in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, and subsequent regional 
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 See pp. 5-7 for his discussion of the impact of Euro-American settlement on the balance of nature 
and pp. 50 – 63 for his support of the Bureau‟s work in the reduction in various “noxious” species. 
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development up through the mid 1980s.  His primary argument is that the region‟s 
natural wealth led to a relatively easy life for Northwestern residents – especially 
whites.  Consistent with the agrarian social theory of the early 19
th
 century (Smith, 
1950), the region offered lots of room with ample supplies of water (at least in the 
western part of the region and along the region‟s rivers), fertile soil, timber, and 
minerals combined with a temperate climate.   
Dodds (1986) is valuable for his careful chronicling of key dates and events, 
his insights into regional culture and identity, and his careful articulation of the 
historical social, political, and cultural trend.  He also offers the insight that the 
region‟s vast resources allowed for institutions to develop and take root absent serious 
competition, at least initially.  When they later came into conflict (such as fisheries 
versus hydropower development), the by-then well-established institutional senses of 
identity and culture made agreement difficult.  He also adds to the worldview of 
American settlers to the Northwest.  Noting that they for the most part originated in 
the Midwest, they were already convinced of American exceptionalism.  He describes 
the newcomers to the Northwest as an energetic and conservative people, imbued with 
the premises of Manifest Destiny that in part proclaimed American democracy as part 
of God‟s divine plan for the advancement of humankind.  American values of political 
democracy, economic opportunity, social mobility, and religious freedom were 
considered self-evident truths the spreading of which justified the establishment of a 
continent-wide empire.  
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Dodds (1986) does not discuss governance other than the establishment of 
formal political entities such as territories, states, and, to a limited degree, counties.  
His main argument regarding Northwest “complacency” and ill preparedness for 
change proved prescient in that the difficulties the regional faced in resolving conflicts 
between the region‟s economic dependence on resource extraction and environmental 
concerns came were just beginning to come to the fore at about the time of 
publication.   
In addition to Smith (1950) and Dodds (1986), Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman 
(1963/1917), Hays (1957), Wiebe (1967), Johansen (1967), and Meinig (1968) provided 
the facts and circumstances surrounding white western settlement.   
Joseph Schafer published his A History of the Pacific Northwest in 1905 and 
updated it in 1918.  His work was reprinted in 1943, which is the edition reviewed 
here.  His only stated purpose was to update his earlier work.  In style and 
organization, his intent seems to have been to provide a textbook on Northwest 
history.  As such, he presents a factual and straightforward account of Northwest 
exploration and settlement from the early 16
th
 century up to 1917.  This study used 
Schafer primarily for information on the region‟s early settlement and to cross check 
material presented by Lyman (1963/1917) and Johansen (1967).    
Adding color commentary to the Pacific Northwest‟s history of settlement is 
William Lyman‟s (1963/1917) Columbia River: Its History, Its Myths, Its Scenery, Its 
Commerce, first published in 1909.  Lyman, who died in 1920, produced his book‟s 
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second and third editions in 1911 and 1917 respectively.  The fourth edition was 
edited, updated, and expanded by someone only identified by the initials “L. K. P.”  
Lyman‟s stated intent was to present a history and description of the Columbia 
River.  He wished to convey “a lively sense of the romance, the heroism, and the 
adventure” of the river‟s white settlement and development.  He further wished to 
“breathe into the narrative something of the spirit and sentiment which we call 
„Western‟ – a spirit and sentiment more easily recognized than analyzed (Lyman, 
1963/1917, p. iii, apparently using the forward from the original 1909 publication).  
L.K.P. updates Lyman‟s work with the results of research not then available to Lyman 
and makes other factual corrections to the text, mostly through footnotes.  He also 
adds a section on development, contrasting the pristine conditions eloquently 
chronicled by Lyman with the river‟s subsequent development up through the early 
1960s – most notably the construction of the river‟s mainstem dams. 
Lyman (1963/1917) is presented in three sections.  The first presents a regional 
history from early geologic formation up through the late 1910s.  The second is a 
narrative of a journey down the river taken by Lyman.  Lyman states that his sources 
are other books supplemented with his own observations of the river and 
conversations held with original pioneers, hunters, steamship crewmembers, and tribal 
members.  Unfortunately, the book is absent any bibliography for Lyman‟s original 
work.  The third section is L.K.P.‟s update regarding dam construction and other river 
development, supported by a bibliography.  Of these, only the first section is used 
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here, as L.K.P.‟s third section has been superseded by additional dam construction and 
more recent accounts.   
What Lyman (1963/1917) adds to Schafer (1943/1918) and Dodds (1986) is a 
very human component to historical events.  For example, he includes tribal legends 
regarding the first arrival of whites and tribal perspectives on subsequent settlement.  
Quoting from transcripts of the time, he puts life into the region‟s historical founders.  
For example, he details the issues and positions of Oregon founders in his account of 
the political issues and debate behind the establishment of a provisional government 
for what became the Oregon Territory in 1848, an account L.K.P. rightfully critiques 
as being “4th of Julyish.”  In fact, there is a strong tone of patriotic and regional pride 
throughout Lyman‟s account, a tone counterbalanced by Dodds (1986) more objective 
presentation. 
Hays‟ 1957 The Response to Industrialism 1885-1914 focuses on the impact of 
industrialization on the lives of people throughout the United States.  His interest is on 
the transition from a society of “relatively stable, local business affairs” to one of 
“intense nationwide competition that rendered [the individual‟s] way of making a 
living far less secure” (p. i) regardless of whether he was a manufacturer, merchant, 
laborer, or farmer.  He argues that industrialization led to the growth of large cities 
with an urban culture that slowly encroached into the countryside, replacing traditional 
networks of personal relationships with more impersonal forces of efficiency and 
competition.  These new forces threatened the familiar order with an indifference to 
tradition and a community‟s sense of identity.  It also resulted in a large influx of 
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foreigners seeking work.  Hays‟ intent is to examine the ways in which the people of 
the United States responded to these drastic changes in their lives.   
Hays (1957) disputes the accepted historical argument that the unifying theme 
of history between 1885 and 1914 was a populist attack against corporate wealth in 
which a discontented public sought to curb corporate influence through government 
action.  He sees this argument as simplistic and incomplete.  More fundamental, in his 
view, was the social reaction to industrialization and the multiple ways in which both 
industrialization and the reaction to it changed American life.  In essence, it 
represented a clash between the values of the price-and-market economy and the 
values of the intimate, interpersonal community relationships. 
Wiebe (1967) provides a social and political context to the American social 
order in the early 1900s.  In The Search for Order 1877-1920, Wiebe outlines a 
dramatic social transformation of society that began at the end of the post-Civil War 
reconstruction period.  His purpose is to describe the breakdown of informal, rural-
agricultural American society and its eventual replacement with a more hierarchical 
urban-industrial model.  
Dorothy Johansen and Charles Gates first published their Empire of the 
Columbia: A History of the Pacific Northwest in 1957.  Johansen produced a second 
edition in 1967, and it is that edition used here.  Her stated intent with the second 
edition was to put more effort on the flow of events and on the interaction of politics 
and economics on the first half of the 20
th
 century.  Like Schafer (1943/1917), Lyman 
(1963/1918) and Dodds (1986), Johansen provides a straightforward, textbook-like 
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account of Northwest settlement and history.  Of particular interest for this study was 
her work on early settlement and development (which corrected some of the material 
presented by Lyman) and her discussion of the Progressive movement in the 
Northwest.  
Weber (2002/1920), Smith (1950), Cameron (1928 and 1929), Wiebe (1967), 
Hays (1957), Dodds (1986), Schafer (1943/1918), Lyman (1963/1917), Johansen 
(1967) and Meinig (1968) all write solely from the perspective of white Americans.  
Lyman (1963/1917), although he includes tribal traditions in his narrative, does so in 
the context of white exploration and settlement.  Together they illustrate both the 
worldview of Anglo-American settlers to the Northwest and the implications of that 
worldview in shaping events.  Equally important to a discussion of regional 
governance, however, is the worldview held by the region‟s original inhabitants and 
its implications.   
 
Domain: Columbia River Basin Commercial Development 
This next body of literature examines the commercial development of the river.  
The works reviewed are grouped by four general themes.  These are memoir accounts 
of efforts at regional planning and economic development; histories of the Federal 
Columbia River Power System; legal and political histories; and – given its centrality 
to the most recent attempts at regional governance – histories of the region‟s salmon 
fisheries and attempts at salmon restoration.  This literature is central to the purposes of 
this study as it was the expanding efforts in developing the basin‟s resources that 
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brought various resource users into conflict and gave rise to the need for governance 
systems and structures.   
 Memoir accounts of regional planning and development. 
Four works that were reviewed were written by men with active roles in 
regional developmental policy and governance in the 1950s and „60s.  As such, they 
offer personal perspective, insight, and context.     
 Charles McKinley served as consultant to the Northwest Regional Planning 
Commission, the Hoover Commission Task Force on Natural Resources, as a 
researcher for the President‟s Water Resources Policy Commission, and a consultant to 
other various Northwest agencies and commissions.
155
  He also served as a faculty 
member of Reed College.  He authored several papers on New Deal planning (Bessey, 
1963).  In 1952, while at Reed, he published Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest: 
Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River Valley.  He presents 
a critical administrative and political history of federal “field agencies” (regional 
offices) that manage and develop natural resources in the Pacific Northwest.  His intent 
is to describe the relationships between regional federal entities and the impact of those 
relationships on public administration and policy.  In effect, he presents an argument 
favoring an authoritative Tennessee Valley Authority-like governance structure for the 
Columbia, citing what he views as the inadequacies of the voluntary collaborative 
approaches put in place following World War II, particularly the Columbia Basin Inter-
Agency Committee.  Although his description of agency missions and inter-agency 
conflict is dated, (for example, the jurisdictional competition between the Corps of 
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Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation over yet-to-be-built dams) much of his 
critique of collaborative decision making rings true today.   
A contemporary of McKinley was Roy Bessey.  Bessey was commissioned by 
the state of Washington‟s Department of Conservation to chronicle regional resource 
planning from 1933 to 1963.  His pamphlet, Pacific Northwest Regional Planning: a 
Review was the result.  Bessey wrote as a strong advocate of regional planning.  His 
over 50-year career included work with government and private consulting firms in 
the fields of engineering, resources development, planning, and programming.
156
  He 
was active as a consultant during the period covered in his book.  As such, and like 
Ogden and McKinley, Bessey writes with the insights of an insider who had a front-
row seat and was actively involved in the planning activities he documents.   
Bessey‟s intent is to provide a study of the regional experience in resource 
planning, noting the lack of such literature for the Pacific Northwest (as opposed to the 
Tennessee Valley Authority).  He states his purpose as “…to give a reasonably-
connected narrative account of a regional planning movement from the necessarily 
limited perspective of a single witness” (p. viii).  He does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive, detailed, or definitive investigation of the whole PNW planning effort.  
Rather, he provides “…a reasonably-connected narrative account of a regional 
planning movement from the necessarily limited perspective of a single witness” (p. 
viii). 
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Although presented as administrative history, Bessey writes with a strong bias 
to central government planning.  Comparing the Tennessee Valley experience with the 
Columbia, he argues that, “[t]he parallel Pacific Northwest effort obviously has fallen 
short of that of the more innovational TVA in a number of respects – notably as to 
integration of program, impacts upon the region, and world attention and interest 
engendered” (Bessey, 1963, p. vii).   
Bessey provides an excellent source of early efforts at multi-agency 
cooperation and governance (although the word “governance” does not appear).  He 
organized his book into periods defined by key events that changed the planning 
paradigm nationally and regionally.  The first period is 1933 – 1943, marked by the 
Great Depression at one end and the outbreak of World War II on the other.  Bessey 
characterizes this period by the strong leadership from the national level and support 
for centralized resource planning from the national to local levels in order to overcome 
the effects of the Depression.  The second period is 1943 – 1953, during which the 
nation was focused on winning World War II and the Korean War.  This period, 
according to Bessey, is characterized by abolition of the New Deal‟s National 
Resources Planning Board that had provided the “heart and life blood” for the 
planning movement.  The result was fragmentation of the New Deal‟s centralized 
governmental planning effort and its replacement with voluntary arrangements and 
compliances.  The federal role shifted from central planning to technical analysis, and 
the pre-Depression policy of laissez-faire begins to reassert itself.  Bessey‟s third 
period is from 1953 to 1963, a period of strong economic growth, with 
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correspondingly less support for strong government involvement in the economy.  
Bessey‟s model of defining historic periods by points of “punctuated equilibrium” 
(Gersick, 1991) or “critical situations” (Giddens, 1984) is used in this study as the 
organizational model for Chapter 4.  Of direct interest to this study are Bessey‟s 
insights into the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNWRPC), with 
which he personally worked.   
 Roy Scheufele served as executive assistant to the Commanding General of 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers North Pacific Division, a position from which he 
retired in 1963.  He completed his History of the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency 
Committee: the Story around 1970 (the work is undated).  The history was 
commissioned by unanimous resolution at the last meeting of the Committee and 
funded through pooled agency funds.    
The Columbia Bain Inter-Agency Committee (CBIAC) was formed through 
voluntary agreement among the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Forest Service, and Federal Power 
Commission in 1946.  It was later joined by the Departments of Labor and Health, 
Education, and Welfare, and functioned until replaced by the Pacific Northwest River 
Basins Commission in 1967.   
Citing primary material drawn from CBIAC meeting files, Scheufele (c. 1970) 
provides a history and critique of the CBIAC‟s origins, operation, problems, 
accomplishments, and failures.  He also provides occasional glimpses into other 
governance systems that came into being around the same time, in some cases being 
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the only references to those organizations found during the research for this study.  
Examples of these other systems include the Northwest States Development 
Committee and the Pacific Northwest Governors‟ Power Planning Committee, all 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.  Scheufele organizes his work into three 
sections.  The first deals with the genesis of the CBIAC, recounting the region‟s 
history in resource planning back into the 1800s.  The second is a chronicle of CBIAC 
meetings.  The third is his candid and insightful critique of the Committee‟s 
operations, accomplishments, and weaknesses.  The value of this critique is its general 
applicability to subsequent governance systems organizes around the concepts of 
voluntary cooperation and consensus-based decision-making. 
Gus Norwood published his book Columbia River Power for the People: a 
History of the Policies of the Bonneville Power Administration apparently in 1981, 
although the work itself is undated.  Norwood was the first executive director of the 
Northwest Public Power Association from 1947-1967.  As such, his history is written 
from a pro-public power point of view.  He also offers the perspectives of one 
personally involved with many of the policies of which he writes.  As noted in the 
forward by Sterling Munro, BPA Administrator at the time the book was published, 
“…this is not a safe and sanitized bureaucratic exercise.  It is written from a 
perspective and a point of view” (Norwood, c. 1981, p. v.). 
 Norwood was hired by BPA (who published his book) to review the history of 
BPA‟s policies and examine that history‟s relevance to the agency‟s future.  He 
presents a history of the policies of the Bonneville Power Administration.  His 
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guidance from Don Hodel, BPA Administrator at the time the project began and 
Munro‟s predecessor, was to (1) “follow the facts wherever they lead, or the history 
will not have credibility” and (2) “where appropriate and feasible, evaluate the policies 
for their relevance to the future” (Norwood, c. 1981, p. viii).   
 Norwood adopted a three-step approach to the project.  First, he identified 
BPA‟s major policies and, from these, selected those he felt were most significant to 
the purposes of the study.  Second, he traced each policy back to its genesis, many of 
which had roots that preceded the agency‟s creation.  Third, he described the setting 
and political context at the time each policy was adopted.  Norwood organized his 
findings into ten parts, arranged chronologically.  The first three discuss the national 
and regional context within which the conservation and public power movements in 
the Northwest evolved, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.   
Underlying the entire book are three themes.  Most prominent, and captured in 
the title, is the provision of economic electrical power to the public at large.  Policies 
on federally built and operated transmission facilities, cost-based postage stamp rates, 
anti-private utility monopolies, public preference for federally produced hydropower, 
industrial and economic development, and rural electrification underscore the New 
Deal belief in the social power of electricity to improve people‟s lives.  Second is the 
regional nature of the transmission system.  The nation‟s largest at the time of 
Norwood's writing, the grid system opened the door for power management beyond 
the marketing of federally generated electricity.  Third, and of greatest interest to this 
study of regional governance, is the institutional evolution of BPA as a member of “a 
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pluralistic, regional electric system of public, cooperative, and private utilities, and 
large industrial customers, with major inter-regional and inter-agency relationships” 
(Norwood, c. 1981, p. ix). 
McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele (c.1970), and Norwood (c.1981) 
all offer first-hand insights into the issues of which they write.  They also, albeit 
inadvertently, exemplify a perspective favoring a worldview of economic 
development, accepting as a given the dominant use of natural resources for 
enhancement of the regional economy.  Ogden (1949) and McKinley (1952) do not 
address tribal or environmental issues other than in passing.  Scheufele (c.1970) does, 
but limits his discussion to the conflict between fishery managers and river developers.  
Scheufele writes from the perspective of salmon as a market commodity, the harvest 
of which was effected by the construction of dams and other commercial impacts on 
fish habitat.  Bessey (1963) makes passing acknowledgement of the impact on the 
environment and fish, but makes little mention of tribal concerns.  Norwood (c.1981) 
discusses both, writing at about the time that the Northwest Power Planning and 
Conservation Act with its mandates for fish and wildlife protection were enacted.  
However, Norwood can only introduce the topic as he was writing at the time the 
Council was only just getting organized and before it fully developed its program.     
Interestingly, although all four were directly involved with the governance 
systems of their day, only Scheufele‟s (c.1970) work is specifically devoted to 
chronicling any given system.  McKinley (1952) provides an overview and analysis of 
the role played by federal agencies in resource development and management and 
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argues that the fractured nature of federal management should be replaced with a 
valley authority-type agency.  Bessey (1963) documents the history of regional 
planning efforts.  Norwood‟s (c.1981) interest is the administrative history of the 
Bonneville Power Administration.  Whereas the experiences of each offer insights into 
the region‟s development, other sources are needed to fully establish the social and 
political contexts from which the region‟s various governance systems emerged. 
 The Federal Columbia River Power System. 
The Columbia Basin‟s commercial development is most vividly exemplified 
by its integrated system of federal and non-federal hydroelectric dams.  The federal 
dams and related transmission grid are jointly operated by the Corps of Engineers, 
Bureau of Reclamation, and Bonneville Power Administration.  Among the earliest 
accounts of federal hydroelectric development is the unpublished PhD dissertation of 
Daniel Ogden, written in 1949, entitled Development of Federal Power Policy in the 
Pacific Northwest.  In later years, Ogden became an active participant in the region‟s 
governance systems, serving in multiple administrations and positions and being a 
frequent lecturer and writer on regional issues.  Ogden‟s intent in his dissertation was 
to trace the historical basis for federal involvement in Columbia River hydropower.  
Using primary source documents and interviews with many of the key individuals 
involved with the development of the Columbia‟s hydropower system, Ogden presents 
an in-depth history of that development and the policies and issues that drove it.  
Ogden argues that the origin of the system were the twin demands for irrigation in the 
arid land east of the Cascades and a safe and economical means of river transportation 
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through the Columbia‟s falls and rapids as an alternative to high railroad prices.  
Neither, by themselves, would justify the necessary expense on the part of the 
government.  Hydropower was added later as a component of the public power 
movement; as a public works employment program during the Depression; to promote 
regional economic growth, and to provide inexpensive electricity as a counterweight 
to high private utility prices, especially to rural areas.     
 Of interest to this study are (1) the regional context of the period prior to and 
through the New Deal; (2) the development of what became strong regional support 
for federal ownership and operation of hydroelectric dams in the Northwest; and (3) 
his detailed discussion of the policy issues of the day and how they translated into 
various planning and operational structures.  He also discusses in some detail the 
debate over creation of a Columbia Valley Authority; the option to allow the Corps of 
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation to market power from their projects; and the 
policy issues behind the 1937 Bonneville Project Act.    
Whereas Ogden‟s dissertation presents a detailed litany of events, dates, 
personalities, and motivations written from largely an economic perspective, Robert 
White‟s The Organic Machine: the Remaking of the Columbia River (1995) provides 
a view of the Basin‟s development through the lenses of social and environmental 
history.  He argues that it was the Columbia River dams that made the Pacific 
Northwest a region, connecting the states through a network of hydroelectricity, 
irrigation, and river navigation.  In so doing, the Columbia was remade from a natural 
ecological system to an industrial- scale machine designed for production of 
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commercial and social goods and services.  His underlying theme is that this 
industrialization came at the cost of both the environment and the personal 
relationship that native tribes and the earliest Euro-American settlers had with their 
environment.   
 White (1995) argues that, prior to industrialization man‟s relationship with 
nature was measured by his personal labor.  Man knew nature through the labor it took 
to overcome and live with it.  It was direct and personal.  The impacts of human action 
on the natural environment were immediately felt and vice versa.  Interactions 
between humans and nature occurred on a very personal scale (examples: farming, 
tribal fishing, families rafting down rapids of The Dalles to get to Portland, and the 
predictable seasonal threat of flooding.)  While industrialization reduced or eliminated 
many of the very real threats to personal safety and property inherent in this personal 
relationship, it did so by turning what had been, in White‟s eyes, romantic and 
majestic into a sanitized, tightly managed suite of commodities.  But he over does it.  
White‟s romanticized description of the pre-development river and his if-only-we‟d-
known-we-would-never-have-done-it tone seems to dismiss or trivialize the very real 
threats posed by the natural Columbia to those trying to build communities and 
livelihoods from the river‟s resources.  It also ignores the worldview assumed by the 
region‟s Anglo-American settlers and developers that guided their responses to those 
threats.  Their conceptual framework would simply not allow serious consideration of 
non-development options.   
 430 
   Romanticism notwithstanding, the value of White‟s work for this study is his 
presentation of the history of the social organizations employed by the Basin‟s 
societies at various periods and the impact of technology and culture on those 
organizational forms.
157
  He helps illustrate the differences between the tribal and 
Euro-American worldviews.  His review of organizing structures includes the 
Columbia Valley Authority, PNWRPC, and Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee 
and the context from which they emerged.  He also provides a concise synopsis of the 
private-public power debate, the influence of the Progressive era‟s conservation 
movement, and the counterintuitive lack of early involvement by salmon harvest 
managers as issues of  governance as the system was being planned and developed.    
Eve Vogel presented a study of Northwest regionalism in her 1997 doctoral 
dissertation, The Columbia River‟s Region: Politics, Place, and Environment in the 
Pacific Northwest, 1933-Present.  Vogel studied the role of regional institutions in 
fostering the regionalist ideal in the 1930s.  Her thesis is that this ideal was 
institutionalized in the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, established 
in 1934.  She argues that the NPWRPC was conceived as a way to avoid political 
conflict over Basin development by creating an inclusive process to accommodate 
interests that otherwise were likely to come into conflict.  She evokes and extends 
White‟s (1995) argument regarding the Columbia River as the basis for Northwest 
regionalism.  In her argument, it was not so much the river as the interest in the low 
cost hydropower the river could produce and the institutionalization of that low cost 
power through creation of the Bonneville Power Administration. 
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The region‟s institutional methods for estimating power needs, its efforts to 
integrate nuclear power with the hydrosystem, and resulting economic catastrophe of 
the 1970s are the subject‟s of Daniel Pope‟s 2008 Nuclear Implosions: the Rise and 
Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System.  Pope‟s goal is to explore the 
recently revived interest in nuclear energy in the U.S.  He attributes this interest to 
rising oil and gas prices and a growing concern about the impacts of carbon emissions 
on climate.  As a result, the author believes that public opinion is shifting in greater 
favor of nuclear energy.  Furthermore, growing numbers of environmentalists are 
seeing the value of nuclear energy in the face of climate change.  The author‟s 
objective is to inform this current discussion by using the Northwest experience as a 
case study to illustrate both the perils and promise of nuclear development.  He does 
this through a detailed chronological historical narrative beginning with the first 
efforts to harness the river‟s energy and carrying it through the nuclear era.  He writes 
from an economic perspective.  He focuses on the relatively closed set of institutions 
involved in power planning development and how regional utilities, often led by the 
Bonneville Power Administration, evolved into hierarchical organizations that 
emphasized centralized and professionalized long-term planning.  Pope‟s primary 
thesis is that poor planning, closed circuit thinking, and misjudgments that led to one 
of the largest public bond defaults in United States History.   
Political and legal histories of Basin development. 
Five histories of Columbia Basin political and legal events were reviewed.  
Each deals with the policies and politics a specific periods.  Jay Brigham (1998) and 
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Phyliss DeLuna (1997) present academic studies based on historical research.  Like 
Ogden, Norwood, Bessey, and McKinley, and unlike Brigham and DeLuna, Michael 
Blumm and Roy Hemmingway were both close observers and participants in 
Columbia Basin power issues and provide firsthand accounts of their observations and 
resulting insights.  Writing from a more detached perspective are reporters Bill 
Crampton and Barry Espenson who focus almost exclusively on natural resources 
issues in the Columbia Basin.    
In his 1998 book Empowering the west: Electrical politics before FDR, Jay 
Brigham presents the rise of the public power movement prior to the New Deal.  
Franklin Roosevelt‟s election in 1932 represented the culmination of efforts begun in 
the early 1900s to use government to counter the excesses of private industry.  The 
1932 election brought people into power with a predilection to use government to 
solve social problems.  The public power movement, which began in the 1920s, was 
only one of these social issues.   
The author notes that American business was in a state of transition at the turn 
of the century.  Echoing Wiebe (1967) and Hays (1957), Brigham (1998) argues that 
the nation was moving from small, locally owned economic enterprises to nationwide 
multi-unit corporations.  This consolidation and expansion was made possible by 
technical advances in communications and transportation, abetted by the doctrine of 
laissez-faire by the government, enabled large corporations to amass a great deal of 
power.  The excesses of these large corporations resulted in the progressive reform 
movement.   
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Brigham‟s (1998) work has received mixed reviews.  While praised as an 
“excellent study”  that “significantly extends our understanding of electrification” 
(Cannon, 2000), it has also been criticized for “reductivist tendencies” in that he tends 
to generalize and categorize various complex issues into two or three conceptual nodes 
(Wollner, 2001) and for presenting an overly simplistic and incomplete account 
(Williams, 2000).  While these criticisms may be true, they do not detract from the 
value of Brigham‟s work to this study.  Brigham dispassionately lays out the key 
arguments of advocates of both private and public power.  In doing so, he presents one 
of the few relatively in-depth renderings of the free market perspective.  He centers his 
argument on three case studies in the search for inexpensive electricity: Seattle, Los 
Angeles, and eight small-towns across America.  Although it may have its flaws, 
Brigham helps a layperson understand the foundations upon which the public-private 
power debate rested.    
Whereas Brigham (1998) discusses the public power movement prior to 
Roosevelt, Phyliss DeLuna‟s (1997) book focuses on the period immediately 
thereafter.  Public vs. Private Power During the Truman Administration: A Study of 
Fair Deal Liberalism presents the efforts of New Dealers to retain what they saw as the 
gains of the public power movement that was coming under increasing attack by pro-
market advocates.  DeLuna‟s stated intent is to contribute to the understanding of the 
political significance of the Truman years with regard to public power policy, focusing 
on the period 1949-1952.  She offers insights into Fair Deal liberalism with regard to 
the public-private power debate.  Just as Brigham (1998) argues that the debate did not 
 434 
begin with Roosevelt‟s election, DeLuna (1997) argues that it did not end with his 
death.     
 The policy position of the Truman administration was that government should 
be run for the benefit of the public at large versus narrow interests.  “Espousing a form 
of economic democracy, Truman and certain administration officials put themselves 
forward as defending the country‟s natural resources against monopolization by 
special interests and ensuring that they were developed for the good of the whole 
citizenry” (p. xi).  DeLuna (1997) goes on to recount a resurgent effort to install first a 
Columbia Valley Authority in the Northwest, followed by a more modest Columbia 
Valley Administration.  Neither effort succeeded, as the nation and region were more 
comfortable with voluntary, collaborative associations, such as the Columbia Basin 
Inter-Agency Committee, that came into being in the 1940s.  DeLuna offers an 
excellent account of the politics and positions of federal agencies, states, and private 
interests as this debate played itself out. 
Michael Blumm, a professor at Northwestern School of Law and director the 
law school‟s Northwest Water Law and Policy Project, has authored numerous books, 
essays, and articles on Columbia Basin issues.  His work is often critical of the 
impacts of the hydropower system on the environment.  The paper reviewed for this 
study was his 1982 paper The Northwest‟s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act.  The paper was 
published in 1982, two years after enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power 
Planning and Conservation Act (1980 Power Act).   
 435 
 Blumm (1982) argues that current resource conflicts are a legacy of past 
policies and programs.  His intent is to provide historical perspective on Northwest 
hydropower policies that led to the 1980 Power Act.  He provides a thoughtful, 
chronological discussion of key events leading to enactment of his Act.  Somewhat 
similar to Bessey (1963), he organizes his paper by periods that changed the direction 
of important power policy.  His categories are the pre-New Deal (or progressive 
period); World War II and the post war years; and the region‟s hydro-thermal program 
where it was envisioned that regional energy needs could be best met by adding 
nuclear generators to the region‟s hydropower system.  In so doing, he provides a fact-
laden history of dates and events that provide context for the creation of the Council.   
Roy Hemmingway served as a member of Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber‟s 
administration and one of the original appointees to the Northwest Power Planning 
Council.  Hemmingway, an attorney by training, also wrote his essay The Northwest 
Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future Role shortly after passage of the 1980 
Power Act.  Like Blumm (1982), his purpose is to outline the history of the Council 
and articulate its roles and potential.  He begins his 1983 history with the hydro-
thermal program, preferring to devote more discussion on the potential for the future 
rather than recounting the past.   
  Hemmingway (1983) describes the Council as a unique experiment in 
American federalism.  The 1980 Power Act was not a case of surrendering federal 
jurisdiction or power to the states, but sharing authority among federal agencies and 
the Northwest states in regional decision making.  It did not require federal agencies to 
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follow the plans and programs prepared by the Council, but only to consider them 
when making decisions.  As such, Hemmingway envisioned the Council as a check on 
arbitrary agency decision-making. 
 What Blumm (1982) and Hemingway (1983) both point out is that, unlike its 
predecessor structures, the Council was the first in which the region recognized an 
obligation to balance hydropower with the systems impact on fish and wildlife and to 
tribal interests.  The crisis generated by construction cost overruns in the government-
backed nuclear power facilities, an inflated projection of regional energy needs, and 
other issues opened a window in which environmental and tribal interests could obtain 
a seat at the regional governance table.    
Bill Crampton and Barry Espenson have methodically covered Columbia Basin 
FCRPS issues for years, and their first-hand reports are a primary source of 
information on the rise and collapse of the CRBF as related in Chapter 1.  In 2009, 
they summarized their reporting in Salmon and Hydro: An Account of the Litigation 
over Federal Columbia River Power System Biological Opinions for Salmon and 
Steelhead, 1991 – 2009.  Bill Crampton is the owner of Intermountain 
Communications and serves as editor and publisher of both the website and the 
Columbia Basin Bulletin on-line newsletter.  He has worked for 20 years as a 
newspaper reporter and editor in Alaska and the Northwest.  Barry Espenson is a 
senior writer for the Columbia Basin Bulletin.  He has worked for 20 years as a 
newspaper reporter and editor in the Northwest, often specializing in natural resource 
and agriculture issues.  
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 Salmon and Hydro is a summary of their reporting over the years and an 
overview of litigation concerning NOAA‟s series of FCRPS biological opinions on 
ESA listed salmon and steelhead.  It begins with the first listing of Snake River 
Sockeye on November 20, 1991 and follows through 12 subsequent listings and the 
issues in front of the court as of the date of publication.  The authors‟ intent is to 
provide the reader with “a general understanding of the history of biological opinion 
litigation – how the Northwest moved, in legal terms, from the first salmon listings 
under the Endangered Species Act to the 2008 Federal Columbia River Power system 
Biological Opinion – and the major issues involved in case after case” (p. 4).  Source 
material comes from original reporting by the authors as published in the periodic 
Northwest Salmon Recovery Report, which ran in print from 1997 to 1999, and in the 
on-line Columbia Basin Bulletin from 1998 to the present.  Their central thesis is that 
the 1995 biological opinion and the court decision on that opinion rendered in 1997 
were turning points in regional salmon management and hydropower operations.   
The “issue summary” condenses what are likely hundreds, if not thousands of 
pages of court filings, declarations, motions, and orders into a concise 77 pages.  As 
such, it only offers the broadest outline of the key issues at play in the courts.  In their 
effort to be brief, the authors may confuse readers not intimately familiar with the 
details of which they are writing.  For example, terms like “population,” “stock,” 
“evolutionary significant unit (ESU),” and “distinct population segment (DPS)” are 
not well defined and may appear to the lay reader to be interchangeable when, in fact, 
each is a term of art with its own specific meaning and application.  A second example 
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is their discussion of the Regional Forum.  The Regional Forum originally consisted of 
an Executive Committee of sovereign leaders, an Implementation Team of senior 
managers and policy advisors, and several technical teams.  The authors introduce the 
Executive Committee and technical teams on pages 12 and 13, discuss Oregon‟s 
objections to them on page 17, and the court‟s ruling on them on page 27.  The term 
“Regional Forum” is not introduced until page 28.  To a reader not familiar with 
Regional Forum organization and history these may appear to be separate, unrelated 
entities.   
However, these criticisms are minor in comparison to what the authors 
accomplish.  Salmon and Hydro presents a succinct outline, laid out in generally 
chronological order, of the listing of thirteen species of salmon in the Columbia Basin, 
the associated biological opinions written by the National Marine Fisheries Service on 
the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), and the sequence of litigation 
that followed.  It summarizes the major parties involved, their interests and 
motivations, the key decisions rendered by the courts, and the impact of those 
decisions on FCRPS system operations.  Consequently, the authors largely achieve 
that which they set out to do. 
The authors also tangentially provide useful insights as to how the Basin‟s 
litigation battles over fish affected experiments with different governance systems.  
These systems include the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council, the 
Regional Forum, the CRBF, the Columbia River Fisheries Council, and the lower 
river tribes‟ Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission, all discussed only to the 
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degree they intersect with the litigation narrative.  For example, the authors note that it 
was the region‟s inability to agree on a coherent salmon recovery strategy that led to 
the ESA listings and collapse of the Regional Forum‟s Executive Committee.  The 
resulting frustration motivated the initiation of the Three Sovereigns Process, which 
eventually resulted in creation of the CRBF.  The authors do no more than introduce 
the CRBF.  The (rightful) implication is that the CRBF, although at least partially 
linked to regional efforts to respond to litigation actions, proved functionally 
inconsequential to later decision making.    
 
Domain: The Impact of Development on Regional Salmon 
There is no shortage of written material on the status of northwest salmon and 
related institutions.  Much is written to promote various policy positions.  For 
example, James Buchal‟s 1998 The Great Salmon Hoax attributes the salmon decline 
to overfishing, mismanaged hatchery practices, and ulterior political motives of 
federal regulatory agencies while dismissing the impact of Columbia Basin dams.  
Alternatively, Michael Blumm et al. (1998) place primary blame on the existence and 
operation of the dams.  As Taylor (1999) puts it, “Every interest claimed to speak for 
citizens and salmon, but their rhetoric revealed that the core dispute was less about 
salmon than social legitimacy” (p. 165) as they argued so vehemently over who was to 
blame for the salmon decline.    
Basic background facts were obtained primarily from two sources.  The 
National Research Council‟s Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest 
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(1996) provides a comprehensive general overview of the evolution of the salmon 
situation and the causes of salmon decline.  Rather than focus on any one cause, the 
Council outlined the threats to traditional salmon runs brought about by changes in 
salmon habitat, development of the dams and hydropower system, over harvest, 
hatchery management, and changes in ocean conditions.  For this study, Upstream was 
used for general background information and facts.   
Similar use was made of Cone and Ridlington‟s The Northwest Salmon Crisis: 
A Documentary History (1996).  As Pevar (2002) did with key source documents 
central to tribal rights, Cone and Ridlington provide excerpts from source documents 
central to understanding the policy decisions and social structures that underlay the 
salmon decline.  These documents include statutes, policy statements, Indian treaties, 
text from speeches, and technical reports.  Each document is accompanied by editorial 
comment from a variety of regional salmon experts representing a variety of 
perspectives and viewpoints.  Cone and Ridlington provide an excellent, 
comprehensive desk-side compendium of key documents with accompanying context.  
 Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006) provide holistic 
treatments of the social aspects of the salmon debate and the impacts of cultural 
perspectives on salmon policy.  All provide a comparison between the tribal and 
Anglo-American worldviews and the consequences of those worldviews with respect 
to the environment in general and regional salmon runs in particular.  As such, they 
provide both insights into the social aspects of the salmon situation and add to the 
understanding of the tribal worldview introduced above. 
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In Salmon Without Rivers: A History of the Pacific Salmon Crisis (1999), 
James Lichatowich argues that the concept of hatcheries to offset the impacts of 
development on salmon runs created an unrealistic and devastating perception that the 
Northwest could have it all – salmon plus the benefits of development.  Thus, it is not 
a critique of hatchery management per se, but a critique of an industrial approach to 
resource management that viewed nature as a warehouse of marketable commodities.   
Of particular interest to this study is Lichatowich‟s (1999) contrast of the 
traditional Indian gift-based economy with the Western market-based economy.  He 
states that the relationship between man and salmon in the Northwest began to evolve 
about 9,000 years ago on the Fraser River in Canada and about 7,000 – 8,000 on the 
Columbia at The Dalles.  The technology for preserving salmon through drying and 
smoking evolved about 3,000 years ago.  This allowed salmon to be stored between 
fishing seasons, thus boosting the region‟s human carrying capacity and laying the 
basis for development of complex cultural customs.  Fully developed salmon 
economies appeared in Oregon and Northern California about 1500 years ago. 
The author notes that the common perception that Indians lived within the 
constraints of the natural ecological economy is misleading.  The Indians developed a 
sustainable salmon based on the power of their own world-view, a way of thinking 
that would not have accommodated modern ecological concepts.  “The sustainable 
relationship between the Pacific salmon and Native Americans derived not from 
ecology but from an economy based on the age-old concept of the gift and a belief 
system that treated all parts of the earth – plants, animals, rocks – as equal members of 
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a community.”  (p. 34).  The economy was based on gift giving, a way to transfer 
goods and redistribute wealth.  Gift-based economies worked on a cycle of obligatory 
returns. 
Joseph Taylor‟s 1999) Making Salmon: an Environmental History of the 
Northwest Fisheries Crisis looks holistically at the historical events leading to the 
current state of the region‟s development and its impacts on salmon.  His work 
critically examines the major northwest resources users – logging, grazing, mining, 
commercial and sport fishing, pre- and post-contact tribal activities, and the effects of 
development through dam building and the spread of urban areas.  Similar to 
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor provides a cultural and historical context for the evolution 
of perspectives regarding salmon in the PNW in general and the “Oregon country” in 
particular.  
Taylor (1999) looks at the intersection of culture, economy, and nature to 
examine the long-running collapse of the salmon fishery in the Pacific Northwest.  He 
notes that the “crisis” has been unfolding in plain sight for over 150 years, with 
imminent extinction of salmon runs being first prophesied in 1875.  Throughout most 
of the book, he presents an even-handed and meticulously researched history of the 
region, offering insights, ironies, and paradoxes.  He saves his opinions and 
conclusions for the end.   
Also like Lichatowich (1999), Taylor‟s (1999) main critique is social rather 
than technical.  Taylor argues that history is story telling and, like any story, the 
narrator makes decisions about what to include and exclude.  He states, 
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History is political.  Its ability to legitimate or condemn activities of the state, 
society, and markets make it a force in public debates, which is, in part, why 
Pacific northwesterners have argued so vehemently about Who is to Blame for 
the decline of salmon.  Every explanation has rested on a rendition of the past, 
and each version holds profound social, cultural, and environmental 
consequences…We do not all view the world through a common lens.  
Identity, culture, and location affect how we understand the present and 
remember the past (Taylor, 1999, pp. 237-238, emphasis in original).   
Northwesterners segregated the salmon fisheries by race, ethnicity, class, and 
geography.  Each side claimed themselves to be decent citizens, property owners, and 
taxpayers while disparaging other groups as greedy, self-serving, and corrupt.  “Every 
interest claimed to speak for citizens and salmon, but their rhetoric revealed that the 
core dispute was less about salmon than social legitimacy” (Taylor, 1999, p. 165).  His 
key insight is that the salmon decline is not a sudden disaster discrete in time, but the 
result of a long-running process.  “The essence of the salmon crisis is the struggle to 
define and solve a complicated environmental and social problem, but resolution has 
been elusive because participants have so little in common.” (p. 4).  “How people 
respond depends on who they are, where they live, what they do for a living, and how 
they think it happened.”  (p. 4).   
Taylor‟s (1999) summary argument is that once salmon became viewed as an 
economic commodity rather than an integral part of a natural process, they fell victim 
to other sectors of industrial development that offered greater financial return.  
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“Fishers, managers, and scientists tried to moderate damage, but their combined 
numbers and strongest arguments paled before the bureaucratic might, popular appeal, 
and Progressive ideology of the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and 
Bonneville Power Administration.  “Salmon fishing was simply less profitable than 
other industries” (Taylor, 1999, pp. 225-226) such as timber, mining, hydroelectricity, 
and agriculture. 
In 1992, the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council requested 
that an independent science group (ISG) to review the Council‟s 1992 fish and wildlife 
program.  The members of the ISG, which included James Lichatowich, subsequently 
published their recommendations and the logic behind them in a collection of essays 
titled in Return to the River: Restoring Salmon to the Columbia River (2006), edited 
by Richard Williams (also a member of the ISG).  The intent of the book is to present 
a critique of the failure of salmon and steelhead management in the Columbia Basin 
and suggest a new “conceptual foundation” for salmon management for the 21st 
century.  It also presents a critique of the Council as a suitable governance body to 
address the salmon issue, arguing that it is captive to the developmental worldview of 
the federal agencies, fishery managers, and regional electrical power interests. 
The authors note the region‟s well-documented failure to halt the decline in 
salmon runs.  Of interest to this study is their insight on the role of perspective, 
identity, and culture in that decline – making arguments consistent with Taylor (1999) 
and, not surprisingly, Lichatowich (1999).  “What is [sic] less recognized is the lack of 
an explicit and scientifically based conceptual foundation and the consequences of this 
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on salmon management and recovery actions” (Lichatowich, McConnaha, Liss, 
Stanford, and Williams, 2006, p. 4).   
The authors‟ (2006) intent is to propose an alternative to the commodities-
based conceptual foundation with one that holistically stresses the role of natural 
ecological processes.  They characterize the dominant regional market perspective as 
one that began with a belief in an inexhaustible supply of resources that was later 
replaced with the belief that technical fixes, through engineering and artificial 
propagation, could mitigate for the loss of natural processes.
158
  This new conceptual 
foundation is based less on engineering nature to fit societal needs and more on 
managing human activities to facilitate natural processes that shape the environment.  
This “return to the river” concept envisions the Columbia as an ecosystem as opposed 
to the organic machine described by White (1995).   
Williams and his colleagues (2006) write from the perspective of the ecologist.  
As such, they seem to miss a fundamental implication of their own argument.  The 
authors, in their essays, present a detailed history of the region‟s development and 
support their arguments with a large amount of detailed, technical information.  In 
effect, they attempt to use a rational argument to convince the reader of the correctness 
of the conceptual foundation they propose.   
The findings of this study of Columbia Basin governance and history of 
regional governance calls the “lack of an explicit and scientifically based conceptual 
foundation” part of their argument into serious question.  Arguably, the problem is not 
the lack of a conceptual foundation but the large number of them, all conflicting in 
                                                 
158
 Again, consistent with Taylor (1999) 
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their objectives and all claiming scientific underpinnings and legitimacy.  They also 
miss (or do not acknowledge) the fact that others can look at the same technical data 
they do and either derive different conclusions or offer counter-data in challenge.   
This is because, to use the authors‟ own language, conceptual foundations are 
defined as “a body of prior knowledge reflecting training, beliefs, and experience”; a 
“lens through which we interpret observations and thereby form conclusions”; and a 
set of “principles and assumptions” (p. 29).  “Conceptual foundations are often buried 
so deep in the culture of management agencies that they are rarely articulated, 
examined, or evaluated.”  (p. 36).  Their definition is very similar to the “shared basic 
assumptions” that Schein (2004) uses in his definition of culture.  Consequently, an 
argument to adopt a new framework centered on salmon restoration and preservation 
as the region‟s most important value is unlikely to sway the beliefs and values of 
others based on rational argument, regardless of how well supported.    
What this study does confirm is Williams‟ and his colleagues‟ (2006) more 
fundamental point on the power of conceptual foundations (or worldviews) to drive 
social system and structure.  “A conceptual foundation or „worldview‟ is fundamental 
to how we interpret the „facts‟ garnered from observation or scientific investigation, 
and, in turn, to how we manage human interactions with the environment” (p. 4).  This 
point will be tested in the examination of governance structures presented in the 
chapter to follow. 
Lichatowich (1999), Taylor (1999), and Williams (2006), in addition to 
offering the connections between culture, social organization, and policy decisions all 
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provided detailed accounts of the history behind the regional salmon fishery 
development.  As such, they add to (and largely complement) the accounts of dates 
and events provided by Schafer (1943/1918), Johansen (1967), Dodds (1986) and 
Lyman (1963/1917); the just-the-facts narratives of the National Research Council 
(1996) and Cone and Ridlington (1996); and the discussion of basin commercial 
development provided by Ogden (1949),  McKinley (1952), Bessey (1963), Scheufele 
(c.1970), Norwood (c.1981), Hemmingway (1982), Blumm (1982), White (1995), 
DeLuna (1997), Brigham (1998), and Pope (2008).    
 
Domain: The American Environmental Movement 
Early roots and philosophic underpinnings. 
Although the earliest roots of the American environmental movement can be 
traced to the Middle Ages and biblical teachings (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Kline, 
2000; Dunlap, 2004), environmental historians generally credit George Perkins Marsh 
as providing the intellectual foundation of the American environmental movement.  
For example, in 1931 Lewis Mumford credited Marsh as “the fountainhead of the 
conservation movement” (quoted by Lowenthal in introduction to Marsh, 1965/1864, 
p. ix) and Dunlap (2004) describes Marsh as providing “the first lengthy discussion of 
humans as a geological and biological force” (p. 37). 
Marsh‟s (1965/1864) intent, as stated in his introduction was: 
 “…to indicate the character and, approximately, the extent of the changes 
produced by human action in the physical conditions of the globe we inhabit; 
to point out the dangers of imprudence and the necessity of caution in all 
operations which, on a large scale, interfere with the spontaneous arrangements 
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of the organic or the inorganic world; to suggest the possibility and the 
importance of the restoration of disturbed harmonies and the material 
improvement of waste and exhausted regions; and, incidentally, to illustrate the 
doctrine, that man is, in both kind and degree, a power of a higher order than 
any of the other forms of animated life, which, like him, are nourished at the 
battle of bounteous nature.” (p. 3).   
 
His basic argument was that humankind was destroying the land and water 
upon which it depended for its existence.  As he put it, “man has too long forgotten 
that the earth was given to him for usufruct alone, not for consumption, still less for 
profligate waste” (p. 36) and “man…is essentially a destructive power” (p. 36) against 
which nature cannot respond fast enough. 
Man in Nature (1965/1864) chronicles Marsh‟s observations regarding 
apparent linkages between timber over-harvest and over-grazing to hillside erosion, 
insect infestations, disease, the drying up of springs, and the destruction of fish 
spawning beds by the resulting sedimentation.   
Benjamin Kline (2000) provides a more holistic history in First along the 
River: a Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement.  His intent was to present 
an introductory study of the history of American environmentalism by discussing the 
historical foundations of the U.S. environmental movement and introduce the 
important facts and themes essential to understanding the movement.  Kline is, 
however, an environmental advocate and his book is in essence a critique of the 
market-capitalist worldview.  His presentation of historical events is, however, fairly 
straight forward.    
Of interest to this study is his presentation of the philosophical underpinnings 
of European society‟s relationship with the natural world.  Kline (2000) argues that 
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this relationship is based on the philosophy of the Judeo-Christian tradition, citing the 
biblical commandment to multiply and subdue the earth.  He notes the spread of 
Christianity across Europe by 500 AD and the corresponding reduction in paganism.  
Whereas paganism taught that people and the natural world were connected and 
interdependent, Judaism and Christianity taught that people were placed separate from 
and above nature by God.  It was God‟s will that man dominate nature in the struggle 
for sustenance and life, following the bible‟s examples of Adam and Noah.  
Kline (2000), like Weber (2002/1920), provides the philosophic justification 
for – and perceived inherent rightness of - commercial development of natural 
resources.  Wiebe (1967) and Hays (1957 and 1999/1959) explain how the 
administrative capacity for a nationwide application of that philosophy developed.  
Thomas Dunlap (2004) takes an additional step: rather than just limiting himself to an 
accounting of the development of environmental thought he argues that 
environmentalists should directly challenge the righteousness of the market 
philosophy by countering it with environmentalism‟s own sense of spirituality.   
Thomas Dunlap‟s Faith in Nature: Environmentalism as Religious Quest 
(2004) was inspired by the reaction of some historians and environmental advocates to 
an essay delivered by William Cronon entitled The Trouble with Wilderness.
159
  
Cronon argued an academic point that the concept of “wilderness” was socially 
constructed.  By this, he meant that certain areas of land were designated “wilderness” 
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 Of interest is the similarity between Dunlap‟s account of his motivation for writing Faith in Nature 
and the observations by Stuart Albert and David Whetten of colleagues‟ reaction to relatively minor 
budget reductions imposed by the Illinois state legislature on the University of Illinois.  That 
observation led to their development of a theory of organizational identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985). 
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based on historical processes and events and certain characteristics.  This in turn 
shapes the way the public looks at those lands and nature in general.  Members of the 
environmental community were outraged – in their view, wilderness was something 
real with objective and intrinsic characteristics.  Dunlap points out that Cronon made a 
distinction between “wilderness” – which, as mentioned, Cronon believed to be 
socially constructed - and “wild nature” or “wild land” which Cronon saw as an 
objective condition in nature.  This distinction was lost on or ignored by Cronon‟s 
critics, and they in effect condemned him for an argument that he did not make.  In the 
view of his critics, arguing that wilderness was anything less than an objective reality 
gave anti-environmentalists a basis to argue against wilderness preservation.   
 The vehemence of the environmentalist reaction to Cronon‟s argument seemed 
to Dunlap (2004) analogous to the reaction of Christian fundamentalists to historical 
critiques of the Bible.  Even if such a critic was a Christian in good standing, 
suggesting that Scripture was the product of human recorders influenced by the social 
conditions of their time and not a direct, inherently truthful rendition of God‟s words 
brought charges of apostasy.  Impressed by the passion of the environmentalists‟ 
reaction to Cronon, Dunlap looked more closely at its source. 
 Dunlap‟s (2004) adoption of a religion-like perspective is his book‟s main 
argument and its greatest weakness.  It is weak for two reasons.  First, Dunlap‟s 
(2004) justification for his argument reads as strained and contrived.  Second, the way 
he makes his  argument opens Dunlap to the same situation as befell Cronon – of 
being attacked for a making a case that he has no intention of making.  Dunlap (2004) 
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carefully stops short of declaring environmentalism to be its own religion.  He does 
not call for a new paganism or the worship of animals, trees and rocks.  Nevertheless, 
devout religious believers and rationality-oriented capitalists alike could easily make 
the point that this is exactly what he is doing, and thus completely dismiss Dunlap‟s 
work through ridicule.   
These weaknesses are unfortunate, because they mask the book‟s otherwise 
tremendous strengths.  In a concise 172 pages, Dunlap presents a cogent and 
accessible history of the development of the American environmental movement.  In 
effect – to borrow from Giddens (1985) – Dunlap outlines the structuration of that 
movement.  He identifies agents who most influenced the American movement‟s 
evolution beginning with Marsh‟s Man in Nature and through Aldo Leopold, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, Rachel Carson, 
and more recent authors Michael Pollan and Sara Stein, among many others.  He sets 
this evolution in historical and cultural context, noting the movement‟s link with and 
contradictions over American values such as private property, the role of science, 
individual choice, and Western instrumental rationality over time.  Of greatest interest 
to this research project are the values and belief systems he notes underlying the 
movement‟s current branches.   
Marsh (1965/1864) provided an intellectual framework for the conservation 
movement grounded in the American capitalist and protestant traditions, while Kline 
(2000) and Thomas Dunlap (2004) trace the historical trajectory of environmental 
philosophy from the Middle Ages up through the 1990s.  What follows next is a 
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review of literature charting the history of the movement‟s institutional development 
as presented by Hays (1999/1959 and 2000), Riley Dunlap and Mertig (1992a), and 
Rosenbaum (2005). 
 
 Institutional history. 
Marsh‟s arguments in Man in Nature partially inspired the Progressive 
Conservation movement.  Samuel Hays‟ examined that movement in his Conservation 
and the Gospel of Efficiency: the Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 
(originally published 1959; edition reviewed published 1999).  Hays uses the 
evolution of policies during the progressive conservation era to study the political 
structure of the time and the decision-making system that efficiency and conservation 
represented.  He wished to produce a history of the structure of power, not solely an 
intellectual history of conservation policy development.  He sees conservation not as 
just a public policy, but as an integral part of the evolution of the United States‟ 
political structure. 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency is, in a sense, a critique of the 
normal way environmental history is presented.  Hays (1999/1959) argues that to most 
environmental historians, the significance of the conservation movement lies in the 
substance of progressive policies concerning sustained yield forestry, multiple use 
river development, and efficient public land management.  He wants to look at the 
period differently, not as a recounting of events and decisions but rather to examine 
the patterns of social forces that caused the events to occur.  To Hays, and reminiscent 
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of Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991), history is best understood as a “web of 
human relationships, of patterns of human interaction within the larger society” as 
opposed to a simple sequence of events (Hays, 1999/1959, p. ix).   
Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig collected and edited a series of essays 
presented in American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement, 1970 
– 1990 (1992a).  They note that, despite predictions to the contrary, the American 
environmental movement has not had the short life span of most social movements.  It 
ranks among the relative few that significantly changed society.  Their purpose was to 
describe the evolution of the environmental movement from 1970 – 1990 and to assess 
its current status.  The book provides an overview of environmentalism‟s major 
organizations and explores the diversity of the movement. 
Although Dunlap and Mertig (1992a) place the roots of American 
Environmentalism in the Progressive Movement‟s late 19th century backlash to the 
reckless exploitation of natural resources, government corruption, and bureaucratic 
ineptitude (consistent with Marsh (1965/1864), Kline (2000), and T. Dunlap (2004)), 
they note the catalyst for the modern movement as the first Earth Day in 1970.  They 
then trace the evolution of the movement through three “waves.”  The first wave 
occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s and was primarily grounded in the wise 
management of natural resources for human use, although they acknowledge the 
preservationist movement‟s origins also date to approximately the same time.  The 
second wave occurred during the Franklin Roosevelt administration and addressed the 
environmental consequences of the dust bowl and massive flooding.  The third wave 
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began in the 1950s as more Americans gained affluence in the post World War II 
economic boom, creating an increased demand for preservation of natural areas for 
public enjoyment.  By the 1960s, this third wave had evolved into modern 
environmentalism. 
An even more up to date accounting of institutional environmentalism is 
Walter Rosenbaum‟s sixth edition of Environmental politics and policy published in 
2005.  Rosenbaum notes that in recent times Americans have lost their “ecological 
innocence.”  Only a few decades ago the average American never heard of 
environmentalism, whereas now they debate the wisdom of international treaties on 
global warming.  Environmentalism has thus changed Americans‟ view of themselves 
and their place in the natural order.  His intent is to offer an accounting of how far the 
nation has progressed, how far is left to go, what has been lost, and what has been 
gained.  Like Dunlap and Mertig (1992a, whom he cites and, who in turn, cite his 
earlier editions), he places the catalytic origin of the modern environmental movement 
to Earth Day 1970.  His goal is to speak to the changes from that point forward, 
emphasizing the political context of environmental issues and the political 
implications of policy decisions. 
Of interest to this study is Rosenbaum‟s (2005) chronicling of changes in 
national policy due to changes in presidential administrations and congressional 
makeup; the shift from single issue policies for protection of individual elements of 
the environment such as water, air, and discrete species to more holistic concerns over 
ecological impacts; the uncertainty of science; and the political difficulty of justifying 
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costs for environmental consequences that fall to individual consumers whereas the 
benefits are spread over the population.  He argues that environmentalism is a passive 
consensus issue, by which he means that public support is widespread but not intense 
unless flamed by specific issue or action.  He also notes traditional American 
resistance to supporting specific actions when inconvenience or personal cost is 
involved.  Although Rosenbaum speaks from a national perspective, his arguments are 
germane to Northwest natural resources policy in general and salmon restoration in 
particular.  He places the number of organized groups as over 10,000, with 
organizational membership largely drawn from upper middle class, well educated, 
whites.  Consequently, the movement is frequently criticized for being racist and 
elitist, especially when confronted with issues of environmental justice, public health, 
and poverty.   
Rosenbaum (2005) also catalogues the basic ideologies of the movement into 
the following subgroups: 
 The “ideological mainstream” of pragmatic reformers.  These groups 
emphasize political action through government.  There is a great deal of 
diversity within the mainstream groups, from preservationism as promoted by 
the Sierra Club vs. wise use and economic exploitation represented by the 
NWF or Izaak Walton League.  
 The “deep ecologists” who feel man is at best a part of nature, and all life 
forms have an equal right to exist.  Deep ecologists call for fundamental 
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changes in national institutions and lifestyles are essential to preserve global 
ecological integrity. 
 The “radical environmentalists” who do not support compromise and favor 
direct and occasionally violent action.   
Rosenbaum‟s concluding argument is that 21st century environmental 
degradation is being resolved under 19
th
 century rules and institutions.  Checks and 
balances, federalism, interest group liberalism, and congressional localism were 
created by the Constitution or were implicit in its philosophy.  Administrative politics 
now play as fundamental a part in environmental policy as any other element of 
government.  The growth of regulation and legislation, coupled with the intransigence 
of many environmental challenges, has created a permanent new policy domain within 
federal and state governments. 
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APPENDIX B 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Introduction 
Images of the Columbia River as a “spiritual force” and “cornucopian provider 
of economic value” (Lang, 1999, p. 147) and as a natural ecological system heavily 
degraded by manmade structures and operations (Williams, 2006) illustrate 
profoundly different worldviews of the relationship between the people of the Basin 
and their place in the natural order.  This study identified three worldviews operative 
in the Pacific Northwest and relevant to the establishment of governance structures 
and systems.  They are characterized as “tribal,” “market-commodity,” and 
“environmental.”   
Within each of these worldviews evolved numerous organizations, institutions, 
and other societal systems created to carry out specific missions and purposes – 
purposes defined within the context of the worldview held by the original institutional 
organizers.  Examples include native Indian tribes and clans, state and federal 
agencies, private business corporations, and non-profit interest groups among 
numerous others.  Each of these institutions subsequently evolved with their own 
cultures, values, and senses of identity consistent with the purposes for which they 
were created and shaped by organizational members, the constituents they served, the 
sociological environment in which they operated, and their experiences over time.   
The sheer number of institutions operating within a defined geographical space 
would anticipate disagreements over resource use priorities based on differing 
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organizational missions and interests.  Rational, interest-based conflict of this nature is 
termed “realistic” (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) or 
“instrumental” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).  Long standing lines of realistic 
conflict within the Columbia Basin conflict include debates over public vs. private 
hydropower development (Ogden, 1949; McKinley, 1952; Bessey, 1963; Norwood, c. 
1981; White, 1995; DeLuna, 1997); commercial versus sport and tribal fishers 
(Taylor, 1999); fishery managers versus hydropower system developers (Robbins, 
2004) and others as identified in Chapter 8.  However, if these disagreements were 
simply over rational allocation of resource use, and if the parties‟ interests could be 
served by agreement on an optimum allocation of those resources, one would expect 
governance systems that successfully address those needs to generate support from the 
parties concerned and thus enjoy extended periods of stability.   
There are examples from outside the scope of this study where this has been 
the case.  The Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement and the “single utility” 
concept essentially resolved the regional debate between public and private power and 
has been in place since the 1960s (Pope, 2008).  An even longer lasting example is the 
commercial harvest allocation process agreed to between Oregon and Washington 
under the Columbia River Compact, codified in 1918, that resolved forty-four years of 
dispute over fishery management (Taylor, 1999).    
In sharp contrast to the constancy enjoyed by the Pacific Northwest 
Cooperation Agreement and the Columbia River Compact is the variety of attempts at 
a Basin-wide governance system.  Interest-based (also called instrumental or realistic) 
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conflict theory suggests that this is due to the much broader array of interests affected, 
thus making stable agreement that much more difficult to attain.  This study concluded 
that the consistent desire for a rational approach to regional decision could be 
attributed to instrumental (or realistic) conflict theory.   
Instrumental conflict theory does not explain the intensity and personal 
attachment with which parties in the basin hold to various positions.  Recognition of 
this phenomenon in other settings led to the development of “social” conflict under 
social identity theory.  Social conflict is based on findings that merely being a member 
of a group can lead to feelings of hostility toward other groups even where no realistic 
competition exists.  Social conflict is grounded in group values and the degree to 
which an individual‟s identity is linked to the values of the social group(s) in which 
the individual is a member (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).   Related to identity is the 
influence of organizational culture on individual belief patterns.  At its core, 
organizational culture consists of a set of shared basic assumptions that are 
normatively taught to organizational members and inform them of the proper way to 
think, feel, and perceive conditions and circumstances within and external to the 
organization (Schein, 2004).  Taken together, influences of identity and culture form a 
powerful interpretive lens through which members perceive, think, and relate to their 
environment (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Schein, 2004).  
Chapter 7 concluded that a major reason that so many Basin governance 
systems failed was due to an inability to instill into participating individuals a sense of 
identity that could both transcend the identities and values of members and be 
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reconciled and integrated with the values framework of their respective institutions.  It 
further concluded that the reason for the durability of other systems, such as the 
Pacific Northwest Cooperation Agreement and the Columbia River Compact, is that 
the parties to those agreements did adopt and internalize the goals and purposes of 
those arrangements into their cultural and identity frameworks.  Consequently, those 
systems were able to persevere in the face of the same circumstances that caused other 
systems to collapse.   
Chapter 7 went on to offer four hypotheses regarding the influence of values 
on individual participants.  This chapter establishes a theoretical framework within 
which those hypotheses may be tested.  To do so, it draws on the theoretical domains 
of sociology, social psychology, and psychology.  Such an amalgamation is necessary 
in that no single body of theory provides a complete explanation for neither the 
process by which the memorandum of agreement establishing the CRBF (and, by 
extension, other systems) came about nor the reasons for which the CRBF eventually 
failed.   
Empirical Setting and Research Focus 
The theoretical framework presented herein is proposed to be tested using the 
circumstances surrounding negotiation of the Columbia River Basin Forum 
memorandum of agreement as its empirical setting.  The CRBF offers several 
advantages for studying the underlying dynamics of regional governance.  First, its 
initiation, development, activation, and demise occurred in a discrete period providing 
clear start and end points for the entire process.  Second, the nature and substance of 
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the debate over its creation was well documented by the local press.  Third, meetings 
were open and well recorded, both by a hired facilitator and note-taker and by two 
news reporters who faithfully attended and reported on almost every meeting.  Fourth, 
the institutional interests and issues at play in the development of the CRBF MOA – 
which became the Forum‟s operating charter - are consistent with the interests at play 
in previous regional governance attempts.  Fifth, almost all of the participants 
involved in the CRBF reside locally and are available for interview.  Consequently, 
the CRBF provides a potentially rich empirical setting through which to examine the 
region‟s governance history using the theoretical framework introduced above. 
In addition to the CRBF records, there is a rich body of literature on the Pacific 
Northwest‟s history of development and the major political and social trends affecting 
the region over time.  There is, however, no published work that deals exclusively 
with the issue of interjurisdictional governance within the Columbia Basin.  
Contributions to theory. 
This proposed study approach offers three contributions to theory.  The first is 
the integration of several bodies of theory to explain the CRBF paradox.  The 
historical record alone is insufficient to fully explain why the region has not just failed 
but actively resisted establishing a governance system with the authority to solve the 
problems that cause many to think such a system necessary.  A complete answer can 
potentially be found through an integration of:    
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 Theories of structuration (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984) and social becoming 
(Sztompka, 1991), as reinforced with theories of organizational culture 
(Schein, 2004) and social conflict (Giddens, 1979; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). 
 Theories of organizational and individual identity (Tajfel and Turner, 
2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and 
Terry, 2001).   
 Theories of individual decision making, in particular image theory (Beach, 
1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).    
Social formation is the product of the “duality” of collective norms and 
individual choices.  Individuals or select groups of individuals act as agents in the 
development of social structures.  Their actions result in social structures - rules and 
norms – that serve to constrain or enable future behavior.  Yet the choices available to 
these agents are in turn constrained or enabled by those social rules enacted by those 
that came before them.  Thus, agents do not create totally new social systems.  They 
reproduce or transform systems already in existence, remaking them through the 
“continuity of praxis” (Giddens, 1984, p. 171, emphasis in original; Sztompka, 1991, 
p. 41).  Through praxis, the boundary of social organization is constantly challenged 
and changed by agents even as the opportunities available for change are shaped by 
existing rules and norms.  Thus, social structure is both the result of agent action and 
the medium in which such action occurs.  Furthermore, structuration theory stresses 
the importance of history.  All social structures are evolutions of the structures they 
replace and, in turn, set the foundations for the structures yet to come.   
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The historical evolution of regional governance and the development of the 
CRBF is a case study of structuration and social becoming in action.  The Northwest 
has experimented with issues of regional governance since the Columbia River system 
was first envisioned in the 1920s.  The institutions involved have remained relatively 
constant over this period, although there have been significant periods where some 
interests‟ voices were muted by others.160   
The governance structure preferences for participating institutions have also 
remained relatively stable over this period.  The history of governance in the region 
demonstrates the following, all consistent with structuration theory: 
 There have been repeated initiatives since the 1920s to establish a regional 
governance structure in the Northwest. 
 Institutions put forward representatives to serve as agents in the public debate 
over the structure and authority of these governance initiatives.   
 These agents work to change, defend, or abolish the structures in existence at 
the time consistent with their respective institution‟s interest at the time. 
 Institutional interests consist of both material interests and institutional 
worldview values.    
 Each new governance structure has a pedigree that can be traced to previous 
governance decisions. 
                                                 
160
 For example, tribes, harvest interests, and environmental advocates had little voice in regional 
decision making from the 1920s through the 1960s.   This changed with the rise of the tribal sovereignty 
movement, the Boldt Decision, and the environmental movement in the 1960s/1970s and passage of the 
Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Act of 1980.    
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Thus, structuration theory provides a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding the CRBF than does interest group theory alone.  In fact, the concept of 
praxis provides the context in which institutional interests played themselves out.  But 
structuration theory still does not fully explain the CRBF paradox.  It does not, for 
example, explain the intensity of belief that agents brought to the MOA development 
process.  Although it asserts that all human beings are knowledgeable agents with the 
capacity to effect change through their actions, it does not explain how some members 
of a social group are selected (or accepted) as agents in specific circumstances and 
others not.  And it does not fully explain how institutional values are transmitted – 
relatively consistently - through generations of members over time.   
Identity and image theories help fill in these blanks.  Indeed, in his 1984 book 
on structuration, Giddens states that societies are “social systems” with defining 
features, among which are feelings of “some sort of common identity” (p. 165).  He 
describes social identity as a “marker” in the “virtual time-space of structure” and 
associates identity with social roles (p. 282).  The literature on social identity theory 
argues that individuals self-categorize themselves into social and organizational 
groups that either display values the individual already holds or would like to assume.  
Thus, social groupings become collections of like-valued individuals, albeit with 
varying degrees of attachment to the values and norms of the group.  Those with the 
strongest attachment integrate the values and goals of the group as part of their 
personal sense of self.  Moreover, identity provides an interpretive lens which defines 
how members think and perceive of events around them.  The organizational 
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representatives involved in the CRBF MOA negotiations approached the discussion 
with their own sense of what was right, a sense shaped by the social identity of the 
organization and institutions they represented.  Identity therefore helps explain the 
intensity of belief that individual agents brought to the MOA development process.   
But identity theory does not explain how individuals cognitively process and 
come to accept organizational norms and values as their own.  Although there are 
likely other theories of cognitive psychology that attempt to explain this phenomenon, 
this study will focus on image theory (Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach, 1998; Beach 
and Connolly, 2005).  Image theory explains the process of individual decision 
making as being grounded in the principles and values of the individual decision 
maker.   
In summary, traditional interest group theory is insufficient to explain the 
value disputes that underlay the CRBF MOA development.  The phenomenon of the 
MOA process is likewise not fully explainable by structuration, identity, or image 
theory by themselves.  Taken together, however, a more complete explanation of the 
MOA can be compiled.  Conversely, the development of the CRBF MOA offers an 
empirical vehicle through which elements of each of these bodies of theory can be 
examined, hopefully adding to the better understanding of each. 
A second contribution to theory is the application of identity theory and image 
theory to better understand the nature of agency. 
A third contribution to theory is to potentially offer further development of 
social conflict theory and the role of identity in conflict settings.  The body of 
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literature that has evolved since the early 1980s linking social identity with social 
conflict mostly focuses on violent conflict along international, ethnic, or religious 
lines.  There is recognition of the applicability of identity to organizational and 
domestic political conflict, but there doesn‟t appear to be much direct treatment on 
that particular subject (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001).  An exception is the work 
of Pruitt and Kim‟s (2004) which offers an integration and synthesis of several 
interrelated theoretical domains from the social psychology field.  These include 
theories on conflict, strategic choice, inter-group competition, and conflict group 
mobilization.  Fundamental to these theories is social identity and, relevant to the 
dynamics of Northwest governance issues, its application to organizations through 
organizational identity theory.   
This assertion of Northwest relevance is based on the observation that the 
debate and development of the CRBF tended to play out along organizational lines.  
Representatives and leaders from state and federal agencies, business entities, non-
profit organizations, tribal governments, and, in some cases, organizations comprised 
of a coalition of organizations, were the primary actors (or agents, to put it in the terms 
of structuration theory) in advocating that the mission, structure, and power of the 
CRBF be shaped consistent with their respective organizational interests
161
.  The 
upshot of their actions was an MOA that preordained the eventual failure of the CRBF 
                                                 
161
 There were also a large number of consultants involved in the effort.  Some of these were members 
of relatively large consulting firms whose interest in the outcome was limited to their firms‟ contractual 
obligation to the client.  But a significant number of others were self-employed individuals long 
associated with and whose personal values and beliefs closely aligned with the organizations they 
represented.    
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despite the widespread support for a meaningful and substantive governance process.  
Understanding the processes of identity and how identity encourages or dampens 
social conflict impulses can thus contribute to a deeper understanding of the reasons 
why an effective northwest regional governance structure proved so elusive in this 
particular case, with potentially generalizable lessons to be applied elsewhere.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized into two sections.  It begins by 
reviewing the literature regarding theories of structuration, identity, and decision 
making.  In section 2, it argues the need to draw from multiple theories in order to 
fully explain the region‟s governance experience.  The chapter concludes by 
identifying the opportunity presented by this model and the CRBF for empirical 
validation.    
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Section 1 
Literature Review: Theories to Guide Future Research 
 
Introduction 
The long-running disputes over natural resource use in the Columbia River 
Basin is highlighted by not just the deep differences over interests but by the intensity 
of the positions observed in proponents of those interests.   Traditional interest-group 
theory alone cannot explain the paradox of Northwest governance.  There is no one 
theory, or even field of theory, that completely explains the development of 
governance systems in general or the behaviors and decisions that produced the CRBF 
MOA in particular.  Consequently, this study looks to theories from the fields of 
sociology, social psychology, and psychology
162
 for a more comprehensive and 
integrated theoretical framework within which to further explore the reasons behind 
the rise and demise of regional experiments with governance systems.  Specifically, it 
reviews a relevant sampling of literature from theories of structuration, social identity, 
and decision making upon which such a framework may be based.    
 
Theories of Social Structuration 
Structuration theory. 
Anthony Giddens first addressed structuration in his 1973 book, The Class 
Structure of Advance Societies.  Known for his interdisciplinary approach to 
                                                 
162
 The boundaries between these fields are muddy, at best.  Much of the bodies of literature found 
relevant to this study are themselves syntheses from multiple theoretical fields of study.  Examples 
include structuration (Giddens, 1984), organizational culture (Schein, 2004), and organizational identity 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004).    
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sociology, Giddens interweaves anthropology, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, 
history, and economics throughout the body of his work.  He apparently began his 
work on structuration around 1969 (Giddens, 1979).
163
 
Structuration theory did not originate with Giddens; Jones (1999) cites its 
general emergence in Europe in the late 1970s.  According to Bryant and Jary (1997), 
Giddens borrowed the term from Piaget and Gurvitch.  But Giddens is credited with 
being “the single most important figure in the debate” over macro and micro 
influences in society (Bryant and Jary, 1997, p. 4) and with presenting “the most 
serious attempt to provide one, single, comprehensive, true social theory (Boyne, 
1997, p. 72).  Although disagreeing with his presentation and conclusions, many of 
Giddens‟ critics agree that his treatment of the topic is among - if not the - most 
influential in the field and it is his work to which most writers react (Held and 
Thompson, 1989; Bryant and Jary, 1991; Bryant and Jary 1997).   
Giddens is credited with the maturation of structuration as serious sociological 
theory through its sequential, evolutionary treatment in New Rules of Sociological 
Method (1976), Central Problems of Social Theory (1979), and The Constitution of 
Society (1984) (Bryant and Jary, 1991).  Giddens describes The Constitution of 
Society as “a summation of [his] previous writings, setting them out in a developed 
and coherent manner” (Giddens, 1984, preface).  As such, and although these three 
books are reviewed below, it is Constitution that is most heavily relied on for the 
purposes of this study. 
                                                 
163
 Giddens introduces his 1979 book Central Problems in Social Theory as the latest in a ten-year 
project of studying the legacy of 19
th
 century European social theory. 
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In New Rules (1976), Giddens presents a critical analysis of 19
th
 century social 
theory – specifically hermeneutics (or interpretive sociology) and functionalism - and 
its legacy of application in the 20
th
 century to the fields of sociology, anthropology, 
and political science.  His stated intent was to elaborate upon and begin a 
reconstruction of the problematic manner in which these prevailing theories dealt with 
human social activity.  He was especially critical of the way the theories treated 
“action” by individuals within social contexts.  His two main arguments were that (1) 
social theory must treat action as rationalized conduct ordered reflexively by human 
agents and (2) that it must grasp language as the practical medium whereby reflexive 
action is made possible.   
New Rules (1976) introduced several of Giddens‟ central tenets of 
structuration, specifically the concepts of system, structure, agency, institutions, and 
the duality of structure – described more fully in the discussion of Constitution (1984) 
below.  Giddens (1976) also displays his ambivalence toward empirical research with 
regard to structuration.  He specifically states that this book is “not a guide to practical 
research” and that he is avoiding specific research proposals.  Rather, the book is 
intended as “an exercise in clarification of logical issues.” (p. 8).  He provides that 
clarity by proposing eleven “new rules” to guide future theoretical development, 
organized under four categories.    
   In 1979‟s Central Problems Giddens completes his critique of prevailing 
theory by addressing structuralism.  His confidence in structuration theory apparently 
grows as he here formally proposes it as a more holistic and complete than are the 
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hermeneutic, functionalist, and structuralist approaches upon which he draws and 
integrates.  He does not give language the centrality in Central Problems as he did in 
New Rules, focusing instead on theories regarding “volunteerism” of the individual 
and the “determinism” of social groups.  He argues that, up until his work, the two 
were treated as incompatible opposites
164
 unable to address or cope with the questions 
and problems that one posed to the other.  Because of these incompatibilities, Giddens 
argues that two could not simply be added together; they had to be substantially 
adjusted.   
In Constitution (1984) Giddens states his intent as to put an end to the debate 
between the school of “functionalists” and “structuralists,” with their emphasis on the 
primacy of social constraints over individual action, and the schools of “humanism” 
and “hermeneutics” that claimed that the voluntary actions of and meanings held by 
individuals are the prime explanation for human social conduct.  “The basic domain of 
study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the 
experience of the individual actor nor the existence of any form of social totality, but 
social practices ordered across time and space.” (1984, p. 2).   
Critiques of structuration theory. 
Although applauded for his effort to present a grand theory of sociology, 
Giddens Constitution of Society has his critics.
165
  Some are very positive: Mario 
Zamora (1985) welcomed the book as “one of the best standard reference works on 
                                                 
164
 Giddens used the term “antimonies” to describe this mutual exclusiveness, a word for which this 
author could find no definition. 
165
 Critical reviews of New Rules (1976) and Central Problems (1979) are not presented since Giddens 
proclaimed Constitution (1984) as the culmination of all of his previous work on structuration.  
Consequently, the focus here is critiques of his finished product. 
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Anthony Giddens‟s [sic] ideas” and recommended it be “in the library of every serious 
social scientist (p. 568).  Others less so: Charles Powers (1988) states that while 
Constitution is filled with “penetrating insights” (p. 1124) and constructively adds to 
Giddens‟ previous discussion of time and space, it falls short of Giddens‟ stated 
objective of presenting a complete and comprehensive theory.  As such, he sees the 
book as another step in the progression of Giddens‟ ideas rather than the end point the 
author envisioned.   
Further critique is found in three anthologies of essays dedicated to 
Constitution.  The tones of the essays range from constructively critical to outright 
dismissive.  The first to be published was Social Theory of Modern Societies: 
Anthony Giddens and his Critics, edited by Held and Thompson in 1989.  The second 
was Giddens‟ Theory of Structuration: a Critical Appreciation, edited by Bryant and 
Jary in 1991.  The third, also by Bryant and Jary, was published in 1997 and entitled 
Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments.  The arguments in those essays can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Giddens arguments are “conflicting and contradictory” and suffer from 
“ambiguity and vagueness.”  Consequently, it is questionable if structuration 
theory is even relevant to understanding the critical functions of society. 
(Bernstein, 1989). 
 Rather than bridging the macro-micro argument, structuration theory 
“reinstitutes an outer deterministic force” that influences action without being 
affected by society‟s actors.  In fact, too much autonomy and influence is 
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awarded to individuals as Giddens turns “social pattern[s] and distribution” 
into a “process.”  (Bauman, 1989, emphasis in original). 
 Giddens' “lack of coherence on key questions cast doubt on his work as a 
whole,” especially in his treatment of class and citizenship (Held, 1989). 
 Giddens' treatment of time and space is frustratingly limited.  His focus on 
“presence or absence” in time and space fails to account for human ability to 
reproduce and represent space, especially through symbols and narratives 
(Gregory, 1989).  His formulations on time and space index important issues 
but do provide enough information to adequately explain a fully worked out 
position (Urry, 1991). 
 Giddens misappropriates elements of his theory, discounting portions that do 
not align with his overall conclusions (Boyne, 1991; Jary, 1991).  He 
especially misrepresents the work of French social theorists, such as Foucault.  
(Boyne, 1991).   
 Structuration theory is “unhelpful when trying to account for variations in the 
proportions of volunteerism and determinism” and “degrees of freedom and 
constraint associated with action” (Archer, 1997). 
 Giddens oversimplifies the psychology of individuals (Craib, 1997) and the 
role of the routine in motivating behavior (Willmott, 1997). 
It is beyond the scope of this study to address or reconcile the comments of 
Giddens‟ critics.  What is of interest here is the very limited amount of empirical 
research that either supports or contradicts Giddens‟ arguments, a fact lamented by at 
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least one team of researchers (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  The critiques cited above 
and the others found in the edited volumes of Bryant and Jary and Held and Thompson 
are almost all theoretical in nature.
166
  The only one that addresses empirical issues is 
Boyne (1991) who critiques Giddens use of Foucault‟s study of French prisons.  One 
critic (Gregson, 1989) lays the blame for this on Giddens, dismissing structuration 
theory as a “second order” theory that conceptualizes the general outline of human 
society but is too abstract and imprecise to generate concepts that directly apply to 
empirical settings.  In essence, Gregson argues, structuration theory as presented by 
Giddens is inherently non-empirical. 
Giddens himself seems ambivalent on the issue.  In 1976‟s New Rules he 
states his intent specifically as not to present a model for research but rather to address 
the logic of prevailing theory.  Although he devotes a chapter to laying out an 
empirical approach in 1984‟s Constitution, noting the importance of ensuring that any 
theory must be relevant to the world as actually experienced, he subsequently seemed 
to downplay importance of empirical validation.  In a 1989 reply to his critics Giddens 
states, “Theoretical thinking needs in substantial part to proceed in its own terms and 
cannot be expected to be linked at every point in empirical considerations” (Giddens, 
1989, p. 294).  He also argues in Constitution that whereas empirical research is fully 
appropriate for study of the natural sciences, given nature‟s “factual” basis, it is an 
incomplete tool for the study of society since social reality is based on the experiences 
and interpretations of those living it.   
                                                 
166
 Presumably the arguments and positions presented in the essays were based on empirical research 
conducted by or known to the authors.  Such research, if conducted, was not cited. 
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Social becoming. 
Adding to the work of Giddens, Piotr Sztompka addresses, albeit indirectly, 
some of the criticisms of Giddens‟ work by offering a “synthesis of syntheses” to 
explain what happens as social organizations come into being.  His 1991 book Society 
in Action: the Theory of Social Becoming, like Giddens‟ Constitution (1984), attempts 
to bridge the human action vs. group determinism argument.  Also like Constitution, 
Society in Action is an argument grounded in theoretical reasoning rather than 
empirical observation.  Although published after Constitution, and covering much of 
the same ground, Society in Action is not derived from Giddens‟ work.  Sztompka 
acknowledges and references structuration theory, but he – as did Giddens - roots his 
theory in earlier sociological theory.  Thus, his conclusions, although consistent with 
Giddens‟, appear to have developed in parallel with Giddens‟ with roots in similar 
intellectual ground.    
Sztompka starts from two broad lines of theoretical development.  The first is 
“agency” which he describes as the active, constructive side of social life by 
individuals, but with due recognition to constraints posed by the structural framework 
within which human conduct takes place.  The second is historical sociology, which 
reintroduces the dimension of time and provides the causal mechanisms through which 
agential creativeness and structural influences merge in the flow of historical process.   
Sztompka (1991) summarizes his theory with three insights: 
 That society (defined as any social grouping) is humanly constructed. 
 That humans are socially shaped 
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 That society and humans are both immersed in the flow of historical time 
Sztompka apparently did not attract the same degree of critical attention as did 
Giddens; no critiques of his theory of social becoming were found in the course of this 
review.  Sztompka answers and resolves a number of issues raised by Giddens‟ critics.  
He is much clearer in his discussion of the interface between individuals and collective 
society, better explaining praxis and Giddens‟ duality of individual action and social 
constraint.   He is also clearer in the way he addresses time-space, using his “historical 
coefficient” to explain society as a constantly dynamic and sequentially evolving 
series of events over time.   
Both Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) recognize the role of formal rules, 
allocation of resources, and normative social expectations as constituents of structure 
and their role in the evolution of social systems.  For the purposes of creating a 
framework for future research of regional governance, a closer examination of 
normative expectations within systems, or organizational culture, is warranted.     
Organizational culture. 
Edgar Schein started writing on organizational culture in 1968, publishing his 
first book on the subject in 1985.  Organizational Culture and Leadership (1985) was 
widely accepted and cited within the organization theory community (Shafritz and Ott, 
1996).  Miner (2005) identifies Schein as being considered by his peers as having 
developed one of the “essential theories” of organizational behavior – despite its 
relative lack of empirical support and the view of some that, like Giddens structuration 
(1984), Schein‟s theory is inherently non-empirical.  Schein‟s 1985 edition presented 
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“the most comprehensive and integrative statement of the organizational culture 
school” up to that point in time (Shafritz and Ott, 1996, p. 25).   
Schein published his second edition in 1992 and the third in 2004.  The 
difference between earlier and later work is that subsequent editions edit the chapters 
and incorporate more recent case studies while leaving his basic argument and 
construct intact.  Consequently, it is the 2004 publication that is reviewed here. 
Schein (2004) maintains that unique cultures can evolve in social units of any 
size.  His focus, however, is at the organization level.  He describes organizational 
culture as a complex psychology-based phenomenon that is difficult to understand but, 
once understood, clarifies much about a given organization‟s behavior that might 
otherwise appear irrational.    
Whereas Schein‟s (2004) concept of culture explains the normative element of 
social structure (as used in the Giddens (1984) sense), it leaves little room for 
individual agency.  Schein notes that some cultures of the world are grounded in the 
freedom of the individual while others are centered on the importance of the group.  
Thus, individual agency can only exist if the culture allows it to – in contradiction of 
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991).  Schein seems to make an exception for 
organizational leaders, noting that one of the sources of culture is the beliefs and 
practices of the group leader at the time the group first forms.  Once ingrained, it 
defines all group behavior until such time as the group is threatened, at which point 
the group will again look to the leader for innovative solutions.  In other words, 
agency is confined to the leader and then only under specific circumstances.   
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In this Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) seem to have the better argument.  
For example, Schein‟s theory does not cover situations in which individuals belong to 
multiple organizations and the role that influences from one organization may act as 
an "external influence" on the behavior of individuals within another organization, 
thereby contributing to the evolution of the second organization‟s culture.  An 
example would be a business employee‟s involvement with an environmental group 
that leads to promotion and adoption of conservation practices within the business.  
Schein cannot account for this cultural interplay at the individual level, since such 
interplay does not represent the “shared group experience” central to his model.  
Additionally, if behavior is always determined by cultural disposition or in response to 
external situations, how does one explain behavior deviant to organization cultural 
norms or social “counter-movements” (Sztompka, 1991)?  Schein (2004) does not 
provide an answer, whereas the theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social 
becoming (Sztompka, 1991) do.  Despite this omission, Schein (1984) offers an 
elegant, “logically tight and compelling theory” (Miner, 2005, p. 343) that provides 
clarity to structuration theory‟s normative component of social “structure.” 
Intergroup conflict. 
In the main, with the obvious exception of the Indian wars and the tribes‟ 
relocation to reservations in the mid 1800s, issues of conflict in the Pacific Northwest 
played out without widespread violence (Dodds, 1986).  The conclusion that the 
search for a rational and peaceful way to resolve regional disputes is the primary 
reason for consistent support for some form of Basinwide governance system.  A 
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theoretical understanding of non-violent conflict is therefore needed.  Giddens and 
Sztompka observe the existence of conflict and explain it through the framework of 
agency, power, and control.  But their discussion of the causes of conflict is 
frustratingly sparse.  Although Giddens‟ Central Problems (1979) attributes the causes 
of conflict to competing interests, group identity, and ideology, his Constitution 
(1984) – self-described as his cumulative summary of structuration – is silent on these 
issues.  Sztompka (1991) does not address the causes of conflict at all.   
In the 1980s and 1990s other social and behavioral researchers, picking up on 
the work of Tajfel and Turner (2004/1979) and others, increasingly emphasized the 
role of identity as a major source of intergroup conflict.  In Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict, and Conflict Resolution (2001), Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David 
Wilder collect a set of essays that seek to explain ways in which (1) social identities 
create and exacerbate intergroup conflicts, (2) intergroup conflict in turn influences 
social identity, and (3) addressing social identity may help resolve some intergroup 
conflicts.  They note that issues of self and identity occur at multiple levels of conflict.  
These include disputes among individuals within a social context, among groups 
within larger social groupings (such as a nation), and among nations.  The essays 
selected focus on real world conflicts among ethnicities, races, religions, and nation-
states, and draw contributors from a variety of social sciences such as anthropology, 
political science, psychology, and sociology.  Of use to this study is the authors‟ 
conclusion – consistent with Giddens‟ and Sztompka‟s “duality of structure” - that 
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analysis of intergroup conflict cannot be reduced to either to the individual or group 
levels; both be taken into account.   
Alice Eagly, Reuben Baron, and Lee Hamilton‟s 2004 book, The Social 
Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict is, at its heart, a tribute to the work 
of Herbert Kelman renowned for his theoretical and practical contributions to conflict 
resolution.  The contributors to this collection of essays are all students or followers of 
Kelman‟s work.  The book is organized in three sections.  Beginning with several 
essays that review of the precepts of social psychology, the book then presents case 
studies of application in various contexts, ranging from health psychology, student 
access to the internet in schools, and business organizations.  The third section is more 
directly focused on psychological approaches to conflict resolution, discussing case 
studies from Sri Lanka, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Cyprus.   
While underscoring the important role of identity in conflict, the scale and 
scope of the conflicts in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution 
(2001) and The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict (2004) are of, 
at best, indirect applicability to governance issues in the Northwest.  A more 
generalized and useful discussion is found in Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim‟s 2004 
book, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (3
rd
 edition).  The authors 
integrate and synthesize several interrelated theoretical domains.  These include 
theories on conflict, strategic choice, inter-group competition, conflict group 
mobilization and social identity.   
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Pruitt and Kim wrote their book intending to “produce a readable and 
integrated synthesis of theory and research on social conflict and its resolution” (p. 
xvii.) incorporating literature from the social psychology field.  They note that conflict 
has been studied since antiquity, with modern treatment rooted in work by Charles 
Darwin (with his emphasis on the benefits of biological competition to long term 
species survival), Sigmund Freud (Individual resolution of internal psychodynamic 
conflict), and Karl Marx (the inevitable existence of conflict within society).   With 
Darwin, Freud, and Marx providing intellectual inspiration, modern social psychology 
developed from the great academic interest in the “cauldron of social conflict” 
surrounding the World War II years (p. xiii).   
For the purposes of this study, Pruitt and Kim (2004) offer the most useful 
synthesis of conflict theory.  Their description of not just the sources of conflict, but 
their discussion of components, strategies, conditions, and stages of conflict resonate 
with the nature of the conflicts observed in the Columbia Basin.    
The literature on structuration, culture, and conflict is summarized in Table B-
1.  This literature offers a theoretical frame for explaining “what” happens as social 
organizations are formed, sustained and modified over time.  The theories discussed 
also partially explain “why” such changes occur in terms of individual autonomy, 
structure (to include culture), agency, and the role of conflict in those changes.   
But these concepts alone are not sufficient to explain the circumstances 
regarding Columbia Basin governance in general or the CRBF in particular.  They do 
not, for example, explain why some individuals become accepted as agents of change 
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Table B-1. 
Theories of Structuration, Social Becoming, Organizational Culture, and  
Intergroup Conflict 
 
Representative Literature 
 
Category 
Year 
Author(s) / 
Editor(s) 
Title: Relevance 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 o
f 
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 S
o
ci
al
 B
ec
o
m
in
g
 
1976 Giddens 
New Rules of Sociological Method:  Critiques the manner in 
which 19
th
 century social theory has been incorporated into 
20
th
 century thinking.  Introduces structuration theory to 
address the problematic manner in which social systems and 
structure and individual agency are addressed in prevailing 
theoretical thinking.  Offers eleven “rules” to guide future 
sociological theorizing and research. 
1979 Giddens 
Central Problems in Social Theory:  Continues author‟s 
critique of the application of 19
th
 century theory to 20
th
 
century situations.  Offers a more rigorous critique of 
prevailing thinking and further refines his theory of 
structuration.   
1984 Giddens 
The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration:  The author‟s most complete and mature 
argument for structuration theory.  The essence of the theory 
is that social structures are products of the irreducible duality 
of collective constraint and individual action.  Social 
structures are created by human agents while simultaneously 
constraining their actions.  Structure is thus both the product 
and medium of social change.  Agents do not create social 
systems, but remake that which is already made.  This 
interplay between the individual and collective is constant and 
continuous.   
1991 Sztompka 
Society in Action: The Theory of Social Becoming:  The 
author reaches similar conclusions to those of Giddens and, 
like Giddens, seeks the middle ground between collective 
determinism and unbridled voluntarism.  He presents his work 
as a “synthesis of syntheses” emphasizing agency, history, 
and praxis.  Offers a “triple insight” of social becoming: (1) 
society is humanly constructed, (2) humans are socially 
shaped and (3) society and humans are both immersed in the 
flow of time.   
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
C
u
lt
u
re
 
2004 Schein 
Organizational culture and leadership (3
rd
 ed.)  Defines 
organizational culture as a pattern of basic assumptions that 
was learned by the group over time and is taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel.  
Culture‟s power lies in its psychological effect on group 
members, defining what to pay attention to, what things mean, 
how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what 
actions to take in various situations.  
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Table B-1.  (Continued) 
Theories of Structuration, Social Becoming, Organizational Culture, and  
Intergroup Conflict   
 
Representative Literature 
 
Category 
Year 
Author(s) / 
Editor(s) 
Title: Relevance 
S
o
ci
al
 C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
2001 
Ashmore, 
Jussim, and  
Wilder 
Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution.  
Interdisciplinary collection of essays on social conflict, 
centering on the role of identity.  Argues that identity 
contributes to conflict just as conflict influences future 
identity.  States applicability to all levels of conflict, while 
focusing on case studies of ethnic, racial, religious, and 
nationality based conflict.    
2004 
Eagly, 
Baron, and 
Hamilton 
The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict.  
A collection of case studies from the field of social 
psychology focusing on intra- and international scaled 
conflict.    
2004 
Pruitt and 
Kim  
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (3
rd
 
edition).  The authors integrate and synthesize several 
interrelated theoretical domains from the social psychology 
field.  These include theories on conflict, strategic choice, 
inter-group competition, conflict group mobilization and 
social identity.  Fundamental among these is social identity 
theory and its application to organizations through 
organizational identity theory.   
 
and others do not, nor explain differences in the degree of passion and commitment 
that exist among individual organizational members.  Finally, neither theory attempts 
to explain “how” individuals reach decisions as to whether to support or rebel, to 
follow or lead.  Filling out the answers to questions of “why” and “how” is the basis 
for the following discussions of social identity decision theory.   
 
Theories of Social and Organizational Identity 
Although noting its importance, Giddens only mentioned identity twice in 
Constitution, and then only briefly.  He recognizes “the prevalence, among the 
members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of common identity 
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however that might be expressed or revealed.  Such feelings may be manifest in both 
practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a ‘value consensus.‟ 
Individuals may be aware of belonging to a definite collectivity without agreeing that 
it is necessarily right and proper”(Giddens, 1984, p. 165, emphasis added.)  In this 
argument, identity serves as a “marker” in the “time-space of structure” (p. 282). 
Sztompka (1991) does not discuss identity directly, but argues that the human 
traits of creativeness, educability, the need for self-realization and self-fulfillment, and 
the tendency of individuals to put their talents and abilities to use are the cornerstones 
of agency.  But, as will be shown, these traits are shaped by how individual members 
of society see themselves as individuals and relate to those around them. 
Seminal theoretical treatments on identity. 
Sociologist Charles H. Cooley‟s defined the self in social terms (Hatch and 
Schultz, 2004b).  Writing in 1902, Cooley‟s Human Nature and the Social Order 
sought to reconcile arguments within psychology over what constituted society.  He 
proposed a concept of “organic synthesis” which envisioned that “society” and 
“individuals” are not separable phenomena, but are collective and distributive aspects 
of the same thing.  In Cooley‟s view, individuality and sociality always existed in the 
human experience side by side – a precursor to Giddens and Sztompka‟s duality of the 
social structure.  Cooley argued that the individual‟s very concept of self is made 
within the context of his or her relationship with others.  
In 1934 George H. Mead furthered the concept of the individual‟s relationship 
to the social structure.  He defined two aspects of self as the “I” and the “me.”  The “I” 
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represents thought, behavior, and feelings unique and internal to the individual.  The 
“me” is derived from the assumptions about the attitudes of others, echoing Cooley‟s 
concept of the “looking glass self.”  The incorporation of the attitudes of others into 
“me” is the mechanism through which society influences and becomes part of the 
individual, whereas unique and innovative responses generated by the “I” are the 
mechanism through which the individual shapes society (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b; 
Mead, 2004).   
Irving Goffman expanded the understanding of the psychological interaction 
between the individual and society by reasoning that, since the perception of societal 
judgment greatly influences over the individual; it follows that the individual will 
actively present him/herself in the most positive light to others in society.
167
  Using the 
analogy of the interaction of the performance of theatrical actors with their audience, 
Goffman suggested that identity is an interactive performance with the “actors” ability 
to manage perception a function of interpersonal skill.  In contrast to Cooley and 
Mead, Goffman argued that identity is communicated by the individual to others 
through impression management, as opposed to being formed through the opinions of 
others (Goffman, 2004; Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).  The relevance of this insight to 
organizations is the role that external stakeholders can play in shaping organizational 
identity, a hypothesis later supported with empirical research by Dutton and Dukerich 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).    
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 Note that Giddens cites and critiques Goffman in Constitution.  He states that Goffman‟s writings 
“comprise a major contribution to an exploration of the relations between the discursive and practical 
consciousness in the contexts of encounters” (p. 70).   
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Henri Tajfel and John Turner published The Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations in 1979 in which they were the first to propose a theory of social identity 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).  They reviewed and conducted empirical research that 
focused on in-group and out-group identification, competitive ethnocentrism, and 
negative stereotyping among social groups.  They observed behaviors that could not 
be explained by the then-dominant notion that phenomena of group morale, 
cohesiveness, and cooperation were strictly byproducts of intergroup competition over 
interests.  They concluded that identification with an in-group could operate 
independently of competition and that, even without competition, “the mere 
perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorization per se - is 
sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group” (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2004, p. 56).  “Social categorization” forms the basis for group definition 
where individuals define themselves and are defined by others as a group.  Individuals 
in a group “perceive themselves to be members of same social category, share 
emotional involvement in the common definition of themselves, and achieve a degree 
of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership in it” 
(Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 59).  Social identity consists “of those aspects of an 
individual‟s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives 
himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 59).  Thus, social categorizations 
provide a system of self-reference that clarifies the individual‟s place in society.   
These categorizations are comparative and consist of three variables.  First, the 
individual must have internalized group membership as some aspect of their self 
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concept.  Second, the social situation must allow for comparisons to be made between 
the individual‟s and other groups.  Third, groups do not necessarily compare 
themselves with every available out-group; to merit comparison other groups must in 
some manner relevantly intersect with the interests of the in-group along a dimension 
of shared values.  Supportive of Pruitt and Kim‟s (2001) synthesis of social conflict 
theory is the distinction made between social and instrumental (or realistic) 
competition.  Social competition
168
 is grounded in the group‟s sense of identity and is 
based on social comparison.  As such, it needs only those comparisons to evolve.  
Instrumental or realistic competition is based on self-interest, incompatible group 
goals, and/or struggle over scarce resources (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Hatch and 
Schultz, 2004b). 
Independent of the foregoing work in the psychology and social psychology 
fields was Stuart Albert and David Whetten‟s Organization Identity published in 1985.   
Through this work Albert and Whetten are recognized as inaugurating organizational 
identity as a field of study in the United States.  The importance of this paper is 
manifest by the number of scholars in the field who either reference Albert and 
Whetten‟s criteria for organizational identity without comment or make their mark by 
challenging them all or in part (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).    
Without reference to the rather substantial body of social identity literature 
existing in the social psychology field at the time they wrote – and working within the 
field of organizational psychology - Albert and Whetten (1985) claimed that identity 
had historically been treated as a “loosely coupled set of ideas and concepts” better 
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 Pruitt and Kim prefer to skip the “social competition” term, applying “social identity” in its place.   
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considered a “framework” as opposed to a theory.  They sought to build on the historic 
literature and define “organizational theory” in a way that passes a rigorous test of 
theory and that opens clear avenues of empirical research.  The authors presented a 
sequence of researchable questions and hypotheses throughout paper to facilitate the 
building of a research agenda.   
They argued that to truly be part of an organization‟s identity, any claimed 
feature must satisfy three criteria.  The feature must be seen as the essence of the 
organization, “the criterion of claimed central character”; the feature must distinguish 
the organization from others against which it may be compared, “the criterion of 
claimed distinctiveness”; and the feature must exhibit some degree of sameness or 
continuity over time; “the criterion of claimed temporal continuity” (p. 265).  Despite 
the enduring quality of certain aspects, organization identity can evolve over time in 
reaction to such things as loss of an identity-sustaining element or individual or 
changes to the organization‟s collective status.   
While acknowledging the psychological aspects of individual interpretation of 
organizational identity, Albert and Whetten (1985) did not really explain how or why 
that process takes place.  Ashforth and Mael (1989) addressed that issue by examining 
Albert and Whetten‟s organization identity theory in terms of Tajfel and Turner‟s 
(1979) theory of social identity (which they dubbed with the acronym SIT).  They 
noted SIT‟s social-psychological perspective as to how and why people perceive, join 
and remain in social groupings.  Under SIT, people classify themselves and others into 
social categories (such as gender, age, race, religion, organization membership, etc.).  
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Such categorizations allow individuals to locate themselves in the environment 
through relational and comparative definition with others resulting in a perception of 
oneness with a group of like-minded people.  Thus, individuals will seek to join one or 
more social groups in which their perception of the group‟s values, prestige, and 
behaviors enhance or reinforce the self-image individuals have or would like to have 
for themselves.  SIT, therefore, defines the relationships among the members of an 
organization in terms of psychological connectivity as opposed to a mere extension of 
personal or economic interactions.  This connectivity also creates a distinct 
interpretive lens through which organizations perceive their external environment.  
The stronger the alignment between the individual‟s self image and the organizations 
perceived identity patterns, the greater the degree of identification.  Conversely, a 
weakening of this alignment either through changes in the individual‟s self image or 
changes to the organization will weaken the sense of identification and may result in 
the individual leaving the group altogether.   
Taken together, these six theoretical works offer a powerful explanation as to 
how individuals and social groupings in general (and organizations in particular) 
interrelate and respond to other social groupings in their external environment.  By 
linking individual self-image (who am I?) to social and organization identity (who are 
we?) the authors collectively offer a social-psychological construct through which 
organizational behavior in general and interorganizational conflict in particular can be 
interpreted and better understood.  Thus, either internal changes or the presence of out-
groups that are perceived to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about the central, 
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distinctive, and enduring attributes that members most admire in their organizations 
will generate anxiety and perhaps hostility.  In conflict situations, strong identity with 
group goals and values reinforce belief in the “rightness” of the group‟s beliefs, 
exacerbates points of disagreement, and causes trivial differences to take on an 
importance beyond what the merits would otherwise indicate.    
Empirical research on organizational identity theory. 
Unlike Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) theoretical work, which 
apparently inspired little or no empirical study, Albert and Whetten‟s (1985) theory 
spawned a significant body of empirical research.  These included a seven-year study 
of the New York/New Jersey Port Authority‟s response to homeless transients 
occupying Authority facilities (Dutton and Dukerich,1991); a study of strategic change 
management at universities (Gioia and Thomas, 1996); a study of responses to the 
1992 Business Week rankings of business schools (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); a 
study of the management of competing identities within a non-profit firm (Golden-
Biddle and Rao, 1997); and a seven-year study of two banks holding differing 
strategic orientations and how those orientations affected the organizational response 
to external conditions (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998).    
These five empirical studies both enhanced and challenged various aspects of 
Albert and Whetten‟s (1985) and Ashforth and Mael‟s (1989) original theories.   
Dutton and Dukerich (1991) noted the degree to which perceived organization 
identity affected issue interpretation and action.  Goia and Thomas (1996) found that, 
under conditions of strategic change, top management perceptions and communication 
 491 
of image and identity – especially the desired future identity – are essential to the 
sense making process for subordinate members and serve as an important link between 
organizational context and member issue interpretation.  Strategic change implies a 
revision of interpretive schemes by management, members, and stakeholders.  
Consequently, significant change must be accompanied by alterations in the overall 
perception of organization identity.  Contrary to Albert and Whetten‟s (1985) 
conclusion that identity changes were reactive and incidental, Gioia and Thomas 
found that such change can be deliberately managed and may take place in shorter 
time periods than originally theory envisioned.      
Elsbach and Kramer (1996) found that, in the absence of a generally accepted 
objective measure of what attributes are considered truly important in business 
education, individual business schools evolved unique identities and programs.  By 
ranking the schools in a national magazine, Business Week implied that such an 
objective standard did in fact exist.  The rankings therefore presented threats to 
organization identity by challenging that which was perceived to be “distinct and 
central” (Albert and Whetten, 1985)169 to each school.  The authors found that 
individual members used categorization tactics to reinterpret the findings in ways that 
affirmed positive perceptions of their school‟s identity.170  Thus rather than distancing 
                                                 
169
 The researchers made a point of noting that the rankings did not threaten the physical survival or 
even the schools‟ well being.  All except one remained among the top-20 in national rankings.  What 
caused the consternation was the relative shifting within the top-20, or the fact that a school did not do 
as well as they thought they should have.  Thus, the threat was more to each school‟s identity, not 
legitimacy. 
 
170
 Members would emphasize their school‟s membership in elite social groups not addressed in the 
rankings, affirm cherished organizational attributes and identities neglected by the rankings but valued 
in the business community and select alternate groups of comparison to favorably relate to other schools 
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themselves from the organization – as would be predicted under Albert and Whetten‟s 
(1985) construct -  members distanced themselves from the negative attributes of the 
rating and emphasized other, unchallenged attributes thereby affirming the intrinsic 
good of the organization.  In effect, members elected to selectively categorize their 
organization rather than categorize themselves in a different way.  This finding 
strongly supported Ashforth and Mael‟s (1989) connection between individual and 
organization identity, reinforcing a similar finding by Dutton and Dukerich (1991).    
Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) studied an organization possessed of dual but 
contradictory identities at both the member and board of director levels that all 
considered “central and enduring” (Albert and Whetten, 1985).  Members perceived 
themselves both as a volunteer driven organization and a family of friends.  The board 
of directors perceived themselves as vigilant monitors of organization resources as 
well as friendly, supportive colleagues.  Consequently, some members and directors 
viewed the strict review of budgets by other directors intrusive and over-bearing.  An 
influential sub-set of directors resolved the conflict by reinforcing the conflicting 
values at play (accountability and stewardship versus collegiality) to the satisfaction of 
all.  The researchers concluded that the resolution of such conflicts consistent with 
identity is more important to organization stability than objective merits of given 
budget proposals.      
                                                                                                                                            
higher in the rankings.  For example, members responded with statements such as “many of our 
students turned down Harvard to come here,” “we are the best among public institutions” and “we are a 
top regional school „like‟ Michigan.” 
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Finally, Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt (1998) found that organizations‟ 
strategic orientations act as interpretive filters resulting in different responses to the 
same strategic environmental pressure.  Their study also reinforced the importance of 
leadership in managing identity to ensure changes sustain over time.   
Integrative treatments. 
In subsequent years, the findings and conclusions of these empirical studies, 
along with studies from other fields, were theoretically revisited, integrated, and 
synthesized.  In 1994 Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail presented a model and a revised 
typology to help explain how images of one‟s organization shape the strength of the 
individual‟s personal identification with the organization.  Elegantly melding the 
theories of Albert and Whetten (1985) and Ashforth and Mael (1989) and building on 
the work of Dutton and Dukerich (1991), they define organizational identification as 
“the degree to which a member defines him or her self [sic] by the same attributes that 
he or she believe define the organization” (p. 239).  Borrowing from Albert and 
Whetten (1985), they labeled the set of beliefs that members collectively share to be 
distinct, central and enduring about the organization as “collective identity.”  
Supportive of Ashforth and Mael (1989), individuals assess their organizations to 
determine if the organization will provide a supportive environment and offer 
opportunities for self-expression.  The closer one identifies oneself with the 
organization, the more personally threatening a negative image (or reinforcing a 
positive image) can be.   
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About ten years after publication of Organization Identity (1985), David 
Whetten organized the first of what became a series of three conferences with scholars 
who were active in identity research and development.  The participants met to reflect 
on what had been learned and to determine if in fact organizational identity warranted 
a true place as theory.  The results of those conferences – both individual papers and 
transcripts of participant conversations – were collected and published in Identity in 
Organizations: Building Theory through Conversations (1998), edited by David 
Whetten and Paul Godfrey.  The book is a statement-in-time on the status of 
organization identity theory at the point it was published, and does not really present a 
coherent, consensus view beyond Albert and Whetten‟s three original criteria and the 
recognition of social identity processes within organizations.   
Although Identity in Organizations did not come to closure on a number of 
questions, it did offer an important advancement.  This book appears to be the first to 
look at the relationship of organization identity to organizational culture.  Writing 
from the perspective of achieving organizational change, and referencing Schein‟s 
1985 book Organizational Culture and Leadership, several conference participants 
suggest that the difference between the two is one of perspective.  Identity is defined 
within a social – or cultural – context.  Thus identity answers the question of „who are 
we‟ in relation to larger contexts of meaning and culture.  Noting the subjectivity of 
the work in culture, the difficulty of getting to values and normative beliefs that are 
often unconscious to those who hold them, and the body of writing describing how 
difficult changing organizational culture can be, Fiol, Hatch, and Golden-Biddle 
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(1998) propose that identity may offer managers a more malleable way to manage 
organizational change as opposed to challenging culture directly.   
Essays in the January 2000 issue of The Academy of Management Review 
were dedicated exclusively to the topic of organization identity.  Brown and Starkey 
(2000) argued that individuals and organizations are motivated to maintain self-esteem 
by preserving existing senses of identity.  They assert that organizations fail to learn 
because of ego defenses that maintain the sense of collective self-esteem.  Scott and 
Lane (2000) discuss the degree to which relationships among organizational 
stakeholders (which include external interests as well as internal organization 
employees and managers) can shape image and identity.  They argued that managing 
stakeholder relations is a key task of leadership given the profound effect perceptions 
of the organization by outsiders can have on the workforce.  Pratt and Foreman (2000) 
examined the phenomenon, challenge and benefits of managing multiple organization 
identities.  The major benefit is the capacity to respond to a wider range of conditions 
than single identity organizations, thus increasing the probability of survival in 
complex environments.  Conversely, multiple identities can lead to internal conflict 
and ambivalence among members unable to reconcile contradictory images of what 
the organization is about.   Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000a) followed up on the 
conclusions of Gioia and Thomas (1996) and directly challenged Albert and Whetten‟s 
(1985) argument concerning the enduring aspect of identity.  They argued that the 
accepted definition of organization identity is too static to apply to the pace of change 
in contemporary organizations, and does not hold up when studied over time.  In a 
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companion article, Gioia et al., (2000b) question if the metaphor of individual identity 
is really applicable to organization identity.  They suggest there are important 
differences between the individual and organizational character.  Individual identity is 
extremely personal and resistant to change.  Organization identity is by its nature more 
removed, varied, and malleable as it is constructed by fluid internal and external 
interactions.  Thus, emphasizing psychological metaphors may be blinding researchers 
from other avenues of study that allow organization identity to be better dealt with on 
its own terms. 
In the Academy of Management Review‟s (2000) closing article, three of the 
earliest theorists and researchers offer their conclusions as to what it all means (Albert, 
Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000).  They maintain that identity and identification are root 
constructs in organizational phenomena and a subtext of many organizational 
behaviors.  In order to effectively interact with their environment, organizations need 
an answer to the question “who are we,” just as outside entities need an answer to the 
question “who are they.”  Thus, the authors maintain the central and distinct aspects of 
organization identity first hypothesized by Albert and Whetten (1985) and the social 
identity theory offered by Ashforth and Mael (1989).  But they seem to accept the 
critique that identity may be less permanent than originally thought.   
A comprehensive integration of social and organizational identity theories is 
presented in the 2001 book Social Identity Processes in Organizational Contexts edited 
by Hogg and Terry.  Hogg and Terry and their contributors affirm many of the 
findings identified above; as such, their work won‟t be repeated here.  Of greater 
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relevance to this study is their clear framing of organizational identity as a specialized 
case of social identity.  They state that “organizational contexts provide a near-perfect 
arena for the operation of social identity processes” (p. 1), and that for “many people 
their professional and/or organizational identity may be more pervasive and important 
than ascribed identities based on gender, age, ethnicity, race, or nationality” (p. 2).   
Noting that “the basic idea of social identity is that a social category (e.g. nationality, 
political affiliation, organization, work group) within which one falls, and to which 
one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining 
characteristics of the category” (p. 3, (emphasis added).   
Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz edited and published Organizational 
Identity: a Reader in 2004 to address the issues of scholars and practitioners looking to 
identity theory for insights on corporate branding, recruiting, strategy, fostering 
employee loyalty, and other purposes (Hatch and Schultz, 2004a).  The book offers 
excerpts from a collection of the original sociological and social psychological papers 
that underlay the current state of theory and more recent papers.  Of particular value 
are the editors‟ contextual introductions to the book as a whole and to each of its three 
parts.   
Identity and Conflict 
The literature reviewed for this section further illustrates the contributions of 
identity to intergroup conflict (Giddens, 1984; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  The manner in 
which organizations respond to threats or thwarted aspirations (Pruitt and Kim, 2004) 
depends on a number of identity-related factors.  Organization type (Albert and 
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Whetten, 1985); organization orientation and the nature of the change being faced 
(Fox-Wolfgramm et.al., 1998); the degree of threat perceived (Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); the perceived gap between current identity and 
desired future identity (Gustafson and Reger, 1995); the number of identities within 
the organization that are affected (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Pratt and Foreman, 
2000); proactive leadership (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gustafson and Reger, 1995; 
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; 
Pratt and Foreman, 2000); perceptions of stakeholders (Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and 
Lane, 2000); and the degree to which an organization is preconditioned to respond to 
change (Brown and Starkey, 2000) can restrict or facilitate selection and 
implementation of response actions.  Members‟ sense of identity (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994), the organization‟s strategic orientation (Fox-
Wolfgramm et al., 1998), and management perceptions (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 
1998), all serve as powerful filters for interpreting what is going on and what is to be 
done about it.  These influences will initially cause culturally familiar routines to be 
activated in the face of perceived threats while constraining the degree to which other 
actions are considered acceptable (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).  The organizational 
response of interest to this study is the determination to accept and support or reject 
and challenge any given Basin governance system, whether in place or proposed. 
What emerges from this set of writings (summarized in Table B-2) is a general 
endorsement of organization identity as a legitimate theory within the more 
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generalized framework of social identity theory.  Although some question what is 
really meant by the enduring aspect of identity (Gioia et al. 2000a and 2000b; Albert, 
Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000), and although perspectives of identity other than 
cognitive psychology may deserve exploration (Gioia et al., 2000b), the concept of 
identity as that which is central and distinctive and the relationship between individual 
and organization identity is seemingly well supported and accepted.   
Thus, understanding the role identity plays in organizational behavior is 
essential to understanding any given social conflict.  It is also essential to understand 
the role identity plays in individual decision making.  By recognizing that identity 
serves as a major interpretive lens through which organization members perceive their 
place in the environment and understanding the psychological mechanisms through 
which individuals process their identity in reaching decisions, greater understanding 
can be reached regarding the positions taken in public policy discussion and debate.   
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Theories of Social and Organizational Identity   
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 1902 Cooley 
Society and the Individual: Integrated individual and 
social levels of analysis. 
1934 Mead 
Mind, Self, and Society: Distinguishes between the 
“I” and “me” in social settings.  
1959 Goffman  
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life: Introduces 
role of audiences in the context of identity and self-
presentation. 
1979 
Tajfel and 
Turner 
An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict:  
Introduced social identity theory into social 
psychology 
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1985 
Albert and 
Whetten 
Organizational Identity: Introduced organizational 
identity; produced parallel to developing literature on 
social identity. 
1989 
Ashforth and 
Mael 
Social Identity Theory and the Organization: 
Introduces social identity theory to organizational 
studies.  
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1991 
Dutton and 
Dukerich 
Keeping an Eye on the Mirror: Image and Identity in 
Organizations: Links organizational theory and image 
to strategic choices made in organizational settings. 
1996 
Gioia and 
Thomas 
Identity, Image, and Issue Interpretation: 
Sensemaking during Strategic Change in Academe: 
Concluded that identity is more malleable than first 
thought; introduced identity and image management 
as key leader tasks in times of change. 
1996 
Elsbach and 
Kramer 
Members‟ Responses to Organizational Identity 
Threats: Encountering and Countering the Business 
Week Rankings: Examined how org. members 
respond to threats to identity. 
1997 
Golden-Biddle 
and Rao 
Breaches in the Boardroom: Organizational Identity 
and Conflicts of Commitment in a Nonprofit 
Organization:  Linked individual and organizational 
identity with corporate governance. 
1998 
Fox-
Wolfgramm, 
Boal, and Hunt 
Organizational Adaptation to Institutional Change: A 
Comparative Study of First Order Change in 
Prospector and Defender Banks: Strategic orientation 
impacts response to and duration of imposed 
organizational change.  
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 1994 
Dutton, 
Dukerich, and 
Harquail 
Organizational Images and Member Identification:  
Explains how images of one‟s organization shape the 
strength of personal identification with the 
organization. 
1998 
Whetten and 
Godfrey 
Identity in Organizations: Building Theory through 
Conversations: Collection of papers, reflections, and 
transcripts of discussions between org. identity 
theorists and researchers.   
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2000 - 
Academy of Management Review: January issue 
dedicated to reflection on empirical organizational 
identity research. 
2001 
Hogg and 
Terry 
Social Identity Processes in Organizational Contexts: 
Frames organizational identity as specialized case of 
social identity; promotes application of social identity 
in organizational analysis.   
2004 
Hatch and 
Schultz 
Organizational Identity: A Reader:  Presents 
anthology of central papers on the development of 
organizational identity theory. 
 
 
Theories of Individual Decision Making 
Although the philosophic nature of decision making has been studied for over 
300 years (Connolly and Beach, 1998) its rigorous systematic examination actually 
began in the 1940s (Beach and Mitchell, 1998).  Early attempts (termed as 
“traditional” or “classical” decision theory) explained decision processes in terms of 
either statistically-based analyses of probable outcomes or microeconomics-based 
models of maximum utility.  These traditional models, however, did not stand up to 
empirical scrutiny as to how decisions were observed to actually be made (Mitchell, 
Rediker, and Beach, 1986; Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach, 1990; Beach and 
Mitchell, 1998).   
In response rose alternative schools of thought.  Generally termed “naturalistic 
decision theory” (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 4), they included approaches based on 
decisions based on pattern recognition from previous experiences and decisions as 
incremental learning processes (Connolly and Beach, 1998).  Leroy Beach, Terry 
Mitchell, and a group of their colleagues and students viewed these approaches, along 
with the traditional models, as not so much wrong as incomplete.  In response, they 
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developed “image theory” as a more holistic theory that incorporates the essential 
elements of each of the others and, based on their research and observations, better 
explains how decisions are actually made (Connolly and Beach, 1998).  Image theory 
sees decisions not as mechanistic calculations of optimum outcomes, but rather 
“guided by the beliefs and values” of the decision maker as held to be relevant to the 
decision at hand.  The analytical assessment of most desired outcome called for under 
traditional theory does not take place until after available options have been screened 
for compatibility with those beliefs and values (Beach, 1998, p. x). 
This section reviews the formulation of image theory, supporting empirical 
research, the current state of the theory, and discusses its applicability to this study of 
Columbia Basin governance.  In essence, image theory provides the theoretical “how” 
of individuals translating personal values and beliefs into policy choices within an 
organizational context.  It also provides empirical methodologies that can be used to 
empirically examine theoretical components of structuration.   
 
 
The Formulation of Image Theory: 
“Image Theory” was developed in the mid-1980s in response to observed 
weaknesses in traditional decision theory and extant critiques of the traditional 
approach (Connolly and Beach, 1998).  It was first presented as a chapter by Mitchell, 
Rediker, and Beach in Sims and Gioia‟s The Thinking Organization (1986) and as a 
journal article by Beach and Mitchell in Acta Psychologica (1987).  The theory was 
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first given book treatment in Beach‟s 1990 Image Theory: Decision Making in 
Personal and Organizational Contexts.   
Image theory is presented as a descriptive theory that attempts to explain the 
way in which individuals makers represent information to themselves as they make 
decisions and interact with the world around them.  Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach 
(1986) and Beach and Mitchell (1987) presented a relational model that defined the 
process by which an individual defines his/her current state and plots a course to 
achieve an anticipated future state through the use of internal mental images.  These 
images were defined as “schemata” that embody the individual‟s guiding principles, 
goals, and values.  The constitutive elements of such images evolve early in life.  
These early constructs have a life-long, disproportionate impact on how individuals 
view and react to the world.  Although long lasting, these early-formed images can be 
shaped through membership in organizations and institutions as individuals assimilate 
organizational values and norms into some portion of their own self-image.  
Decisions, in the authors‟ context, are defined as those of more than routine 
importance.  They contend that their theory accounts for both decisions that an 
individual makes in a rational, deliberative manner (i.e. traditional decision theory) 
and those made in a more intuitive manner that is bounded and shaped by internalized 
values and principles. 
Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach (1986) and Beach and Mitchell (1987) initially 
defined the following as the key elements of image theory: 
 504 
 Self Image:  Represents personal beliefs, values, ethics, and morals that one 
intuitively accepts as true.  Self-image is constituted of principles, which guide 
an individual‟s acceptance or rejection of a goal or course of action. 
 Trajectory Image: Represents an individual‟s agenda for the future.  It is 
constituted through goals, which may be either concrete and specific events or 
a more abstract desired end-state.  
 Action Image:  Consists of the plan and tactics envisioned to attain the goals of 
the trajectory image.   
 Projected Image: The projected image consists of events anticipated if the 
action image (plan) is adopted.  Its principle value is that it allows analysis of 
alternate plans and assessment of plans currently underway.   
The four-image construct was revised by 1990.  The “projection” and “action” 
images were combined into a new “strategic” image, and the “self” image was 
modified as a “values” image171 (Beach, 1990).  This three-image theoretical 
construct, although refined over time, remained intact over the subsequent fifteen 
years of empirical research (Beach, 1996 and 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005). 
Critiques of Image Theory: 
Image theory was not well received when first proposed; Beach (1998) notes 
the difficulty he and his colleagues initially had in getting the theory published in the 
                                                 
171
 According to Beach (1990), this revision came about in preparation for a presentation to a lay 
audience for which the presenter combined the “projection” and “action” images into one for purposes 
of simplification.  This in turn caused the authors to reexamine the usefulness of the original constructs 
theoretical usefulness.  Upon reflection, they determined that the components of the projected and 
action images were so interrelated as to be better consolidated into just one.  The author does not 
explain the shift in terminology from the “self” to the “value” image, leaving the language explaining 
the two as essentially the same. 
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United States.  Although published in Sims and Gioia‟s 1986 The Thinking 
Organization, it is worth noting that the book‟s editors were specifically seeking 
innovative, avant-garde approaches to understanding organizational social cognition 
(Sims and Gioia, 1986, introduction).  The books editors encouraged contributors to 
not be bound by traditional or conservative conventions.  Beach and his colleagues 
apparently found little traction in their own right.  Beach and Mitchell (1987) thus 
turned to the Dutch journal Acta Psychologica.  Beach‟s 1990 Image Theory: Decision 
Making in Personal and Organizational Contexts was published in England by Wiley 
as the first in an envisioned series on industrial and organizational psychology.
172
     
One critic of Beach‟s 1990 book described it as “intellectually heuristic” (by 
which the critic meant the theory being useful for research but may be incapable of 
proof).  He further claimed it unconvincing in how it described the manner in which 
decisions are in fact made, that it ignored relevant literature on the same topic, and that 
Beach misrepresented the three studies he used in support (Agor, 1992).  Another 
concluded that the key components of the theory are only partially worked out and that 
a non-associate of the author would have a hard time adopting the books precepts in 
isolation (Boothroyd, 1991).  Both Agor (1992) and Boothroyd (1991) are especially 
critical of the book‟s editing and inconsistent use of terms, making it hard to 
understand.  Both also, however, note the book‟s potential. 
These problems for the most part appear to have been overcome with time; no 
similar critiques of any kind were found for Beach‟s subsequent publications.  
                                                 
172
 Apparently, the envisioned series did not work out as hoped; it is not mentioned on the Wiley 
website whereas other thematic series are.  
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Meanwhile, each succeeding publication (Beach 1996, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 
2005) incorporated the conclusions of empirical study and became clearer in 
presentation.  Miner‟s (2005, 2006) survey of the opinions of organizational 
behavioral theorists cites image theory as an “essential” theory of organizational 
behavior and observes that its major weakness is that it is relatively unknown outside 
of Beach‟s circle of colleagues and students.   
Empirical Support: 
 Beach‟s 1996 and 1998 books both summarize the results of research 
conducted and offered proposals for additional study.  The 1996 book focuses on 
research in specific settings.  Examples include studies in job search and selection by 
Stevens and Beach (Beach, 1996); supervision and job satisfaction by Bissell and 
Beach (Beach, 1996); and audit decisions by Beach and Frederickson (Beach, 1996).  
The 1998 book focuses on research into the compatibility and profitability tests.  
Examples include the effect of screening in assessing decision options by Zee, 
Paluchowski, and Beach (Beach, 1998); the role of imperfect information in pre-
choice screening by Potter and Beach (Beach, 1998; and problem solving strategies by 
Christensen-Szalanski (Beach, 1998).  Both books use the results of the empirical 
research presented to reflect upon and refine the theory, such as Weatherly and 
Beach‟s (1998) empirical study of organizational culture.  They used image theory as 
a framework to examine the impact of culture on organizational decision making, 
holding that the role of an organization‟s culture, goals, and plans on organizational 
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decision making is analogous to the role of individual principles, goals, and plans in 
individual decision making.   
 In his review of organizational theories, Miner (2005, 2006) observes that – 
despite its empirical validity - image theory is not well known outside of Beach and 
Mitchell‟s circle of colleagues and students.  That may be changing: Ruby Brougham 
and David Walsh (2007) used image theory to study retirement decisions, comparing 
image theory‟s predictive power with a decision model based on goal facilitation and 
another based on cost/benefit analysis.  They found that goal compatibility (image 
theory„s “compatibility” test) held more predictive power than the goal facilitation 
model and equaled the cost/benefit model.   
 Beach and Connolly (2005) summarized the state of image theory based on 
empirical research to date and placed its development within an historical context of 
decision theory development.  The key elements of image theory as presented in the 
2005 book and therefore used for the purposes of this study are: 
 Image theory is centered on three elements:   
o The value image is constituted on individual principles, which serve as 
self-evident truths that dictate how things should be and how people 
ought to behave.  Principles underscore what the individual and group 
stand for and form the foundation for decision making. 
o The trajectory image provides the goals the individual has selected for 
the future. 
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o The strategic image consists of the plans, tactics, and forecasts selected 
to achieve one‟s goals.  Plans are implemented through tactics and 
compared over time against forecasts to judge progress.   
o Individuals tend to stay in organizations where the values of the 
individual and organization are congruent, reinforcing the findings of 
social identity research (Tajfel and Turner, 1970; Ashforth and Mael, 
1989). 
The decision theory literature reviewed above is summarized in Table B-3.  In 
essence, image theory sees decisions as based on the beliefs and values of the decision 
maker as considered relevant to the issues at hand and often made on an intuitive 
rather than objectively analytical basis (Beach and Mitchell, 1987; Beach 1990, 1996, 
and 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).  Image theory does not dismiss the analytical 
process of traditional decision theory, but rather relegates its use to those situations 
where two or more decision alternatives have passed the process of value screening.   
Beach and his colleagues‟ work provide additional insight to both structuration and 
identity theory.   
Table B-3 
Image Theory  
 
Representative Literature 
Category Year 
Author(s) 
/ 
Editor(s) 
Title: Relevance 
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1986 
Mitchell, 
Rediker, 
and Beach 
Image Theory and Organizational Decision Making:  Published 
as a chapter in The Thinking Organization (1986) apparently 
based on the same manuscript used for the 1987 Acta 
Psychologica article.  Critiques traditional decision theories based 
on statistical gaming and economic models. Introduces image 
theory as more comprehensive alternative, consisting of four 
components (self image (principles), trajectory image (plans and 
goals), projected image (ordering of events), and action image 
(tactics).   
 
1987 
Beach and 
Mitchell 
Image Theory: Principles, Goals, and Plans in Decision Making:  
Authors present a descriptive theory to explain the way in which 
people make individual decisions as they interact with the world 
around them.  They suggest a decision-making process in which 
an individual assesses their current state and then plots a course 
to achieve a desired future state.  This theory contends with 
decisions made in a rational, deliberative manner as well as those 
made automatically.  Consists of essentially the same content as 
the 1986 chapter in The Thinking Organization. 
 
1990 Beach 
Image Theory: Decision Making in Personal and Organizational 
Contexts.  First book-length treatment.  Consolidates the four-
image constructed presented in previous articles to three: the 
values image (principles), trajectory image (goals), and strategic 
image (plans and tactics).  Continues critique that economic and 
statistics-based decision models are too mechanistic and not 
reflective of how decisions are observed to be made.   
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1996 Beach 
Decision Making in the Workplace:  Presents collection of essays 
that presents results of empirical research of image theory and its 
application in the work place.   
 
1998 Beach 
Image Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations:  Presents 
additional empirical results and theoretical extensions.  Notes 
strong empirical support for theoretical components of 
compatibility testing, profitability testing, progress decisions, and 
strategy selection.  Notes lack of support or research on the 
concept of “images.” 
 
2007 
Brougham 
and 
Walsh 
Image Theory, Goal Compatibility, and Retirement Intent.  
Empirical study that uses image theory as framework for 
understanding retirement decisions.  Only research found outside 
the coterie of Beach colleagues and students. 
 
Table B-3. (Continued) 
Image Theory 
 
Representative Literature 
Category Year 
Author(s) 
/ 
Editor(s) 
Title: Relevance 
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2005 
Beach and 
Connolly 
The Psychology of Decision Making (2
nd
 Ed):  Provides 
summation of evolution of the course of decision making theory 
over the years, to include growth of various schools of theoretical 
thought.  Provides typology of decision theory.  Argues that 
image theory most comprehensive and allows for holistic nesting 
of other theories within the image theory construct.  Basic 
construct of image theory is unchanged, but component elements 
much more clearly defined and discussed.   
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Section 2 
A Theoretical Framework for Future Research 
 
Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the substance of the theories reviewed in Section 1, 
outlines the reason why an integration of these theories is necessary in order to fully 
explain the paradox of Northwest regional governance, and presents a framework 
within which the concluding hypotheses from Chapter 7 may be tested. 
 
Summary of Relevant Theories 
Sociology: theories of structuration and social becoming 
Anthony Giddens summarized his work on social structuration in The 
Constitution of Society, published in 1984.  His stated goal was to put an end to the 
debate between functionalists and humanists over the relationship between the social 
whole and individuality.  Functionalists emphasized the primacy of structural 
constraints (both formal and normative) imposed over individual members as the 
dominant explanation for social behavior.  Alternatively, advocates of the humanist or 
hermeneutic school described society as the summation of individual actions.  Giddens 
reconceptualized these oppositions as a coexisting duality of “agency and structure.” 
(p. 162).  In his construct, humans are knowledgeable agents within social systems, 
with the capacity to simultaneously subordinate themselves to social order and engage 
in autonomous, creative activity (Giddens, 1984). 
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Giddens (1984) describes daily life as a flow of intentional actions.  Human 
actors within society have an inherent capacity to understand what they do while they 
do it and are thus free to accept societal expectations or not.  Life is simplified through 
routinization, in which non-salient decisions are relegated to the rules and normative 
expectations of those around them.  Indeed, routinization is considered vital to 
psychological mechanisms in that it sustains a sense of trust and ontological security 
among society members.  Salient issues are acted on in a more affirmative manner, 
providing a capacity for creativity and innovation that can serve to challenge or defend 
existing social arrangements.  The concept of agency thus represents intentions and the 
capability of people to do the things they intend.  “Agency concerns events of which 
an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a 
given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have 
happened if the individual had not intervened” (Giddens, 1984, quote from p. 9).     
Under Giddens‟ (1984) construct, social groups are manifest through systems 
and structures.  Systems are the relationships among and practices of human agents, 
patterned to the point that they define identifiable social entities (such as groups, 
organizations, or other social collectivities).  Structures are recursively organized sets 
of rules and resources recognized by members as legitimate properties of the social 
system and sustained in memory of human agents.  As such, these institutionalized 
features of social systems have structural properties (or rules) that serve to stabilize 
relationships across time and space, contributing to social order.  These rules come in 
two forms.  Normative elements are the non-codified behavioral expectations that 
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members hold for themselves and others.  Those rules more formally established are 
termed codes of signification.    
“Structuration” is the patterning of social practices in time-space involving the 
reproduction of situated practices (through rules and alignment of resources).   
Structure exists in the practice of social activities by members and is recorded in their 
memories.  It is through these practices and memories that human conduct is oriented, 
fostering social stability.  “The most deeply embedded structural properties, 
implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, I call structural principles. Those 
practices which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be 
referred to as institutions” Giddens, 1984, p. 17, emphasis in original).  He further 
states that “the most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively 
involved in institutions.” (p. 24.)  Structuration thus governs the continuity or change 
of systems, and therefore the reproduction of social systems, with change made more 
difficult based on the degree of institutionalization that has taken place.  Fundamental 
is the point that agents, systems, and structures are not independent phenomena, but 
coexist as an irreducible duality.  The continuous interaction between system and 
individual agency means that actors (agents) do not create social systems.  They 
“reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of 
praxis” (Giddens, 1984, p. 171, emphasis in original).  These human activities are 
recursive, a product (praxis) of individual ability to monitor the ongoing flow of life 
and adjust social systems accordingly. 
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Piotr Sztompka approached his theory of social becoming (1991) with the 
same intent as Giddens.  He too sought to resolve the long standing sociological 
debate on the location of “agency” (the capacity for change) between the “macro” of 
societal structures and the “micro” of the individual.  His goal was to “…combine 
these efforts by introducing a concept of social becoming which attempts to find the 
middle ground between the rigid determinism of reified totalities and the unbridled 
voluntarism of free individuals.” (p. 5).  Although cognizant of Giddens‟ work, 
Sztompka does not build his theory upon Giddens.  Rather, he seems to work from 
similar sources in parallel with Giddens.  In so doing, he reinforces and clarifies some 
of Giddens‟ conclusions while introducing others of his own.     
Sztompka (1991) describes his theory of social becoming as a synthesis of past 
syntheses.  Consistent with Giddens, he treats totalities (social structures and 
constraints) and individualities (individual creativity) a dualities, arguing that they are 
“two analytic dimensions of human nature, separable only in imagination.” (p. 5).  
“The real, not merely conceptual, synthesis of those analytical aspects – individualities 
and totalities, creativeness and constraints – is due to the historical, processual nature 
of social life, to its ontological embeddedness in time.” (p. 5).  
Also consistent with Giddens is Sztompka‟s (1991) treatment of agency and 
praxis, summarized in his diagram presented here as Figure B-1.  Sztompka (1991) 
defines agency as the ultimate cause of events.  It is the active, constructive side of 
social life carried out by individuals but with due recognition of the structural 
framework within which human conduct takes place.  Thus, social structure is both the 
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medium for its own continual development and the product of that developmental 
process.  Like Giddens, Sztompka sees agency as carried out by individuals, but notes 
that multiple individuals can engage in agency collectively for common goals.  But 
Sztompka (1991) expands the concept of agency through introduction of the concept  
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4. The direction, goal, and speed of change are contestable among multiple 
agents.  Direction, goal, and speed thus become the area of conflict and struggle. 
5. Action occurs within a context of encountered structures, which agents 
shape in turn.  This results in the dual quality of structures as both shaping and shaped 
and the dual quality of actors as both producers and products. 
6. The interchange of action and structure occurs in time by means of 
alternating phases of agential creativeness and structural determination. 
Sztompka (1991) treatment of praxis is likewise consistent with Giddens, but 
greatly clarified.  Sztompka describes praxis is the context of mediation, defining it as 
“the actual manifestations of social fabric…where operation and action meet, a 
dialectic synthesis of what is going on in a society and what people are doing.” (p. 96).   
As such, it “provides the bridge between acting individuals and changing structures” 
(p. 41).  Thus praxis is doubly conditioned from below by individual actions and 
above by the operation of wider society.  “But it is not reducible to either.  It is 
something more than the sum of individual actions, and it is something more than the 
outcome of ongoing operation.  With respect to both levels – individualities and 
totalities – it is a new emergent quality.  Having its own specific ontological quality as 
reality sui generis, it emanates in two directions, engendering actors‟ conduct and 
originating systemic tendencies.  It is the true core of social life.” (p. 41). 
“Praxis” thus provides both the product of social becoming - society - and the 
medium in which societal changes take place.  To Sztompka, “society” is seen as the 
collection of social groupings in which individuals participate, from local church or 
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community groups up through civilization levels (Sztompka, 1991).  Accordingly, any 
social grouping can thus be nested within other groupings, each undergoing its own 
simultaneous process of structuration / becoming.   
Sztompka (1991) is clearer in describing the role of time than is Giddens 
(1984).  He uses historical sociology to explain the causal mechanisms through which 
agential creativeness and structural influences merge in the flow of historical 
processes.  He introduces the concept of an historical coefficient which, like his 
agential coefficient, is defined by six ontological assumptions: 
1. Social reality is not a steady state but a dynamic process.  It occurs rather 
than exists and is composed of events, not objects. 
2. Social change is a confluence of multiple processes with various vectors, 
partly overlapping, partly convergent, and partly divergent.  These vectors may be 
mutually supportive or destructive.   
3. A social grouping undergoing change may be perceived not as an entity but 
as a fluid set of relations pervaded by both tension and harmony, by conflict and 
cooperation. 
4. The sequence of events within each social process is treated as cumulative.  
Each phase is culmination of previous phases and sets the stage for the next phase.  
Future courses of action are delimited by past courses adopted. 
5. Social process is constructed by individual or collective human agents 
through their actions over time. 
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6. People do not construct society as they please, but within given structural 
conditions inherited from the past (constructed by their predecessors).  “…there is 
dialectic of actions and structures, in which actions are partly determined by earlier 
structures and later structures are produced by earlier actions.” (Sztompka, 1991, p. 
26). 
Finally, Sztompka (1991) offers an enhanced definition of “structure.”  
Whereas Giddens (1984) defined structure as a recursively organized sets of rules and 
resources, Sztompka offers four-fold typology of structural “levels” identified as 
normative, ideal, interaction, and opportunity.
173
  The normative level is the network 
of rules, norms, values, and institutions prescribing the proper expected conduct and 
proscribing “wrong” conduct.  This level is found in systems of laws, mores, and 
customs and make up a reality of social facts external to any single individual.  At the 
ideal level is the network of ideas, beliefs, images, and convictions about reality.  This 
level clusters in creeds, dogmas, doctrines, and ideologies. Next is the interactional 
level, consisting of communication networks such as formal channels and lines of 
access that serve to coordinate the mutually oriented actions of multiple individuals. 
Finally is the opportunity level.  This level is grounded in classes, societal 
stratification, and prospects for social mobility.   
Sztompka (1991) summarizes his theory with three insights: 
 That society (defined as any social grouping) is humanly constructed. 
 That humans are socially shaped 
                                                 
173
 Giddens‟ (1984) definition of structure encompasses Sztompka‟s (1991) normative and ideal levels.   
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 That society and humans are both immersed in the flow of historical time 
As wide-ranging as they are, structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social 
becoming (Sztompka, 1991) provide only incomplete explanations of the regional 
governance experience.  They explain “what” happened through the role of individual 
and collective agents in shaping systems and structure, the influence of systems and 
structure on individuals, and the historical connectivity between structures.  To a 
limited extent, they also explain “why” things happened the way they did in terms of 
the roles of  individual autonomy and freedom and the cognitive consciousness of 
members in their own social phenomena.  But while they note the varying degrees in 
intensity of commitment held by individuals, they do not explain what motivates some 
members of a social group to act as change agents while others act just as passionately 
as agents of the status quo.  Nor do they explain “how” individuals process the 
systems and structures of the social groups in which they are members when rendering 
individual decisions.  Therefore, other theoretical domains must be looked to for a 
more complete explanation. 
Social Psychology: Culture, Identity, and Conflict 
Worldviews and culture: 
Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka (1991) assert that social groups are 
recognizable through organizational patterns and structures of formal rules, norms, 
customs, and belief systems.  Within this construct, the tribal, market-commodity, and 
environmental worldviews identified in Chapters 3 through 7 represent normative 
elements of structure.  Each provides what Lichatowich et al. (2006) describe as a 
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conceptual foundation of principles and assumptions that guide activities.  They exist 
at the broadest possible societal level and, though themselves unwritten, will inspire 
and guide promulgation of laws, regulations, rituals, and other written and unwritten 
manifestations of social expectations that serve to guide member behavior.  
Worldviews may be thought of as “culture” in the anthropologic sense. 
Culture also exists at the organizational level.  Edgar H. Schein (2004) argues 
that culture is a complex learning process that occurs within social units holding a 
shared history.  It originates in one of two ways.  It may begin through spontaneous 
interactions within an unstructured group that gradually leads to patterns and norms of 
behavior as the group becomes better organized over time.  In more formal groups, it 
begins with the values of the organization‟s founder.  In this circumstance, the 
founder‟s vision, goals, beliefs, and assumptions as to how things should be are 
imposed on group members.  Initially, the acceptance of this imposition is 
transactional in nature.  It produces compliance but not necessarily buy-in.  However, 
as the group experiences success over time, these values and beliefs become validated 
and eventually shared within members of the group.  “What was originally the 
founder‟s individual view of the world leads to shared action, which, if successful, 
leads to a shared recognition that the founder „had it right.‟  The group will then act 
again on these beliefs and values and, if it continues to be successful, will eventually 
conclude that it now has the „correct‟ way to think, feel, and act”  (Schein, 2004, p. 16, 
emphasis in original).  Regardless whether originating through group consensus or an 
individual founder, this evolved culture provides a shared sense of stability that 
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becomes embedded within the group and spans all aspects of group functions.  It then 
leads to patterning of routine behaviors that help members make sense of the world 
around them.  Schein summarizes his definition of culture as:       
…a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by the group as 
it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems” (Schein, 2004, p. 17). 
 
Schein (2004) maintains that culture can evolve within any size social 
groupings in which people share significant experiences over time.  Such shared 
experiences lead to learning a shared view of the world and condition future responses 
to the environment based on those experiences.  Over time, the original reason for the 
behavior may be forgotten, but the behavior continues.    
Culture‟s power is drawn from its psychological effect on group members.  
“Culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to pay attention to, what 
things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in 
various kinds of situations” (p. 32).  Culture can evolve within any size social 
groupings in which people share significant experiences over time.  Such shared 
experiences lead to learning a shared view of the world and condition future responses 
to the environment based on those experiences.  Over time, the original reason for the 
behavior may be forgotten, but the behavior continues.  Therefore, all behaviors result 
from either the ingrained culture or in reaction to external events. 
Culture, then, explains why organizational members behave as they do in 
carrying out organizational business and complements Giddens‟ (1984) and 
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Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of structure.  But it does not fully explain personal 
commitment.  To illustrate, envision two proverbial employees.  One is only in a 
business organization “for the job.”  This individual adheres to organizational 
expectations, carries out duties assigned, but departs promptly at closing.  To this 
employee, membership in the organization has no intrinsic meaning other than as a 
source of income.  In contrast is the employee who devotes much extra time and effort 
into organizational goals.  This employee always volunteers to organize after-hour 
social events, puts extra time into getting products completed to the highest quality 
possible, and actively promotes the organization in external forums.  In contrast to the 
first employee‟s purely transactional relationship, the second relates to the 
organization on a personal basis to the degree that membership is integral to the 
individual‟s self image.  Identity theory explains this difference in ways that, like 
culture theory, complements structuration theory and provides additional insight into 
the regional governance experience. 
Organizational and Individual Identity: 
Giddens recognizes a role for identity in structuration when he notes “…the 
prevalence, among the members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of 
common identity, however that might be expressed or revealed.  Such feelings may be 
manifest in both practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a ‘value 
consensus.‟ Individuals may be aware of belonging to a definite collectivity without 
agreeing that it is necessarily right and proper” (Giddens, 1984, p. 165, emphasis 
added.)   This, however, is the limit of Giddens‟ examination as to how identity shapes 
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structuration and vice versa.  Identity theory merits further discussion given its 
importance.   
Individuals exist within social systems and structures and define their sense of 
self in relation to the members of the social situation in which they reside.  Individual 
identity is therefore heavily influenced by others (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 
2004/1934).  In response, individuals will cognitively attempt to in turn influence the 
perceptions of others in their social group (Goffman, 2004/1959).  An individual‟s 
drive for self-enhancement and desire to associate with groups of like-minded 
individuals determine which social groups they do or do not decide to join.  Among 
social groups that people choose to join are organizations (Hogg and Terry, 2001) and 
people will self-categorize into organizations that share values and worldviews with 
which they identify or wish to emulate (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989).  This results in organizations tending to evolve into collections of like-
valued people.  Individual and organizational identity is thus inextricable linked, the 
degree varying with the level of alignment between individual self-image and the 
organization‟s perceived values and behavior patterns (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Albert 
and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).   
Strong psychological bonds may form between individuals and their 
organizations resulting in individuals adopting attributes of the organization as their 
own (Dutton et al., 1994).   For many people, “their professional and/or organizational 
identity may be more pervasive and important than ascribed identities based on 
 524 
gender, age, ethnicity, race, or nationality” (Hogg and Terry, 2001, p. 2).  Not all 
members of an organization will necessarily share the same intensity of psychological 
bonding with the group.  Often members will recognize and adhere to social 
expectations without psychologically identifying with them (Giddens, 1984; Albert 
and Whetten, 1985; Schein, 2004; Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  For those who do so 
identify, perceived threats to the organization become perceived threats to the 
individual, with the response varying by the nature and degree of the threat (Dutton 
and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).   
The combination of individual and organizational identities becomes a 
powerful lens through which interpretations of other groups within the environment 
and acceptable response alternatives to intergroup relations are viewed (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2004; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991, 1994; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).  This 
interpretive lens shapes the selection of organizational responses to the actions of 
others.  Organization leaders affect perception by explaining what is going on in the 
environment within the context of the organizational identity lens, thus facilitating 
member sense-making (Gioia and Thomas, 1996).   Consequently, the understanding 
of observed organizational behavior – such as exhibited during negotiations over the 
CRBF‟s MOA - can be greatly informed by the contexts of individual and collective 
identity of those participating.     
An organization‟s relationship with its environment is iterative and reciprocal 
(Albert and Whetten (1985); Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; 
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Scott and Lane, 2000).  Organizational leaders are charged with the formal 
representation and defense of the organization to the public.  Individual members also 
influence outside perceptions as well through customer service, interaction through 
professional associations, and other contacts (Scott and Lane, 2000).  Organization 
leaders affect the perception of change by explaining what is going on in the 
environment within the context of organizational identity thus facilitating member 
sense-making.   These identity mechanisms are not permanently fixed, and may evolve 
over time (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 2000a).   
Other significant factors influencing perceptions of the environment include 
perceptions by outsiders (Cooley, 2004; Mead, 2004; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Scott and Lane, 2000), the 
worldview as held by members of the organization (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Albert 
and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998), and the 
strategic orientation of the organization (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm 
et al., 1998).  An organization‟s relationship with its environment is iterative and 
reciprocal.  Organizations prepare images for public consumption designed to put the 
organization in the best positive light (Albert and Whetten (1985); Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Scott and Lane, 2000).  Managers – 
acting as representative agents - have a key role in this process, since they are charged 
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with the formal representation and defense of the organization to the public (Scott and 
Lane, 2000).   
Outsiders evaluate these images within the context of organization behavior, 
media coverage, and their personal relationship and identification with the 
organization and its members.  They reflect their interpretation of the images back to 
the organization (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fox-
Wolfgramm et al., 1998).  Individual members will then compare their self-identity 
and their perceptions of the organization‟s identity with the perception of the 
organization as articulated by management and reflected by relevant stakeholders 
(Goffman, 2004; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and Lane, 
2000).  Thus, the organizational perception of environment is a complex interaction 
among organization members, organization leadership and external stakeholders that 
is filtered and interpreted through the organization‟s internal orientation and sense of 
identity.  For Basin governance, this means that those participating in governance 
negotiations would be expected to represent their views and interests in the best 
possible light while dismissing or trivializing the alternative messages offered by 
others. 
Conflict: 
The history of events surrounding the structuration of Columbia Basin 
governance is replete with conflict.  Examples include clashes between advocates of 
public and privately owned electrical power (Ogden, 1949; White, 1995; Brigham, 
1998; Pope, 2008); fisheries proponents and river developers (Scheufele, c.1970; 
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Blumm, 1981; Robbins, 2004); states and tribes over fishery allocations and other 
tribal rights (Wilkinson, 2005; Pevar, 2002); turf disputes between federal agencies 
(McKinley, 1952; Clarke and McCool, 1996); and among just about everybody in the 
West over water (Wilkinson,1992; Pisani, 2002).  These and other regional lines of 
conflict are recorded in greater detail in Chapters 3 through 7.      
On the surface, these regional conflicts could be viewed as struggles among 
divergent interests over scarce resources.  Indeed, up until the late 1970s, resource-
based (or instrumental (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979) or divergent interest (Giddens, 
1979) or realistic (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) competition 
was considered – at least within social psychology circles – as the dominant reason 
conflict occurred (Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).  But this reasoning did not address 
observed hostility between groups with no apparent competing interests.  This gap was 
answered when Henri Tajfel and John Turner published their theory of social identity 
in 1979.  Social identity has subsequently assumed a dominant role in conflict analysis 
by some (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004) and 
a co-equal role with interest-based causes by others (Cox, 1996/1993).    
Giddens devotes a chapter to conflict in Central Problems (1979).  He defines 
conflict as the “struggle between actors or collectivities expressed as definite social 
practices” (p. 131).  He notes “two senses of conflict,” one being disputes over 
divergent interests and the other as struggle among groups or actors based on the mere 
existence of those groups.
174
  He emphasizes the role of ideology in conflict.  Writing 
                                                 
174
 This second source was the phenomenon under study by Tajfel and Turner at approximately the 
same time.  See section 2 below. 
 528 
within the context of World War II‟s Jewish holocaust, he describes ideology as a 
“belief system.”  He notes that the promise of science in the age of enlightenment was 
to end what had been traditions of irrational and unfounded prejudices of unthinking 
belief.  To Giddens, that failed in the face of Nazi ideology in the Germany of the 
1930s and „40s thus illustrating the potential for positions of belief to undermine and 
overwhelm positions of reason.   
Giddens did not carry forward this discussion of conflict in Constitution 
(1984).  But he implicitly invokes it through his discussion of critical situations, 
power, and control.  He defines critical situations as those where the “established 
modes of accustomed life are drastically undermined or shattered” (Giddens, 1984, p. 
60).  He defines power as “the means of getting things done” (p. 283) and control as 
the capability of some actors to influence the circumstances of others.  By defining 
agency as the capacity for individuals to act autonomously, he endows them with the 
power to challenge the status quo of prevailing systems and structures as enforced 
through the power and control of those in charge.  Power and control represent the 
exercise of agency by some actors as they seek to constrain the agency of others 
seeking change.  The resolution of critical situations, the exercise of power, the 
imposition of constraint, and agency occur in praxis.  Power and constraint represent 
the exercise of agency by some actors as they seek to restrict the agency of those with 
whom they disagree.  Thus, the capacity for and occurrence of social conflict is 
inherent in Giddens‟ theory. 
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Sztompka (1991) is more forthright on the subject.  He devotes a great deal of 
discussion to social movements and counter movements.  Such movements result in 
the emergence of new creeds, beliefs, norms, values, tactics, internal structures, and 
relationships.  Any society wishing to grow must foster the conditions for the 
emergence of social systems that can effectively challenge the status quo.  Thus, in 
Sztompka‟s construct, conflict appears essential to social evolution.  In summary, 
Giddens and Sztompka observe the existence of conflict and explain it through the 
framework of praxis and agency.  What they don‟t do is explain the triggering 
mechanisms that cause conflict to begin. 
There are two bodies of theory that do.  The first is conflict based on 
competing group interest.  Rational, interest-based conflict of this nature is termed 
variously as “realistic” (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) or 
“instrumental” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).  Realistic, or instrumental, competition 
originates with incompatible group goals and manifests in struggles over tangible 
(such as territory, money, or food) or intangible (such as power, prestige, honor, or a 
sense of physical security) resources in short supply (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Tajfel and 
Turner, 2004/1979; Hatch and Schultz, 2004b).  The second source of conflict is social 
identity.  Under this theory, the mere knowledge that another group exists within the 
salient environmental framework of an in-group can lead to out-group bias and 
discrimination.  Termed “social competition” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979), such 
conflict is based solely on social comparisons as made by group members (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001).   
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Conflict may arise under conditions of either realistic or social competition.  The 
presence of both, however, can greatly exacerbate the nature of the conflict and make 
resolution that much more difficult (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001). 
Pruitt and Kim (2004) define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interest, a 
belief that the parties‟ current aspirations are incompatible” (p. 8, emphasis in 
original).  The central components of realistic conflict are interests, which are defined 
as “people‟s feelings about what is basically desirable” (p. 15) and aspirations, 
defined as “mental representations of the things [a party to the conflict] strives for or 
believes it must achieve” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16).  Conflict size (or intensity) is 
influenced by the salience of any given threat to a group interest or aspiration.  
Conflict thus arises through the perception of “relative deprivation” that occurs when a 
party believes that a reasonable interest or aspiration is threatened or has been 
thwarted.   
The manner in which organizations respond to threats or thwarted aspirations 
depends on a number of identity-related factors.  Organization type (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985); organization orientation Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996); the nature of 
the change being faced (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996); the degree of threat perceived 
(Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); the perceived gap between 
current identity and desired future identity (Gustafson and Reger, 1995); the number 
of identities within the organization that are affected (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; 
Pratt and Foreman, 2000); proactive leadership (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; 
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Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Pratt and Foreman, 2000); perceptions of stakeholders 
(Dutton et al., 1994; Scott and Lane, 2000); and the degree to which an organization is 
preconditioned to respond to change (Brown and Starkey, 2000) can restrict or 
facilitate selection and implementation of response actions.  Members‟ sense of 
identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994), the organization‟s strategic 
orientation (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998), and management perceptions (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Fox-
Wolfgramm et al., 1998), all serve as powerful filters for interpreting what is going on 
and what is to be done about it.  These influences will initially cause culturally 
familiar routines to be activated in the face of perceived threats while constraining the 
degree to which other actions are considered acceptable (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).  
For the purposes of this study, the organizational response of interest is the 
determination to accept and support or reject and challenge any given Basin 
governance system, whether in place or proposed.   
Theories of culture, identity, and conflict answer the questions of “why” not 
addressed under structuration (Giddens, 1984) and social becoming (Sztompka, 1991).  
The deeply embedded assumptions regarding the correct way to think, feel, and 
perceive that underlay organizational culture explains why organizational members act 
the way they do (Schein, 2004).  The strong psychological connection that develops in 
organizational members as they incorporate organizational values and goals as part of 
their own self-identity (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; 
Dutton et al., 1984) explains why some organizational members hold the degree of 
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intensity they do to given positions.  Realistic and social competition theories explain 
the nature of conflict, whether over competing interests or due to the existence of other 
social groups (Coser, 1964; Campbell, 1965; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Pruitt and 
Kim, 2004).  Identity theory explains why organizations respond to perceptions of 
threats or thwarted aspirations the way they do (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, others).  Taken 
together, they greatly help explain the dynamic nature of the region‟s governance 
history.  But the explanation is still incomplete in that these theories do not explain 
“how” the influences of culture and identity get translated into individual decision 
making.   
Psychology: image theory and individual decision making 
Left unanswered in culture and identity theory is the question of “how” 
individuals come to make the decisions they do and how organizational values are 
transferred between individuals and from generation to generation.  Decision theory, 
especially “image theory,” more fully answers the “how” questions in exploring the 
role values and beliefs play in individual decision making. 
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) define agency as the capacity to effect 
changes to social systems and structures.  They argue that individuals exercise agency 
individually or collectively based on a cognitive understanding of their social 
environment.  Implied is an individual decision making process that leads one to 
actively challenge, actively defend, or passively acquiesce to the status quo.  
Consistent with Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of agency, Beach 
and Mitchell (1998) argue that all decision making occurs at the individual level.  
 533 
Once the individual makes up their own mind, the result may be subject to adjustment 
when presented to and discussed with others.  Groups, per se, do not make decisions, 
but rather serve as “the contexts within which individual members‟ decisions become 
consolidated to form a group product” (p. 9).  At issue here is how those individual 
decisions come to be made and the influences in play as those decisions are tested and 
defended or modified during inter-group and intra-group interactions.   
Traditional prescriptive models of decision making are not up to this task.  
Traditional decision theory, borrowing from economic theory, presumes decision 
makers engage in a relatively formal analytical process, evaluating the consequences 
of available actions to maximize utility.  Although simple and easy to model, the 
prescriptive model relies on assumptions not clearly borne out by empirical research 
and does not fully reflect how decisions are actually made (Mitchell, Rediker, and 
Beach, 1986).  Traditional theory overly simplifies the “messiness” of day-to-day 
decision making through abstraction.  It is rooted in a linear decision tree model, 
where decision move only in one direction.  Individual values, motives and 
preferences (which may change over time) are dismissed.  Time is simplified into 
“now” (point at which decision is made) and “later” (when result is achieved).  There 
is no continuum over which things can change (Connolly and Beach, 1998).   
Beach and Mitchell (1998) argue that, in practice, these formal analytical 
strategies are seldom used.  As a practical matter, formal utility-based models are too 
time consuming and resource intensive for simple decisions and too “coldly 
intellectual” (p. 6) for important ones.  Furthermore, traditional analytical models 
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presume a search for the “best” of a range of plausible options, with “best” being 
defined as the one that maximizes utility.  Consequently, they do not explain situations 
in which only one option is under consideration.  Left unaddressed is the process by 
which the array of options is first determined and the implication if that process results 
in only one plausible option.  Actual decision making is most often based on doing the 
“right” thing, even which this “right” option is not in the individual or organization‟s 
best interest.  They observe that in those cases where a formal analytical decision 
model is used, decision makers will frequently reject the results the results run counter 
to their concept of “rightness.”   
In summary, traditional utility-based theory is prescriptive in that it identifies 
how decisions should be made, but falls short of accurately describing how decisions 
are actually made.  “In both individual and organizational settings, the problems are 
the same: decision making is much richer and more subtle than the formal models 
would suggest, while at the same time it is less thoroughly thought through and less 
premeditated than the formal models demand” (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986, p. 
295). 
Connolly and Beach (1998) identify other decision making models that have 
challenged the traditional model and attempted to explain decision making 
complexity.  Descriptive models based on theories of “cognitive situation 
assessments,” “decision through argument,” and “decision through exploration” all 
involve situation assessments, past experience, and causal thinking.  “Decision cycle 
theory” is more incremental, arguing that one‟s view of a given situation is modified 
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through the experience of implemented behavior.  Subsequent decisions are based on 
that experience, with subsequent behavior modified accordingly.  Cognitive processes 
allow for learning that guides and justifies decisions through time.  These theories 
address the “messiness” of actual decision making, but still do not fully address the 
role of values in shaping the selection of alternatives and ultimate decisions made.  As 
such – like traditional decision theory - they are not so much wrong as incomplete 
(Connolly and Beach, 1998). 
“Image theory” (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986; Beach and Mitchell, 
1987 and 1998) holistically incorporates the essential elements of these theories 
(Connolly and Beach, 1998).  Image theory assumes decision makers use three 
“schematic knowledge structures,” or “images” to organize and frame their thinking 
(Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 12).   
The first of these is the “value image.”  The value image is composed of 
“principles.”  Principles are the imperatives for individual behavior and the behavior 
of the organization(s) to which the decision maker belongs.  They are the decision 
maker‟s beliefs, morals, ethics, and social conventions.  These “principles” are “self 
evident truths” that must be respected, thus providing a “rigid criteria” by which the 
rightness or wrongness of a goal or plan is judged (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 9).  
As such, they “serve to internally generate candidate goals and plans for possible 
adoption” as well as criteria against which the goals and plans of others may be 
evaluated (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 12, emphasis in original).  Principles begin to 
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be developed in childhood and evolve over the course of one‟s life.  As such, they are 
inherent to one‟s self-image and sense of identity.175   
Principles can run the gamut from specific to general; from the compelling to 
the trivial; from admirable to abhorrent; from rational to irrational.  For example, 
greed and accumulation of personal power can be as important a principle to some as 
altruism and charity are to others.  Regardless, principles form the foundation upon 
which all decisions are based.  As such, the ultimate legitimacy of decision outcomes 
is defined by the degree to which the outcomes conform to principles.  Goals and 
strategies not in accordance with principles – whether internally or externally 
generated - will be deemed unacceptable.  More fundamentally, choice alternatives not 
consistent with the decision maker‟s principles will be rejected from further 
consideration regardless of utilitarian value (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and 
Connolly, 2005). 
The second image is the “trajectory image” consisting of the goals for the 
future as generated from the decision maker‟s principles.  These goals are not static, 
however, and extend through time.  Goals can be specific or abstract.  The more 
abstract the goal, however, the more difficult the selection of plans and strategies 
become (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005).  
                                                 
175
 In earlier versions of image theory, the authors specifically identify “self-image” as one of four 
images used in decision making.  They describe self-image and its constituent principles as reflecting 
how one sees oneself and as precepts for the conduct of one‟s life. They represent personal beliefs, 
values, ethics, and morals that one intuitively accepts as true.  See Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986, 
and Beach and Mitchell, 1987.  In later versions, the number of images is reduced to three, with the 
concept of “self-image” apparently subsumed into the “value image” described above.  See Beach and 
Mitchell, 1998. 
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The third image is the “strategic image” consisting of the plans adopted for 
achieving the trajectory image‟s goals.  Each plan is an “abstract sequence of potential 
activities, beginning with goal adoption and ending with goal attainment” (Beach and 
Mitchell, 1998, p. 13; Beach and Connolly, 2005).   
Embedded within the three images are two types of decision.  The first is the 
“adoption decision” which answers whether the goal or strategy is reasonable and 
achievable.  The second decision is termed the “progress decision.”  This is the 
decision to proceed with the adopted choice based on whether the desired goal will be 
achieved.  Consequently, the “progress decision” recurs over time as experience grows 
and new information is acquired (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 
2005). 
Both the “adoption” and “progress” decisions are subject to two tests.  The first 
is termed “compatibility testing.”  Compatibility testing screens candidate goals and 
plans against the three “images,” identified above.  This screening depends exclusively 
on whether the choice presented violates the decision maker‟s principles.  This 
comparison against principle is not weighted or nuanced in any way – it is solely an 
“accept or reject” determination, and might well occur subconsciously.  In progress 
decisions a determination of non-compatibility will usually lead to adjustments in the 
plan rather than automatic withdrawal.  The second test is termed “profitability 
testing.”  Profitability testing is used when multiple candidates survive compatibility 
testing.  The decision maker will engage in some analytical method or strategy (which 
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may be formal or informal, to include traditional decision theory) to select the “best” 
of the surviving candidates (Beach and Mitchell, 1998; Beach and Connolly, 2005). 
Connolly and Beach (2005) amplified on other precepts introduced in early 
image theory publications.  Framing consists of applying relevant elements of the 
three images to situation at hand.  All decisions are made individually; there is no such 
thing as a “group” decision, per se.  Group decisions are agreements reached as each 
member of the group processes options through their image processes.  Agreement is 
reached at the point when either the option(s) is (are) modified to be congruent with 
each party‟s principles, goals, or plans or the individuals involved modify their goals 
and plans to be consistent with the rest of the group.  This modification of options 
and/or principles, goals, and plans did not occur in the CRBF experience, contributing 
to its failure.   
The basic precepts of image theory are illustrated in Figure B-2.
176
  Individual 
decision makers frame situations within their experience and knowledge of past and 
present events and select (often intuitively) those principles (from the values image), 
goals (from the trajectory image) and plans and tactics (from the strategy image) as 
applicable to the circumstances at hand.  Any given choice is thus subject to the 
“compatibility test” to determine whether the options at hand violates the decision 
maker‟s principles, goals, or plans.   If only one option survives this screening, it is 
adopted.  If more than one option survives, it is then subjected to a “profitability” test 
of varying degrees of formality and consistent with traditional theory to determine 
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 This figure first appears in Weatherly and Beach‟s 1998 essay (presented in Beach, 1998) on the 
relationship between organizational culture and decision making.  Although appearing long after image 
theory‟s first formulation, it illustrates the theory as first envisioned very well.  
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which provides the best outcome (as defined in terms of principles, goals, and values).  
If no options past these tests, it is possible for the decision maker to redefine and 
adjust their principles, goals, and plans depending on the criticality of the decision and 
the situation at hand.    
 
Figure B-2. 
Image Theory  
 
 
 
Weatherly and Beach (1998) use image theory to examine the relationship 
between organizational culture and the decisions made within that organization.  Their 
intent is to propose a theoretical link between culture and decision making and to test 
the implications of that link.  Citing the work in organizational culture of Schein, 
Schneider, and Trice and Beyer,
177
 authors define culture as a body of 
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 Schein, E. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Schneider, B. (Ed.). (1990). Organizational culture and climate. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
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“organizationally relevant beliefs and values that are mutually understood and 
subscribed to by its members.”  They summarize the work of these authors in this 
way:  Being grounded in values, culture prescribes what is “true, necessary, and 
desirable” and thus dictates goals and the strategies considered acceptable.  Likewise, 
it prescribes what is “false, unnecessary, and undesirable” and, thus, “goals and 
actions that one should not pursue oneself and that one ought to resist when proposed 
by others” (Weatherly and Beach, quotes from p. 211). 
Weatherly and Beach (1998) illustrated both the fundamentals of image theory 
and the relationship of image theory to culture as shown in Figure B-3.
178
  In their 
construct, the firmly-held principles of the decision maker‟s value image are 
analogous to the culture of the organization.  Similarly, the organizational vision and 
selected strategies are similar to the decision maker‟s trajectory and strategic images, 
respectively.  Any decision option is subject to a compatibility screening using the 
constituents of the value, trajectory, and strategic images as screening criteria.  Should 
multiple choice options survive the compatibility test, they are subjected to formal or 
informal profitability testing, again based on the decision maker‟s images, to 
determine which choice represents the best decision.  In cases where only one 
candidate survives compatibility screening, that option becomes the decision with 
                                                                                                                                            
Trice, H.M. & Beyer, J.M. (1993).  The cultures of work organizations.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
 
178
 Figure 8-3 is shown as essentially presented by the authors.  It is, however, a bit misleading in that it 
visually suggests a linearity and finality to decisions that is not consistent with the fluidity described in 
Beach and Mitchell, 1998.  What is apparently missing in the diagram are feedback loops from 
decisions as they get recycled through the process once new information becomes available, decisions 
are met with unforeseen obstacles, or checks are made to ensure the goals and strategies are on track. 
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further analysis to be conducted over time as new information comes available 
(Weatherly and Beach, 1998). 
 
Figure B-3 
An Image Theory Analysis of Organizational Culture
179
 
 
 
Although written from an organizational perspective, this does not violate 
Beach and Mitchell‟s (1998) assertion that all decisions are made individually.  
Rather, it articulates the role that organizational culture plays on those individual 
decisions.  Weatherly and Beach (1998) argue that “potential goals for inclusion in the 
vision and tactics for inclusion in the strategic plan must not violate the organization‟s 
culture, its existing vision, or its existing plans(s)” (p. 213) and that any new ideas 
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must be compatible with members‟ image of themselves as an organization and their 
goals for the future.  Since organizational members share these images, individual 
decisions will tend to be compatible with member principles even when made in 
isolation.  The implication is that, consistent with Schein (2004), member images and 
principles will effect member acceptance or rejection of decisions made on the 
organization‟s behalf by their leaders.  Decisions or ideas that are not compatible with 
member images risk the leader losing legitimacy in the eyes of those members.   
Image theory thus explains “how” values underlying theories of organizational 
culture and identity are processed into decisions, positions, and actions by individuals.  
Adding this to the “what” as provided by theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and 
social becoming (Sztompka, 1991), and the “why” provided by theories of culture 
(Schein, 2004) and identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934; Goffman, 
2004/1959; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989) a comprehensive theoretical framework can be offered to explain the 
evolution of Columbia Basin governance in general and the rise and fall of the CRBF 
in particular. 
 
Why an Integration of Multiple Theories is Necessary 
There is no single body of theory that adequately addresses the question as to 
why the CRBF failed.  As wide-ranging as they are, structuration (Giddens, 1984) and 
social becoming (Sztompka, 1991) provide only incomplete theoretical explanations 
for the regional governance experience.  They explain “what” happened through the 
 543 
role of individual and collective agents in shaping systems and structure, the influence 
of systems and structure on individuals, and the historical connectivity between 
structures.  To a limited extent, they also explain “why” things happened the way they 
did in terms of the roles of  individual autonomy and freedom and the cognitive 
consciousness of members in their own social phenomena.  Schein‟s (2004) theory of 
organizational culture helps flesh out the concept of structure and helps further explain 
how normative expectations influence organizational member behavior.  But, while 
acknowledging the varying degrees of intensity in individual commitment, neither 
Giddens (1984) or Sztompka (1991) explain what motivates some members of a social 
group to act as change agents while others act just as passionately as agents of the 
status quo.  Nor do they explain “how” individuals process the systems and structures 
of the social groups in which they are members when rendering individual decisions.   
Similarly, theories of interest based conflict, centered on competition over 
resources or other conflicts of interest (Coser, 1964) do not account for situations 
where no such conflict of interest exist (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).  Theories of 
individual and group identity help fill in the “why” gaps in the theories of structuration 
and conflict.   
Theories of individual identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934; 
Goffman, 2004/1959) explain the concept of individual self within social settings.  
Social and organizational identity speak to the strong psychological connection that 
can develop in organizational members as they incorporate organizational values and 
goals as part of their own self-identity (Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashforth and 
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Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1984) and explain why some organizational members hold 
the degree of intensity they do to given organizational positions and values (i.e. a 
system‟s normative structures).  Theories of social competition, grounded in social 
identity, expand the understanding of the nature of conflict and argue that identity-
based competition can either exacerbate conflict over competing interests or lead to 
conflict in its own right merely based on the existence of other social groups (Tajfel 
and Turner, 2004/1979; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; 
Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004).  Identity theory further explains why 
organizations respond to perceptions of threats or thwarted aspirations the way they do 
(Albert and Whetten, 1985; Dutton et al., 1994; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1996; Dutton 
and Dukerich, 1991; Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Gioia 
and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Scott and Lane, 2000; Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000; Brown and Starkey, 2000; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  Taken together, 
they greatly help explain why the interrelationship between the social group and the 
individual occurs the way it does.  But the explanation is still incomplete in that these 
theories do not explain “how” the influences of system structure, agency, and identity 
get translated into individual decision making.   
Decision theory, especially “image theory,” more fully answers the “how” 
questions in exploring the role values and beliefs play in individual decision making.  
Giddens (1984) and Sztompka (1991) define agency as the capacity to effect changes 
to social systems and structures.  They argue that individuals exercise agency 
individually or collectively based on a cognitive understanding of their social 
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environment.  Implied is an individual decision making process that leads one to 
actively challenge, actively defend, or passively acquiesce to the status quo.   
Consistent with Giddens‟ (1984) and Sztompka‟s (1991) concepts of agency, 
Beach and Mitchell (1998) argue that all decision making occurs at the individual 
level.  Once the individual makes up their own mind, the result may be subject to 
adjustment when presented to and discussed with others.  Groups, per se, do not make 
decisions, but rather serve as “the contexts within which individual members‟ 
decisions become consolidated to form a group product” (p. 9).  At issue here is how 
those individual decisions come to be made and how the influences of structure and 
group identity come to play as those decisions are tested and defended or modified 
during inter-group and intra-group interactions.   
Traditional prescriptive models of decision making and more recent 
naturalistic models are not up to this task.  Traditional decision theory, borrowing 
from economic theory, presumes decision makers engage in a relatively formal 
analytical process, evaluating the consequences of available actions to maximize 
utility.  Although simple and easy to model, the prescriptive model relies on 
assumptions not clearly borne out by empirical research and does not fully reflect how 
decisions are actually made, (Mitchell, Rediker, and Beach, 1986).  Furthermore, these 
structured models are seldom used in practice.  They are too time consuming and 
resource intensive for simple decisions, too “coldly intellectual” (p. 6) for important 
ones, and assert that actual decision making is often based on doing the “right” thing, 
even which this “right” option is not in the individual or organization‟s best interest.  
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They observe that in those cases where a formal analytical decision model is used, 
decision makers will frequently reject the results the results run counter to their 
concept of “rightness” (Beach and Mitchell, 1998).  Similarly, while descriptive 
models based on theories of “cognitive situation assessments,” “decision through 
argument,” “decision through exploration,” and “decision cycles” address the 
“messiness” of actual decision making, they still do not fully address the role of values 
in shaping the selection of alternatives and ultimate decisions made.  As such – like 
traditional decision theory - they are not so much wrong as incomplete (Connolly and 
Beach, 1998). 
The empirical research on image theory (Beach, 1996, 1998) tends to focus on 
decision makers situated under relatively passive circumstances.  Decision makers are 
either portrayed as facing problems imposed upon them.  The studies of Beach and his 
colleagues do not report on situations in which the subject is aggressively pursuing a 
predetermined agenda or outcome.   
There is another body of theory, termed “motivated reasoning,” that does.  
Motivated reasoning theory states that motivation to a particular belief or outcome 
affects reasoning through “reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies 
for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.”  These processes appear in two 
major categories: those in which the motive is to arrive at an accurate (or factually 
correct) conclusion and those in which the motive is to arrive at a particular, 
directional conclusion (or predetermined outcome).   This second case is constrained 
in that people wishing to arrive at particular conclusion construct justifications that 
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would persuade dispassionate observers.  These justifications, however, is based on 
memories of beliefs and rules that support the conclusion and creative combinations of 
accessed knowledge.  The individual or people in question believe the arguments thus 
construed to be objective and factually based, missing the point that their very process 
is biased by the goals they are attempting to achieve.  This is not cognitive hypocrisy, 
but rather unconscious decision making based on only a relevant subset of the body of 
knowledge and beliefs available (Kunda, 1990).   
Motivated reasoning has been applied to explain numerous situations, such as 
perceptions among American Democrats and Republican Party members regarding 
justifications for and support of the Iraq War (Jacobson, 2010).   There are clear 
parallels between motivated reasoning theory and image theory.  Image theory‟s 
grounding in the way in which people access those personal principles, goals, and 
plans relevant to a given situation (Beach, 1998) is remarkably consistent with 
motivated reasoning‟s use of belief‟s and strategies in arriving at desired conclusions.  
As such, this body of literature will not be further examined here.
180
 
Image theory integrates the values underlying identity theory with individual 
decision making.  It also offers insight into the relationship between organizational 
culture (Schein, 2004) and individual agency (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991).  
Weatherly and Beach (1998) illustrate the relationship of image theory to culture as 
shown in Figure B-2.  In this construct, the firmly-held principles of the decision 
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 The literature on motivated reasoning theory was identified late in this study effort and is not 
reviewed here in more detail due to its similarities with image theory and also in the interests of time.  
A cursory web search revealed that the literature on motivated research is extensive in the psychology 
and social psychology fields.  Its roots appear at least partially grounded in identity theory.   
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maker‟s value image are analogous to the culture of the organization and, by 
extension, other expectations of system structure.  Similarly, the organizational vision 
and selected strategies are similar to the decision maker‟s trajectory and strategic 
images, respectively.  Any decision option is subject to a compatibility screening 
against both organizational and individual value, trajectory, and strategic images.  
Should multiple choice options survive the compatibility test, they are subjected to 
formal or informal profitability testing, again based again on the organization‟s and 
decision maker‟s images, to determine which choice represents the best decision.  In 
cases where only one candidate survives compatibility screening, that option becomes 
the decision with further analysis to be conducted over time as new information comes 
available (Weatherly and Beach, 1998).  
Image theory thus explains “how” the values underlying theories of 
organizational culture and identity are processed into decisions, positions, and actions 
by individuals.  Adding this to the “what” as provided by theories of structuration 
(Giddens, 1984) and social becoming (Sztompka, 1991), and the “why” provided by 
theories of culture (Schein, 2004) and identity (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934; 
Goffman, 2004/1959; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979; Albert and Whetten, 1985; 
Ashforth and Mael, 1989) completes the explanation as to “how” agents come make 
the decisions they do.  From this combined set of theories, coupled with observations 
drawn from the governance history presented in Chapters 3 through 7, a 
comprehensive theoretical framework can be offered to explain the evolution of 
Columbia Basin governance in general and the rise and fall of the CRBF in particular. 
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In summary, structuration and social becoming theory explain what happens as 
social organizations emerge and evolve and partially explains why they do so.  Social 
conflict is at least one vehicle through which social evolution occurs in the praxis 
process.  Theories of individual, social, and organizational identity complete the 
explanation for why agents choose to engage in various issues and the intensity of 
commitment to social organization values and objectives.  Image theory explains how 
individuals come to accept social values and norms and incorporate them into ones 
sense of self.  These theories provide the building blocks from which a framework can 
be constructed to guide future research into the region‟s governance paradox. 
 
Research Framework 
A generalized model of governance structuration. 
Figure 8-4 presented the pattern of structuration for Columbia Basin 
governance systems as found in the historic record.  This figure was generalized as 
shown in Figure 8-5.  The discussion which follows discusses the model with respect 
to the findings of this study on governance and the theories introduced above.  This 
generalized model is not limited to situations of governance.  It could, for example, be 
used to explain the evolution of a local Friday night poker club, a government agency, 
or any other system.   
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Theories of structuration (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) hold that all 
systems and their associated structures exist in the flow of historical time, with any 
given system having been built on what came before even as it serves as the 
foundation for what will come later.  This point is illustrated in the box in Figure 8-5 
entitled “Existing Systems and Structures”.  Each existing system is comprised of its 
own set of structures.  Structures include the formal and informal rules and 
expectations guiding social behavior (Giddens, 1984).  These include the normative 
expectations of culture (Schein, 2004) and organizational identity (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, (1989).  These structures provide stability to the 
group over time, allow for routinization of mundane tasks, and provide group 
members a sense of security (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991); contribute to an 
individual‟s sense of self (Cooley, 2004/1902; Mead, 2004/1934); and provide 
interpretive lenses that shape how members think  about, feel, and perceive other 
systems and events within their environment (Schein, 2004; Albert and Whetten, 
1985; Tajfel and Turner, 2004/1979).    
The relationship among systems can be in alliance or in conflict.  Conflictual 
relationships can be due to competition over resources and interests and/or issues of 
social identity (Giddens, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  These 
existing relationships also consist of patterns of dominance and subjugation as more 
powerful systems are able to further their interests at the expense - perceived or actual 
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- of others (Giddens, 1984) thus frustrating the aspirations of weaker systems and 
creating the potential for future conflict (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).  
Internally, each system will evolve through time as established systems and 
structures are either adjusted or defended in response to actions and agency exercised 
by its members (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991) and internal movements and counter 
movements (Sztompka, 1991) – in effect going through its own process of 
structuration internally.  Such internal evolutions occur consistent with member 
principles (Beach, 1990, 1996, 1998) and organizational values (Schein, 2004) and 
identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985).  This internal structuration is unlikely to rise to 
the level of attention of other systems unless the other systems‟ senses of identity 
and/or interests are challenged (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and 
Hunt, 1998; Scott and Lane, 2000).  
The stability of the existing arrangement of systems will continue until 
challenged by situation of sufficient criticality to threaten the status quo (Giddens, 
1984) as portrayed in the box labeled “Critical Situation.”  Critical situations may call 
the existing patterns of internal and external relationships into question by challenging 
member identity attachments to the organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Elsbach 
and Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998) or challenge external 
relationships by creating opportunities to reopen unresolved differences, create new 
issues of conflict over resources or interests, or exacerbating conflicts due to identity 
(Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Eagly, Baron, and 
Hamilton, 2004).   
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Critical situations may or may not result in conflict.  For example, the 
ascendancy of the Republicans to a majority in Congress in 1943 resulted in the 
defunding of New Deal central planning entities, to include the Pacific Northwest 
Regional Planning Commission.  This occurrence did not result in conflict; the 
participants to the PNWRPC at the regional and national levels met and voluntarily 
reformed themselves into the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee (Bessey, 
1963; Scheufele, c.1970).  Conversely, the hydro-thermal crisis and Bonneville Power 
Administration‟s notice of insufficiency in 1976 presented a situation where long 
suppressed tribal, commercial, and sport fishery concerns over the impact of the 
hydropower system on regional fisheries resulted in creation of the (now named) 
Northwest Power and Conservation Council which gave those interests more influence 
over operational decision making (Blumm, 1982; Hemmingway, 1983; Pope, 2008).    
Regardless of whether or not conflict occurs, institutional and other regional 
leaders will attempt to find resolution.  Where conflict does occur, organizational 
identity and individual principles will serve to reinforce the righteousness of 
organizational positions and serve as filters through which members interpret the 
issues and events at hand (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; 
Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Beach, 1998; Ashmore, 
Jussim, and Wilder, 2001; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton, 2004).  
Critical situations do not necessarily need to result in conflict between systems; they 
can serve simply as catalysts for internal change within a system (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991; Goia and Thomas, 1996; Golden-Biddle and Rao; 1997). 
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Consequently, although regional leaders may be seeking a rational and 
objective way to resolve the issues at hand, agents engaging in resolution negotiations 
come to the negotiation table with a personal suite of principles and values heavily 
informed by institutional worldview, organizational culture, and social identity (Tajfel 
and Turner, 2004/1979; Schein, 2004; Beach and Connolly, 2005).   
Critical situations affecting relationships among systems, whether involving 
conflict or not, will lead to calls for rational resolution by system leaders (Hypothesis 
1).  Organizations will select agents to engage in negotiations to defend organizational 
values and values and obtain an outcome consistent with those values and interests 
(Hypothesis 2).  Selected agents will enter into these discussions influenced by 
organizational expectations as well as their own sense of identity, principles, goals, 
and plans (Hypothesis 3; Beach 1990, 1996, 1998).   If the catalytic situation is critical 
enough to fundamentally threaten the values and interests of the negotiating parties, 
then the senses of social identity at risk may be altered as may the image goals and 
plans of individual agents (Goia and Thomas, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 
1998; Scott and Lane, 2000; Beach, 1990, 1996, 1998)
181
 and compromises reached 
that result in new systems and/or reconstructed patterns of relationships.  Over time, as 
these new systems patterns become established, they will become the foundations for 
future changes in the face of new critical situations (Giddens, 1984; Sztompka, 1991).  
If the situations prove to be not of sufficient criticality, the old patterns and systems 
will likely continue. 
                                                 
181
 Alternatively, identity forces can cause interpretations of events that ignore actual threats and 
foreclose the possibility of resolution (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996).   
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Figure B-4 illustrates how the bodies of theory discussed above can be 
combined with the historical record of Columbia Basin governance to help explain the 
inception, rise, and collapse of the Columbia River Basin Forum focusing on 
examination of the causes for the structural weaknesses of the CRBF‟s memorandum 
of agreement.  Structuration, identity, and decision theories combined establish the 
linkage between group values and interest and individual decisions and actions.  This 
in turn explains the how the institutional representatives selected to negotiate and later 
execute the CRBF MOA behaved in the way they did to create such a weak 
organizational structure leading to the system‟s ultimate failure.  The historical record 
of governance change recounted in Chapters 3 through 7 and illustrated in Figure 8-4 
(and generalized in Figure 8-5) provides the social and political context that both 
provided the background from which the CRBF emerged and shaped the institutions 
whose agents participated in the CRBF development and operation.   
 
Research Approach 
The creation of the CRBF MOA provides a unique opportunity to apply the 
theoretical concepts identified above against the hypotheses presented in Chapter 8.   
The research methodology to test these hypotheses should consist of both inductive 
and deductive components.  The study‟s unit of analysis would be the organizations 
represented in the development of CRBF MOA; the unit of observation would be the 
organizational representatives to MOA development proceedings.  The elements of 
evidence to be obtained by interview will be collected using structured, open ended  
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Figure B-4. 
Theoretical Framework for Analysis of Governance Structuration   
 
 
 
interview questions will be administered as prescribed by Patton (2002).  In effect, the 
questions are used as an interview guide versus a rigidly followed script to allow 
fullest possible identification of participant values, predispositions, and 
beliefs.  Recommended participants are to be selected from the formally appointed 
representatives to the CRBF and close observers, such as the group facilitator and 
reporters who attended most CRBF meetings.  Basic themes to be explored in the 
interviews include: 
 What did the organization / institution that you represented expect the CRBF to 
accomplish? 
 What did the organization / institution that you represented think it would 
accomplish? 
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 What did you personally expect the CRBF to accomplish? 
 What did you personally think it would accomplish? 
 What did you / your organization believe to be the salient issues that needed to 
be addressed by the CRBF? 
 To what degree were you free to negotiate those issues within the CRBF? 
 To what degree were you restricted from negotiating issues within the CRBF? 
This effort will, by its nature, rely heavily on qualitative techniques.  As such, 
it faces challenges of validity and generalizability.  In qualitative research, validity has 
been described in terms of trustworthiness (Krefting, 1999) which will be assessed in 
the eye of the reader.  Several authors (Johnson, 1999; Maxwell, 2002; Krefting, 1999) 
offer frameworks for assessing qualitative work.  Others (Schofield, 2002; Lincoln and 
Guba, 2002) suggest validity is best achieved through careful selection of 
methodology.  Krefting (1999) offers a strategy for achieving validity that consists of 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  But, Maxwell (2002) 
suggests, the only elements of validity under the direct control of the researcher are 
descriptive validity and interpretive validity.  The upshot, according to Maxwell 
(2002), is that good qualitative work must be transparent in its articulation of author 
background, potential biases, and selected methodology.  It must also be relentless in 
its accurate representation of findings.  Authenticity and trustworthiness can be 
enhanced through transparency of method and use of direct quotation evidence to 
highlight key points.   The point is great care must be taken with study and instrument 
design to ensure the results are supportable and applicable. 
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Appendix Summary 
This study treats the series of governance systems experienced by the 
Northwest as regional social organizations that, consistent with Giddens (1984) and 
Sztompka (1991), have evolved over time within a context of the social and political 
environments of the day, salient regional issues, and institutional competition.  The 
deeply held beliefs and values underlying the cultures of those institutions (the 
worldviews), the sense of social identity shared by their members, and the principles 
held by their members influenced the positions and perceptions of institutional agents 
participating in the negotiations over those various systems.  Consequently, 
understanding the Columbia River Basin Forum and its predecessors requires an 
understanding of the values and worldviews of the regional institutions engaged in 
their creation.   
Neither structuration nor social becoming offers a clear empirical roadmap 
through which their assumptions and conclusions can be tested.  Indeed, Giddens‟ 
structuration theory has been critiqued as “inherently unempirical” (Gregson, 1989) 
with Giddens (1984 and 1989) appearing ambiguous (at best) on whether there is even 
a need for empirical study.    
A broader study of Columbia Basin governance should be premised on the 
grounds that individual decisions and perspectives, as played out in negotiations over 
the CRBF MOA, were shaped by the social identity and worldviews of the participants 
and the institutional culture of the organizations they represented.  The methodological 
challenge is how to make this connection.   
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